On April 15, 2013, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev placed and detonated two homemade bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three bystanders and injuring more than two hundred others. This case profiles the role the Massachusetts National Guard played in the complex, multi-agency response that unfolded in the minutes, hours, and days following the bombings, exploring how its soldiers and airmen helped support efforts on multiple fronts – from performing life-saving actions in the immediate aftermath of the attack to providing security on the region’s mass transit system and participating in the search for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev several days later. Read more about 2089.0 Defending the Homeland: The Massachusetts National Guard Responds to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings

“Ready in Advance” prompts students to consider what pre-event preparedness measures allowed officials in Tuscaloosa, AL to respond to a major tornado in 2011. Among other things, it illustrates the usefulness of group training initiatives, dedicated political leadership, and organizational frameworks that enable coordination across functions and sectors. The case demonstrates how taking advance action can lead to effective in-the-moment response, ultimately minimizing disaster risk and damage.

The case prompts students to consider what community recovery entails, especially vis-à-vis mental health issues and resiliency; the role of different institutions therein; and how to accommodate a range of public views on these topics. It also explores broader issues in local government, most notably coordination within and across agencies as well as between the public and private sectors.   

In July 2012, a gunman entered a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado and opened fire, killing 12 people, injuring 58 others, and traumatizing a community. Case A provides background on Aurora, describes the shooting, and recounts the emergency response that unfolded in its aftermath. The case then focuses more specifically on the role of the Aurora Public Schools, which under the leadership of Superintendent John L. Barry drew on years of emergency management training to play a substantial role in the response and the early community recovery efforts that took place over the ensuing days.

Throughout August 2010, flooding continued to spread across Pakistan, eventually overtaking large portions of the southern part of the country. With Case A providing background and recounting early response efforts, Case B explores how the crisis worsened and the response intensified throughout the second half of August, highlighting actions taken at the federal level, as well as by the United States and other foreign governments. It also explores efforts by the United Nations, on behalf of the international humanitarian community, to support flood relief.

In summer 2010, unusually intense monsoon rains in Pakistan triggered slow-moving floods that inundated a fifth of the country and displaced millions of people. This three-part case series describes how Pakistan’s government responded to the disaster and highlights the performance of the country’s nascent emergency management agency, the National Disaster Management Authority. It also explores the integration of international assistance, with a particular focus on aid from the international humanitarian community and the U.S. military. Case A provides background on the political situation in Pakistan at the time of the floods, as well as on the country’s water management policies and its newly formed emergency management system. It also recounts initial efforts to respond to the disaster.

By August 2011, one year after the apex of Pakistan’s 2010 flooding crisis, recovery efforts had progressed substantially – but many Pakistanis still needed assistance. This epilogue highlights key accomplishments as well as some of the remaining challenges associated with the recovery, while also exploring actions taken by the national government to address problems experienced during the 2010 response. It closes by exploring how Pakistan and the international humanitarian community dealt with yet another round of severe flooding that occurred in late summer 2011.

The December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean tsunami caused tremendous damage and suffering on several continents, with Indonesia’s Aceh Province (located on the far northern tip of Sumatra Island) experiencing the very worst. In the tsunami’s wake – and with offers of billions of dollars of aid coming from all corners of the globe – the Indonesian government faced the daunting task of implementing a massive recovery effort that could meet the expectations of donors and survivors alike. With this in mind, Indonesia’s president established in April 2005 a national-level, ad hoc agency – known by its acronym, BRR – to coordinate reconstruction activities across the province. This case examines some of the core challenges BRR’s leaders encountered as they moved to set up the agency and then proceeded to coordinate and execute a recovery process involving hundreds of domestic and international partner organizations and thousands of independent reconstruction projects.

As the second case in the two-part Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill case study, Case B builds upon Case A’s overview of the disaster and early response of the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in late April 2010, by focusing on the challenges the National Incident Command encountered as it sought to engage with state and local actors – an effort that would grow increasingly complicated as the crisis deepened throughout the spring and summer of 2010.

Following the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in late April 2010, the Obama administration organized a massive response operation to contain the enormous amount of oil spreading across the Gulf of Mexico. Attracting intense public attention and, eventually, widespread criticism, the response adhered to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, a federal law that the crisis would soon reveal was not well understood – or even accepted – by all relevant parties. This two-part case profiles the efforts of senior officials from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as they struggled to coordinate the actions of a myriad of actors, ranging from numerous federal partners (including key members of the Obama White House); the political leadership of the affected Gulf States and sub-state jurisdictions; and the private sector. Case A provides an overview of the disaster and early response; discusses the formation of the National Incident Command (NIC), which had responsibility for directing response activities; and explores the NIC’s efforts to coordinate the actions of various federal entities.

When Indiana State Health Commissioner Dr. Judy Monroe learned of the emergence of H1N1 (commonly referred to as “Swine Flu”) in late April 2009, she had to quickly figure out how to coordinate an effective response within her state’s highly balkanized public health system, in which more than 90 local health departments wielded considerable autonomy. Over the next several months, she would come to rely heavily on relationships she had worked hard to establish with local health officials upon becoming commissioner – but she and her senior advisors would also have to scramble to find new ways to communicate and coordinate with their local partners, who represented jurisdictions that varied considerably in terms of size, population demographics, resources, and public health capacity.

In late 2006, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg created the Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO). Born out of recommendations made by the Bloomberg appointed public-private Commission for Economic Opportunity, CEO was designed to be an innovations lab that would test anti-poverty programs by applying a results-based approach. With a budget of $100 million, CEO would closely monitor new programs and hold them accountable for producing measurable results. Uniquely, CEO would cut funding for programs that did not “make the grade.” Bloomberg named Veronica White the Executive Director of CEO. White had decades of experience working in executive positions in several New York City agencies but with CEO she had daunting tasks ahead. She would have to redefine how poverty was measured in the city, facilitate cross agency partnerships, and, most important, develop an effective and achievable evaluation system for all programs. This case traces the CEO team’s challenges in placing program evaluation at the core of their mission. 

On January 15, 2009, shortly after takeoff from LaGuardia Airport, US Airways Flight 1549 struck a flock of Canada geese. The geese were then sucked into the plane’s twin engines, causing total engine failure and the loss of power. Case A of this three-part series recounts how over the following four minutes, Flight 1549’s Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger and First Officer Jeffrey Skiles grappled with a variety of extreme challenges. Not only did they have to keep the plane under control, but they also had to quickly decide whether they could make an emergency landing at a nearby airport – or find another alternative to get the plane down safely in one of the most crowded regions in the country. Cases B and C then describe how, after the plane landed in the cold waters of the Hudson River, emergency responders from many agencies and private organizations – converging on the scene without a prior action plan for this type of emergency – scrambled to both rescue passengers and crew and stabilize the aircraft as it began to move downstream.

On January 15, 2009, shortly after takeoff from LaGuardia Airport, US Airways Flight 1549 struck a flock of Canada geese. The geese were then sucked into the plane’s twin engines, causing total engine failure and the loss of power. Case A of this three-part series recounts how over the following four minutes, Flight 1549’s Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger and First Officer Jeffrey Skiles grappled with a variety of extreme challenges. Not only did they have to keep the plane under control, but they also had to quickly decide whether they could make an emergency landing at a nearby airport – or find another alternative to get the plane down safely in one of the most crowded regions in the country. Cases B and C then describe how, after the plane landed in the cold waters of the Hudson River, emergency responders from many agencies and private organizations – converging on the scene without a prior action plan for this type of emergency – scrambled to both rescue passengers and crew and stabilize the aircraft as it began to move downstream.

This case prompts readers to consider the challenges of responding to a sudden crisis involving intense pressure and significant uncertainty. By highlighting the actions the captain and crew of US Airways Flight 1549 took following the failure of the plane’s two engines. Cases B and C illustrate the complexities of coordinating a multi-organizational response involving actors from a range of public agencies and private sector partners.

This case examines the steps political leaders, emergency management professionals, and public health officials in Louisiana and Texas took to improve their capacity to evacuate, shelter, and repatriate individuals with special needs following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, both of which revealed serious shortcomings when it came to the execution of evacuation processes. (In the context of evacuation management, the term “special needs“ generally refers to people requiring assistance to move out of harm’s way, including those with disabilities and medical conditions, the elderly, the institutionalized, the homebound, and people without direct access to their own means of transportation.) The case also looks at how well the states’ revised plans prepared them to manage yet another round of special needs evacuations when, in 2008, Hurricanes Gustav and Ike threatened the New Orleans and Houston metropolitan regions, respectively.

In late summer 2005, Hurricane Katrina – the worst natural disaster in U.S. history – wreaked havoc along the Gulf Coast, causing massive loss of life and property damage. (Just a few weeks later, Hurricane Rita would inflict even more suffering across much of the same area.) The evacuation of special needs individuals (e.g., the institutionalized, those with medical conditions, people without access to cars, etc.) from New Orleans was especially problematic, not simply in getting people out of the city but also in tracking who had gone where, letting their families know what had happened to them, caring for them properly in receiving areas, and repatriating them to their homes and loved ones. Illustrating the challenges health officials and political leaders faced in evacuating people with special needs during Katrina and Rita, this case prompts readers to consider the complexities of managing a critical public safety function as response plans are upended and capabilities overwhelmed.

The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic posed enormous challenges for state health departments across the U.S. This case focuses on the experience of Tennessee – which endured an intense resurgence of the disease in late summer and early fall 2009 – and explores, in particular, how state health officials, working with their partners from local government and the private sector, mobilized in advance of this second wave of the disease. An array of preparedness efforts, such as the development of mechanisms for distributing vaccine, ultimately put the state in a strong position to deal with H1N1 come fall, but health officials still experienced considerable difficulty in several areas, including vaccine delivery, communicating with an anxious public, and managing a surge of patients seeking care. The case highlights methods for preparing for a significant public health emergency and explores the difficulties of coordinating a response involving multiple jurisdictions and a mix of actors from both the public and private sectors.

In the spring of 2009, cases of a previously unidentified strain of influenza began appearing in Mexico and the southwestern U.S. Within just a few months, outbreaks of 2009 Novel H1N1 (commonly referred to as Swine Flu) were so widespread that the World Health Organization declared its first influenza pandemic in over 40 years. This case focuses on how state health officials in Texas, which experienced some of the first cases of H1N1, organized a response to the disease in the face of considerable uncertainty regarding its contagiousness, lethality, and geographic spread. The case prompts readers to contemplate the challenges of responding to a rapidly unfolding event featuring a high degree of novelty, the benefits and limitations of pre-event preparedness efforts, and the difficulties of coordinating an effective response among a number of partners and across multiple levels of government.

Wraparound Milwaukee: Milwaukee County, WI – 2009 Innovations Winner

This video is a companion piece to the “Bringing Kids Home: The Wraparound Milwaukee Model“ case study (case number 1927.0). The Wraparound Milwaukee program was created in 1995 by Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and provides services and treatment to severely emotionally and behaviorally disturbed children and youth. The program utilizes the “wraparound philosophy” to provide the children and youth it serves with a highly individualized, community, and strength-based approach to care. The delivery of services is facilitated by a Care Coordinator who works with the family to choose the right services from Wraparound Milwaukee’s network of individual providers and community based organizations. The program’s funding is pooled from several state and county agencies. Wraparound Milwaukee’s innovative approach to care has brought considerable savings to the county: $3,878 per month per child for Wraparound Milwaukee, versus $8,000-$10,000 per month per child that the county paid for residential placement. Wraparound Milwaukee has seen positive outcomes in the youth it serves after disenrollment in terms of clinical health indicators, as well as other indicators.