What Does Civil Society Want?
Broadening & Deepening Civil Society Involvement in Tunisia’s Open Government Reforms

Nada Zohdy
Master in Public Policy Candidate (2015)
Harvard University - Kennedy School of Government

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- Client: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – OECD Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Governance Programme
- Dr. Tarek Masoud (Advisor)
- Dr. Thomas Patterson (Seminar Leader)

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This Policy Analysis Exercise (PAE) reflects the views of the author and should not be viewed as representing the views of the PAE’s external client(s), nor those of Harvard University or any of its faculty.
Foreword
This assessment of Tunisian civil society and open government reforms was produced with a dual purpose: in partial fulfillment of the graduation requirement for the author, a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, and as a pro bono external consultancy assignment for the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Governance Programme, within the OECD Directorate for Public Governance and Territorial Development.

The OECD has been a forefront international actor in promoting the principles and practices of open government worldwide over the last decade. The MENA-OECD Governance Programme mandate is to promote good governance and policy reforms in MENA countries for the sake of helping stimulate growth and create climates more conducive for investment and economic development. This Programme has actively supported its counterparts in the Tunisia government since 2011 in promoting open government reforms.

Though a handful of Tunisian civil society organizations have been actively involved in developing Tunisia’s open government reforms (in collaboration with OECD), both the OECD and the Tunisian government recognize their engagement with Tunisian civil society on this issue has been limited to a small group. Ultimately, organizations focused on open government issues likely account for well under 3.5% of the overall Tunisian civil society landscape.¹

This report was commissioned – from an author with experience promoting capacity-building to impact public policies with civil society across North Africa – to understand the open government perceptions and priorities of a diverse cross-section of Tunisian associations. This was done to develop recommendations primarily for Tunisian government on how to strategically engage more diverse civil society organizations as partners in open government reform. Secondarily, this report seeks to provide guidance to OECD as an ongoing external supporter of Tunisia’s path toward open government. Finally, the report offers suggestions to civil society organizations themselves on how to increase their impact of Tunisia’s open government reforms. The report highlights the perspectives of diverse Tunisians civil society organizations on open government policies, general and Tunisia-specific open government reforms, and their assessment of the Tunisian government’s effectiveness at engaging civil society with the open government agenda to date. The OECD is an official multilateral partner to the primary vehicle for promoting open government on the international stage – the Open Government Partnership (OGP). As the OGP approaches its four year anniversary, participating countries and institutions are interested in better understanding the value generated by the OGP, how the OGP process might be improved, and what the prospects are for further advancing the open government agenda worldwide.

Acknowledgements
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¹ According to one study based on government data that was cited in the OECD Open Government Review of Tunisia, organizations focused on human rights and on citizenship combined account for about 10% of all CSOs established after the revolution and 3.5% of all CSOs. “Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia.” Foundation for the Future. January 2013. http://foundationforfuture.org/en/Portals/o/Publications/etude%20SC%20english%20version%20finale.pdf
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, she offers her genuine gratitude to all representatives of the 100+ Tunisian civil society organizations that participated in this study. All participants – those who responded to the online survey and particularly those who were interviewed – were generous with their time and insights. She particularly thanks those who helped distribute the survey through networks and who helped introduce her to other associations. This includes generous support from Mr. Badredine Abdelkafi, a current member of Tunisian parliament and former NCA vice president who was responsible for managing relations with civil society. She recognizes the hospitality, flexibility, patience and commitment of the many Tunisians who supported this work in some way, without whom this study could not be possible. She best understands the eagerness of so many Tunisians to help with this project as a reflection of a powerful national spirit that transcends social divisions and calls all Tunisians to play their part in fulfilling this small yet significant nation’s ambitious vision. She is inspired by their aspirations and inspirational efforts.

**List of Acronyms and Abbreviations**

- ATI – access to information
- CSO – civil society organization
- NGO – non-governmental organization
- NCA – National Constituent Assembly (Tunisian constitution drafting and legislative body, 2011-14)
- OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
- OG – Open Government
- OGP – Open Government Partnership
- UNDP – United Nations Development Program
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Executive Summary

This analysis was developed to advise the Tunisian government and external supporters on how to strategically engage a wide range of civil society organizations in open government (OG) reforms. It offers guidelines by examining the perceptions and priorities of diverse Tunisian civil society organizations (CSOs) on such reforms. By examining the civil society landscape in its diversity, it also offers recommendations for CSOs themselves to help broaden the horizon of associations involved in open government.

The global open government movement has been gaining momentum in recent years. Through the 2011 establishment of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and other initiatives, governments, civil society organizations, and multilateral actors are using the umbrella of open government to promote transparency, accountability, citizen engagement, and technology. This report makes an important contribution to understanding what active civil society participation in implementing open government reforms can look like, specifically in a young, newly established democracy.

Today, Tunisia is widely perceived as the only “successful” Arab Spring country. The Tunisian popular uprising that led to the ouster of long-time dictator Ben Ali on January 14, 2011 catalyzed protest movements across the region. While many of its neighbors face security vacuums, economic collapse, renewed repression and even civil war, Tunisia has managed to achieve notable political stability in a fairly short period of time.

Tunisians just completed its democratic transition phase in December 2014, with the earlier passage of a widely-praised constitution and the more recent free and fair election of the country’s new parliament and president. However, the road to democratic consolidation is long. Maintaining Tunisia’s current political stability will require addressing a number of challenges, including security and economic growth.

In the midst of competing priorities, why should the Tunisian government and supporters of a democratic Tunisia care about open government reforms? Simply put, because core principles of open government – transparency, accountability and citizen participation – lie at the heart of the popular demands that catalyzed Tunisia’s revolution, yet remain largely unfulfilled. Though other issues are undoubtedly important, perhaps the greatest threat to Tunisia’s fragile democracy is renewed popular discontent arising from the perception that the goals of the revolution have not been fulfilled. The demands of the revolution fundamentally focused on economic stagnation and social justice concerns. Open government increases good governance and, in doing so, provides a stronger foundation to pursue economic growth as well as equality and political inclusion. Thus, open government reforms that are developed, implemented, and monitored with broad civil society participation offer an important means by which some popular demands of the revolution can be met, thereby increasing democratic stability.

This analysis has been produced for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Middle East and North Africa Governance Programme, to help inform OECD’s existing support to Tunisia’s open government process. As an external partner that has been actively supporting the Tunisian government to promote open government since 2011, the OECD is uniquely positioned not only to improve its efforts to support his work, but also to help relay recommendations to both key sides of the process: Tunisian government and Tunisian civil society.

2 The OECD defines open government as, “the opening up of government processes, proceeding, documents and data for public scrutiny and involvement” (taken from the website of the MENA-OECD Governance Programme).
This report is based on quantitative and qualitative original data obtained from over 100 Tunisian civil society organizations who participated in this study. Through conducting nearly 30 in-depth interviews (mostly with Tunisian civil society leaders) and collecting over 80 nonprofit organizations’ responses to an online survey (with little overlap between the two groups), we obtained data that formed the basis of our findings. This mixed method approach offered both nuance and a larger picture to help develop a strategy toward further engaging civil society in open government reforms.

The diverse 100+ CSOs that participated in this research were categorized in several ways. We compared organizations based on several different traits and levels of analysis, but ultimately focused on comparing organizations across three types of traits: 1) capacity, 2) focus, and 3) open government affiliation.

These descriptive characteristics of CSOs were considered independent variables. Four primary variables related to open government were identified as dependent variables - OG principles, general OG reforms, Tunisia-specific OG reforms, and the Tunisian government’s OG effectiveness. The two sets of variables were compared in different ways to determine various different sub-sets of civil society perceive and prioritize open government differently.

**Key Findings**

Many CSOs feel that Tunisian government “talks the talk,” but they do not necessarily know if it will “walk the walk.” Most organizations expressed confidence that the Tunisian government has positively spoken the language of open government (including in the 20 commitments in Tunisia’s OGP Action Plan). Yet the great challenge lies in meaningfully implementing reforms during Tunisia’s new phase of democratic consolidation.

Organizations interviewed consistently underscored the centrality of “decentralizing” open government. There was an overwhelming consensus on the need to implement open government at the local level. Open government will likely only begin to truly take hold and have meaning in the lives of citizens when reforms are seen on the local level (particularly after Tunisia’s first post-revolution local elections are held in late 2015).

This report offers other valuable insights about the challenges and opportunities to Tunisia’s open government agenda, including the prospects of increasing CSO-CSO collaborations, and CSO-government collaborations.

**Key Recommendations for the OECD**

1. Invest in local government capacity and civil society capacity to raise both the “supply and demand” for open government reforms.
2. Support organizations (and individual leaders) who can help bridge the gap between government and civil society.
3. Provide platforms for civil society organizations to collaborate.

**Key Recommendations for the Tunisian Government**

1. Prioritize open government reforms specifically related to transparency and public integrity.
2. Be strategic when investing in technology-oriented open government initiatives.
3. Tailor engagement based on civil society capacity, sector and open government affiliation.
4. Significantly promote open government at the local level.

**Key Recommendations for Tunisian Civil Society Organizations**

1. Embrace civil society’s role as “civic educators” and help simplify and translate open government concepts to be meaningful to ordinary citizens.
2. Pursue projects that help CSOs develop credibility, trust, and respect of local government bodies by providing them value and useful services.

3. Invest in building organizational capacity through a number of means.

By adopting these recommendations and redoubling efforts to broaden and deepen civil society engagement on open government, all parties can take advantage of Tunisia’s strong existing constitutional and legal foundation for open government. Making open government more concrete and meaningful for ordinary citizens and putting open government reforms into action in various ways and at various levels will help all parties meaningfully contribute to strengthening Tunisia’s nascent democracy.
I. Chapter One: Introduction and Context

1. Introduction

*Tunisia has recently completed its democratic transition. Open government reforms – initiatives that increase transparency and participation in public decision making – offer an important way for Tunisia to address the demands of the revolution and make progress on key longer-term policy priorities.*

Tunisia’s Democratic Transition and Open Government Reforms

Tunisia recently celebrated the four year anniversary of the popular revolution that ousted long-time dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and catalyzed popular uprisings across the Arab world. By the eve of the revolution anniversary, widespread consensus existed that Tunisia has completed the phase of democratic transition with passage of its strong constitution and first free election of its parliament and president in November and December 2014. Worldwide, Tunisia has also been heralded as the best and only “successful” Arab Spring country to date. Some researchers and practitioners interviewed for this study argued that one of the most consequential differences between Tunisia and other Arab Spring countries is the nature of Tunisia’s civil society – including the pivotal role civil society organizations (or CSOs) played not only participating in early protests but legitimizing them, and later mediating between conflicting political factions to resolve political crises and ensure stability during the transition. While civil society certainly cannot be seen as the single factor that explains Tunisia’s contemporary democratic success (particularly because most Tunisian CSOs today were formed after the revolution), there is wide general consensus on the highly influential role civil society has and will continue to play in shaping Tunisian politics and society.

While Tunisia undoubtedly faces significant security and other challenges (most recently exemplified by March 2015 Bardo attacks in Tunis that killed over 20 people), the overall political stability and completion of the democratic transition phase with a strong constitution and free and fair elections are praiseworthy achievements. However, now that Tunisia has just entered the long, difficult period of democratic consolidation, in many ways one could argue that the hard part has just begun.

Now is the beginning of Tunisia’s long path to solidify its current achievements, make progress on latent essential issues such as transitional justice, equitable regional development, economic development and other longer-term goals of the revolution necessary to cement truly democratic institutions and culture. Certainly Tunisian officials face many pressing priorities, among them fundamental economic reforms and comprehensive efforts to promote security and stability. However, open government policies are vital for both economic improvement and stability. Transparency and measures to combat corruption and promote broader

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3 Throughout this assessment the terms civil society organizations (CSOs), nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and simply associations may be used interchangeably. All terms refer to independent organizations outside of the private and public sectors (i.e. business and government) and outside networks of kinship that are characterized by collective action on issues of public concern.

4 In a recent interview with the author, former Tunisian Prime Minister of the technocratic compromise government Mehdi Jomaa affirmed the key role civil society played in helping Tunisia reach political compromise. [http://hksjmepp.com/jmepp-interviews-tunisian-prime-minister-mehdi-jomaa/](http://hksjmepp.com/jmepp-interviews-tunisian-prime-minister-mehdi-jomaa/)

participation of the citizenry help alleviate the concerns of disenfranchised populations (diminishing the likelihood the resort to desperate or even violent measures), and unlock Tunisia’s true potential to attract meaningful, long-term foreign economic investments. Ultimately, corruption and citizen distrust of government were central catalysts for the revolution, so implementing open government reforms in collaboration with civil society during this new phase should be a top priority, as open government ultimately aims to transform interactions between citizens and their governments by opening access to information on wide-ranging government activities and by promoting citizens as partners in policymaking and creation of public value.

The Challenge
Over the last four years various government agencies have illustrated some willingness and made some progress in pursuing open government reforms. Numerous articles in Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution affirm the rights of citizens to participate in public decision making and the obligations of government to be transparent, accountable, inclusive and open. A September 2011 law significantly eased the process to establish a civil society association, while a May 2011 law for the first time firmly established the right of all Tunisian citizens to access information about the public administration. Such reforms helped Tunisia become admitted to the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in January 2014.

While significant constitutional and legal frameworks exist to enable open government policies and practices, the capacity for the Tunisian government to implement open government reforms and the sphere of participating civil society associations remain limited. In particular, two key research questions remain:

1) What do a wide variety of Tunisian civil society organizations know and think about open government reforms? What are diverse CSOs’ perceptions and priorities on open government?

2) And what opportunities exist to deepen government-civil society collaborations and to broaden the breadth and depth of civil society involvement in open government reforms? In particular, how can new CSOs (i.e. not only “open government-affiliated” CSOs) be engaged in the process?

Most Tunisians themselves and political scientists alike agree that the democratic transitional phase in Tunisia has just been completed, with the Dec 21, 2014 election of President Beji Caid Essebsi. As the country now enters the long and challenging phase of democratic consolidation – with both Nidaa Tounes and El-Nahda in power – what mechanisms can be established to promote effective dialogue and interactions between government and diverse citizen groups? This includes not only the minority of associations that speak the language of and are well-versed in ideas of open government (i.e. have an explicit focus on transparency, accountability, etc.), but even more importantly those that seek some relationship with government and influence on policy but have not been systemically engaged?

What is Open Government?
The concept of open government has existed for about a decade, and includes two basic types of activities: increasing citizen access to information about government activities (generally under the broad umbrella of “transparency”), and increasing citizen direct participation in decision making and policymaking processes (generally under the heading “participation”). The OECD defines open government as:

“the opening up of government processes, proceeding, documents and data for public scrutiny and involvement”
(taken from the website of the MENA-OECD Governance Programme).

The Open Government Partnership (OGP) was established as a voluntary multilateral body in 2011 to promote governments and citizens alike to adopt open government reforms. It elaborated on the open government
definition above by identifying four key open government principles as transparency, citizen participation, accountability, and technology and innovation. The OGP also highlights five main goals of open government reforms, including concrete outcomes such as improved public service delivery as well as less tangible though equally important outcomes such as improve integrity in the public sector.

The establishment of the OGP in 2011 helped legitimize the notion of open government and facilitate its spread across various regions worldwide. The OGP currently consists of 65 member (mostly developed) countries, all of whom have undergone the process of meeting the OGP eligibility criteria. Once admitted, each member country is responsible for publishing its own national “OGP Action Plan” every two years and implementing the commitments outlined in these plans. Its admittance to OGP helped lend post-revolution Tunisia new credibility on the international stage.

Why Open Government Matters for Tunisia

Core principles of open government – transparency, accountability, and citizen participation – represent the heart of the popular demands that catalyzed Tunisia’s revolution. Yet over four years since the ouster of Ben Ali, they remain largely unfulfilled. Perhaps the greatest threat to Tunisia’s fragile democracy is renewed popular discontent arising from the perception that the goals of the revolution have not been fulfilled. The demands of the revolution fundamentally focused on economic stagnation and social justice concerns. Open government increases good governance and, in doing so, provides a stronger foundation to pursue economic growth as well as equality and political inclusion. In this way, open government reforms that are developed, implemented, and monitored with broad civil society participation offer an important means by which some popular demands of the revolution can be met, thereby increasing democratic stability.

Why Civil Society Matters for Tunisia and for Open Government

First, civil society is an integral part of Tunisia’s recent political trajectory. Many argue that participation from key independent associations was ultimately decisive in the revolution’s success. Civil society intervention in also widely seen as one of the most important reasons Tunisia averted a derailed democratic transition after a major political crisis erupted summer of 2013 after the second assassination of a liberal politician. In short, civil society is in very large part a (if not the) reason for Tunisia’s democratic consolidation and present political stability.

Second, civil society involvement in open government reform is not only nice but necessary. A government meets the common definition of open only if it enables citizen participation. For their part, civil society organizations are by definition much closer to citizens than governments. As the primary vehicle by which citizens organize collectively, CSOs represent important aggregators of citizens’ opinions, concerns, demands, and suggestions. CSOs in underdeveloped and marginalized regions of Tunisia have a particularly important role to play in relaying citizen input to various levels of government. The historic blossoming of independent associations in the wake of the revolution also means that today Tunisia has a plethora of CSOs that help represent citizens in all their diversity.

Governments should not fear the prospect of increasing citizen voice and influence on public decision making; in fact, governments often derive many benefits from engaging in such activities. Consultations with civil society tend to help increase public trust in government. This helps officials implement their desired policies while in

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office more effectively by having greater popular support, and its helps them compete for re-election.7 In the end, government capacity is limited. The capacity of a new government arising from transformative political transition and facing elevated expectations from the citizenry is even more limited. For these reasons, it is imperative for the Tunisian government to both broaden (i.e. expand the network of CSOs it engages with) and deepen (i.e. increase the substance of its government-CSO collaborations) its civil society engagement for open government.

Overview of this Report
This report first outlines the context for Tunisian civil society engagement in the country’s open government agenda. In the next chapter, it overviews relevant literature and presents some conceptual frameworks and guiding insights on the various components of open government and the nature of government-civil society engagements. Chapter 3 presents the two-part, mixed methods research methodology used to address our research question. This is followed by Chapter 4, which gives a detailed analysis of the key findings from both the qualitative and quantitative data to inform the sketch we are creating about diverse CSOs’ perceptions and priorities of open government. Building upon these key findings, we offer actionable recommendations in Chapter 5 for the Tunisian government, civil society organizations, and the OECD to help strengthen civil society’s role in advancing open government. We then offer some concluding remarks.

2. Context

*Tunisian civil society has blossomed since the revolution, and now includes 17,000 associations focusing on a wide range of issues. In the last few years, Tunisia has made some notable strides in advancing an open government agenda – particularly through establishing a strong constitutional and legal foundation for open government. Yet many challenges remain. The Constituent Assembly’s “participatory constitution” offer valuable insights on government-civil society collaborations, including the role of external actors.*

Tunisia’s Civil Society Landscape
Prior to the January 17 Revolution, few active associations dotted the civil society landscape, due to restrictive practices of previous regimes. There were notable exceptions to this rule. One of the most well-known and historically influential CSOs, the UGTT labor union played a role facilitating relations between citizens and government prior to 2011, and remains active and highly politically influential today.8

Still, the civil society landscape was radically transformed by the revolution. Due to the sudden opening of civic space after decades of repression, the ouster of Ben Ali was accompanied by an explosion of civil society activity (the permissive post-revolution civil society environment was enshrined in Public Decree 88 of September 20119.) This reality was underscored by the fact that the vast majority of organizations surveyed and interviewed for this study were established in or after the year 2011.

A civil society assessment report by Foundation for the Future in 2013 estimated that approximately 17,000 Tunisian associations are currently in operation. They encompass activities as diverse as sports, advocacy,

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9 The Full Arabic text of Public Decree 88 (September 2011) can be found here: [http://www.legislation-securite.tn/ar/node/30452](http://www.legislation-securite.tn/ar/node/30452)
scientific and professional associations, the environment, research, development, and more. Some of the most commonly cited challenges facing Tunisia's civil society sector include:

- Limited access to funding
- Limited capacities and skills
- Politicization of some civil society organizations and/or divisions along ideological lines

This list of challenges facing civil society will be added to and elaborated upon in our Analysis chapter below.

It should be noted that there are some notable limitations to citizen representation in civil society. A recent UNDP study entitled “Empowered Youth, Sustainable Futures” found that only 6.1% of Tunisian youth participate in civil society (and only 2.7% participate in political parties). Nonetheless, civil society organizations in Tunisia continue to represent one of (if not the) primary vehicle and aggregator of collective voice of citizens and a bridge between citizens and policymakers. This is bolstered by the historical influence of select CSOs prior to the revolution, the instrumental role CSOs played in organizing and fulfilling the revolution, and the role civil society most recently played in helping resolve the greatest political crisis that threatened the country’s democratic transition in the summer of 2013.

**Tunisia’s Open Government Efforts to Date**

Since the January 14th Revolution, Tunisian officials have taken some notable strides to promote transparency and citizen participation in policymaking. At the same time, many “bottom-up” initiatives of citizens demanding greater openness and participation have emerged in the last four years, along with other initiatives stimulated (or at least significantly supported) by external, non-Tunisian actors.

The OpenGov.Tn Task Force was established in November 2011 as one of Tunisia’s earliest open government efforts. This independent initiative was led by many public officials, including Mabrouka M’barek, an NCA representative for Tunisians abroad.

A number of public consultations were conducted through the constitution drafting process. At the same time, numerous civil society organizations – focused on everything from women’s rights and transparency to environmental issues and government monitoring – played an integral role in developing key articles in the new constitution. Some of the resulting achievements are articles that emphasize the rights of women, establish a framework for Tunisian decentralization, and enshrine principles of transparency, anti-corruption and good governance.

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In addition, the Tunisian government conducted a self-assessment of the legal, economic and regulatory frameworks and practices related to combating corruption and promoting integrity in the public sector. Known as the “Integrity Scan of Tunisia,” the OECD supported the government in this effort and published a final report about the findings in June 2013. Though many of the 13 issues examined in the Integrity Scan are more technical in nature (reforming public procurement, tax laws, and competition policies, etc.), two points from the Integrity Scan relevant to this report include recommendations about participatory governance and about lobbying.

Furthermore, the Finance Ministry published Tunisia’s first-ever Citizen Budget in late 2013. This was the work of a Joint Committee on Budget Transparency comprised of government representatives and civil society leaders. The Committee utilized feedback from a survey of 100 civil society organizations about budgetary priorities conducted by the International Budget Partnership (IBP).14

The government has also been pursuing several projects to integrate technology to enhance citizen participation. This includes a website to collect public input on various issues (www.consultations-publiques.tn). For example, this website compiled public opinions to inform a Code of Conduct for civil servants adopted by the Council of Ministers. 15


These efforts culminated with Tunisia’s admittance into the international Open Government Partnership in January 2014. An OGP Steering Committee that was created in April 2013 to guide Tunisia’s open government work then became responsible for drafting Tunisia’s first OGP Action Plan (as per OGP membership regulations). The Secretariat of State for Governance and Civil Service within the Tunisian government’s Prime Minister’s Office was the lead government party on the committee, though it also included representatives from other government agencies including the Finance and Interior Ministries. The E-Government Unit with this Secretariat has played a key role in the process, while OpenGov.Tn and a representative from the NCA have continued to stay involved in the process.

This process was initiated began on 7 March 2014. Then in May it was formally launched, at which point a few dozen CSOs were invited by the Secretariat to participate in a roundtable discussion. Then the government representatives as that the civil society activists in attendance nominate three organizations to serve as their representatives. Some of the participating organizations interviewed here felt it was reasonable for the government to request civil society to decide amongst itself three representatives, while others were extremely frustrated with this process, citing lack of clarity from the government on any criteria and exact responsibilities. (CSO concerns with the OGP Action Plan drafting will be discussed at length in Chapter Four. In the end, the final committee included 10 members – three civil society representatives, three government representatives, one business representative and one academic.

After conducting some online and offline public consultations, the Secretariat of State for Governance and Civil Service (formerly the Ministry for Governance) published the final Tunisian OGP Action Plan for 2014-16 in September 2014. This document outlines 20 specific commitments the government will pursue to promote open government principles across policy areas and several administrative bodies. All 20 commitments correspond to four thematic areas:

The Tunisian Citizen budget can be found here: http://www.finances.gov.tn/images/le_budget_citoyensmallpdf.com.pdf
15 “Civic Engagement in Tunisia,” OECD Open Government Review.
Four Themes in Tunisia’s OGP Action Plan

- Strengthening integrity in the public sector (including fighting corruption and promoting democracy through a transparent government)
- Improving public service delivery (including strengthening the participatory approach and instilling open government principles within the public sector)
- Improving transparency in the financial field and in the field of public procurement
- Devoting transparency in the area of natural resources management, infrastructure projects and environment protection

All thematic areas included language that said reforms would be pursued “in consultation with civil society.” However, little specific guidance exists on how various government entities might most effectively and efficiently engage civil society organizations in policy formation.

Finally, in some instances activity around open government reforms have been driven by civil society actors themselves. For example, in 2013 CSO Touensa, in collaboration with the Association for Administrative Sciences and the Open Government Tunisia Task Force, launched Marsoum 41 as an online database to direct public requests for information directly to relevant government entities. (Unfortunately the site is no longer in operation). The prominent government monitoring organization Al-Bawsala played an instrumental role in instilling open government practices with parliament. They monitored and published about the activities of the NCA before it had the capacity (or interest) to do so itself. Civil society representatives on the Steering Committee (including Al-Bawsala) proposed many of the final commitments in the Action Plan.

“A Participatory Constitution” - Lessons from the NCA’s Civil Society Engagement

In the last few years, the single issue most influence by government-civil society dialogue was Tunisia’s new constitution. Three formal rounds of public consultations were held throughout the constitution drafting process (in August 2012, December 2012 - February 2013, and January 2014). In addition, a wide variety of CSOs directly contributed articles to the final draft. Citizen and civil society input on the draft constitution was primarily channeled through the six thematic constitutional drafting committees. The vice president of the NCA who was responsible for relations with civil society created a working group of five other parliamentarians representing all major political affiliations to help lead this process and ensure Tunisia’s final constitution was truly participatory. The budget that helped support the NCA’s outreach activities was provided by UNDP.

Most of the CSOs interviewed for this report had a favorable or highly favorable opinion of the NCA’s efforts to solicit public and civil society input and participation during the constitution drafting process. As one interviewee noted, “the NCA should be commended for being very open to civil society throughout the constitution drafting process, they did not draft behind closed doors.”

In total, these formal NCA-public consultations involved 80 members of the Assembly, more than 5,000 citizens, and about 300 civil society organizations. They were supplemented by significant interactions and dialogues between CSOs and the separate constitutional committees. As the drafts developed and greater public feedback

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16 http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/07/03/new-website-promotes-freedom-of-information/#sthash.27tyP1e8.dpuf
17 Author interview with former NCA vice president responsible for relations with civil society. Tunis, Tunisia. January 2015.
19 Author interview with Tunisian League of Women Voters representative. Tunis, Tunisia January 2015.
was incorporated, there was an increasing adoption of international standards, particularly around human rights (for example Article 46 on gender rights and Article 49 on limitations on freedoms). The positive experience that government officials and citizens (including several CSOs included in this study) had in the public consultations during the constitution process undoubtedly creates a strong foundation for continued citizen-government engagements to implement open government reforms. Public consultations around the constitution proved both the government capacity to hold public consultations broad in scope (addressing numerous constitutional issues) and scale and citizen interest in such opportunities.

The public consultations on the constitution were undoubtedly aided by the general sense of urgency and historical importance of such efforts. Government and civil society representatives seeking to organize similar events to obtain citizen input on open government reforms should attempt to mimic this sense of urgency by moving open government concepts from the abstract to the concrete, and linking key concepts with concrete reforms that could be seen in the lives of ordinary citizens.

In sum, what are some lessons the NCA’s experience incorporating public input into the constitution might offer to government efforts to engage civil society in open government?

- Create a sense of urgency and importance around the issue at hand.
- Link abstract concepts to concrete realities in the lives of ordinary citizens.
- Actively solicit participation from organizations that represent Tunisia’s full political and ideological spectrum - this can be more easily achieved when the government officials leading the public engagement process reflect this diversity themselves.

Role of External Supporters of Tunisian Open Government

A final contextual observation should be made: external actors have and likely will continue to influence Tunisia’s political trajectory in some significant ways. The key role UNDP played in supporting the NCA’s public consultation process (both with funding and with technical training for parliamentarians) was just noted. Many people also believe that the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s refusal to provide Tunisia economic support during a dire time was a critical pressure point that helped persuade the ruling Ennahda to cede its power during the 2013 political crisis.

The influence of outside actors could be perceived positively or negatively depending on the audience (a few organizations interviewed seemed conflicted by their inability to criticize outside intervention because of their reliance on foreign funding). But the relevant point here is that there is already precedent for this phenomenon. In its own recent work, the OECD has played a key role in supporting Tunisia’s endeavors to produce its OGP Action Plan, for example. This illustrates the continued potential for external actors to play an influential role in Tunisia. As such, efforts should be strategically targeted to support key overarching priorities of the country of growth and stability.

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http://participedia.net/en/cases/civic-engagement-tunisias-constitutional-drafting
II. Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework & Literature Review

In this chapter we summarize several relevant points from the literature to clarify and deepen the concept of open government, and to help conceptualize the important notion of government-civil society relations.

Guiding Questions for Literature Review:

- What are some ways in which open government creates public value and benefits?
- What lessons might be gleaned from a comparative case study of open government?
- What are good practices for governments to engage citizens and civil society organizations to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate policies?
- What are different ways to conceive of the relationship between governments and citizens/civil society organizations?
- What are specific mechanisms and tools that facilitate government-citizen dialogue and cooperation (including trust/confidence building mechanisms)?

1. Clarifying the Concept of Open Government

There are different conceptual framings of open government, but access to information tends to be seen as the foundational cornerstone for other open government priorities, including citizen participation. Open government can offer many benefits, including tangible improvements in service delivery and other outcomes. A brief examination of open government in the United States offers a case study comparison.

Terminology

Like many other new concepts in policy and social science, open government in many ways has become a buzz word, with many audiences using the term in varying ways. Here we provide more clarity of our open government concept, building upon the definition given in the last chapter. The figures below present two markedly different ways to frame open government – either as the product of transparency, collaboration and participation (a definition that seems more common in the United States), or as a product of open data, open decisions and open services. The left-hand figure focuses more on the driving principles of open government, while the other emphasizes more the resulting outcomes.
FIGURE 1: Different Conceptual Framings of Open Government

One comprehensive review of U.S.-based open government reforms in 2010 described an open government as one with many features, a government which, “opens its doors to the world; co-innovates with everyone, especially citizens; shares resources that were previously closely guarded; harnesses the power of mass collaboration; drives transparency throughout its operations; and behaves not as an isolated department or jurisdiction, but as something new—a truly integrated and networked organization.”

In addition, we note here that the three basic building blocks to our definition of open government - transparency, accountability and citizen participation - are all conceptual cousins. Transparency and citizen participation fall clearly on the two ends of the information-participation spectrum of open government. Meanwhile, accountability can be seen as a concept that helps bridge these other components: government must disclose enough information about itself to enable it to be held to account, while citizens must also take action to hold government’s accountability. The idea of social accountability elaborates on this approach. “Social accountability can be defined as an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e., in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations who participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability. Mechanisms of social accountability can be initiated and supported by the state, citizens or both, but very often they are demand-driven and operate from the bottom-up.” In this way, the notion of social accountability is closely related to the idea of citizen participation in open government.

The framework of supply and demand can also be useful to further conceive of open government. The demand for openness from public official stems from citizen action, while the supply of open government comes from government disclosure of information and government opening up processes for public participation.

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Access to Information as the Cornerstone of Open Government

While there is clearly significant variation in the precise ways different audiences define open government, a general point of consensus exists: opening access to information (ATI) about the government’s doings is a foundational cornerstone that helps activate other aspects of open government practice. For this reason it is valuable to briefly focus on some of the common challenges to practically implementing ATI.

**Common Barriers to Successful Implementation of Access to Information**:25:

- Request for information is denied
- Request is delayed
- Not all information requested is provided
- Information is not provided in the citizen’s preferred or requested format
- Limits are placed on ability to use, access, and/or distribute the information

Open Government Logic Model and Benefits

The processes by which open government generates public value can be complicated, by the benefits can be significant. The OECD explains the implicit logic model behind open government reforms in a short report describing the analytical framework for producing OECD Open Government Reviews:

“A government is open when it is transparent, accountable, engaging and integer (principles), which is likely to lead to better services and policies (intermediate outcomes), higher trust in government, social well-being, quality of democracy and economic growth (final outcomes) through specific policy instruments and practices (catalysts) driving change and innovation processes.”26

**FIGURE 2: OECD Open Government Reviews – Analytical Framework**

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Other scholars have elaborated on some of the key benefits that manifest themselves from open government reforms. In particular, transparency and accountability initiatives have been shown to contribute the five important outcomes in certain conditions:

- Better budget utilization
- Improved service delivery
- Greater state responsiveness to citizens’ needs
- Creation of spaces for citizen engagement
- Empowerment of local voices.27

The body of overall literature about the impacts of open government is limited, given the newness of the concept. Still, findings like this are encouraging. They suggest that the abstract concepts that constitute open government in fact can lead to real, tangible (and intangible) improvements in quality of life. This was an essential theme that surfaced in our data and will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

**Building on the OECD Open Government Review of Tunisia**

The OECD recently concluded its Open Government Review of Tunisia – using the analytical framework outlined above. This comprehensive assessment of the state of open government in Tunisia analyzed the legal and policy frameworks for open government, in addition to outlining the state of civil society and some operational challenges facing government officials as well as civil society activists seeking to promote open government. The review developed a number of important findings and highlighted key needs, including:

- The need to develop a strategic framework and identify more multi-channel approaches to engage a wider variety of civil society organizations (given that percentage of CSOs directly focused on open government issues is so miniscule compared to civil society as a whole)
- Strengthen the ability for civil society organizations to network, collaborate with one another and collectively liaise with the government, helping them leverage their collective impact

This reports builds upon the OECD Open Government Review primarily by addressing this first recommendation. By categorizing the 100+ civil society respondents in many different ways (by size, by issue, by focus, by open government familiarity, etc.) and comparing how different groups prioritize open government issues differently, it provides guidance on how to strategically engage different types of CSOs on different types of open government reforms. It also offers a brief commentary on the state of collaboration and possibility of promoting further collaboration amongst diverse CSOs in the Analysis chapter.

**A Comparative Snapshot: The American Experience with Open Government**

U.S. President Barak Obama issued a memorandum on transparency and open government on his first day in office in January 2009, setting a tone to prioritize open government for years to come. The U.S. was the first country to issue a National Open Government Action Plan in 2011, positioning itself as a global leader in transparency, accountability and participation. At the local, state and federal levels, more actors in and outside government have embraced this concept in recent years.

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During the Obama administration, the federal government has taken several steps to promote open government. This includes Data.Gov (the first federal open government data set in the world), and We the People (Petitions.WhiteHouse.Gov), the platform that gives Americans a direct line to voice their concerns to the President via online petitions. In two years, more than 10 million users produced over 270,000 petitions on a wide variety of topics, which received a video response from the President, and unlocking cell phones for use across provider networks, which led directly to policy action. 28

At the same time, American cities like Boston, Chicago and New York have increasingly embraced the role of laboratories for innovation through the programs of innovation departments/units and other activities. A growing body of literature addresses the ways in which both government and citizens (and other outside actors) can promote transparency, collaboration (within government across department silos or “stovepipes,” and across sectors), and participation. Much of the U.S.-centric literature focuses heavily on the role of technology in catalyzing such reforms.

A variety of American civil society organizations have actively engaged in processes to pressure American federal and local governments to implement open government reforms. A prime example comes from the Civil Society Report on Implementation of the First US National Action Plan, published in March 2013 by a coalition of American civil society organizations led by the primary convener of CSOs to monitor America’s Open Government Action Plans, OpeningTheGovernment.Org. This Civil Society Report evaluated the government’s open government reform efforts for this report on the basis of four criteria:

1. Completion of commitments (in Action Plan)
2. Efforts to collaborate with civil society organizations on the initiative
3. Responsiveness of the government to recommendations made by civil society organizations
4. Meaningfulness and sustainability of the government’s efforts

This American civil society report and the evaluation criteria used could represent a model for Tunisian civil society organizations to consider as they begin to monitor and evaluate the Tunisian government’s efforts to implement the 20 commitments outlined in its recently published First National OGP Action Plan.

Modernizing Government and Reforming Civil Service and Public Administration

Though somewhat less central than transparency or accountability, the notion of internal reforms to government are also often seen as important elements to open government reform. This includes but is not limited to issues that address bureaucratic processes, promote openness and information exchange between different (often siloed) government departments and units, and changes to the culture, code of conduct, and/or expectations of the civil service/public employees. 30


30 These reforms are discussed at length in “Chapter 8 – Modernising Government” of the book, Making Reforms Happen: Lessons from OECD Countries. 2010.
2. Conceptualizing Government-Civil Society Relations

Two key elements to conceptualize government-civil society relations are level of engagement (comprised of both the frequency and depth of engagement), and stage of participation in the policy formation process.

We begin our conceptualization of government-civil society relations by outlining different levels of engagement. As information is the cornerstone component of the notion of open government, so too information represents the foundation of deepening government-civil society relations. In other words, “information is at the basis of strengthening government-citizen relations. It is a condition for further activities of consultation and active participation to work.”

The more involved both parties become in the exchange, and the more frequent the interaction, the deeper the level of engagement. The figure below illustrates three basic levels of engagement.

**FIGURE 3: Three levels of Citizen-Government Engagement**

By comparing the different levels of government-citizen engagement across the two dimensions of frequency and depth of engagements, we translate the framework illustrated in the pyramid above along a two by two matrix.

**TABLE 1: Frequency vs. Depth of Government Engagement with Civil Society**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depth</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One-Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shallower</strong></td>
<td>Information (basic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(One Way Information Exchange)</td>
<td>Information (more complex)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deeper</strong></td>
<td>Consultation (limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Two-Way Exchange)</td>
<td>Deliberation/Participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, we add to this conceptualizing by defining five different stages in the policy formation process. This is relevant to government-civil society relations because it helps us conceive of how the stage of policy formation can and should impact the nature of civil-society government engagement. The most effective tools to engage citizens in generating ideas for new policies (such as a website to collect citizen suggestions to a particular issue or problem), for example, are likely not the most appropriate tools for monitoring or evaluating policy formation.

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31 Citizens as Partners OECD Handbook.
One way to distinguish the stages of the policy formation process is as “upstream” or “downstream.” The former refer to the earliest stages of policy formation during which ideas and considered and the actual policies are designed, while the latter “downstream” stages are periods in which policies are put into action and then assessed. An important finding from the literature is that many transparency and accountability initiatives focus on citizens’ “downstream” role in implementing policies that were formulated without their involvement. Citizens who were engaged further “upstream” in formulating the policies are more likely to engage in monitoring them; and engagement in policy formulation can arguably increase accountability more than ex post monitoring.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{33} Gaventa and McGee.
III. Chapter Three: Research Design and Methodology

1. Methodological Overview

Data for this study was obtained through qualitative and quantitative means (in-depth interviews and an electronic survey). Over 100 associations in total participated. Participants were categorized along three key dimensions (capacity, focus, and OG-affiliation). The open government perceptions and priorities of various sub-sets of this civil society sample were examined, and the unique city of Sfax offered regional diversity.

The findings in this analysis come from two primary sources:

1. Qualitative data obtained through nearly 30 in-person, in-depth interviews between the researcher and the interviewees during a 10-day research visit to (Tunis and Sfax in January 2015)

2. Quantitative data obtained from a variety of Tunisian CSOs that responded to an electronic survey (distributed in January and February 2015). The majority of interviews were conducted in Arabic (with the remainder in English), and the survey was fully bilingual (Arabic and English).

There was little overlap between the 82 organizations that responded to the quantitative research survey and the 29 organizations interviewed. Therefore, over 100 total civil society organizations participated in this study.

In analyzing the data obtained through these mixed methods, two types of variables were identified. A list of independent variables was created to include several descriptive characteristics of the organizations, while a list of dependent variables was created to include different types of open government indicators.

**TABLE 2: Summary of Key Independent and Dependent Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Traits (Independent Variables)</th>
<th>Open Government Indicators (Dependent Variables)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Focus – including primary sector and primary issue area</td>
<td>2. General Open Government Reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Open government affiliation – an organization is either affiliated or unaffiliated</td>
<td>3. Tunisia-Specific OG Reforms (i.e. 4 categories in Tunisia’s OGP Action Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Tunisia OG Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Qualitative Method (Design, Process, Analysis)**

A total of 29 in-depth interviews were conducted for this analysis. All but one were conducted in person during a field visit to Tunis and Sfax in January 2015. Two basic types of individuals interviewed for this assessment - civil society practitioners and policy experts. Civil society practitioners account for the majority (73%) of interviews, given the focus of this research inquiry on understanding civil society perceptions about open government, while the remainder came from experts in Tunisian political affairs, including political party representatives, government officials, and representatives of international organizations.

Of the total number of civil society practitioner interviews, eight were conducted with open government-affiliated organizations, and the remaining 62% were with non-open government-affiliated CSOs.
Snowball sampling methodology was partially used to secure participants for the qualitative interviews.

The interview process was semi-structured. All CSOs were asked a series of questions related to four themes:

1) Descriptive background on organization
2) Outreach/partnerships/collaborations
3) Organization interaction with government
4) Perceptions of open government

At the same time, some flexibility in the interview question protocol was maintained to better reveal interviewees underlying understandings and perceptions of open government.

Detailed notes of all interviews were produced then reviewed to highlight key terms and concepts. Then, we compared responses across interviewees to identify overarching and/or significant trends. By examining similarities and differences across interviews – including by coding all interviews by key content, terms and concepts – we interpreted the overall qualitative findings.

**Quantitative Method (Design, Process, Analysis)**

Upon completing the interviews, a research survey was developed based on preliminary background research and was informed by preliminary findings from the interviews. The survey included two basic components:

1) A section with background questions on the nature and activities of the association
2) A section asking associations' for their opinions of open government priorities and efforts to date.

The first section was comprised of two types of questions – those that focused on issues of capacity, and those that focused on issues related to the organization’s mission and focus. The second section asked for respondents’ assessments of four open government indicators: OG principles, general OG reforms, Tunisia-specific OG reforms, and a rating of the government’s OG effectiveness. This is visualized below.

Most survey responses were made using a five-point Likert scale, in order to capture more gradations and nuance in responses – both about the nature of CSOs’ activities about their perceptions of open government reforms. Rather than asking each association to check one box that best describes their mission, for example, respondents were given a number of different questions to help describe their organization’s work. Response
options almost always were a 1-5 scale, with 1 representing an activity they do not do at all, and 5 representing an activity that is the most important thing they do. See the Appendices to view the full research survey.

**FIGURE 6: Survey Design Part One – Organizational Backgrounds and Profiles**

**FIGURE 7: Survey Design Part Two - Open Government Perceptions and Priorities**
The survey was distributed to all CSOs that were interviewed, who were asked to complete the questionnaire on behalf of their own association but also distribute it to other associations in their networks. However, in the end, the vast majority of survey responses came from organizations that were not interviewed. Most interviewees instead helped distribute the survey to other associations.

A few large CSO networks with hundreds of members – including the Tunisian Network of Associations for Citizenship and Development (La Toile des Associations pour le Civisme et le Développement, or TACID), and the Sfax Associations Forum – were also key in distributing the survey to diverse CSOs.

A total of 82 associations responded to the questionnaire.

The qualitative survey response data was analyzed through several steps. First, descriptive statistical analyses were performed to determine an overarching picture. Second, we performed a correlation analysis to identify basic trends. In addition, a multivariate regression analysis was performed specifically to examine the “open government effectiveness” dependent variable. Finally, and most importantly, the majority of our findings were determined by performing dozens of cross-tabulation analyses (using the Pivot Table function in Excel) that compared the several independent variables with the several dependent variables in many different ways, which will be explained in the next section.

The multivariate regression analysis was structured to identify if any correlations existed the outcome of perceived effectiveness of open government efforts to date (Y variable) with the following independent variables:

1) whether or not an association was considered open government-affiliated
2) whether the organization has at least one staff member or was all volunteer (capacity)
3) by the organization’s primary sector (Service Delivery, Research, Networking, Watchdog/Government Monitoring, and/or Advocacy)
4) by the organization’s primary issue area (Economic Development, Civic Engagement, Environment, Empowering Marginalized Groups, and/or Culture)

These independent variables were transformed into dummy or bivariate variables. This means all organizations were coded as either being in one group or the other (either an organization was or was not open government affiliated, was or was not all-volunteer, etc.).

In other words, the multivariate regression was represented with this function:

\[ OG_{\text{effectiveness}} = B_0 + B_1 \times OG_{\text{affiliate}} + B_2 \times AllVolunteer + B_3 \times Service + B_4 \times Research + B_5 \times Networking + B_6 \times EconDev + B_7 \times CivicEngage + B_8 \times Environ + B_9 \times MarginalizedGroups + B_{10} \times Culture + \text{error} \]

We focused on the B1 coefficient result when interpreting this regression. By doing so, we can conclude in the Analysis chapter later that holding constant several other variables related to CSO capacity, sector, issue area, and open government affiliation, we find that being open government-affiliated was associated with a -0.68 decrease in open government effectiveness rating compared to non OG-affiliated organizations.

Characterizing and Categorizing Respondents

Perhaps the most important step in the research process commenced after all qualitative and quantitative data was obtained: characterizing and categorizing the wide variety of CSO respondents in numerous ways.

At the highest level, all survey respondents were characterized along three basic dimensions. Within each of these categories, however, we further sub-divided organizations in several ways. More specifically, all surveyed organizations were characterized and coded in the following ways.
1) Capacity
   a. Staff Size – All Volunteer or Not
   b. Budget Size – Small, Medium, or Large
   c. Age of organization
   d. Geographic reach (across 6 regions)
      i. Total Number of Regions of Geographic Presence
      ii. “Small-scale” (present in 1-3 regions) vs. “Large-scale” (in 4-6 regions)

2) Focus
   a. By Sector
      i. Each of 5 Sectors 34
         1. Service Delivery
         2. Research
         3. Networking
         4. Government Monitoring (watchdog organizations)
         5. Advocacy
      ii. Total Number of Primary Sectors
   b. By Issue Area
      i. Each of 5 Issue Areas
         1. Economic Development
         2. Civic Engagement
         3. Environment
         4. Empowerment of Marginalized Groups (including women and youth)
         5. Culture
      ii. Total Number of Primary Issue Areas

3) Open Government Affiliation

Finally, there were two additional descriptive traits that we briefly considered in our analysis: whether or not a CSO had a religious background35, and whether or not it received funding from the UNDP. Neither of these variables were initially considered during the research design phase, but because they were voluntarily raised by a fair number of CSOs themselves in interviews, we briefly considered how these traits might affect an association’s perceptions and priorities related to open government.

Clarification of Research Terms
- “Interviewees vs. Respondents” - Given that our findings rely on both qualitative and quantitative data, we use the term “interviewees” to connote the group of CSOs that participated in in-depth interviews through our qualitative method. Meanwhile “respondents” refers to the group of CSOs that participated in the online survey through our quantitative method. This distinction can be made because there was very little overlap of CSOs between these two groups. This distinction is made to clarify the source of the finding.

34 These five sectors and five issue areas were created in an attempt to best capture the anticipated diversity of survey respondents in a way that would be most helpful to address the research question. This categorization of issues and sectors was based both upon preliminary findings from the interviews as well as a brief review of existing literature on Tunisian civil society.
35 Namely, some organizations described themselves as having an “Islamic reference” and/or being rooted in religious values, though their actual programs do not explicitly focus on any religious issues. This represents an interesting analog with the nature of Tunisia’s formerly predominant political party, Ennahda. Ennahda is also often described by its leaders and observers alike as having an “Islamic reference” (مرجعية إسلامية).
• “Sector vs. Issue Area:” It is important to clarify that for purposes of this analysis the term “sector” henceforth refers to the core activities of the organization (for example, distinguishing between service providers and advocacy organizations, among others), while the term “issue area” refers to the core mission or issue of the organization (for example, distinguishing between economic development, environment, empowering marginalized groups like women and youth, etc.).

• Open Government-Affiliated/Familiar or Unaffiliated: A small, select number of Tunisian civil society organizations have been engaged with the country’s open government process from the beginning. Therefore, in addition to categorizing organizations by capacity and focus traits, we also noted whether or not CSOs were OG-affiliated. Initially, two different definitions for affiliation were used:

- Definition of OPENGOV1 = one of about 15 CSOs who participated in the initial OECD OGP consultations March 2014
- Definition of OPENGOV2 = member of any open gov-related networks, including TACID and tnOGP Collectif (this also includes all groups under definition 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3: Categorizing Organizations by Open Government Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“OG-Affiliated Group 1”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated 1 (“The Rest”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“OG=Affiliated Group 2”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated 2 (“The Rest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: All organizations in group 1 are also in group 2.

An Appendix examines how the comparison between affiliated and unaffiliated groups differs depending on how we define OG affiliation – with the definition for group 1 or group 2. However, in order to keep our primary analysis straightforward, we henceforth utilize only the first definition in our Analysis Chapter.
Selection of Sfax as a Regional Case Study

Our final methodological notes focuses on why the city of Sfax was selected as the second city to interview participants (besides the capital of Tunis, where several more professionalized and even elite CSOs are concentrated). There are many important factors that distinguish Sfax and make it an intriguing city to examine civil society dynamics and the possibility for increased civil society-government cooperation around open government reforms. The key relevant traits are as follows:

1) Sfax is the second largest city in Tunisia, and is the country’s economic and industrial hub (about 36% of the country’s entire economic output comes from Sfax, even though the city only benefits from about 2% of the national budget migration and rural ‘diaspora’ best exemplified by Sfax.
2) The geographical and economic standings of Sfax make it well-positioned to facilitate cooperation between northern and southern regions, bridging the oft-cited regional development divide.
3) Although it is a large urban center, Sfax is known for preserving traditions (including religious traditions) and valuing closer family ties more strongly than in Tunis.
4) Sfax is also known for having numerous well-educated and active citizens (including a high concentration of university students). In recent decades many Sfax residents immigrated to Tunis, so this city suffers an external migration challenge. A number of the most prominent civil society leaders in Tunis originally hail from Sfax.

As our report will soon reveal, one of the most important takeaways from this entire analysis is the centrality of implementing open government at the local level. Including Sfax in this study Well-positioned to facilitate improved cooperation between Northern and Southern regions of Tunisia and help bridge the oft-cited regional development divide.
IV. Chapter Four: Findings

This section will present key findings from the information obtained from over 100 Tunisian CSOs using mixed methods. This findings chapter breaks down as follows. First, we present a descriptive section featuring profiles of the varied participating organizations. Second, we present a discussion of CSO perceptions and priorities related to open government (first an overview of top open government concerns for this sample as a whole, then various comparisons of how open government perceptions differ for different types of associations). Third, we discuss CSO-CSO collaborations, internal to the voluntary sector. Fourth, we discuss government-civil society collaborations (including case vignettes of effective cooperation). Fifth, we summarize key challenges and opportunities to open government in civil society’s perspective. Finally, we overview the key findings.

1. Descriptive Profile of CSOs – Capacity, Focus, and OG-Affiliation

Most associations are very young with limited human and financial capacities, and geographic presence. This sample captured significant diversity in terms of the primary sectors and issue areas of organizations. Many respondents indicating having more than one primary sector and issue area, suggesting some CSOs may be spread too thin, particularly because of limited reliance on collaboration with others.

The immediate purpose of providing the in-depth descriptive portrait of characteristics of survey respondents is to lay the foundation for the analysis of how different organizational traits affect CSOs open government perceptions, in light of the original inquiry driving this research. Yet the profile that follows provides a valuable cross-sectional snapshot of Tunisian civil society, capturing much of its diversity. While a fair number of previous studies of Tunisian civil society have generated important information about organizational capacities (most often focusing on financial, skill-based, and human resource capacities), this survey was unique in its focus on capturing some of the textured nuance of the substance of what organizations actually work on – by asking about mission but also giving respondents the opportunity to express their organizations degree of involvement in different sectors and issue areas.

Had this survey simply asked organizations to check one box that best describes who they are (whether in terms of their key issue area of key activities), it would not have been able to capture the reality that many CSOs straddle different sectors and issue areas. This is particularly true because most Tunisian CSOs were established after the revolution and are thus young and still in their early stages of identity formation and programmatic specialization. Instead, we gave respondents the opportunity to respond to five different sectors and five different issue areas using a five-point scale (ranging from 1 – “we do not do this at all”, to 5 – “this is the most important activity/issue we work on”).

We cannot claim that the 82 survey respondents are a truly representative sample of Tunisian civil society, yet the results below illustrate that this sample does captures some of the important breadth of Tunisia’s associational landscape. In this way, the descriptive portrait that follows makes a valuable contribution on its own (i.e. not in relation to the open government responses) to the broader literature on Tunisia’s developing civil society. (We also note that the vast majority of individuals responding to this survey on behalf of their organizations were in a key leadership role – see the Appendices for a more detailed breakdown).

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36 This section is based on the number descriptive traits we identified earlier as the independent variables.
Interestingly, virtually none of the 100+ organizations that were either surveyed or interviewed pursued explicitly religious activities as a core part of their work. However, a sizable number of organizations interviewed (about 20%) did self-identify as “having an Islamic reference” (مرجعية إسلامية). This suggests that Islam often manifests itself in the background of a civil society organization’s work as inspiration, but not in the foreground of their day-to-day programming or activities. Like Tunisia’s political system as described in the new constitution, Islam might be understood as present but not predominant.

Size and Capacity Traits
Here we present a variety of data that summarizes the general capacities of the organizations surveyed – in terms of age of the organization, financial capacity, human resources capacity, and geographic reach.

Year of Establishment
The vast majority of CSO respondents – 87 percent – were established after the 2011 Tunisian Revolution.

![FIGURE 8: CSOs Breakdown by Year of Establishment](image)

Staff Size
Survey respondents exhibited a notable range of staff size (suggesting different levels of human capacity), but fully 50% of all organizations reported having no staff whatsoever and being purely driven by volunteer capacity, while an additional 18% have less than five full-time employees. Organizations were characterized as either all volunteer or as having at least one full-time staff member.
Respondents also exhibited a fair variety of annual budget sizes (including financial capacity), but 42% of all CSOs possess a budget of less than 5,000 Tunisian Dinars (about 2,500 USD). Organizations were categorized as either having small, medium, or large budgets as illustrated in the table below.
Regarding CSOs financial status, respondents were also asked to indicate all types of funding sources they received and were presented with seven options. These funding categories were determined based on information some organizations provided during the interviews, and on desk research that reviewed the few other studies examining Tunisian civil society. See the Appendices for a detailed breakdown of the CSOs’ diverse sources of funding.

37 Note: A few examples of funding sources were included in the survey to provide clarity: Multilateral Institutions – “such as the United Nations or European Union”; Bilateral donors – “such as the British embassy.”
Geographical Presence and Reach
Respondents were also asked to indicate all geographic regions in which their organization has a presence or any form of activity, from six commonly defined regions of Tunisia.¹³⁸ 10 organizations (12% of all survey respondents) can be considered national CSOs because they indicated having a presence in all six major regions of Tunisia.

**FIGURE 11: CSOs Breakdown by Geographic Presence**

Note: The six geographic regions included in the survey were defined as follows: 1) Greater Tunis – Governorates of Tunis and Ariana; 2) The East – Governorates of Nabuel, Mahdia, and Sfax; 3) The Northwest – Governorate of Kef; 4) The Western Central – Governorates of Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid; 5) The Southeast – Governorates of Gabes, Medenine, and Tatouine; 6) The Southwest – Governorates of Gafsa, Tozeur, and Kebili

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¹³⁸ Note: The six geographic regions included in the survey were defined as follows: 1) Greater Tunis – Governorates of Tunis and Ariana; 2) The East – Governorates of Nabuel, Mahdia, and Sfax; 3) The Northwest – Governorate of Kef; 4) The Western Central – Governorates of Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid; 5) The Southeast – Governorates of Gabes, Medenine, and Tatouine; 6) The Southwest – Governorates of Gafsa, Tozeur, and Kebili
Perhaps not surprisingly, the survey results suggest that lack of capacity and sustainable funding are ongoing areas of concern for many civil society organizations, which can inevitably impede their ability to collaborate with government to promote open government reforms. This is affirmed by the fact that 89% of responding organizations are still nascent, having been established in 2011 or later. Furthermore, the average personnel size of participating organizations was 1-2 full-time staff.

**Focus and Issue Traits**

The second category of descriptive traits by which CSOs were characterized are those that focus on the focus of their work. This includes defining their overall mission, *primary* sector (i.e. the main activities they pursue), and *primary* issue area (i.e. the substance of their work). Both the sector and issue area data were determined by coding all organizations who gave the highest possible response to any sector or issue area question (i.e. who responded as “5 – this is the most important activity we do”). In this context, it should be noted that some overlap exists across categories, as some organizations responded with a “5” to more than one issue or sector within each category. Nonetheless, the data below paints a picture of the overall dispersion of respondents on the basis of their focus of work.
Primary Sectors
The breakdown by sector reveals that about 1/3 of respondents primarily identify as government monitoring/watchdog organization, another 1/3 primarily identify as research organizations, 20% focus primarily on social service delivery, and smaller sub-sets included advocacy and networking organizations.
TABLE 6: CSOs Breakdown by Primary Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Sector (‘5=most important activity we do’)</th>
<th>Number of Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Service Delivery</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchdog/Government Monitoring</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>108</strong>&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>39</sup> The total is greater than the number of organizations surveyed because some organizations responded with a 5 to more than one sector, indicating that there was more than one sector that included “the most important activity” they work on.
Main Issues Areas

**FIGURE 15: CSOs Breakdown by Primary by Issue Area**

**TABLE 7: CSOs Breakdown by Primary Issue Area**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Issue Area</th>
<th>Number of Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Awareness, Rights, Civic Engagement</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowering Marginalized Groups</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts and Culture</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>119</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The total is greater than number of survey respondents because some organizations responded with a 5 for different issue areas, meaning that more than one issue was “the most important issue we work on.”*
2. CSOs Perceptions and Priorities of Open Government

Open government is defined first and foremost as access to information by most CSOs. Transparency is seen as the key OG principle, while public integrity and public service delivery are the top OG reform areas. The majority also highlighted the need for open government at the local level to make implementation successful. Comparing open government priorities across organizations of different capacities reveals more differences than comparing across organizations of different issue areas and sectors. About one quarter of interviewees attributed at least part of their understanding of open government to the UN Development Program (UNDP).

Based on the qualitative interviews conducted by the author as well as the results of the online survey, this section highlights the dominant perceptions about open government amongst the diverse group of participating Tunisian civil society organizations.


To begin, one valuable contribution of this study is that it helps give clarity on how civil society organizations – namely non-open government affiliated CSOs – define and understand open government. Open government as a buzz term can often be used by different audiences to mean different things. From our qualitative assessment we find that organizations first and foremost associated access to information with the term open government. In fact, organizations were two times more likely to first mention access to information when prompted with a question about open government, than to identify corruption. They were even less likely to explicitly mention citizen engagement as a foundational part of open government, though all interviews and survey responses ultimately addressed the question of government-civil society collaboration on open government, given the design of this research. Interestingly, a sizable portion of interviewees also explicitly mentioned something related to budgets (either access to information about budgets, or participatory budgeting) in this discussion as well. Still others alluded to the inextricable link between transitional justice and open government, though they too were a minority.

The word cloud below the most common concepts civil society interviewees mentioned when they were asked the first open-ended question about open government.

FIGURE 16: What is Open Government According to Civil Society Organizations?
Based on the interviews performed for this study, the following concepts were most often cited by interviewees when they were asked the first open-ended question about open government (in order of frequency):

1) Local Good Governance
2) Access to Information
3) Budget Issues (including transparent budgets and participatory budgeting)
4) Citizen Engagement
5) Anti-Corruption; Transitional Justice
6) Participatory Democracy

It is important to clarify that local good governance was raised by interviewees later in the discussion, as a key component of implementing and activating open government in a meaningful way. Meanwhile, all other concepts above were initial responses to the first open ended question about this topic, suggesting that interviewees perceived them as definitional traits. In this way, local governance was the most important related concept raised by CSOs when discussing open government implementation, but access to information was the most important definitional trait of open government.

Overall Rating of Open Government Variables
The table below presents some of overall findings from the survey. Transparency was ranked as the single most important of four open government principles across all respondents. Meanwhile improving public services and increasing public integrity were ranked at the top two types of OG reforms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 8: Highest Ranked Overall OG Principles and Priorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OG Principles, in order of priority</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Transparency (75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Citizen Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Innovation and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OG Perceptions and Priorities by CSO Capacity
Having given a brief look at the overall OG perceptions and priorities of respondents, we now examine in closer detail how these OG responses vary by our three primary categories of CSO descriptive traits: Size and Capacity, Focus and Issue, and OG Affiliation.

Annual Budget Size (Financial Capacity)
When we compare how OG principles are rated across organizations with small, medium, and large budgets, we see the highest OG ratings for small and large budget organizations, with a moderate “dip” for medium budget-sized organizations.
Geographic Presence and Reach
After categorizing organizations by their relative geographic presence (where organizations present in three or fewer regions were considered “small-scale” and organizations present in four or more regions were considered “large-scale”), we did not find a significant difference between the two groups in terms of any of our four OG dependent variables: principles, general reforms, Tunisia-specific reforms, or rating of government effectiveness. This finding suggests that both small-scale and large-scale organizations tend to perceive and prioritize different aspects of open government in a similar fashion in general.

Interestingly, we then compared groups by the actual number of regions they have a presence in (from one through six), and a slight trend seems to emerge. It seems that all OG variable ratings tend to go up as the number of regions increases. This trend however peaks at 4 regions, and then seems to drop. Thus organizations with the smallest and largest geographic presence (in one region and in six regions) generally have the lowest OG ratings, and with the rest in between.
OG Perceptions and Priorities by Focus
We now compare OG responses by primary sector and primary issue area. 41

41 Note that some organizations identified themselves as having more than one primary issue area and/or sector. It is was also somewhat surprising to find that on average survey respondents indicated having two distinct
By Sector
Comparing OG perceptions and priorities across our five sectors, we find some variation in responses. For example, research organizations give the highest average rating to the importance of Transparency as a key OG principle, while advocacy organizations provide the highest average ranking for Accountability and for Innovation and Technology.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Sector</th>
<th>Transparency Rating</th>
<th>Accountability Rating</th>
<th>Civic Engagement Rating</th>
<th>Innovation &amp; Tech Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchdog/Government Monitoring</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While response bias may be at play in this circumstance – where respondents may have been encouraged to appear as pursuing numerous issues and activities in order to appear “favorably” in the eyes of the researcher – the data in the above tables was produced using very conservative estimates. For both type of issue area and type of activities, only the strongest possible response (“this is the most important aspect of our work,” or a “5” on the five-point scale) were tallied. Had both 4s and 5s been tallied, for example, the results would have indicated an even greater range of types of issue areas and activities of CSOs.
By Issue Area

Now examining OG principles across civil society issue areas, we find much similarity but also a few interesting instances of variation. Somewhat surprisingly, Civic Engagement-focused organizations actually did not give the highest relative rating for civic engagement as an OG principle (rather, CSOs that focus on empowering marginalized groups did). Also of note is the fact that Culture (followed by Economic Development) organizations gave the relative highest ratings to Innovation and Technology, the OG principle that was the lowest ranked overall.
TABLE 10: Comparing OG Principles by Primary Issue Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Issue Area</th>
<th>Transparency Rating</th>
<th>Accountability Rating</th>
<th>Civic Engagement Rating</th>
<th>Innovation &amp; Tech Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Engagement</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>3.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalized Groups</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 21: Comparing OG Principles by Primary Issue Area
By Open Government Affiliation

Finally, we examine how OG-affiliated versus unaffiliated CSOs compare in their OG perceptions and priorities.

A central question driving this research inquiry from the beginning has been the following: how do the OG perceptions and priorities from the handful of CSOs who specialize in open government issues and have been engaged already in Tunisia’s open government reforms (perhaps most notably the drafting of the OGP Action Plan) *compare* to the perceptions and priorities of a diverse sampling of all other civil society actors? The importance of this question stems from the reality that OG-affiliated organizations ultimately are a tiny portion of the voluntary sector and are thus not representative of broader civil society. They are often specialized organizations based in Tunis and may have limited direct contacts with citizens and may be perceived as somewhat elite. This begs the question of identifying the perceptions and priorities of a diverse sampling of other, non-OG affiliated CSOs to provide a foundation of basic knowledge that can facilitate the government and the OECD’s engagement with these newcomers to the open government process.

In order to address this inquiry, as noted in the Methodology chapter above, we coded each CSO respondent as either “OG-affiliated” or “unaffiliated.” What follows is a comparison of the OG rankings of these two groups along some of our key OG variables.

**FIGURE 22: Comparing OG Principles by OG-Affiliation**

The figure above reveals that there does not seem to be a marked difference in how the two groups prioritize different OG principles.

However, our regression analysis reveals that OG-affiliated CSOs are more likely to give the Tunisian government a lower OG effectiveness rating than others. We find from this regression that *being open*
government-affiliated was associated with a -0.68 decrease in open government effectiveness rating compared to non OG-affiliated organizations. (See the Appendices for the full regression output).

Our multivariate regression analysis compared the impact of open government affiliation on perceived rating of the Tunisian government’s open government effectiveness (holding capacity and focus-related independent variables constant). The effectiveness data came from the five-point scale CSO responses to the question: “how effective do you think the Tunisian government’s efforts have been at including citizen input and promoting civic participation?”

This suggests that CSOs that have not been engaged in consultations with the government about open government reforms to date are more likely to have a positive perception of the government’s effectiveness at civil society engagement. An important limitation of reading too much into this data comes from the fact that this result is not statistically significant. Likely reasons for this include the smaller sample size (N=82) and the introduction of numerous independent variables, which increases the possibility of error. Still, this finding hints at the great potential for the government to engage non-OG affiliated organizations, given their relatively more favorable view of the government in this sense.

3. The State of CSO-CSO Collaborations

Though many participants were affiliated with some CSO network, advocacy organizations were the most likely to prioritize networking with other CSOs.

What Types of CSOs Are More Likely To Collaborate With Others?
One valuable finding about the nature of civil society collaborations within the sector is that compared to all other sectors, advocacy organizations were the most likely to also identify as primary networking organizations. The relatively strong correlation (of 0.6) found between advocacy and networking preliminarily suggests that advocacy organizations maybe be more likely to engage in collaborations and network with one another than social service providers, research organizations, and watchdogs. Advocacy groups seem more likely to recognize the need to partner and cooperate with one another to achieve their goals than organizations in other sectors. Thus, if the OECD and/or Tunisian government would like to see civil society organizations collaboration more with one another, attention should be focused on promoting the importance of collaboration for non-advocacy organizations.

Opportunities and Challenges to Further CSO Collaboration
Some CSOs interviewed cited negative experiences participating in formal coalitions due to conflicts between personalities and/or limited capacities. As one interviewee described, “we were too busy building NGOs to simultaneously build strong networks.” Yet others emphasized the imperative for CSOs to work together more.

Ultimately, the many benefits of greater CSO-CSO collaboration are clear: civil society associations need to collaborate to have a stronger presence vis-à-vis the government, and to gather limited human and financial resources to have greater collective impact. Not surprisingly, a number of interviewees cited lack of capacity as one of, if not the, greatest challenge they face.

Interestingly, some of the most commonly cited CSO networks that participants were involved with are also organizations that receive significant support from external international organizations.

42 Author Interview with Tounesa. Tunis, Tunisia, January 2014.
Common CSO Networks and Coalitions among Participants:
1) TACID – a nationwide network of hundreds of citizenship, civic engagement, and/or development orgs.
2) Sfax Associations Forum – 350+ new CSOs member association for the city of Sfax
3) The Accountability Network – a network supported by the International Republican Institute
4) The Arab Network of Social Accountability (ANSA) – a regional network supported by the World Bank
5) UTIL – a broad based CSO network backed by UNDP support

Creating a CSO Network That Bridges Ideological Divides: According to some interviews, ideological divisions between CSOs represent a significant impediment to CSO coalition building. The Sfax Associations Forum, is an interesting large civil society coalition that has deliberately recruited members across the ideological spectrum. It currently claims about 350 affiliated CSOs.

The Forum was launched in collaboration with the Municipality of Sfax in January 2014. The Forum director, described by other Sfax civil society activists as a well-respected neutral activist (who also coincidentally works for the regional Ministry of Culture office), described a long-term process undertaken by the Forum to identify the key minimum principles that all members could commit to (including democracy, tolerance, transparency, nonviolence, etc.). He explained that the accommodation of some religious organizations into the Forum initially posed a challenge, but in the end all such associations were allowed on the condition that they had no connection whatsoever to any acts of violence. Through this prolonged deliberative process of identifying universally shared values, and by choosing to avoid dialogues on identity issues, the

4. Exemplary Government-Civil Society Collaborations

Civil society and government entities collaborated very effectively throughout Tunisia’s constitution drafting and its 2011 and 2014 elections. These and other experiences provide strong precedent for deepening government-CSO collaborations.

Case Vignettes: Diverse Examples of Effective CSO-Government Collaborations
The two most commonly cited examples by diverse interviewees of effective civil society-government collaborations were around 1) the constitution drafting process, and 2) the 2011 and particularly the 2014 elections. Here are more detailed examples
- Mouraqiboun, along with ATIDE, i-Watch and international NGO Democracy Reporting International (DRI) collaborated on a project working with the high electoral commission and with the relevant NCA drafting body to reform to the electoral code. Ultimately their proposal was the basis of Tunisia’s new civil society law.

The League of Tunisian Women Voters and countless other CSOs across the country collaborated with Tunisian independent electoral commission (ISIE) to register voters and monitor elections in 2011 NCA elections and again in the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections.

A coalition of Sfax-based CSOs submitted a proposal to the regional Ministry of Culture office to bid on having Sfax becoming the “the Arab Culture Capital 2016” - an honor the city was recently awarded. In this case CSOs proposed an entirely new idea to the regional ministry office. Because it aligned well with the office priorities, the office adopted the CSO proposal and the bid was ultimately accepted. (recently awarded) represents a positive example of effective collaboration of a number of Sfax-based cultural CSOs and the Ministry of Culture at the regional level.

The Transitional Justice and Reckoning Association (of Sfax) presented suggestions that were ultimately incorporated into the Transitional Justice law passed by the National Constituent Assembly in December 2013 that outlined a framework for addressing transitional justice issues and established the Truth and Dignity Commission.

Based on the case vignettes presented here, we extrapolate some common elements for effective CSO-government collaboration:

**Some Common Elements of Successful Government-CSO Collaborations**

- Time-bound, high-profile, nationwide events (such as elections) help provide a platform for government-civil society collaboration.
- Some examples include situations when civil society reached out to government with an idea or offer to support, while other instances are of the opposite (ex: the ISIE Electoral Commission contacting many CSOs and requesting they help with voter registration and election monitoring).

**Moving from Confrontation and Collaboration**

A second theme we identified particularly from the interviews is an important mentality shift for at least some CSOs. A number of organizations distinguished between taking a confrontational versus collaborative approach to working with government. Many noted that they are increasingly adoptive a collaborative approach, and some argued that this is happening as a broader trend across civil society.

In addition, numerous CSOs respondents to the online survey highlighted this topic on their own when given the option to add any additional comments at the end of the survey. Several respondents emphasized how they strive to be a productive source of proposals and feasible policy alternatives for governments (not just a source of confrontation, criticisms, or demands), and that they hope to see other embrace this approach. In both interviews and surveys a common phrase emerged: (قوة اقتراح), meaning that CSOs should be a valuable source of proposals and policy alternatives.

Just as citizens should be seen by government as partners according to the open government framework, so too it seems that many CSOs are increasingly viewing themselves as partners and collaborators in the public decision making process.

**5. Key Challenges and Opportunities for Open Government**

The common perception of the government’s open government work to date as superficial and the politicization of parts of civil society are some important challenges to this work. Meanwhile, the decentralization of open government seems promising.
After presenting a myriad of findings about diverse civil society perceptions and priorities about open government based on both our qualitative and quantitative data, we now synthesize some key points raised by civil society about both the challenges and opportunities to broadening and deepening open government in Tunisia, including increasing the role of civil society.

Common Concerns with the OGP Process
We now review some common concerns that participating CSOs raising specifically with regarding to the process of drafting the Open Government Partnership (OGP) National Action Plan through the Joint Government-Civil Society Steering Committee in the summer of 2014. These comments below come from OGP-affiliated organizations who were directly involved in this process.

- **The OGP Process was seen as somewhat disorganized.** In particular, interviewees noted challenges with not having clear criteria and guidance from their government counterparts on how to nominate their civil society representatives, and how to evaluate different proposals for reforms to consider including in the OGP Action Plan. Others call for greater transparency throughout the process itself – by having a clear facilitator, sharing comprehensive meeting minutes in a timely manner, etc.

- **The final 20 reforms in the national OGP Action Plan only have limited value.** Some interviewees noted that some of the reforms listed in the action plan were already developments that were previously underway. Others highlighted that the actual impact of some of the reforms will be very limited – for example, draft laws do not equate to meaningful policy change. A few other interviewees argued that a sizable portion (perhaps even the majority) of the final recommendations actually came from civil society representatives themselves (one example was the idea of legal protection for whistleblowers proposed by CSO al-Bawsala).

- **There are major barriers to implementation of reforms.** Some CSO representatives are concerned that there is not adequate funding to support to actual implementation of the OGP commitments. Others worry that the recommendations were not developed with sufficient buy-in from the necessary actors across government. Some interviewees noted the important distinction between the political, elected government and the longstanding bureaucracy of the state. In fact, a common theme throughout several interviews (with CSO representatives and political experts alike) focused on difficulty in transforming the entrenched culture of centralized bureaucracy.

Broader Challenges

- **The government’s commitment to open government so far is largely seen as superficial; the true test of open government lies in its meaningful implementation.** Countless interviews with civil society representatives – of open government-related and other organizations alike – affirmed the widespread perception that the Tunisian government says the right things when it comes to open government reform, and the post-revolution laws on the books are even effectively depict an ideal situation, but these efforts are by and large aspirational. As one interviewee put it, “our problem is not with their [government] talk, it’s with their practice.” The same interviewee (a representative of the think tank the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy) noted: We worry that efforts like OGP will be done by government in the name of freedom but with the practical effect of disabling and delaying true freedom.”
One respondent argued that open government efforts will remain superficial until Tunisia makes significant progress in the area of transitional justice, while others highlighted the very limited number of CSOs engaged in the open government process as evidence of the government’s superficial efforts. In the words of another interviewer: “We worry that efforts like OGP will be done by the government in the name of freedom but with the practical effect of disabling or delaying true freedom.”

Even for CSOs that did not have concerns about insidious possibilities, at a minimum there was widespread consensus that the true test to open government lies in its meaningful implementation. One OG-affiliated CSO representative described the OGP Action Plan as “A+ paper,” but articulated her fears about if and how the ideas would be put into action. Another interviewee – this time a member of the leadership of the Nidaa Tounes party – noted that he had not seen any tangible outcomes yet from open government, even though he was active in politics and was concerned about these issues.

While these may seem a harsh criticism against the government, it should be contextualized with the average rating of effectiveness of current the government’s efforts to engage civil society in OG at 3.4 (on a 5-point scale with 5 being the highest score). This above-average overall rating – representing an aggregation of data from a wide range of CSOs – suggests there is significant hope for improving the open government process. The government can and should redoubling efforts to involve civil society, as at least some trust and overall confidence in the process remains.

- The politicization of some CSOs may threaten the legitimacy of government-CSO engagements. About 25% of all interviewees highlighted a post-revolution trend of some CSOs serving as vehicles to support political party activities and/or as being divided along ideological lines as a challenge for the sector and for the open government process. The post-2011 a ban on receiving foreign funding for political campaigns contributed to this process of some civil society groups becoming politicized along and becoming vehicles for funding political parties and campaigns. In order to avoid being perceived as biased or engaging civil society as a front to support one’s own political party, it is extremely important for government officials at all levels to systematically engage the political and ideological diversity within civil society whenever performing this type of outreach.

- Very limited accountability mechanisms exist for both government and civil society actors. Our interviews revealed accountability and trust challenges on both sides of open government engagements. On one hand, a government representative who played a key role in facilitating the outreach to civil society to jointly draft Tunisia’s OGP Action Plan noted that there were no clear mechanisms to ensure full civil society commitment to the process and by which they could be held to account. At the same time, underlying many comments from a variety of civil society representatives was a concern that accountability mechanisms to mandate the government to regularly and comprehensively consult civil society were limited.

Opportunities to Promote Open Government

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44 One association interviewed, i-Watch, actually has a program devoted to researching the links between civil society organizations and political parties, as part of a broader political corruption project.

45 Author interview with staff member at the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy. Tunis, Tunisia - January 2015.

46 Author interview with representative of the Tunisian Prime Minister’s Office, E-Government Unit. Tunis, Tunisia. January 2015.
“Decentralize open government” by targeting reforms at the local level. There was widespread consensus among nearly all interviewees about the centrality of implementing open government reforms at the local level, in order to ensure that such reforms have a meaningful and tangible impact on the lives of ordinary Tunisians. A historic opportunity exists for this given major upcoming decentralization efforts.

Over four years have passed since the January 14 Revolution and Tunisia has yet to hold elections at the local level. Numerous interviewees highlighted the fact that many civil society organizations are greatly anticipating regional elections (currently expected to take place at the end of 2015). Historically, local Tunisian officials have always been appointed rather than elected. Many respondents stated that this reality contributed to lack of trust between citizens and government at the local level. Thus, upcoming regional elections present an important next step in Tunisia’s longer-term open government trajectory.

6. Summary of Some Key Findings

Before concluding this chapter it is important to note a general limitation of interpreting these findings is that the survey data is all self-reported by associations. Specifically, there may be some degree of survey response bias in both the qualitative interviews and quantitative survey results. We attempted to address this by triangulating results across the two sources of qualitative versus quantitative (i.e. in-depth interview vs. online survey) data.

In this chapter we analyzed detailed information about the background profiles, open government perceptions and priorities, and experiences of internal and external collaborations (i.e. with other CSOs but also with government) of a wide range of over 100 Tunisian CSOs. From this analysis we highlight some common themes:

1. **Local governance and decentralization are key** – a clear majority (over 55%) of interviewees discussed at length the importance of and possibilities for “localizing” open government.

2. **Non-OG affiliated CSOs have a slightly more favorable perception of the government and are thus well poised for government engagement.** The average overall rating of the government’s effectiveness is notably higher when we compared OG-affiliated with unaffiliated groups.

3. **There is a great to move from surface-level pledges to meaningful implementation.** A very strong constitutional and legal foundation now exists to support open government in Tunisia, but the real challenges undoubtedly lies in widespread and effective implementation.

4. **OG-affiliated and unaffiliated organizations generally prioritize OG principles and types of reforms in a similar fashion.** Comparing OG-affiliated and unaffiliated responses to three of the four OG variables (principles, general reforms, and Tunisia-specific reforms) reveals little overall difference between how the two groups prioritize open government issues.

5. **Both Islamically-inspired and secular organizations express interest in open government.** Though only 1% of all survey respondents identified “religious activities” as a key part of their mission, a number of interviewed organizations self-identified as having an “Islamic reference.” These organizations were equally enthusiastic about open government as their secular counterparts that were interviewed.
6. **Advocacy organizations were more likely than others to prioritize networking than others.** This may because the nature of advocacy work inherently requires collaboration more than research work, for example, or for other reasons. Regardless, this is an important finding to help target efforts to promote civil society networking and collaboration.

7. **A wide variety CSOs expressed eagerness to “simplify” OG concepts for ordinary citizens.** Strikingly, almost 40% of interviewees expressed their willingness in and/or desire to see civil society organizations play the role of “simplifying” the abstract concept of open government to ordinary citizens and helping translate open government reforms into concrete, tangible impacts on everyday lives.

8. **External actors and lay a significant role in familiarizing CSOs with open government, and promoting CSO networks and collaborations.** A surprising finding from this research was the frequency with which both interviewees and survey respondents mentioned the UN Development Program (UNDP) when discussing open government. A fair number of respondents indicated an affiliation with UNDP when asked if there were a member of any networks or coalitions. Though UNDP grantee status was not a variable that was initially considered to be relevant to this research when the survey was designed, the fact that many respondents self-identified as such signaled it would be a variable worthwhile to incorporate. We also found that almost all of the coalitions or networks that participants were affiliated with receive significant support from a variety of international organizations.
V. Chapter Five: Recommendations

Based on the above analysis of both qualitative and quantitative findings about open government perceptions and priorities of over 100 Tunisian civil society organizations, we present the following recommendations. These center on how to both broaden and deepen civil society participation in meaningful Tunisian open government reforms. Recommendations are given for all three audiences that are deeply linked with this agenda: the Tunisian government, the OECD, and Tunisian civil society organizations. These recommendations were also developed with an eye toward three important criteria to help ensure feasibility: creation of public value, necessary political legitimacy and support, and sufficient operational capacity.47

Recommendations for the OECD

1. Invest in local government capacity and civil society capacity to raise both the “supply and demand” for open government reforms.

Given that the notion of local governance was the single most frequently raised concept across all interviews, one of the most valuable ways the OECD can support Tunisia’s journey toward more open government is by helping “decentralize” open government, in parallel with Tunisia’s ongoing broader push toward political and administrative decentralization.

Regarding the “supply” side, the OECD longstanding relationships with government officials (both within Tunisia and in OECD countries, who can help provide guidance and international good practices) makes it well-positioned to continue building government capacity to implement reforms. Now, greater focus should be paid to strengthening government capacity at the local level – particularly to effectively respond to information requests, as access to information was commonly seen as the cornerstone defining trait of open government.

Regarding the “demand” side, the OECD can serve as a valuable resource for Tunisian CSOs that are already interested in and/or working on raising citizen awareness about Tunisia’s many constitutional and other legal assurances that provide the foundation to implement open government reforms.

Fortunately, Tunisia’s new constitution mandates that local governments embrace participatory democracy and open government (as stipulated in Article 139 of the 7th Chapter about Local Government). Indeed, the only explicit mention of “open government” is found in this local government section of the constitution. Thus, a strong legal framework exists to promote open government at the local level. Many of the CSOs interviewed were beginning or expanding their own programs related to local governance – this is an opportunity that external supporters like the OECD should capitalize.

Furthermore, the OECD should consider strategically investing in local good government pilot programs that have high potential to be replicated in other cities, especially in Tunisia’s interior under-developed regions. Our earlier discussion of why Sfax was selected as a case study also affirms the value of targeting this particular city to help encourage replication in other internal regions of Tunisia.

The opportunity to help open new relationships and build confidence between citizens and local officials, facilitated by civil society intermediaries, should increase tremendously within one year, after the first post-revolution municipal elections are held. These landmark elections (currently scheduled for late 2015) will

47 These criteria come from the “Strategic Triangle Framework” developed by Harvard Kennedy School Professor Mark Moore.
represent a major shift from local officials historically being appointed to becoming elected. This will provide a direct accountability mechanism between citizens and their to-be representatives. This will make the environment riper to promote local good governance and open government.

2. **Support organizations (and individual leaders) who can help bridge the gap between government and civil society.**

As noted immediately above, local-level reforms are key. Local elections also present a fantastic opportunity to promote collaboration between government and civil society at the local level, as many civil society leaders are expected to run in local elections. These unique individuals – with experience both in civil society and in government – will be ideally positioned to facilitate cooperation between both sides. The OECD could consider offering electoral training sessions specifically for proven civil society leaders to compete in forthcoming local elections. Though politicization of civil society seen as a challenge or concern, this risk can be mitigated by making this training equally available to organizations with a full variety of political and/or ideological leanings.

This study also revealed that, by nature of their capacities, skills, and/or missions, certain civil society organizations are particularly well-positioned to facilitate cooperation between government and civil society actors. Examples include the Tunisian Auditors Professional Association (a rather unique instance of a civil society organization entirely comprised of government employees), TACID (a civic engagement network of associations across all regions of Tunisia), the Jasmine Foundation (an association that could be considered both a “think and do” tank in its focus on policy analysis and advocacy but also direct civic education), and ADRA (a small association outside Sfax that has heavily invested in building positive relations with its local officials). All these organizations in some way combine grassroots awareness (especially on issues like the constitution, transitional justice, and citizenship) and action, with policy analysis and government engagement.

This study also noted an encouraging trend: some CSOs seem increasingly interested in shifting from an approach of confrontation to collaboration with government. OECD should take advantage of this and could consider offering trainings or workshops to help build the specific skills and ways of thinking (like how to analyze policies or consider constraints on decision makers) for civil society organizations who want to make this transition in mentality.

3. **Provide platforms for civil society organizations to collaborate.**

A number of CSOs identified their limited capacities (financially, in terms of human resources, skills, etc.) as a significant constraint to broadening government-CSO collaborations. We found that in this diverse sample of 100+ organizations, the vast majority are young (less than four years old), small (with little to no staff and budgets under 20,000 Tunisian Dinars), and have limited geographic reach (are present in only one or two main areas of the country). Thus, networking between civil society organizations is essential to help build their collective voice as well as collective capacity, thus significantly increasing their ability to serve as a counterpart and partner to government. In particular, we find that advocacy organizations seem more likely than others to prioritize networking, so organizations in other sectors within civil society (namely research, service delivery, and government monitoring organizations) should be targeted.

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48 For example, in an interview with the author, the head of a 350+ member coalition of civil society associations in Sfax noted he expects many CSOs leaders to enter local politics after local-level electoral reform occurs.
Recommendations for the Tunisian Government

1. Prioritize open government reforms specifically related to transparency and public integrity.

Transparency and public integrity reforms were consistently identified as the most important open government principle and type of reform respectively. This was true for organizations with limited and large capacities, differing focuses, and both the open government-affiliated and unaffiliated. The government’s capacity may be limited to fully implement all 20 commitments in time in the OGP Action Plan, but it should at least prioritize the transparency-related commitments and the category of public integrity reforms. This would reflect the priorities of a wide variety of CSOs. It could help improved civil society perception of government effectiveness and strengthen the foundation for government-CSO collaborations around these initiatives.

2. Be strategic when investing in technology-oriented open government initiatives.

One of this study’s most striking findings was that of the four key open government principles included in this research survey, innovation and technology was rated as relatively the least important relative by a significant margin. Again, this was consistent across various sub-sets of the respondent pool, including OG-affiliated and unaffiliated organizations and organizations of varying capacities. This is not to say that CSO respondents generally found innovation and technology unimportant (this principle still received an above average rating of 3.8 out of 5). Yet given notable constraints on government advocates of open government reform (stemming from operational capacity limitations as well as political considerations), it is important to keep the relative OG priorities of civil society in mind.

Furthermore, officials may be surprised to discover that culture and development organizations rated innovation technology more highly than civic engagement and other organizations, despite the fact that the latter may generally be perceived as more of the “usual suspects” interested in technology for open government.

3. Tailor engagement based on civil society capacity, sector and whether or not organizations are open-government affiliated.

The following decision-making framework provides some guidance for government officials at all levels (locally or nationally) to help determine how to best engage their civil society counterparts. This draws on general takeaways in this analysis and should always be adapted to be made more appropriate for the particular context.

In general, in order to determine how to best engage civil society, the government should heed the following issues: 1) the policy issue, 2) the stage of policy formation, 3) general capacity levels of civil society working on that issue, 4) the duration of engagement, 5) realistic government capacity for engagement (deep or shallow; one-time or ongoing).

Furthermore, we offer the following guidance on how to engage certain sub-sets of civil society:

- **Regarding CSO open government affiliation:** CSOs that have not been engaged in open government have similar priorities compared to the OG-affiliated, but they are generally more likely to have a favorable perception of the government’s effectiveness in open government and civil society outreach. This reservoir of “good will” the government has with the OG-unaffiliated as compared with the affiliated should be capitalized on. G2overnment should actively commit to engage these other groups. At the same time, the

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49 For example, Tunisia’s internet penetration rate is significant but not predominant at 40%, and presents both operational and political limitations to purely ICT-driven reforms.
leading government entities in the OGP process (namely the E-Government Unit within the Prime Minister’s Office) should codify and operationalize the lessons learned from the OGP Action Plan Drafting Steering Committee to help avoid repeating the issues that caused the OG-affiliated organizations to give a lower rating for government effectiveness.

- **Regarding CSO Capacity:** As this study and others confirm, a sizable portion of Tunisian civil society organizations are small, young, and completely voluntary, with limited resources and programmatic scale. The government should tailor its engagement with civil society based on a realistic understanding of this capacity. Smaller size organizations should not be expected to make major, longer-term commitments, or they are likely to disappoint, and no real accountability mechanisms exist to ensure CS commitment to such engagements with government.

- **Regarding CSO Focus:** We advise targeting government outreach to civil society based on the specific types of open government principles and reforms with which they are most likely to be concerned. For example, we found that research organizations valued Transparency more than groups in any other sector, while organizations focused on empowering marginalized groups (like women and youth) on average valued both Transparency and Civic Engagement more than their peers who focus on other issue areas.

Finally, see the Appendices for a general framework to help determine the appropriate government approach to civil society engagement, depending on the context.

4. **Seriously promote open government at the local level.**

This study strongly supports the great value of government actors promoting basic awareness and understanding of open government – including the vital task of meaningfully engaging civil society in government decision making – throughout national, regional, and municipal levels of government. While CSOs recognized one of their key roles as educating citizens about open government and making concrete this abstract idea, they also expect government to embrace the task of promoting open government awareness *within and throughout the Tunisian bureaucracy*. Delineation of clearer roles between government and civil society was identified as an important priority in many interviews and has been emphasized in other publications.

- **Distribute a One-Page Memo on Open Government to the Regional Offices of All Relevant Ministries** - One specific way the government can support open government at the local level is by disseminating a very short memo summarizing Tunisia’s open government priorities (including its 20 commitments in the OGP Action Plan) to the regional offices of all ministries. The regional ministry offices in all 24 of Tunisia’s official administrative regions (also known as governorates) can help then help relay such information to municipal-level offices. In addition, to promote two-way exchanges between national and local-level offices, local offices could share with higher-level offices lists of local civil society organizations with which they are connected. Given the centrality of good governance at the local level, this bottom-up provision of information about civil society partners to local governments can complement the more top-down approach of memo distribution from central ministries in Tunis through their network of regional offices.

- **Use Preparation for “Sfax: Arab Cultural Capital 2016” Initiative to deepen civil society-government cooperation** – Sfax can be a model for helping bridge open government reforms from the ministerial to the local government levels. Given the very distinct civil society operating environment and context in the capital of Tunis compared to anywhere else in the country, investing in a tangible project that is exemplified
by effective civil society-government collaboration in Sfax can be a strong model for other less-developed areas.

**Recommendations for Tunisian Civil Society Organizations**

1. **Embrace civil society’s role as “civic educators” and help simplify and translate open government concepts to be meaningful to ordinary citizens.**

Many participating CSOs (both interviewees and survey respondents) expressed both a willingness and readiness to help translate and simplify abstract open government concepts by relating them to tangible conditions in ordinary citizens’ lives. A goal of many civil society projects in Tunisia over the last two years was to educate the public about the constitution drafting process and help make constitution principles tangible. Similarly, civil society can and should now lead this process for open government. It is vital for the successful of open government in Tunisia and is not something the government can do as well, so CSOs should readily embrace this role.

Civil society organizations are undoubtedly closer to the people than government has the capacity to be, and therefore can play an instrumental role in the transformation of open government as a high-level esoteric principle understood by the few to a meaningful concept implemented extensively and felt in the ordinary levels of the many. Some interviewees also emphasized the two-way “give and take” or “supply and demand” relationship that characterizes most open government reforms. Governments may improve their apply to supply information transparently about government activities and financing, for example, or offer open consultations and other opportunities to solicit public input on decision making, but it is much more likely to take such steps – and do so in a sustainable and effective manner – if citizens clearly demand opportunities both for information and participation.

In particular, CSOs are advised to integrate open government concepts into their existing programs and work as much as possible. This will both mitigate the burden on these capacity-limited organizations, and will be a more effective means to meet the goal of civic education.

In light of this, the myriad educational activities CSOs pursue under the umbrella of “awareness-raising” play a pivotal role in many of Tunisia’s open government existing achievements. Whether informing citizens about their constitutionally-enshrined rights to access information (Article 32), local participatory democracy (Article 139), or to seek public integrity and accountability (Article 15), CSOs should continue to help generate citizen demand for ongoing open government reforms.

2. **Pursue projects that help CSOs develop credibility, trust, and respect of local government bodies by providing them value and useful services.**

This was a common trait of the most successful CSOs who have worked with governments identified in this sample. One CSOs focused on the development of a particular urban region, for example, undertook an extensive effort to map out all existing resources in the geographic area they serve. This project not only helped inform their programs to better fulfill their mission of providing relevant services to people in need; it also was a critical way this organization but credibility, trust, and respect with the local government. CSOs can also be creative in how they approach government officials to advocate for open government reforms. For example, local governments might be more inclined to respond to information requests if CSOs point out that citizens may be
much more likely to pay local taxes (an issue riddled with enforcement challenges for Tunisia’s less developed regions) if they better understand what the government does.

3. **Invest in building organizational capacity through a number of means.**

Increasing civil society capacity (in the broadest sense of the term) will undoubtedly help persuade the Tunisian government to more frequently and more meaningful engage civil society in policy formation, and it will help increase the ability of CSOs to actual deliver on the goals they set to achieve. Thus, increasing capacity is key. But this can and should look somewhat differently depending on the nature of the organization (particularly its existing capacity, focus, and whether or not it is open government affiliated).

More specifically, one minority subset of organizations in this sample were found to be “enthusiasts of everything.” When given the ability to describe in detail the nature of their work using the five-point scales on our survey, they noted that *all* sectors were the most important thing they do, and *all* issues were the most important issues they worked on. Perhaps not surprisingly, these same organizations also had a tendency to say that *all* different open government principles and reforms were equally important. Such scattered organizations would do well to hone in their focus so they are able to see meaningful progress in their work.

Meanwhile, OG-affiliated organizations often recognized the importance of applying basic principles of open government (namely, transparency and accountability) to their own work; non-OG-affiliated organizations would do well to follow this example.

Finally, the smaller CSOs – who ultimately make up a majority of Tunisian civil society overall - in particular should prioritize networking with others as a key (if not the) primary means by which they can efficiently and substantially increase their overall capacity.
VI. Chapter Six: Next Steps and Conclusion

Tunisian civil society has proven its instrumental value in the years since the revolution – from helping ensure three successful internationally heralded free and fair elections (in 2011 and 2014) to facilitating the resolution of a major political crisis in 2013. As the Tunisian government continues to pursue a path towards open government reforms with support from external partners like the OECD, diverse civil society partners must be more strategically and deeply engaged.

Most CSOs in this study noted that the constitutional and legal framework for open government exists, but implementation challenges are key. Of course, broad implementation is a large and daunting task. But a prime opportunity for such efforts exists, now that Tunisia has recently completed its transition phase and its current political leaders have greater authority and mandate to institute longer-term, comprehensive reforms.

Government actors should take advantage of the high potential to engage non-OG-affiliated CSOs – who seem both interested in a variety of open government issues but also who seem to have a slightly more favorable perception of the government’s effectiveness. At the same time, government actors should heed the concerns and lessons learned from the OG-affiliated CSOs who participated in the OGP Action Plan process.

For their part, civil society organizations should continue finding ways to more constructively engage their government counterparts, including by offering feasible policy suggestions that take into account constraints on decision makers, not just criticisms and demands. The onus for increasing CSO-CSO collaborations, partnerships, and networking initiatives largely falls on the civil society associations themselves.

While this study offers a plethora of observations on the state of civil society, the ability to promote effective government-CSO collaborations, and the ability to advance Tunisia’s open government agenda more broadly, questions still remain. For example, what might be done in the lead-up to the regional elections to lay a strong foundation for open government reforms and collaborations with civil society?

This study does not claim that its sample of over 100 Tunisian associations is fully representative of Tunisian civil society as a whole. More research should be devoted to capturing representative sub-samples of associations along various dimensions. However, this sample did succeed in capturing a wide range of variation of organizations, in terms of mission, scale, scope, and a number of other descriptive traits.

The most important open government developments in years to come will likely play out on the local level. Increased decentralization over the next year will pose some significant challenges with Tunisia – like ensuring that decentralization doesn’t exacerbate inequality across regions, one of the greatest issues in Tunisia today, and striking the right balance between national oversight with local independence. Still, with these challenges will come even greater opportunities.

Most significantly, decentralization and a growing emphasis on local governance offers the chance to transform open government from an abstract (even elite) concept to a meaningful source of policy guidance that helps produce a tangible improvement in the quality of ordinary citizens’ lives. Civil society organizations are ideally poised to facilitate this process. This study confirms that a wide variety of diverse organizations – working across sectors, issue areas and geographies, as well as of wide ranging sizes – are eager and ready to incorporate open government principles into their existing role and simplify and translate open government concepts to the citizens with whom they are closely connected. Both the OECD and the Tunisian government should capitalize on this momentum to ensure that Tunisia takes advantage of its strong constitutional and legal foundation to ultimately help make transparency, accountability, innovation, and citizen engagement permeate all levels of Tunisian government and society in the years to come.
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Appendix 1: List of 82 Survey Respondent Organizations

1. ACEO 5Apposition and Civic Engagement Organization)
2. Acte Theatral
3. AGF
4. Al bawsala
5. Association Citoyenneté et droits humains
6. association culturelle et environnementale de kelibia
7. Association des diabétiques de Zaghouan
8. Association IRADA kssar ouled boubaker
9. association nationale de la ceativitee dans l industrie artisanat beja
10. Association Tabarka pour l'écotourisme
11. Association Touensa
12. Association Tunisie Patrimoine Internationale
13. association tunisien sans frontiere
14. Association Tunisienne de management de projets
15. Association Tunisienne des Ingénieurs Agronomes
16. association tunisienne des urbanistes
17. Association Tunisienne pour l'Avenir des Sciences et de Technologie (ATAST)
18. association. de développement. durable. et coopération. internationale. zriba
19. CAPSA LA NOUVELLE
20. Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy
21. Citoyenneté pour tous!
22. Errawassi de developpement
23. Femme libre SFAX
24. first skills club
25. Forum des jeunes pour la culture de citoyenneté
26. inma gafsa
27. Jeunes Leaders Tataouine
28. jeunes sans frontiéres
29. l horizon media et citoyenneté
30. NAKHLA
31. organisation tunisienne de défense des droits des personnes handicapées
32. Tacid network
33. tourisme 21
34. Tourisme et développement durable
35. Tunisian Association for Governance
36. Tunisian Scouts
37. Un Sourire Pour Tous
38. UTIL
39. vision du martyr de cherifet
40. Youth Decides
41. شبكة دستورنا
42. ابداع وفنون
43. اتحاد الشباب düيمقراطي التونسي
44. اطفال و شباب للتنشيط والتومادة الفئائية والتثقيفة الرقمية
45. الجمعية التونسية لقانون التنمية
46. الجماعية التونسية للمرافون
47. الجمعية التونسية للمرافون العمومين
48. الجمعية التونسية لمرضى الكلى و زارع الي الأعضاء
49. الجمعية التونسية لكافحة الفساد
50. الجمعية التونسية لوقاية من حوادث الطرقات
51. الجمعية التونسية نوران
52. الجمعية الوطنية للإبداع الثقافي
53. الجيش المدني
54. الشباب و التنمية
55. المنظمة الوطنية للمحرمون من حق الشغل
56. تنمية بلا حدود بنطاقين
57. تونس للتنمية
58. تونس النقد للاقتصاد
59. تونسيون من أجل الحق في الشغل
60. جماعة "عيد
61. "جمعية "بخلة
62. جماعة الشباب والعلم - نادي جرية
63. جماعة العدالة ورد الاغتيال
64. Association Justice et Réhabilitation
65. جماعة العمل المدني
جمعية المحرومين من الشغل
جمعية اوفياء الهوية
جمعية تنمية الكفاءات
جمعية تونس الخيرية مدنين
جمعية تونس للتفكير الدولي
جمعية حقنا بمدنين
جمعية فكهة للتوعية والإعلام
جمعية نماء للتنمية والديمقراطية
حركة النساء قادمات

Mouvement de femmes en
marche
حقنا
خلق وإبداع من أجل التنمية والتشغيل
رابطة الحقوقية الشبان
رابطة المهندسين التونسيين
رابطة الناشطات التونسيات
زايرا

مشاعل الحرية
منتدى الحوار والفكر الحر بمنزل بورقيبة
وفاء بلا حدود للتنمية البيئية و الا عمال الخيرية
## Appendix 2: List of 26 Organizational Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name</th>
<th>Interview Location</th>
<th>Open Government-Affiliated CSO?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I-Watch</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Afek Tounes Party</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. League of Tunisian Women Voters</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Association Tunisienne des Controleurs Publics (ATCP)</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID)</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Touensa</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Free Woman Association</td>
<td>Sfax</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ennahda Party Parliamentary Candidate*</td>
<td>Sfax</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ennahda Party NCA and Parliamentary Member*</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Justice and Rehabilitation Association</td>
<td>Sfax</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Sfax Associations Forum (350+ member NGO network)</td>
<td>Sfax</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. ADRA</td>
<td>Sfax</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Literacy and Friends of the Library Association</td>
<td>Sfax</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. International Republican Institute (IRI)*</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Al-Bawsala (Marsad Al Mawazana - Budget project)</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. African Youth Movement</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Sawty</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>18. Nidaa Tounes Party Election Committee Leader*</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Al-Bawsala (administration)</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Applied Social Sciences Forum (ASSF)</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. UN Development Programme (UNDP)*</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. Tunisian Association for Management and Social Stability (TAMS)</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. Jasmine Foundation</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Asterisk denotes “expert interview,” the remainder are all with representatives of civil society organizations.**
24. **Tounissiet** | Tunis | No
25. **Prime Minister Office (E-Government Unit)*** | Tunis | Yes (main government partner)
26. **AfriCan Charity** | Tunis | No
27. **Youth Decides** | Tunis | No
28. **Tunisian High Independent Authority For Elections (ISIE)*** | Tunis | N/A
29. **La Toile des Associations pour le Civisme et le Développement (TACID)** | Remote (Skype) | Yes

**Appendix 3: Regression Output**

<table>
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<th>Regression Statistics</th>
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<td>Multiple R</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R Square</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>Residual</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>t Stat</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Lower 95%</th>
<th>Upper 95%</th>
<th>Lower 95.0%</th>
<th>Upper 95.0%</th>
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<td>X Variable 1 (OG Affiliated or Not)</td>
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<td>X Variable 3 (Primary Sector: Service Delivery)</td>
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<td>-0.940763056</td>
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<td>0.401259204</td>
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<td>1.496703089</td>
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<td>X Variable 5 (Primary Sector: Networking)</td>
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<td>0.04827049</td>
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<td>1.50171835</td>
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**Appendix 4: Comparison of Open Government Perceptions and Priorities by Two Different Definitions of “Open Government Affiliated”**

Throughout this research we have considered different ways to characterize what CSOs can be considered "open government-affiliated” versus the unaffiliated. Here we provide supplementary information to illustrate how changing this definition altering the resulting ratings and perceptions of open government.

The definition of OG-affiliated used throughout this analysis was based on whether or not the CSO was one of about 15 organizations to participate in the initial consultation meeting regarding the formation of the joint government-civil society OGP Action Plan Steering Committee (run by the OECD in March 2014, soon after Tunisia was admitted to the Open Government Partnership).

However, we found that a significant number of survey respondents were members of TACID or tnOGP Collectif, two open government-focused coalitions, though they were not part of this initial group of 15. In order to get a...
sense of the impact of membership in an OG-affiliated network, we compare the results of these two different definitions (the former being “OGAffiliated1” and the latter “OGAffiliated2”) below.

- “OGAffiliated1” = one of about 15 CSOs that participated in initial the OECD’s initial OGP Action Plan Steering Committee Consultations (March 2014)

- “OGAffiliated2” = member of any open government-related networks (including TACID, tnOGP Collectif, etc.)

![Average Ratings of OG Principles (OpenGovAffiliated vs. Unaffiliated)](chart.png)
Appendix 5: Supplementary Survey Data

ORGANIZATIONAL ROLE OF SURVEY RESPONDENT

- Founder/Director
- Board Member
- Founding Member
- Staff

Average Ratings of OpenGov PRINCIPLES (OpenGov2 vs. the rest)

Transparency Accountability

Civic Engagement

Innovation and Technology

Non-OpenGovAffiliated2

OpenGovAffiliated2
Appendix 6: Key Takeaways from Correlation Analysis

The following bullets illustrate a series of issues in which a high degree of correlation was found.

- advocacy and networking (under CSO sectors)
- corporate accountability (general) and managing public resources (general)
- Managing public resources (general) and financial and procurement transparency (Tunisia-specific)
- Corporate accountability (general) and financial and procurement transparency (Tunisia-specific)
- Financial and procurement transparency (Tunisia-specific) and natural resource transparency (Tunisia-specific)
- Strongest correlation (0.72) seen across all combinations of the independent and dependent variables in the comprehensive correlation matrix was between financial and procurement transparency (Tunisia-specific) and Pub Integrity, Anti-Corruption, Transparency (Tunisia-specific)

Appendix 7: Full Electronic Survey

استبيان بحثي حول "المجتمع المدني التونسي والتحكيم المفتوحة"

Tunisian Civil Society & Open Government Research Questionnaire

يركز هذا البحث بالأساس على فهم آلية تعميق وتوسيع مشاركة المجتمع المدني التونسي في مبادرات "التحكيم المفتوحة" التي تطلقها الحكومة التونسية. فقد انضمت تونس لمبادرة شراكة الحكومة المفتوحة (شبكة دولية لتأييد الشفافية ومشاركة المواطنين في صياغة السياسات) العام
The basic purpose of this research is to understand how to deepen and broaden Tunisian civil society engagement in government’s “open government” initiatives. Last year, Tunisia joined the international Open Government Partnership (OGP) and recently the Tunisian Secretariat of State in Charge of Governance and Civil Service published Tunisia’s National OGP Action Plan. This Action Plan describes 20 commitments the government has made to promote open government in the next two years, all of which should include involvement of civil society. However, it is unclear how exactly the government might tailor civil society consultations based on the nature of different types of associations, so this research seeks to address this question.

This research is being done as a Master’s thesis for the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. It is also being done with the support of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) MENA Governance Programme (http://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/) which has been actively working with the Tunisian government on open government reforms. The results of this study are expected to be published by Harvard University and the OECD.

* Required

**Name of the Association**

*

**Role of Person Completing the Survey in the Association**

- Founder/Director
- Board Member
- Staff Member
- Volunteer
- Other:

**Email for the Organization**

*.

**Mission of Organization**

*.

Please check all that apply:

- To support the general development of Tunisian women
- To support the general development of Tunisian youth
- Support religious activities
- Support cultural and artistic activities
- Support environmental activities
- Deliver basic services to Tunisians in need
- Educate and promote awareness of political and social issues (including rights)

**Other:**

---

**Activities of the Association**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Service Delivery</th>
<th>This is our most important activity</th>
<th>We do not do this at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Year the Organization was Established**

- 2011
- 2012
- 2013
- 2014

**Number of full-time staff**

- 0، 1-2، 3-4، 5-9، أو أكثر

---

**Research**

<table>
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<th>3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>لا تقوم الجمعية بهذا النشاط على الإطلاق</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Policy advocacy/lobby**

<table>
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<th>3</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>لا تقوم الجمعية بهذا النشاط على الإطلاق</td>
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</table>

**Coalition Building & Networking**

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<tr>
<td>لا تقوم الجمعية بهذا النشاط على الإطلاق</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Government monitoring/watchdog activities

Economic development

Political awareness, rights, and/or civic engagement

Environmental activities

Empowerment of marginalized groups (women, youth, minorities, etc.)

Cultural and/or arts activities

Approximate size of annual budget

- Tunisian Dinars 4,999-0
- Tunisian Dinars 9,999-5,000
**Funding sources**

Please check all that apply

- International private foundations
- Tunisian businesses
- Membership fees
- International multilateral institutions (ex: UN, European Union)
- Other self-generated funds (please describe)
- International bilateral donors (ex: British embassy)

*Other:

**Geographical Presence**

Please check all that apply

- Greater Tunis: Governorate Tunis and Ariana
- The East: Governorate of Nabeul, Mahdia, and Sfax
- The Northwest: Kef Governorate
- The Western Central Region: Governorate of Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid
- The Southeast: Gabès Governorate, Medenine and Tataouine
- The Southwest: Governorate of Gafsa, Tozeur, and Kebili

**Are you a member of any of these networks?**

Please check all that apply

- Associations Forum of Sfax
- tnOGP Collectif
- La Toile des Associations pour le Civisme et le Développement (TACID)
Ranking Relative Importance of 4 Key Open Government Principles 1

1. Transparency

2. Accountability

3. Citizen Engagement

4. Innovation and Technology

Ranking Relative Importance of 5 Key Goals of Open Government 2

1. Improving Public Services

2. Increasing Public Integrity—(measures that address corruption, access to information, etc.)
3. More Effectively Managing Public Resources - (measures that address budgets, procurement, natural resources, and foreign assistance)*

فعالية إدارة الموارد العامة (بما في ذلك الموازنات، المشتريات الحكومية، الموارد الطبيعية، و المساعدات الخارجية)

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<td>أكثر أهمية</td>
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</table>

4. Creating Safer Communities - (including public safety, security sector, crisis response, etc.)

خلق مجتمعات أكثر أمنًا (بما في ذلك إصلاح قطاع الأمن، تحسين الأمن العام، مواجهة الأزمات، إلخ)

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5. Corporate Accountability - (business responsibility on the environment, anti-corruption, etc.)*

مساءلة الشركات (بما في ذلك مسئولية الشركات تجاه البيئة، مكافحة الفساد، إلخ)

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</table>

3. Rank the relative importance of the 4 categories of reforms in Tunisia’s Open Government Partnership (OGP) Action Plan

برجاء ترتيب الأهمية النسبية لعناصر الإصلاح الأربعة في خطة العمل الوطنية التونسية لشراكة الحوكمة المفتوحة

1) Strengthening integrity in public sector, fighting corruption and promoting democracy through a transparent government*

تعزيز النزاهة في القطاع العام ومحاربة الفساد ودعم الديمقراطية من خلال حكومة تتسم بالشفافية

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</table>

2) Improving public services delivery, strengthening the participatory approach within the public sector *

تحسين الخدمات العامة وتعزيز المنهج التشاركي في القطاع العام

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</table>

3) Improvement of transparency in the financial field and in the field of public procurement *

3. More Effectively Managing Public Resources - (measures that address budgets, procurement, natural resources, and foreign assistance) *
4) Improving transparency in natural resource management *

4. If you are familiar with the Tunisian government’s open government activities, how effective do you think these efforts have been at including citizen input and promoting civic participation?

5. Do you have any additional comments about making Tunisia’s open government programs more effective?

6. Do you have any additional comments about the role diverse civil society organizations can play in implementing such initiatives?

Thank you!

- Harvard University Kennedy School - Graduate Student (USA) - Research Contact: Nada Zohdy External Consultant for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) MENA Governance Programme

EMAIL: Nada_zohdy@hks15.harvard.edu