Publications

    The Chinese Economy: Sectors and Prospects

    Hao Chen, February 2024

    The future of the Chinese economy has sparked extensive discussions in both academia and the policy community. Opinions among China specialists are varied; some believe the economy is in the midst of a severe cyclical downturn, while others maintain that a sharp decline is unlikely. There are also those who believe it is still too early to tell.

    Indeed, China is experiencing a trend of economic slowdown. After joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, China’s economy grew at a dazzling pace; the average growth rate of China’s gross domestic product from 2001 to 2012 was 10.25%. However, since Xi Jinping came up in spring 2013, the average annual growth rate has dropped to 6.22%, plummeting to only 3% in 2022. So, which sectors have been most affected by this economic slowdown? And what are the future prospects of the Chinese economy?

    China's Most Generous: Examining Trends in Contemporary Chinese Philanthropy (2019 Update)

    Edward Cunningham and Yunxin Li, March 2023  

    This annual report highlights leading results from the most recent data analysis of the Harvard Kennedy School Ash Center’s China Philanthropy Project. Our team gathered 2019 data on over 20,000 donations from 7,166 foundations, 1,220 charitable organizations, and 2,597 universities in China. To focus on elite giving, we further refined our analysis to 4,434 donations of over RMB 1 million (US$0.14 million), given by 4,070 unique donors. The resulting report on top individual, corporate, and organizational philanthropy provides an important view into current trends among China’s major donors and recipients.

    In 2019, elite Chinese giving:

    1. was dominated by large organizations (most commonly corporations) rather than individuals,
    2. supported in large part central government policy priorities in the areas of education and poverty alleviation, and
    3. remained fairly local in scope.
    What to Expect from the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

    Tony Saich, September 2022

    On October 16, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will convene its 20th Party Congress. Held every five years, the Congress is a critical event. While nothing is seriously debated there, the symbolic function of the Congress is extremely important. It summarizes past achievements and sets out future objectives, all while displaying an outward power and unity. The Congress brings together just over 3,000 delegates from the provinces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and some central agencies for about a week to approve the report of the General Secretary, amendments to the party statutes, and any other documents placed before them. In theory, this sets in motion the appointment of a new leadership by electing candidates to the Central Committee (around 200 members and 150 alternates). In reality, the Congress approves the slate proposed by the outgoing Political Bureau (Politburo) and senior leader- ship. In turn, the Central Committee elects members of the Politburo, its Standing Committee, and the Secretariat, again based on lists provided after the Party leadership has finished haggling.

    This Congress will be special, as General Secretary Xi Jinping seeks a third term as political leader (either as general secretary or party chairman), confirms his place and ideas even more concretely within the party statutes, and seeks to appoint a leadership cohort drawn from his associates. Below, I provide my best guesstimates on his chances of reappointment, the leadership structure, and indications for future policy trends.

    Risk Mitigation and Creating Social Impact: Chinese Technology Companies in the United States

    Wenchi Yu, April 2021

    Chinese technology companies have become a topic of interest to not only the business and investor communities but also increasingly the national security and intelligence communities. Their scale and level of innovation present new possibilities and new competition as well as shape global trends. Yet the relationship of such companies to the Chinese government is often opaque. As a result, their growing integration into the global telecommunications system also casts doubt on their intentions and legitimacy.

    This paper reviews key US policy developments under the Trump administration, both broadly toward China and more narrowly relating to trade and technology, and examines the business strategy of four Chinese technology companies operating in the United States. It outlines the benefits of a corporate risk mitigation approach that incorporates social impact creation as an integral part of business and nonmarket strategy for Chinese technology companies, in the United States, and elsewhere. However, this paper also argues that corporate actions can only go so far. Because technology necessarily involves concerns of national security, the role of government—and government cooperation—is essential. It is only through a combination of more locally engaged corporate actions and internationally agreed upon sectoral rules and standard settings that we will be better able to improve transparency and trust-building across borders.

    Cunningham, Edward, and Philip Jordan. 2020. “Our Path to “New Normal” in Employment? Sobering Clues from China and Recovery Scores for U.S. Industry.” Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation. Read the full report Abstract

    Edward Cunningham and Philip Jordan, July 2020 

    The US National jobs reports for May and June exceeded expectations, and for many, this signaled that April was the true peak of American job losses and real recovery may be underway. Yet mounting evidence suggests that a job recovery is a long way off and that many jobs may not return.

    Part of the analytic disconnect stems from the fact that the global pandemic is a novel challenge for policymakers and analysts. We lack current, useful benchmarks for estimating the damage to the labor market, for estimating what recovery would look like, and for measuring an eventual recovery in jobs. Given this paucity of models, one place to look for patterns of potential recovery – particularly relating to consumption and mobility – is China.

    The Chinese economy is driven largely by consumption, urban job creation is driven by small and medium-sized companies, and China is several months ahead of the US in dealing with the pandemic’s economic and labor impact. An analysis of China’s experience may, therefore, offer important clues about our recovery here at home, and inform new models of thinking about American job recovery.

    Understanding CCP Resilience: Surveying Chinese Public Opinion Through Time
    Cunningham, Edward, Tony Saich, and Jessie Turiel. 2020. Understanding CCP Resilience: Surveying Chinese Public Opinion Through Time. Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation. Read the full report Abstract

    Edward Cunningham, Tony Saich, and Jessie Turiel, July 2020

    This policy brief reviews the findings of the longest-running independent effort to track Chinese citizen satisfaction of government performance. China today is the world’s second largest economy and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has ruled for some seventy years. Yet long-term, publicly-available, and nationally-representative surveys in mainland China are so rare that it is difficult to know how ordinary Chinese citizens feel about their government.

    We find that first, since the start of the survey in 2003, Chinese citizen satisfaction with government has increased virtually across the board. From the impact of broad national policies to the conduct of local town officials, Chinese citizens rate the government as more capable and effective than ever before. Interestingly, more marginalized groups in poorer, inland regions are actually comparatively more likely to report increases in satisfaction. Second, the attitudes of Chinese citizens appear to respond (both positively and negatively) to real changes in their material well-being, which suggests that support could be undermined by the twin challenges of declining economic growth and a deteriorating natural environment.

    While the CCP is seemingly under no imminent threat of popular upheaval, it cannot take the support of its people for granted. Although state censorship and propaganda are widespread, our survey reveals that citizen perceptions of governmental performance respond most to real, measurable changes in individuals’ material well-being. For government leaders, this is a double-edged sword, as citizens who have grown accustomed to increases in living standards will expect such improvements to continue, and citizens who praise government officials for effective policies may indeed blame them when such policy failures affect them or their family members directly. While our survey reinforces narratives of CCP resilience, our data also point to specific areas in which citizen satisfaction could decline in today’s era of slowing economic growth and continued environmental degradation.

    China's Most Generous: Examining Trends in Contemporary Chinese Philanthropy

    Edward Cunningham and Yunxin Li, March 2020 

    This annual report highlights leading results from the most recent data analysis of the Harvard Kennedy School Ash Center’s China Philanthropy Project, capturing over one-quarter of estimated national giving in China. We focus on elite giving by building an annual database of the top 100 individual donors, top 100 donors from corporations and other organizations, and also top university recipients of philanthropic giving.

    In 2018, such Chinese giving:

    • was dominated by large organizations (most commonly corporations) rather than individuals,  
    • supported in large part central government policy priorities in the area of poverty alleviation,
    • revealed an intriguing new philanthropy-driven educational model in the country, and
    • remained fairly local in scope.

    Read the report in Chinese 

    William H. Overholt, December 2019

    This is an extensively edited, updated and expanded text of a lecture given for the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at Harvard Kennedy School on October 31, 2019. From the origination of “one country, two systems” in 1979 to today, this paper analyzes the history of the unique relationship between Hong Kong, Beijing, and the world.

    Arthur N. Holcombe, June 2017

    In this paper Holcombe discusses lessons from successful poverty alleviation in Tibetan areas of China during 1998–2016. In the period between 1978 and 2015, the World Bank estimates that over 700 million people have been raised out of poverty based on a poverty line of $1.50 per capita. It also estimates that about 48 percent of residual poverty in China is located in ethnic minority areas where top-down macroeconomic policies to reduce poverty have been least effective and where strategies to target poor ethnic minority households with additional financial, technical, and other support were not successful in overcom- ing cultural and other barriers to greater income and food security.

    Anthony Saich & Paula D. Johnson, May 2017

    Values and Vision: Perspectives on Philanthropy in 21st Century China is an exploratory study of philanthropic giving among China’s very wealthy citizens. Recognizing the increasing number of successful entrepreneurs engaged in philanthropic activity in China, the study explores the economic and policy contexts in which this philanthropy is evolving; the philanthropic motivations, aspirations and priorities of some of the country’s most engaged philanthropists; and the challenges and opportunities for increasing philanthropic engagement and impact in China.

    Chinese (traditional) translation available here

    Chinese (simplified) translation available here 

    David Dapice, September 2012 

    Myanmar, long isolated from western economies due to its government, is one of the poorest and worst governed countries in the world. Ruled for many years by a reclusive dictator, senior general Than Shwe, it was dependent on China for diplomatic protection and arms. Trade and investment deals reflected its lack of alternatives. China’s “One nation, two oceans“ policy and Yunnan’s “Bridgehead“ strategy envisioned Myanmar providing access to the sea via gas and oil pipelines, deep sea ports, naval docking facilities and transport for Yunnan. Yunnan through its Southern Grid along with CPI (China Power International) saw Myanmar’s Kachin state as providing ample hydroelectric supplies for the landlocked Chinese province. Deals were signed under General Than Shwe without popular review or consultation with the Kachin whose state had most of the hydroelectric sites.