Disciplining of a Society
Social Disciplining and Civilizing Processes in Contemporary China

Thomas Heberer
August 2020
Disciplining of a Society
Social Disciplining and Civilizing Processes in Contemporary China

Thomas Heberer

August 2020
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Thomas Heberer is Senior Professor of Chinese Politics and Society at the Institute of Political Science and the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University Duisburg-Essen in Germany. He is specializing on issues such as political, social and institutional change, entrepreneurship, strategic groups, the Chinese developmental state, urban and rural development, political representation, corruption, ethnic minorities and nationalities' policies, the role of intellectual ideas in politics, fieldwork methodology, and political culture. Heberer is conducting fieldwork in China on almost an annual basis since 1981. He recently published the book “Weapons of the Rich. Strategic Action of Private Entrepreneurs in Contemporary China” (Singapore, London, New York: World Scientific 2020, co-authored by G. Schubert). On details of his academic oeuvre, research projects and publications see his website: http://uni-due.de/oapol/.
DISCIPLINING OF A SOCIETY
Social Disciplining and Civilizing Processes in Contemporary China

ABOUT THE ASH CENTER

The Roy and Lila Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation advances excellence and innovation in governance and public policy through research, education, and public discussion. By training the very best leaders, developing powerful new ideas, and disseminating innovative solutions and institutional reforms, the Center’s goal is to meet the profound challenges facing the world’s citizens. The Ford Foundation is a founding donor of the Center. Additional information about the Ash Center is available at ash.harvard.edu.

This research paper is one in a series published by the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. The views expressed in the Ash Center Occasional Paper Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the John F. Kennedy School of Government or of Harvard University. The papers in this series are intended to elicit feedback and to encourage debate on important public policy challenges.

This paper is copyrighted by the author(s). It cannot be reproduced or reused without permission. Pursuant to the Ash Center’s Open Access Policy, this paper is available to the public at ash.harvard.edu free of charge.
CONTENTS

Abstract 1
Introduction 2
Social Disciplining—The Concept 6
The Chinese Concept and Discourses of Discipline/Disciplining and Civilizing 14
Disciplining Processes in China: Political Culture Matters 19
The Chinese State as a Developmental State with Disciplining Capacity 38
Disciplining Processes in China Under Xi Jinping 40
Case Study 1: The Moral State: Creating a “New Social Morality” 45
Case Study 2: The Anti-Corruption Campaign 52
Case Study 3: The “Social Credit System” 57
Further Fields of Disciplining 63
Conclusion 66
References 68
ABSTRACT

In this paper, we specifically focus on the social disciplining process in China since 2012, i.e., in the Xi Jinping era, although we also briefly touch upon historical aspects of disciplining (Confucianism, Legalism, New Life Movement” in the 1930s political campaigns in the Mao era, etc.). The approach adopted in this paper is to conduct an analysis of the disciplining/civilizing top-down project of the state.

We argue that the function of the current Chinese state as a disciplining and civilizing entity is the connecting link tying policies such as the state’s morality policies, its anti-corruption drive or the so-called “social credit system” together under a specific governance logic: to discipline and civilize society in order to prepare the people to become modernized. In fact, modernization and modernity encompass not only a process of economic and political-administrative modernizing but concurrently one related to the organization of society in general and the disciplining of this society and its individuals to create people with “modernized” minds in particular.

Our principal research questions in this paper are twofold: (1) How should disciplining and civilizing processes in general and in contemporary China in particular be understood? (2) What kind of policies and tools does the Chinese state use to pursue and implement its disciplining objectives? This paper thus contributes to the understanding of the logic and rationality of China’s political system, its developmental goals and its disciplining and modernizing trajectories. In this way, it also enhances our knowledge of comparative modernizing processes and multiple modernities.

The paper is structured as follows: First, we clarify our concept of social disciplining in a general sense, building on the propositions of Weber, Elias, Foucault and Oestreich. In a second step, we examine the Chinese concepts of and discourses on discipline/disciplining and civilizing. Thirdly, we trace disciplining processes and ideas in China from the perspective of political culture. Fourthly, we address the function of the Chinese state as both a developmental and a disciplining state striving for a new and modern social order, before, fifthly, we analyze current disciplining efforts. In the final section, we examine three case studies: the functioning of the state as a “moral state”; the ongoing anti-corruption campaign since 2014; and the so-called “social credit system.” We will also briefly touch upon further disciplining or civilizing
domains such as cyberspace control, the cadres' evaluation system, civilizing ethnic minorities, and measures to fight the coronavirus pandemic. We then summarize our main findings in the conclusion.

**Keywords**
Modernizing minds and behavior, disciplining and civilizing processes, self-disciplining, morality state, developmental state, anti-corruption drive, social credit system

**INTRODUCTION**

Since 2014, there have been increasing reports that China's political development under current party leader Xi Jinping has taken on ever more repressive traits. The growing nannyism and content restrictions on scientists, public intellectuals, NGOs and international organizations, and the punishment or detention of critics have been criticized by Western countries, as have phenomena such as the “Social Credit System,” strict Internet censorship and the methods of dealing with the Uighurs in Xinjiang. The initial question addressed in this paper is which logic and objective of the party state (hereinafter: state) are hidden behind these various measures and to what extent these factors can be attributed to a specific and uniform political purpose. In our opinion, simply referring to the will of the party leadership to maintain power is not sufficient to explain these phenomena and their inner coherence. This applies all the more as power always has a functional aspect as well: to serve distinct objectives, be it in the interests of the leader(s), the nation or both. At the heart of the current leadership's efforts stands the mission of developing China into a comprehensive modernized entity by 2050 (see page 43).

In this paper, we argue that the function of the current Chinese state as a disciplining and civilizing entity is the connecting link tying all the above-mentioned policies together under a specific governance logic: to discipline and civilize society in order to prepare the people to become modernized. In fact, modernization and modernity encompass not only a process of economic and political-administrative modernizing but concurrently one related to the organization of society in general and the
disciplining of this society and its individuals to create people with “modernized” minds in particular (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Varieties of China’s Modernizing Processes

© Thomas Heberer

Thomas B. Stephens (1992, 17) noted that: “Discipline is a state of mind. It is that state of mind which accepts without question the submission of the will and to the interest of a hierarchical superior in a group.” This is, however, a rather military definition which fades out both the process of internalizing discipline and of inducing a kind of self-disciplinization and self-discipline in individuals.

Of course, a “modern” mind does not mean that only one specific form of modern mind exists and figures as an example to be achieved by each society in the world. Rather, there are multiple patterns of “modern” minds, varying from country to country and from culture to culture.

Without doubt, modernization is not a unilinear process of or trajectory to modernity as, for instance, some proponents of the early modernization theories believed, a process by which the “underdeveloped” or “late developing” countries gradually adopted Western democracy and Western values, thus following the European example. Instead, we speak of “multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt 2002, Meyer and de Sales Marques 2018), i.e., a broad variety of models of modernizing and modernization. Eisenstadt, for example, rejects the assumption of a homogenizing Western blueprint of modernization and modernities, arguing instead that we face “multiple institutional
and ideological patterns” in the modern world, many of them accompanied by “strong anti-Western or even antimodern themes” that are still “distinctively modern” (Eisenstadt 2002, 2). In a similar vein, Tu Weiming claims that the non-Western world has spawned specific cases of modernization and modernity (Tu 2002, 217). In addition, “late arrivals” cannot repeat the earlier sequences of industrial development (Bendix 1967, 328). In this light, the Chinese leadership bespeaks a “Chinese path to development” which would differ from Western concepts of modernization.

With regard to Europe, historian Gerhard Oestreich (1969) described this process of modernizing the minds of the people as “social disciplining” (Sozialdisziplinierung). He characterized “social disciplining” as a historical process aimed at bringing about a consensus among the members of society on the values and norms that should regulate their behavior and, if necessary, be imposed in a top-down manner by the state. We argue that the modernization concept we present here includes the adjustment of political authority to the requirements of social regulation and disciplining. Sheilagh Ogilvie (2006, 43) explained that its meaning is that the state intervenes in the private life of individual people thus spawning a societal behavior essential for the creation of a “well-ordered” state and the “capitalist modernization of the economy.”

Specifically in Europe, the modernizing process in terms of industrialization and social change in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries spawned a huge transformation of the power structure of societies, of concepts of political order and individual morality (see e.g., Kieser 2016). Increasingly, modernization was accompanied by a top-down disciplining project, often framed as a “civilizational project” which legitimized the invention of the state monopoly on the use of force and the institutionalization of a disciplining apparatus. This project was not a fully unorganized one but was pursued through a planned process in which the military, the clergy, state educators, the Inquisition, town councils, poorhouses, political theoreticians, witch-hunting and the organization of industrial labor played a crucial role.

As Samuel Huntington’s seminal and controversial book “The Clash of Civilizations” (1996) has shown, civilization is not merely a historical category but is still a widely debated issue today. Huntington has brought this notion of civilizations back into the international foreground. The concept has always been controversial since it encompassed different issues such as a specific level of societal development, as
regulated and disciplined behavior and etiquette, or even eurocentristic and colonialist perceptions (see e.g., O’Hagan 2007).

In this paper, we focus on the social disciplining process in China since 2012, i.e., in the Xi Jinping era, although we also briefly touch upon historical aspects of disciplining (Confucianism, Legalism. The “New Life Movement” in the 1930s, political campaigns in the Mao era, etc.). We do not intend, in this paper, to examine the response of social organizations and social groups to state-led disciplining processes and the self-regulation of local communities. That is a matter for further study within the context of an envisioned research project and by means of fieldwork. The approach adopted in this paper is, rather, to conduct an analysis of the disciplining/civilizing top-down project of the state. Concurrently, we are fully aware that the Chinese leaders do not exert strict control over all domains of social life covering every pocket of society in a top-down manner.

Our principal research questions in this paper are twofold:

1. How should disciplining and civilizing processes in general and in contemporary China in particular be understood?
2. What kind of policies and tools does the Chinese state use to pursue and implement its disciplining objectives?

This paper is structured as follows: First, we clarify our concept of social disciplining in a general sense, building on the propositions of Weber, Elias, Foucault and Oestreich. In a second step, we examine the Chinese concepts of and discourses on discipline/disciplining and civilizing. Thirdly, we trace disciplining processes and ideas in China from the perspective of political culture. Fourthly, we address the function of the Chinese state as both a developmental and a disciplining state striving for a new and modern social order, before, fifthly, we analyze current disciplining efforts. In the final section, we examine three case studies: the functioning of the state as a “moral state”; the ongoing anti-corruption campaign since 2014; and the so-called “social credit system.” We will also briefly touch upon further disciplining or civilizing domains such as cyberspace control, the cadres’ evaluation system, civilizing ethnic minorities, and measures to fight the coronavirus pandemic. We then summarize our main findings in the conclusion.
SOCIAL DISCIPLINING—THE CONCEPT

Earlier European political philosophers such as Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) were already concerned with the issue of societal disciplining. Thomas Hobbes explicitly emphasized the necessity to create disciplined citizens (Krüger 2005; Burchell 1999). “Man is not fitted for society by nature, but by discipline,” wrote Hobbes (Gordon 1991, 14). In the 20th century, major exponents of modernization processes such as Max Weber, Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault associated modernizing with the issue of disciplining.

Undoubtedly, Max Weber’s rationalization concept and rationality approach provided a major stimulus for the social science debate on modern organization, administration, a rational system of rule, and modernization processes in a more general sense. Weber was also one of the early sociologists combining the political, economic, structural and cultural dimensions in analyzing modernizing processes and modernity. For Weber, state-building was primarily linked to rationalization and administrative centralization. He was convinced that rationalization would trigger modernity. His concept of rationalization explicitly comprises the issue of disciplinization. Rationalization is primarily related to civil service, characterized by “rational specialization and training. The Chinese mandarin was not a specialist but a ‘gentleman’ with a literary and humanistic education” (Weber 1978, Vol. 2., 1401). Weber defined “discipline” as the “probability that by virtue of habituation a command will receive prompt and automatic obedience in stereotyped forms, on the part of a given group of persons” (Weber 1978, Vol. 1, 53). On the one hand, he conceived of discipline primarily as a negative term, as a mere part of the exercise of power, and as “habituation” and “uncritical and unresisting mass obedience” (Weber 1978, Vol. 2, 827). On the other hand, for Weber, discipline was

nothing but the consistently rationalized, methodically prepared and exact execution of the received order, in which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswervingly and exclusively set for carrying out the command (Weber 1978, Vol. 2, 1149).
In addition, he emphasized the necessity of “social action” and the rational obedience of an “especially large mass” by “training” (Weber 1978, Vol. 2, 1149). Weber called this “rational discipline” (ibid.), referring to “ethical motives” such as devotion, sense of duty, conscientiousness and empathy of the guided according to the will of the leaders (ibid., 1149/1150). In his publication “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” he wrote about the “ethos” of Western Europe and US capitalism embodying traits such as honesty, punctuality, efficiency and professionalism. In capitalism, he argued, “undisciplined” workers and unscrupulous business people were simply of no use. He summarized the corresponding discipline and the way of life associated with it as the “Spirit of Capitalism” (Weber 1988, 34–42). Elsewhere, he mentioned other factors of a rational discipline with regard to politicians: passion, sense of responsibility, objectivity, and duty of truth, and demanded an “ethics for politicians” (Weber 2014, 72–81). The general conscription in the 19th century and the discipline of the military (“mother’s lap of discipline”) and large enterprises were, for him, decisive institutions with regard to social disciplining (Weber 1978, Vol. 2, 1150–1156).

Weber regarded disciplining as one of the key categories of modern and rationalized societies which shaped the actions of the populace by internalizing the rules and objectives that should be achieved by means of internalizing power. What Weber did not clarify and probably did not want to clarify was, on the one hand, the historical process of disciplinization, on which the discipline of modern times could build, and, on the other hand, the concrete patterns of the enforcement of social, rational discipline. At the same time, the analysis of interconnectedness between the state and discipline was neglected in Weber’s writings. It was mainly three other researchers who—based on Weber’s rather general statements on discipline and disciplinization—tried to clarify these processes: Norbert Elias, Michel Foucault and Gerhard Oestreich. Despite many differences in their theoretical approaches and in the interpretation of the term “discipline,” all of them share the interest in the long-term process toward modernity and the changes of human behavior and action emerging during this process.

Elias enriched Weber’s rationalization approach by embedding it in disciplining and civilizing processes that allowed the conditions for rational behavior to be created, i.e., a disciplining ethic. In his work “On the Process of Civilization,” he spoke of the fact that “the personality structure of the individual changes,” thus becoming
“civilized” (Elias 1989, Vol. 1, LXIV–LXV). By this, he meant the “forms of conduct or behavior of people,” their “social quality,” their manners, language, clothing and form of living (Elias 1989, Vol. 1, 317). Growing control of emotions and drives, refinement of manners, increasing self-control instead of external control, greater mutual consideration and empathy, rationalization of thinking in the sense of calculating the consequences of one’s actions in advance, and ultimately the internalization of such values by individuals were the results of this process. Elias understood this not as an individual, but rather as a societal, i.e., collective process, which he examined for the time window of the Renaissance, in which a growing social differentiation and division of labor developed. With this in mind, he wrote:

As more and more people must attune their conduct to that of other, the web of actions must be organized more and more strictly and accurately, if each individual action is to fulfill its social function. Individuals are compelled to regulate their conduct in an increasingly differentiated, more even and more stable manner (Elias 2000, 367).

As described below (page 13), for Elias, no “zero-point” of civilizing exists; rather, it is a continuous process. He thus counters the allegation that “less civilized people” are inferior to “civilized” ones. Elias’s concept of civilization therefore does not stand for westernization but—as Jocelyne Cesari has argued—“rather to the internationalization of western concepts of nation, state, and religion and their grafting in different cultural milieus” (Cesari 2019, 26–27).

In principle, Elias drew upon Weber’s concept of disciplining. Whereas Weber described discipline rather as an instrument of power over the subjects, Elias dealt specifically with the change in behavior in an overall social context, i.e., with the standardization of social behavior. He compared this process with the modern road traffic of a big city, which requires each individual to control and regulate himself and adhere to the existing rules in order to ensure a proper traffic flow (Elias 1989, Vol. 2, 318–319). The latter is ultimately related to both disciplinization (by the state) and self-disciplinization.

Foucault in turn defines “government” as the “totality of institutions and practices by which one steers people” (Foucault 1996, 119). Accordingly, power in a
hierarchical political system functions via the ability to “bring subjects to a specific behaviour” (power from within) (Foucault 2005, 255–257). This includes both the setting and enforcing of rules and the stimulation of “technologies of the self” (Foucault 1979b, 1990 and 1992). In contrast to Elias, in “Discipline and Punishment” Foucault deals with the dark sides of disciplining, i.e., the disciplinizing processes in France from the middle of the 17th to the beginning of the 19th century and “subjugation [Zurichtung, T.H.] of the subject” by means of disciplining techniques. He highlights that the new economic conditions of capitalism and industrialization require an “economization of the system of punishing”: the disciplining of people first in the monasteries, the military, the schools, factories, prisons and psychiatric clinics and later through new technologies (Foucault 1979).

In a hierarchical political system, as Foucault put it, power is expressed as the ability to “make subjects behave in a specific way” without the people affected noticing. Be it in the form of an act of coercion followed by an act of obedience, be it by disciplining actors to behave in a certain way: actors learn that they must behave according to the prevailing rules and norms, otherwise they may be punished if their rule violation is discovered. Foucault’s (2010) concept of “governmentality” thus adds a further facet of power to disciplining. Foucault is convinced that the most effective form of wielding power is when those who are dominated accept as their own the preferences of those who dominate, because this reduces the costs of supervision. In addition, if individuals become thoroughly familiar with the preferences of their dominators, they might even presage preference changes. In this way, they assist in upholding, and even improving, dominance structures.

Foucault’s approach of “technologies of managing people” (Foucault 2010, 46) added the facet of disciplinary power in the administrative system as a means to achieve discipline, self-discipline and conformity among people. He primarily characterized the state as an entity of disciplining and surveillance, apparently overlooking the other side of the coin, i.e., its function as an educating and moralizing state. In the words of Bourdieu, the state is not only a coercive force but also a training instrument (Dressurinstrument) (Bourdieu 2014, 281).

The historian Gerhard Oestreich criticized Weber’s thesis of rationalization as the dominant form of and attitude toward life in capitalist modernity. He explained
that rationalization also existed in absolutist polities. Implicitly, he pointed to an important factor, namely that in the history of state-building and in the theory of the state, debates were primarily focused on economic, military, fiscal and administrative issues, but rarely touched upon disciplinizing and psycho-social aspects. At the same time, he pointed out that absolutist rulers not only thought of ways to maintain power and to increase their own resources, but also saw themselves as competent, responsible leaders and embodiments of the community acting in the interests of maintaining the political and social order of a given polity. The latter in particular became necessary due to extensive migration movements of rural dwellers to urban areas. The state therefore launched a disciplining program to enforce a new concept of order.

This latter point is also of significance in terms of the current Chinese case. Even under absolutist rulers—as Oestreich notes—rulers would have tried to enforce what he called “social disciplinization,” i.e., the disciplining of all subjects with regard to their work (discipline and efficiency), their morals (“virtues”), attitudes, and the education to self-discipline (internalization of these virtues) (Oestreich 1968, 337–343). The social causes of these measures were the growth of cities, the increasing density of the population and the mode of habitation, processes of urban capitalist industrialization and associated with that the growing social division of labor and social dependencies, and finally the increasing variety of tasks and expenditure of the state (see Simmel 1995, 131; Thompson 1967, 56–97). This led to a “fundamental disciplinization,” which from the 18th century onwards gradually covered the entire society (Oestreich, ibid.). The latter differs from the civilization process described by Elias, which commenced from the social elites, whereas Oestreich was more concerned with the top-down process of the absolutist state.

Having said that, Weber, Elias, Foucault and Oestreich coincide in their view that disciplining is a process from external coercion toward the internalization of restraints that are indispensable to achieve social order. In contrast to the Middle Ages, when external coercion was relatively ineffective since it did not spawn internalization of rules and norms, external action aimed at internalizing was therefore a more successful way of disciplining (van Krieken 1981, 606).

---

1 John O’Neill (1986, 47) even argues that “worker discipline was the main ingredient aimed at improving the moral habits of the laboring poor, to make them orderly, punctual, responsible and temperate.”
Based on the approaches of Weber (rationalizing), Elias (civilizing), Foucault (disciplining) and Oestreich (social disciplining), we will try to trace and examine the disciplinary efforts of the current Chinese state. While we define discipline as the fitting of a person into the order of a community and mastering one's own will, feelings and inclinations (self-discipline), in this paper we focus on the issue of “social disciplining.” We define social disciplining as the implementation of government measures aimed at disciplined behavior and finally self-discipline or self-regulation within a given society in the interests of this larger community.

Historically, by means of social disciplining, a consensus was reached in terms of the societal value system and the rules of social behavior. The objective was the disciplining of the entire society and the steering of every individual to internalize the new core values and behavior. In the end, Oestreich’s approach starts out from the perspective of a top-down manner by which the centralized state initiates processes of disciplining. Oestreich characterized this behavior of the state as a mere “tendency” since both social forces and different government levels (provinces, cities, counties) also impact on central government’s policies and its concept of disciplining society.² From the perspective of state-building, Gorski also speaks of a “top-down process” in cases where the state figures as the principal actor (Gorski 2003, xvi, 31). As explained above, this paper focuses on the top-down processes as a part of the state’s disciplining policies and technologies, and does not touch upon the multitude of bottom-up processes.

With regard to Europe, Gorski speaks of a “disciplinary revolution.” He writes:

Like the industrial revolution, the disciplinary revolution transformed the material and technological bases of production; it created new mechanisms for the production of social and political order. And, like the industrial revolution, the disciplinary revolution was driven by a key technology: the technology of observation—self-observation, mutual observation, hierarchical observation. For it

---

² Critics of Oestreich’s approach contend that his arguments were too etatist, i.e., merely analyzing disciplining from the vantage point of the state, see e.g., Schmidt 1997. Since in China the state is the predominant organization and a civil society is widely lacking, a rather state-centered perspective certainly makes more sense here than in the European case.
was observation—surveillance—that made it possible to unleash the energies of the human soul—another well-known but little-used resource—and harness them for the purposes of political power and domination. What steam did for the modern economy . . . discipline did for the modern polity: by creating more obedient and industrious subjects with less coercion and violence, discipline dramatically increased, not only the regulatory power of the state, but its extractive and coercive capacities as well (Gorski 2003, xvi).

The term “disciplinary revolution” is defined by Gorski as a “revolutionary struggle . . . which has, as one of its chief ends, the creation of a more disciplined polity” (Gorski 2003, ibid.).

“Civilizing,” the Chinese government’s preferred term (as will be shown in the following section), has different meanings in different cultures (Elias 1989, Vol. 1, 1–4). Borrowing from Elias, we use it, on the one hand, in relation to creating a new societal morality and, on the other hand, in the sense of “civilized behavior” related to good manners and decency, refinement of life and civilized standards in terms of violence, bodily functions, table manners, forms of speech, i.e., social etiquette and internalized self-restraint. We argue that civilizing people’s behavior in this sense is part and parcel of the process of social disciplining. As the Chinese argumentation shows, it does not mean “westernization”; in fact, it is strongly embedded in China’s traditional culture. 3

Elias uses this term not to describe something superior in the sense of civilizing “inferior” societies or social groups but to signify a continuous project:

There is no zero-point of civilizing processes, no point at which human beings are uncivilized and as it were begin to be civilized. No human being lacks the capacity for self-restraint. No human group could function for any length of time whose adults failed to develop, within the wild and at first totally unrestrained little beings, as which humans are born, patterns of self-regulation and self-restraint. What changes in the course of a civilizing process are the social patterns of

3 Accordingly, Dieter Senghaas (1998, 22) speaks here of an “engagement of cultures with themselves.” However, we do not use this term in a Western imperialist-colonialist sense or merely in the sense of an external process of civilizing other people (e.g., other ethnic groups), something Osterhammel 2006, 9 called the “weapon of a ‘hegemonic culture.’”
individual self-restraint and the manner in which they are built into the individual person in the form of what one now calls ‘conscience’ or perhaps ‘reason’ (Elias, op. cit. in Cesari 2019, 25).

In an interview in 1989, Elias further elaborated the idea of the nonexistence of a zero-point and negated the existence of an absolute stage of being civilized or uncivilized:

"The theory of civilisation shows that one can never speak of an absolute state of being civilised or of an absolute state of being uncivilised, but only of stages of civilisation. The idea that there were ever uncivilised human beings is just as false as the idea that one day there might be absolutely civilised human beings. All that can be observed are changeable relationships of equilibrium between more or less civilised tendencies of self-regulation. But, undoubtedly, the self-regulation of human beings in complex industrialised states is more pervasive and more uniform than in simpler societies." 4

With regard to disciplinization, constant surveillance, supervision and information-gathering are central instruments of exerting discipline and policing people’s behavior. Today, these instruments are becoming increasingly sophisticated by means of new technologies such as artificial intelligence, face recognition, and cyberspace control. Without doubt, China is a forerunner in terms of developing and making full use of such sophisticated surveillance technologies. Drawing on Christopher Dandeker, we argue that surveillance and “surveillance capacity,” i.e., effective bureaucratic surveillance, are “the basis of systems of administrative power in modern societies” (Dandeker 1990, 194).

Giddens speaks of two types of surveillance in modern societies: the accumulation of “coded information” to “administer the activities of individuals about whom it is gathered” and stored, and the “direct supervision of the activities of some individuals by others in positions of authority over them” (Giddens 1985, 14). Talking about the capacity of the state to surveil and monitor, he speaks of the state’s “disciplinary power” (ibid., 15) as crucial for internal pacification and securing law and order (ibid., 189).

4 ‘In reality, we are all late barbarians’ (1989): Interview with Helmut Hetzel. https://quod.lib.umich.edu/h/humfig/11217607.0002.208/-/four-interviews-with-norbert-elias?gn=main;view=fulltext (accessed 14 June 2020).
However, as mentioned previously, disciplining states do not just serve as actors trying to enforce discipline through administration, penalties and surveillance. They also influence the disciplining process by means of educational, ideological and socializing factors. The goal is to achieve not a slavish subject mentality, but the subjectification of the people, i.e., the creation of subjects who internalize discipline in terms of self-disciplining, who are aware of the rules and norms and consciously respect them.⁵

THE CHINESE CONCEPT AND DISCOURSES OF DISCIPLINE/
DISCIPLINING AND CIVILIZING

The currently used Chinese term for discipline *jìlǜ* (纪律) has a history going back more than two thousand years. In the ancient written records, it is mentioned in the “Zuo Zhuan” (The Commentary of Zuo), which is thought to have originated in the 3rd century BC. In this record, we find the sentence “A hundred officials are wary of discipline out of fear,"⁶ which sounds rather Legalistic (see pages 29–30) since it relates to both discipline and fear. The expression originally referred to the observance of Confucian moral rules. The modern Chinese term *jìlǜ* resembles the “Western” one in the sense of protecting collective interests, complying with rules and regulations and steering the behavior of people, but also points to two further factors: (a) to historic and cultural differences, and (b) to enforcing compliance by imposing external constraints.⁷ According to the “Modern Mandarin-Chinese Dictionary” (*Xiándài Hányǔ Cìdiǎn*, 1979, 528), the term is more related to the collective interest of and rule-based processes in organizations.

In the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the term discipline was and is primarily related to party (political) or military discipline, less to the issue of social disciplining (see e.g., Li Peng 2018). Effective disciplinization requires, in turn, supervision and surveillance technologies in order to be effective. Behavioral codes should be gradually memorized by individuals, so that they become a constituent element of

⁵ On subjectification, see Foucault 2006, 237.
the individual himself. The ultimate objective of disciplining until today is to establish self-control internalized by individuals. Nowadays, the use of jilü is rarely used with regard to societal discipline.

There is, however, another term in use for discipline, guixun (规训). With regard to Foucault’s book “Discipline and Punish” or Oestreich’s “Social Disciplining,” in both cases discipline/disciplining has been translated as guixun, and social disciplining as shehui guixun (社会规训) (Hu Yingfeng 2012). As for the Chinese concepts of discipline and disciplining, both 纪律 and 规训 are used. According to renowned political scientist Yu Keping (Peking University), both are modern concepts rather than ancient ones. However, as Yu notes, 纪律 originated from the traditional Chinese army, while 规训 is pretty much a new term. While the terms 规 and 训 were used in traditional Confucian texts, the combination 规训 was seldom used. 规训 as a new term became more popular when the title of Foucault’s book “Discipline and Punish” was translated as “规训与惩罚” (guixun and chengfa). But interestingly, the Chinese term 规训 stands not only for disciplining but also for self-disciplining.9

Dr. Du Lun from the University of Duisburg-Essen argues that due to different traditions, the notion of “disciplining” is also varying. In the context of governance, terms such as “governing by virtue” (德政, dezheng) and “rule by rites” (礼治, lizhi) played a more prominent role in China’s political culture. 纪律 was rarely used in such a context, but there was more use of terms such as “changing through education” 教化 (jiaohua) and “educate and change the minds of the people” (教民, jiaomin). The modern term 规训 in turn is less concerned with rules but means “instructing” or

8 Guixun yu chengfa (Discipline and Punish), https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E8%A7%84%E8%AE%AD%E4 %B8%8E%E6%83%A8%E7%BD%9A%E7%9B%91%E7%8B%B1%E7%9A%84%E8%AF%9E%E7%94%9F/15262496?fromtitle=%E8%A7%84%E8%AE%AD%E4%B8%8E%E6%83%A9%E7%BD%9A&fromid=771350 2 (accessed 14 June 2020); Angzang de ren: zaoqi jindai deyizhi de “kechi qunti yu shehui guixun” (Dirty people: Early period of modern Germany’s disgraceful community and social disciplining). https://zhuanlan .zhihu.com/p/87063658 (accessed 14 June 2020).
9 Personal communication with Yu Keping, 11 June 2020. I am very grateful for his advice.
10 Jiaohua (transformed by education) was already in use in China in the 19th century to explain European civilization. For more on this, see Hirono 2008, 24–26. Hirono related this notion to Confucian thought “which held that the emperor had superior morality, and that this task was to ‘educate’ people and lead them to righteousness and morality” (ibid., 26). Pines (2012, 121) translates it as “moral transformation of the people.”
“teaching.” Finally, guanjiao (管教) is another concept translated as “discipline” but is connected to Confucian ideas of being subject to education, instruction or training.

The CCP considers discipline and moral education more as an essential part of its civilizing project (wenminghua, 文明化), the state’s “attempts to subject the population to new modes of discipline, inscribed as ‘civilized’” (Anagnost 1997, 12), i.e., to create a “civilized society.” The modern concept of “civilization” (translated as wenming) seems to have arrived in China via Japan, which in turn borrowed it from the French concept of “civilisation” (Wang Gungwu 1982, 2). The term wen is an expression of ancient Chinese thinking and relates to people who are able to read and write Chinese and are educated (in a Confucian sense). It is, therefore, related to Chinese (traditional) culture and morals as a precondition of Chineseness. Thus, it differs from the modern word “civilization.” Yang and Hua (2006, 1) even interpret “civilized society” as “a culturally sophisticated one.” Hirono (2008, 24) translates wenming as “enlightened by culture,” which essentially describes the basic concept behind this term.

Wang Gungwu explains that non-Chinese could also be accepted as “civilized” if they fulfilled these criteria:

> It was not Chinese against non-Chinese, it was those Chinese who had civilization as opposed to all those who did not have it. Those who did have it included non-Chinese as well as other Chinese (Wang 1982, 23).

Civilization in China, as Osterhammel (2006, 11) noted, “was an achievement, and others were encouraged to make a similar effort.” At the same time, civilizing was the task of and was brought about by “wise rulers or leaders,” meaning that it is not born out of the initiative of individuals but comes from the (“wise”) ruler who urges the people to change: to “become civilized is to change” (Wang 1982, 27–28). However, the interrelationship between civilized (the elite) and non-civilized persons (ordinary people) is a hierarchical one.

With regard to modern civilization, historian Xu Jilin (2020, 3) raised another interesting point. He distinguished between modernity (related to “wealth and power”)...
and modern civilization, related to “a set of value systems and corresponding institutional arrangements.” He argued that since the late 19th century, many Chinese have perceived wealth and power to be most crucial and considered civilization and values to be less important. “So for a long period,” Xu writes (2020, 7), “wealth and power took precedence over civilization.” He added:

. . . the attitude of Chinese people toward modern civilization was to pay less attention to universal civilizational values and the corresponding system of rule of law, and more to the technical side, the non-value-related aspects of science and technology, the rational order and the capitalist spirit. After a century and a half of hard work, the China Dream finally became a reality. But only half of the dream was actually realized, and China’s modernity remained incomplete. Wealth and power “rose up,” but civilization remains lost in a haze (Xu 2020, 7).

This very fact could explain why the focus of political and social concern is now moving more in the direction of Xu’s interpretation of the concept of civilization.

But what does the current Chinese leadership mean by “civilization”? Alison Kaufman (2018, 2–3) argues that Xi Jinping uses the term in a threefold way: (a) a people tied together by a shared geography, language and history over a long timeframe; (b) in the sense of “culture” (shaped by common mindset, values, history, etc.); and (c) referring to a “process of human development” differing from “non-civilized” people and displaying a type of behavior conceived of as “non-civilized.” This normative understanding, which is strongly related to top-down disciplining and civilizing efforts by the state, is highly relevant for this study. As Kaufman points out,

China’s entire modernization project, from 1840 to today, can be viewed as a quest to become “civilized” . . . that is, to reorient its internal characteristics in such a way [as] to guarantee its national strength, self-determination, and influence in the global arena (Kaufman 2018, 3).

---

13 This resembles Prasenjit Duara’s definition of civilizing as efforts bringing true and proper civilizational virtues to all (Duara 2001, 122).
We further argue that there exists a fourth facet: to discipline and civilize one’s own people so that they will be prepared and their behavior comes into line with the 2050 goal of China’s “comprehensive modernization” program. It is the latter on which this study is focused.

Baidu, the biggest Chinese search engine and most important encyclopedia, informs us that civilization in the Chinese context comprises five factors: material, political, national, social and human civilization. Meanwhile, two further ones have been added: ecological and internet civilization. As related to society, “civilized society” (wenming shehui) refers to the combination of the elements “civilized social relations, civilized social ideas, civilized social systems, and civilized social behavior.” In a narrow sense, “social civilizing” encompasses the factors “civilizing of social subjects” (personal development, family happiness, neighborhood harmony, social harmony), of social relationships (interpersonal, family, neighborhood, community and group relationships), of social ideas (social theories, societal psychology, social manners and customs, and social morality14), of the social system (social institutions, social structures, social policies, social laws), and of social behavior (social activities, social work, social management).15 At the 17th National Congress of the CCP in 2007, “civilizing” (wenminghua) was mentioned 13 times in the report of then General Secretary Hu Jintao16. At the 19th Party Congress (2017), Xi Jinping referred 45 times to the term civilization,17 which shows that it had become increasingly prominent. The civilizing concept of the central leadership has meanwhile trickled down to the lower levels (see pages 49–51).

As described in the following section, we are concerned with the underlying intentions as well with the practical policies to improve the “civilized” and (disciplined) “quality” (suzhi) of the Chinese people. We try to figure out the mechanisms of “haunting,” as Avery F. Gordon (2008, xvi) labeled the process of enforcing discipline

---

14 This aspect is sometimes referred to as “spiritual civilization” (jingshen wenming), based on “traditional Chinese culture” and centering on Confucian ideas and ethics. See Jingshen wenming, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%B2%BE%E7%A5%9E%E6%96%87%E6%98%8E (accessed 1 May 2020).
15 Shehui wenming. https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E6%96%87%E6%98%8E (accessed 1 April 2020).
that is internalized within people's thinking and behavior, leading to self-control. “Haunting” is conceived of as “producing a something-to-be-done,” something that “must be done” (Gordon 2008, ibid.).

As argued above, civilizing is one crucial aspect of social disciplining. Whereas discipline relates primarily to a top-down process in which an entire society is educated to compliance, finally internalizing general norms and rules, civilizing is more related to social behavior imposed by the elite on the ordinary people with regard to modernity. Since civilizing is the predominant term in China, we will use both in this article.

**DISCIPLINING PROCESSES IN CHINA: POLITICAL CULTURE MATTERS**

Weber, Oestreich and Gorski were primarily concerned with European disciplining processes, particularly their relatedness to Protestantism and Calvinism. In Europe, the disciplining process is associated with the rise of cities and a specific urban life. Van der Loo and van Reijen (1992, 135) identified three initial avenues of disciplining processes: a modern military organization; factory organization due to the industrial revolution; and administrative organization. A strong permeation of the state and the church, on the one hand, and for centuries a division of labor between the church and the state, on the other, existed in which the church was primarily responsible for issues of moral disciplining (church discipline, *Kirchenzucht*), while the state dealt with issues of administrative, military and legal disciplining. Although disciplining processes in East Asia differ from those in Europe, even in the latter the state played a crucial role in terms of socialization, regulation, and disciplinization, thus figuring also as a pedagogical, ideological and ethical organization (Gorski 2003, 165–166).

Interestingly, in East Asian countries we find multiple similarities in terms of disciplining processes. For example, disciplining efforts commenced in Japan in the Meiji
disciplining of a society

Social Disciplining and Civilizing Processes in Contemporary China

...era (Ikegami 1989; Faison 2007), in Taiwan in the 1950s (Davis 2004; Chen 2008), and in South Korea (Huer 1989; Davis 2004) and Singapore in the 1960s (Ohno 2005; Heng and Aljunied 2009; Koh 2009). All of these political entities were—like China—developmental states with a disciplining trajectory during their modernizing processes (on the developmental state see page 38–40). And in China, as in other East Asian countries, it was the state which was responsible for both moral and legal education and disciplining in a top-down manner.

China has a lengthy history of written records providing information on disciplining ideologies embedded in specific worldviews and concepts of social order. In the following, we will briefly touch upon two specific cases: first, the historically most prominent ideologies of disciplining, and second on disciplining policies during the Mao era.

As in other East Asian countries, no single, unified state religion existed in China, and religion and a church (as in Europe) did not play a prominent role. Various schools of thought and religions shaped the minds and actions of people in different ways, including Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism, Mohism\(^{19}\) and Buddhism,\(^{20}\) the critics of Chinese traditionalism in the context of the 1919 May Fourth Movement in contemporary history (see Schwarcz 1986), and Western ideological and cultural influences.

Although we find similarities between Europe and China, there are also tremendous differences between, for instance, the concept and logic of the state, on the one hand, and modernizing processes, on the other. Traditionally, the core function of the Chinese state was to preserve stability and avoid disorder (luan) and to safeguard the moral order of society (see e.g., Balázs 1965; Wang 2017). Particularly with regard to the latter function, i.e., ascribing moral virtues to the state and the state’s task of asserting these values within society, this has spawned a different notion of the interrelationship between the individual and the collective on the one hand and the individual and the state on the other. As the late US political scientist and China scholar Lucian W. Pye put it:

---

19 Mohism refers to a school going back to the philosopher Mozi (also: Mo Di, 468–376 BC), which focused on the principle of general love of and solidarity among people. The Mohists rejected traditional class differences, preached frugality and modesty, and gave society priority over the family. Mohism is conceived of as an early socialist trait. See e.g., Mo Ti 1975.

20 On Chinese Buddhism see Ikeda 1990.
No people have ever outdone the Chinese in ascribing moral virtues to the state or in deprecating the worth of the individual. First Confucianism and then the Chinese version of Leninism went all out in extolling the importance of rules and society and in minimizing the rights of individuals . . . The individual has consistently been seen as merely a disciplined member of some larger group and the group’s interests are always assumed to take precedence over those of the individual (Pye 1996, 16–17).

What Pye is telling us is not only that taking care of morality is a task of the state but also that morality and self-education are strongly connected to collective interests and the dedication and commitment of individuals to the collective and the interests of the state.

Accordingly, Martin Jacques noted that the Chinese perceived the state differently from Westerners:

The latter see it as an outsider, an interloper, or even a necessary evil that must be constantly held to account and justified. The Chinese, on the other hand, view the state as an intimate, as part of the family, even as the head of the family (Jacques 2012, 618–619).

Contrary to the European philosophy of state, a pronounced theory of the state did not exist in the Chinese history of ideas. Rather, based on history and the past, ethical standards were formulated, determining how the emperors, civil servants and the people should behave and which standards and norms they had to follow. Confucianism as a state-supporting concept formed the basis of the prevailing ethics. Until modern times, peasant rebellions, overthrow of dynasties, and conquerors have changed little with regard to the political institutions. The perpetuation of these institutions as the basis for the interaction between rulers and the ruled played a part in ensuring that the Chinese political system remained largely constant over the centuries.

In the following sections, we will deal with two case studies: (a) the disciplinary function of Confucianism and Legalism as the two ancient disciplinizing ideologies which still have an impact on present politics, (b) the “New Life Movement” in the 1930s, and (c) the disciplining tools of the Mao era.
Confucianismus

The term Confucianism encompasses three components: a theory of education, a moral system and a social philosophy. Regarding the moral system, it consists of a set of rules of conduct stipulating how to behave in a strictly hierarchical and disciplinized society. Baumann et al. (2020) sum up the Confucian approach toward the individual as follows: “The cornerstone of the Confucian tradition is that no one is unchangeable, and that everybody possesses the capacity to transform themselves, regardless how little. This is achieved through a balance of soft and hard approaches” (Baumann et al. 2020, 105). “Soft approach” here refers to the issue of self-reflection, “hard approach” to punishment due to violating norms and rules (e.g., in a Legalist system).

Among other things, the focus of Confucianism is on learning correct social behavior by means of a moral education process in which everyone should learn how to conduct himself within the family, the society and toward the state. Through a moral improvement and education process, people should learn correct social behavior—the basis of a sound social order. The ultimate goal was “self-cultivation” as the basis of the order of the world. Cultivation of the person itself as a precondition for “good governance” has already been propagated and explained by the canonical Confucian text “Great Learning” (Daxue). Originally, Daxue was a chapter in the “Book of Rites” (Li Ji), one of the five Confucian Classics ascribed to Confucius himself.

During the Song dynasty (960–1279), it was selected as a crucial part of the examinations for the state’s civil service and a foundational introduction to Confucianism (for details, see Lee 1985; Wang 2019). The text is primarily concerned with learning and self-cultivation. The following quotation illustrates the basic political idea behind the concept of “self-cultivation.” Since this concept is crucial for understanding disciplining and civilizing processes in China to this day, we will quote it in more detail:

The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts.

21 The Li Ji is a collection of texts on correct social behavior and social order; see Li Gi 1981.
Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy. From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides. It cannot be, when the root is neglected, that what should spring from it will be well ordered. It never has been the case that what was of great importance has been slightly cared for, and, at the same time, that what was of slight importance has been greatly cared for ... the cultivation of the person depends on the rectifying of the mind.  

Self-cultivation was therefore conceived of as the root of all politics. Politics and morality very closely connected with each other albeit the latter gained priority over the first (see Tu 1993, 26).

The ethics of Confucianism was the ideal of the political elite and thus a “minority morality” (He 2015, 28). The common people, who were not proficient in writing and reading, could not obtain guidance from books of rites. The mass of the people thus had no opportunity to cultivate themselves and to follow their superiors in achieving the elite’s morality goals. Taking care of their livelihoods and daily survival were their main concern. As Mencius (372–289 BC or 385–303 or 302 BC), the second most prominent Confucian philosopher, noted:

The way of the people is this: If they have a certain livelihood, they will have a fixed heart; if they have not a certain livelihood, they have not a fixed heart. If they have not a fixed heart, there is nothing which they will not do in the way of

---

self-abandonment, of moral deflection, of depravity, and of wild license (Mengzi 2006–2020).

Without an adequate livelihood the preconditions for moralizing the masses were lacking (Schwartz 1985, 105–106). In addition, the moral behavior of ordinary people tended to be regulated by pictorial representations of the consequences of deviant behavior (see illustration below). Compliance with moral norms was believed to be monitored by a large number of gods. Disciplinization took place primarily within the families and clans according to their norms and rules (see e.g., Yang 1994). Liu (1959) and others showed in which way, specifically, the rural population was disciplined by clan rules on clan internal and external behavior (Liu 1959 and 1964).

The “Book of Rites” (Li Ji), one of the five texts forming the Confucian canon and thought to have originated in the second century BC, listed ethical rules of conduct for all members of the hierarchically structured society so as to prevent disorder (luan). The Li Ji linked the ideal of a well-ordered family to the well-orderliness of the state:

The piety of the son is the attitude with which one should serve the prince; fraternal subordination is the attitude with which one should serve one’s superiors; paternal love is the disposition with which you have to lead the crowd (Li Ji 1981, 51).

If the family was well-ordered, the state was well-ordered as well. Accordingly, social relationships were regulated in great detail: piety toward one’s parents, adoring love toward elders, loving respect toward one’s wife and children,
friendship toward equals, loyalty toward one’s superiors, humanity toward one’s subordinates, polite restraint toward outsiders, behaving toward the dead according to the rites.

While Mencius argued that humans are innately good, at the same time these good factors required cultivation and the right environment to flourish. This stood in strong contrast to Xunzi (ca. 300 BC–ca. 239 BC) who took the view that men tend toward evil (Hsüntze 1966, 184–187). Both, however, believed that through education and self-cultivation, humans could develop their positive sides.

The renowned social anthropologist Fei Xiaotong defined morality as “the life that people in a society should abide by certain norms of social behavior” (Fei 1992, 71). But in contrast to the Western morality concept, in which morality was “built on the relationship between the organization and the individual” (ibid., 72), morality in China starts out from the individual, thus making self-disciplining and self-educating such a central concept of building morality. Fei refers to the classical Confucian text “Great Learning” (Daxue) and noted that the sentence

> From the Son of Heaven down to ordinary people, all must consider the cultivation of the person as the root of everything . . . is the starting point in the system of morality inherent in Chinese social structure (Fei 1992, 74).

In a similar vein, Tu Weiming (1979, 71) explained that self-cultivation is “the point of departure in Confucianism ( . . . ) rather than social responsibility.” A quote from the ancient book Liezi, attributed to the Daoist philosopher Lie Yukou (ca. 450 BC), helps to underscore this argument. In the chapter “Shuofu” (说符) it is written:

> King Zhuang from Chu asked Zhan He: ‘What should be done to put the state in order?’ Zhan He replied: ‘I only understand how to rectify my own self; I don’t understand how to put a state in order . . . I have never heard that when your own self is in order, the state would get in disorder, and I have never heard that when

---


24 The most prominent neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi (1130–1200) included this text in the canon of the examination system for the state civil service. On Zhu Xi see Chan 1989.
The consequences of prioritizing self-cultivation over social responsibility are that “real” Confucians were apparently concerned more with improving themselves and less with issues of social responsibility. Social disciplining in the modern sense is therefore aimed at bringing people in line with social accountability and social discipline.

According to Confucianism, the people were incapable of managing themselves and were conceived to be immature. The administration should therefore be left to far-sighted officials. If unrest and dissatisfaction occurred, it was the ruler, not the people, who was to be blamed. The subjects owed him respect and obedience, but they had a right to rebel against rulers who deviated from the “path of virtue.” According to this concept, bad rulership became evident through a decline of agriculture and livelihoods, the occurrence of major natural disasters, constant wars, etc.

Fei Xiaotong (1910–2005) spoke of the “Rule of Rituals” that shaped China and the behavior of the Chinese people and which he conceived of as “recognized behavioral forms” (Fei 1992, 96). Ritual in the sense of “Li” (礼) meant the entirety of social conventions and norms that should ensure correct behavior in the interaction and communication with other members of society, thus leading to social order. It therefore figures as a kind of behavioral orientation. As Fei continues:

If you act in violation of rituals, your action is not only immoral but incorrect. Rituals are sustained by personal habits. It is as if there were ten eyes watching you and ten fingers pointing at you all the time. You cannot help but follow the ritual (Fei 1992, 99).

Rituals are related to a distinct moral order that is intended to regulate interactions within a society that has not yet spawned a legal system. The mere existence of such an order signifies that the (Confucian) rituals constituted the disciplining tool of

---

society for many centuries. The *Li Ji* mentioned above is a clear expression of such a code of conduct.

However, throughout history, Confucianism underwent major transformations and no longer exists nowadays as a state cult. But Confucian values are still shaping the minds of the people in terms of thinking and behavior. In the late 1960s, Lucian W. Pye convincingly showed that in China a child’s first encounter with authority was “in the acceptance of the omnipotence of his father” and that one’s self rested in respect for the father’s authority. The acknowledgement of this authority is accompanied by a process of “strict disciplining” and self-disciplining. Self-discipline in this sense meant that an individual could control his emotions and manners were strictly separated from sentiments. The overarching point of reference was an (external) authority, the father in one’s family and the “political authority” within one’s polity (Pye 1968, 94–106).

In recent years, Confucian values and concepts have been revived and instrumentalized by the Chinese government in order to discipline society and stabilize the current social and political order. Confucian tradition is now being cultivated in schools and universities, even in party schools, not only as a means of filling the spiritual vacuum and strengthening national self-confidence, but—as the Ministry of Education explained in 2015—above all in the interests of personality development and as a disciplining tool. This is underlined by symbolic politics of Chinese leaders. In 2014, for example, Xi Jinping became the first party leader to visit Qufu (the alleged place of birth and death of Confucius) to take part in the celebrations in honor of the philosopher’s 2565th birthday. In his speech, Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of Confucian values for China’s present and future development. He also noted that Confucianism and Marxism were not opposed to each other. Patriotism, Confucian values and, recently, the emphasis on studying Marxism, which is still the official guiding ideology of the CCP, should thus be merged to form a new national ideology (keyword: “Building a spiritual civilization”). Officials should regularly attend lectures on Confucianism and classical Chinese thinkers. In 2014, for example, a training

---

26 On China’s traditional morality and its contemporary transformations see He 2015.

27 A good example is, for instance, the bestseller written by Amy Chua (2011), illustrating in which way a “tiger mother” is disciplining her kids thus instilling within them a kind of self-disciplining.
center for local cadres—the Confucius Academy for Traditional Culture—was opened in Guiyang (southern China). All these measures are meant to have a disciplining and value-creating effect, in the sense of creating new core values as well as a morality based on traditional ethical principles of Confucianism and on self-discipline (see e.g., Billioud and Thoraval 2015).

Daoism, which rejected Confucian values such as its rigid morality, knowledge and piety, as well as private property, was the antithesis to Confucian concepts of order. The state, it was argued, should refrain from interfering in societal matters, because the principle of “Dao” would regulate everything anyway without the ruler’s intervention. Daoism was, on the one hand, an expression of the passive village protest against strong interventions in local affairs by the ruling elites; on the other hand—as “popular Daoism”—it offered a philosophy of rebellion and subversion. That does not mean that Daoism was opposed to any kind of morality or discipline. Harmony was a crucial goal specifically in terms of preserving the balance between men and nature. Environment and nature were conceived of as a kind of “sanctuary” in the sense of a “sacred space” and there was a specific code of conduct for how to behave in order to achieve harmony and to avoid destroying the natural order, for instance (Miller 2005, 140–146). Daoist religion also endorsed personal values, compliance with Daoist norms and social values. Moreover, mastering Daoist meditation practices, breathing techniques and physical exercises required discipline, although this kind of ethics and discipline differed strongly from Confucian ones (see e.g., Lee 2014, 13–31).

Pye once noted that Confucianism placed emphasis on conformity, control, orthodox belief and discipline, while Daoism placed more emphasis on tolerance, greater private initiative, a low level of control and free thinking. This dualism has until today been reflected in a cyclical oscillation between “left” and “right,” ideology and pragmatism, rebellion and adaptation. In this way, Confucian discipline was always challenged by its anti-disciplinary (Daoist) antithesis. From this dualism of Confucianism and Daoism (“China’s two cultures”) and the possibility of switching between the two, Pye concluded that a political pragmatism was inherent in the Chinese political culture, by which influence, for instance, the rapid transition from a system of Plan-Stalinism to a market socialism was facilitated (Pye 1988, 38–40). In addition, Daoist spontaneity could always be countered by a disciplining Confucian component.
Even **Chinese Buddhism**, which cannot be discussed in detail in this paper, is per se strongly related to a process of constantly cultivating self-discipline. This requires strict mental discipline and the continuous purifying of the mind. In the “Chinese Buddhist Encyclopedia,” it is noted that discipline is “the systematic instruction intended to train a person,” and the “assertion of willpower over more base desires” and self-discipline are “to some extent a substitute for motivation, when one uses reason to determine the best course of action that opposes one’s desires.”

One specific school of Buddhism prevalent in China is the “Dharmaguptaka” (Chinese **法藏部, Fazangbu**), a division of the Buddhist “Vinaya” canon. Vinaya is generally translated as “discipline” (律, lü) and refers to the norms and procedures of Buddhist monastic communities (see Horner 1957–1970).

**Legalism**

Another prominent disciplining school of thought which has left its mark until today is “Legalism.” This strand of Chinese political philosophy is concerned with the organization of the state. Legalism starts out from the conviction that man is bad by nature and that a strong state with an absolute ruler and strict laws are required in order to intimidate and discipline the people. In contrast to the Confucians, Legalists held that the state could only be governed by harsh laws that precisely regulated rewards and punishments, not by Confucian values such as humanity, justice or ethical models. Laws were understood as an instrument of order (criminal law) rather than law in a European sense. The demand was for a strong state with a single ruler at the top and rigorous subordination required from the people (see Han Fei 1994). Governing should be carried out by means of a system of heavy penalties and rewards, with the absolute subordination of the people under the ruler. The principal idea of Legalism was the concept of a comprehensively surveilling totalitarian entity. The statesman and political philosopher Shang Yang (who died in 338 BC), one of the proponents of Legalism, argued that rulers should rule through fear. Even minor offences should be severely punished so that nobody (except the ruler) would dare to violate the laws or revolt. If people were permanently and strictly watched and monitored, they would conceive

---

of suppression as something natural, just like death is part of nature (Lord Shang 1963). Although legalism only once and for a very short period figured as official state doctrine (during the Qin dynasty, 221–207 BC), it always had an underlying impact on thinking and behavior in China's politics and among Chinese rulers.

In sum, the above section illustrates that discipline, disciplining and self-discipline were salient parts of Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism and Chinese Buddhism, albeit from different vantage points. As this shows, China's political culture thus implies a long history of disciplining and civilizing.

**The “New Life Movement” of the 1930s**

The “New Life Movement” (Xin shenghuo yundong) initiated by then president Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) in 1934 rested upon Sun Yat-sen's conviction that China needed three steps for its national regeneration and modern nation-building process: (1) Restoration of the nation's political unity and central state power by military rule and martial law; (2) Political education of the people by a tutelage government during a transitional period to enable them to exert their citizenship rights; and (3) Introduction of a constitutional government (Sun 1918). In 1934, China was already united and centralized, and Chiang wanted to move to the second stage of Sun's suggested steps, i.e. the process of educating and disciplining the Chinese people.

Although the “New Life Movement” was also related to counterbalancing Communist influence and spreading western ideas of behavior (Ferlanti 2010, 963–981), it was primarily aimed at “modernizing” the minds and behavior of the Chinese people by means of disciplining and creating a new morality based on a mixture of behavioral standards and traditional Confucian values; it was thus part of nation- and state-building efforts. In his New Year's message in 1930, Chiang had already regretted the moral decline of the Chinese people and called for the revitalization of the ancestors' virtues (Tong 1953, 155). In his 1934 speech to an audience of 50,000 people in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, he explained his concept and the purpose of this movement:

---

29 Jiang Jieshi is based on modern Pinyin transcription. Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石) is the mostly used English name (based on the pronunciation in Cantonese). It was also the name used by himself. Therefore, in this paper the latter transcription is used.
The general psychology of our people today can be described as spiritless. What manifests itself in behaviour is this: lack of discrimination between good and evil. Between what is public and what is private . . . Because there is no discrimination between good and evil, right and wrong are confused; because there is no discrimination between public and private, improper taking and giving [of public funds] occur . . . as a result, officials tend to be dishonest and avaricious, the masses are undisciplined and calloused, youth become degraded and intemperate, adults are corrupt and ignorant, the rich become extravagant and luxurious, and the poor become mean and disorderly. Naturally it has resulted in disorganization of the social order and national life . . . As a preliminary, we must acquire the habits of orderliness, cleanliness, simplicity, frugality, promptness, and exactness. We must preserve order, emphasise organization, responsibility and discipline (Jiang 1934).

According to Chiang this movement should be guided by four values of Confucian morality: Li (礼, “regulated attitude”), Yi (义, “right conduct”), Lian (廉, “clear discrimination”) and Chi (耻, “real self-consciousness”) (Chiang 1934), or simply by ritual, duty, honesty and shame (Pitstick 2013, 3). Afterwards, these values were fleshed out by the so-called “eight qualities”: orderliness (整齐, zhengqi), cleanliness (清洁, qingjie), simplicity (简单, jiandan), frugality (朴素, pusu), promptness (迅速, xunsu), precision (确实, queshi), harmoniousness (和谐, hexie) and severity (严肃, yansu) (The New Life Movement 2013). According to Chiang, these principles and values should be applied to everyday life, including issues related to food, clothing, shelter and action and should govern every aspect of human and social behavior as well as self-cultivation. Disciplining (jilūhua) should be achieved by military training (Jiang 1934; Chiang 1934). Similar to Mao, Chiang held the opinion that the military should figure as a role model for disciplining society. Everywhere, so Chiang, in the home, the factory, and the government office, regardless of place, time, or situation, everyone’s activities must be the same as in the army . . . In other words, there must be obedience, sacrifice, strictness, cleanliness, accuracy, diligence, secrecy . . . and everyone together must firmly and bravely sacrifice everything for the group and for the nation.30

30 Chiang Kai-shek as quoted by Clinton (2017), 135.
In principle, this movement can be conceived of as the first government-led disciplining program to achieve modernity and as part of the modernizing process envisaged by Chiang (Liu 2013).

Ultimately, the movement was not a success story, for several reasons. The Japanese invasion of China led to a shift of the country’s priorities, the objectives formulated by the Chiang government were too abstract and not well understood by ordinary people, the recourse to Confucian values was not attractive for intellectuals, and finally, the government was not effective in mobilizing public support but attempted to enforce its program in a top-down manner.31

Interestingly, there are some striking and intriguing similarities between the objectives and principles of the “New Life Movement” and the CCP’s civilizing projects after 1949, including the current ones. Arif Dirlik summarized these similarities as follows:

The most pronounced resemblance concerned the relationship of individual behavior to society and polity. Despite crucial differences in premises and methods arising from broader underlying differences in social and political philosophy, the New Life Movement hoped to create a new Chinese bearing many of the attributes of the ideal Communist in the literature of the sixties . . . And in both instances, the military man—totally dedicated to voluntaristic action on the service of organizational goals—provided the paradigm of the good citizen . . . It shared with Communist-led mass movements the goal of fashioning a citizenry responsive to national needs, willing to endure hardship for the good of society, and ready to exert the maximum effort for the advancement of national progress (Dirlik 1975, 976).

And many of the “civilized values” and behavioral rules promoted in the 1930s such as “Don’t spit,” “Be punctual,” “Kill flies and rats” or “Cleanliness prevents diseases” Schloemann and Friedlingstein 1976, 69) are reminiscent of the Mao era and are still promoted today. The mass campaign commenced in Nanchang (capital of Jiangxi Province) in 1934. The city should figure as a model city of this program. Authorities

31 On the reasons of the failure see e.g. Dirlik 1975, 948–954.
launched a cleaning-up campaign, and with the help of posters, lectures, public rallies the “masses” should be mobilized. Volunteers were asked to inspect homes and living quarters and to call on people to comply with the rules for cleanliness, hygiene, and order. Whereas apparently successful in Nanchang, it did not work well in other localities, specifically not in rural areas. It remained rather an urban movement opposing spitting, smoking, and littering (Thomson 1969, 158/159). Finally, in the context of the Japanese invasion and the fight against it this campaign lost its significance. It failed since its focus was on moralistic goals and changing the behavior and habits of the people only, and not connected to the improvement of the livelihood of the people or the country’s economic development. Or—as James C. Thomson (ibid., 158) noted—it was a movement “built on the toothbrush, the mouse trap, and the fly swatter.”

**Historical Patterns and the Mao Era**

Throughout all historical periods, the Chinese state has endeavored to subjugate the population with its heterogeneous structures and to establish a coherent system of control, monitoring and discipline. The infamous “Baojia” (保甲) system, which was designed by Legalist Shang Yang (Lord Shang 1963, 57) and prevailed from the Song Dynasty (960–1279) until the 20th century, played a major role in this regard. It was first introduced in 1076. According to the original system, ten families were combined into one unit (bao). During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), this unit was called *jia* (approximately 4–13 families), with ten *jia* forming a *bao*. During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), households were organized into sub-groups of 10 (*pai*), 100 (*jia*) and 1,000 households (*bao*) (Ch’ü 1988, 150–154). It divided village inhabitants into household groups with a headman in charge of each unit. The headman was responsible for public security, tax payments, personal registration and disciplining the group members. This system was also harnessed to enforce law and order and monitor compliance with moral and disciplinary standards. The *Baojia* was collectively liable for misconduct or criminal offenses committed by individual group members.

---

32 In the book “Lord Shang” (1963, 57), it was stated: “Now the people in groups of five are responsible for each other’s crimes, they spy on each other to discover transgressions, they denounce each other and cause hostile relations.”
During the Ming dynasty, people were even scored for good (merit) or evil deeds (demerit) by a points system, an idea enshrined in the morality book “Ledgers of merits and demerits” (Gongguoge) (Sakai 1970, 342–345).

As Sakai notes

According to this system the value of human deeds could be calculated with so many credits of merits attached to each good deed and so many debits or demerits for the evil deeds. Using the point system provided him in the Ledgers, each individual could evaluate his deeds one by one, add the merits and demerits, and then strike the balance for himself. The greater the balance of merits, the greater the reward he might expect, and vice versa. A conscientious person would go through this process each day, and also calculate how he stood at the end of each month and each year . . . Mechanical though the system was, however, it was based fundamentally on the idea that the individual did the evaluating for himself and took charge of his own fate (Sakai, ibid., 342–343).

Behind this system, which had historical forerunners in the Song (960–1279) and Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) (ibid.), stood the idea that people could develop moral self-discipline by internalizing this scoring system. Interestingly, from a historical perspective, China had already had experience of a scoring system for the elites.

The Baojia system was adopted by the Qing dynasty (1644–1911). The Japanese forces also used this system during their occupation of China. The system had the same function in both urban and rural areas: surveillance and social control of the people. After the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945, the Guomindang government took over the urban Baojia system. The CCP officially abolished it after its takeover, but went on to establish new disciplining and control instruments. The collapse of civil administration, goods shortages, inflation and public security problems required clear discipline-oriented organizational structures.

In addition, by the end of the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century, we find various efforts to discipline and civilize urban areas. The so-called “study societies” (xuehui) during the late Qing period can be conceived of as a civilizing movement aimed at civilizing and disciplining Chinese society based on Confucianism (Chen 2017).
Military and physical education (“military citizenship”) were thought of as crucial parts of civilizing, disciplining and even nation-building processes (ibid., 128–135).

Furthermore, Wang Di (2003), taking Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province in southwest China, as a case study, explained that in the first half of the 20th century, street supervisors and district supervisors were appointed, along with the issuing of strict behavioral codes. This was supposed to introduce “civilization” and control public behavior. In reality, it brought about new forms of social control and urban administration. In the aftermath of these changes, many tasks which were formerly incumbent upon the guilds and temple associations as charitable organizations were transferred to the police. Strict traffic rules and regulations for merchants, the organization of the market and hygiene were issued. Gambling, prostitution and mendicancy were forbidden and a rigid moral code was introduced. Popular culture and habits of leisure were also subject to strict controls, i.e., a new type of orderly and productive urban community was promoted (Wang Di 2003, 132–135; Stapleton 2000).

Furthermore, the Street Offices and Residents’ Committees established in the early 1950s were tasked with implementing centrally determined and disciplining policies (e.g., mass campaigns) in the neighborhoods and dealing with social problems and “problem groups” (the unemployed, retirees, disabled persons, previously convicted persons in the communities, etc.). They established pre-school facilities, health care institutions and small businesses; they also exercised police auxiliary and disciplining functions and acted as registration offices and social service providers. In times of political radicalization, they mutated into bodies responsible for political and ideological surveillance and control (see Heberer and Göbel 2013).

In the Mao era in particular, political campaigns and mass movements were the predominant means of enforcing political goals, norms, rules and discipline. More than 100 campaigns were carried out in China between 1951 and 1976. The aim of these mass movements was, on the one hand, to consolidate the rule of the CCP and to suppress the forces that challenged this rule. On the other hand, the purpose was to change people’s minds, in the interests of solving political and economic problems. This was to be done by mobilizing the masses in collective actionism. This concept was rooted in the traditional (Confucian) view of man, which was shared by Mao: that people could be purified and their thinking changed by educating them. By influencing
their disposition, according to the underlying idea, internal control and self-discipline could be achieved. By means of self-examination and self-perfection (self-criticism), deviators (“sick people”) could be reintegrated into the wider community. “Healing the disease to save the patient” was the principle advocated by Mao. In 1951, Mao called—in an almost Confucian manner—for “a movement for self-education” and “self-remoulding” (Mao 1978, 60).

According to Mao, workers and peasants were “poor and blank,” i.e., untainted and thus malleable in the interests of Mao’s revolutionary-disciplinary concept. In 1958, he wrote,

The population of 600 million in China has two peculiarities; they are, first of all, poor, and secondly blank . . . A clean sheet of paper has no blotches, and so the newest and most beautiful characters can be written on it, the newest and most beautiful pictures can be painted on it.33

Mao’s “new man” should behave as a disciplined soldier, devoting his entire life selflessly and in a disciplined manner to the party and the construction of socialism.

The household registration system (hukou), which was introduced in the 1950s and tied people, especially rural residents, to their place of birth in an attempt to prevent mass migration to urban areas, was instrumentalized for social control and disciplining the population.34

In the People’s Republic, over the decades, it was the “working unit” (danwei), i.e., the space in which someone worked and lived, to which a person belonged and was registered. The danwei organized the political campaigns within its domain, exerted social control and disciplined its members. Victor N. Shaw (1996, 99) called this disciplining character of the danwei “administrative disciplining,” although this type of disciplining was not only administrative but also socio-political. Sociologist Amitai Etzioni has argued that societies such as China’s, which create a modern economy but at the same time want to cling to the socialist system, are “thick,” i.e., they

33  “Jieshao yige hezuoshe” (Introducing a Co-operative) (1958), op. cit. in Mao zhuxi yulu (Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong), Beijing: Xinhua Shudian 1968, 44.

34 Romero (2018) argued that the hukou system led to a “reification of the axes between the civilized [urbs] and the uncivilized” (rural) people.
need a larger controlled social order and require processes and institutions that can 
“mobilize a certain amount of time, activity, energy, loyalty of the members of soci-
ety to serve one or more common goals” (Etzioni1999, 33). The danwei seem to have 
served this role for quite some time.

The reform process has fundamentally reduced the role of the danwei as a 
disciplining organization. The privatization or closure of many state-owned and 
collective-owned enterprises, the establishment of companies with foreign invest-
ment, the return to family farming in the rural areas and the abolition of large col-
lectives (People’s Communes), the growth of the private sector without danwei 
structures, the decrease in directive planning requirements and the permitting of 
new employment channels have weakened them significantly. This was necessary 
because these structures hindered reform measures and this rather traditional sys-
tem was hardly compatible with market economy structures.35 From the state’s point 
of view, therefore, new forms of control, surveillance and disciplining were required.
The numerous traditional rating systems (such as the “Five Good Households” or 
the “civilized households,” by which the behavior of all households was regularly 
assessed) have remained in existence but have now lost their motivational disciplin-
ing and control function.

The system which in China is called “social management” is—historically and in 
the context of its political culture—not entirely new. Technological development and 
the new monitoring options have merely raised social control to a new, more sophisti-
cated technological level. What is “China-specific” is the traditional role of moral and 
civilizing education, a task that the “Confucian educational government” always had 
(see, for example, Sun Yat-sen’s36 demand in the 1920s that the state should establish 
an “educational dictatorship” in the interests of civilization and moral education of 
the Chinese people; see Sun 1963, 127–129). The disciplining and educational gov-
ernment is now simply pursuing this role with other, i.e., modern technological instru-
ments. What is similar between the Mao and the Xi eras is that both are characterized 
by political disciplining in order to achieve political goals, on the one hand, and social

35 On the danwei system, see Lü and Perry 1997.
36 Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) was the provisional first president of the Republic of China and the first leader of the 
Guomindang (Nationalist Party of China) after the end of the Qing dynasty in 1912.
disciplining, on the other. The difference, however, is that Mao periodically turned to large-scale political mass campaigns which impacted on everyone, whereas Xi’s campaigns are primarily affecting officials and party members, with disciplining and civilizing of society being carried through by administrative means and education.

**THE CHINESE STATE AS A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE WITH DISCIPLINING CAPACITY**

Developmental states are purpose-oriented and “strong” states. Political elites in such states are dedicated to a specific mission: modernizing their nation. Firm determination, consensus and commitment exist among the political and bureaucratic elites to bring about systematic, planned and effective economic development. Such states are capable of pushing through all-round development in a top-down manner, across all particularist interests and in the face of resistance. In addition, they must be able to enforce their policies on a nationwide scale. Achieving these goals requires effective state intervention in the economy, as well as monitoring and disciplining of the workforce. These states are, therefore, also characterized by a close symbiosis of government and enterprises. Furthermore, they have an efficient bureaucracy at their disposal which is constantly being professionalized and is capable of implementing policies in an effective way and ensuring political and social stability. Developmental states invest heavily in tertiary education, vocational training and research. At the same time, they exhibit a relatively high degree of independence from the influence of distinct interest groups. Without such autonomy, the state cannot exercise effective control over society, regulate social relations, and discipline social forces in the interests of national development. Part of this concept is also a strict and repressive approach against potential opponents with regard to developmental policies designed by the political elite. Thus, these states are, as a rule, authoritarian political entities. All in all, developmental states exhibit a high level of state capacity and regime legitimacy. Disciplining processes as part of modernizing policies ultimately reinforce the capacity and power of the state (Haggard 2018; Kohli 2004; Woo-Cumings 1999; Heberer 2017 and Heberer/Müller 2020).
The concept of developmental states—developed by US political scientist Chalmers Johnson in the early 1980s (Johnson 1982)—was originally applied to Japan, later to the role of the modernizing state in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia. In all cases, these were political entities in which the political elite pursued planned and successful development top-down and in an authoritarian manner, based on the rule of a unified organization, be it a single-party system (as in Taiwan or Singapore) or a military dictatorship (South Korea). Even though there are differences between the “prototypes” of the East Asian Developmental State of the 1970s and 1980s, we contend that the economic dimension of China’s modernity project is neatly grasped by this concept and its implicit developmental ideology. Moreover, it offers a suitable framework for understanding the general logic, behavior and action of the Chinese disciplining state led by the CCP. We concurrently argue that the concept of the developmental state is strongly linked to the issue of disciplining as a salient tool to accomplish modernizing objectives.

From a historical perspective, the concept of the developmental state is also rooted in the history of Chinese political ideas. The philosopher and writer Liang Qichao (1873–1929), for example, wrote at the beginning of the 20th century that China’s development required a strong, but at the same time enlightened and balancing authoritarian and disciplining political entity. He opposed both the idea of a separation of powers and any restrictions on state power by means of checks and balances because both aimed to limit the government’s scope of action and thus weakened its ability to enforce its policies. At the same time—in accordance with the Confucian doctrine—Liang was in favor of leadership by the political elite and opposed any kind of “government by the people” (Liang 1902–06; Liang 1912). Only the elite—so Liang argued—was capable of initiating and enforcing a modernizing and nation-building process top-down. He argued that the civilizing level of Chinese people was rather low, a factor which would negatively impact upon the country’s modernizing development. China’s traditional culture, Liang argued, had not spawned a modern society so the country could not advance in the direction of a civilized society (Liang 1902–06; Liang 2005, 322–326). He was, however, convinced that a moral society could only be built on China’s traditional culture and ethics. Liang’s concept is reminiscent of the Singaporean theory of “neo-authoritarianism” popular in China in the 1980s.
and 1990s, i.e., the enforcement of economic, social and political modernization by a strong and capable government.

In a similar vein, the historian and philosopher Qian Mu (1895–1990) argued that the elite had a duty toward the nation and the people. He called for an instructional government (训政) that should educate the people to become modernized. And, as noted above, Sun Yat-sen, the first President of the Republic of China, advocated a strong state, national renewal and a disciplinary dictatorship so as to educate and prepare people for modernization.

In summary, the concept of the developmental state allows us to better understand the objectives of the Chinese state, the planned implementation of the development goals addressed in the following chapter, and the application of disciplining means and policies in order to achieve these goals.

**DISCIPLINING PROCESSES IN CHINA UNDER XI JINPING**

In China, discourses on modernization commenced at the end of the 19th century. Although after the end of imperial power in 1912 political leaders such as Sun Yat-sen or Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) reasoned about how to modernize China, the political environment did not allow a planned trajectory of modernizing due to internal disorder, a war against Japanese aggression and occupation, and civil war. Only after the victory of the CCP in 1949 was a planned process of industrialization set in motion, although frequently interrupted by large-scale “political campaigns” in the Mao era, such as the “Great Leap Forward” (1958–60) and the “Cultural Revolution” (1966–76). Looking back at the 1970s, at the start of its economic reforms, China's leadership promulgated the “Four Modernizations” (of Industry, Agriculture, Science and Technology, and National Defense), pointing to China's determination to catch up and find its place in the modern world. This objective is still crucial: Chinese modernity is strongly connected to the quest for continuous economic development to make China strong and prosperous.

Apart from the economic-technological dimension of modernity à la Chinoise in recent years, some Chinese intellectuals put political modernization to the fore, such
as, recently, political scientist Yu Keping, who argues that modernization requires “modern governance” and, eventually, democratization as an incremental process (Yu 2019). What is widely lacking in the Chinese debates, however, is that effective modern governance needs citizens to exhibit a public spirit and morality (e.g., Yan 2011 and 2019). Modern governance and a stable political entity demand specific pre-conditions which the Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka (1993) classified as “civilizational competence.” By this term, he referred to the cognitive preconditions for a stable and modern human order, and the imperative of an emerging citizenry with a society-oriented public spirit and a sense of civic responsibility. In addition, we understand “civilizational competence” to mean the acceptance of diverging opinions and political criticism by both the state and society, peaceful and effective management of conflicts, and the emergence of empathy, i.e., the capability to understand the feelings, emotions and minds of other people. In the Chinese discussion about social change, these cognitive aspects of creating disciplined citizens are generally neglected. Recent developments in other world regions (Arab countries, Afghanistan) illustrate that something like “democracy” cannot simply be “introduced.” The development and stabilization of modern structures and institutions of governance first and foremost require—apart from economic development and resources—cognitive preconditions for the establishment of a good governance order.

Quite a while ago, the Chinese government arrived at the conclusion that the country was facing a “moral crisis.” In 2011, then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao complained about corruption and food safety scandals and lamented the decay of social morality and the extremely serious loss of intra-societal trust. He noted that “if a country does not have the capacity to raise its people’s morale we absolutely cannot call such a country a real strong one and a country respected by its people” (Wen 2011). A few years later, in 2014, the Chinese government spoke of a “serious moral crisis,” claiming that a new moral order had to be built to restore intra-societal trust and coherence. A “culture of honesty and sincerity” should be created to encourage the authorities and all citizens to be honest and trustworthy (Guowuyuan 2014). The

“moral crisis” is reflected in a serious loss of intra-societal trust. A survey conducted by Chinese sociologists in the context of the World Value Survey (2013) revealed a massive loss of this kind of trust, indicating a moral crisis. According to the survey in China, 77.3% of the surveyed Chinese responded to the question whether or not they would trust unknown people they meet the first time with “not at all” or “only a little bit” (ibid.). In addition, two large-scale surveys in 2014, one conducted by Gao Zhaoming, Director of the Institute of Applied Ethics at Nanjing Normal University, and another by three other scholars, revealed that moral decay and loss of trust were perceived by the respondents as the most serious “social diseases” (Gao 2015; Xu, Yuan, and Tan 2014; Cheng 2015; He 2015).

Nowadays, therefore, the Chinese leadership does not only focus on the economic dimension of modernity but also strives for the creation of a new system of ethics and morality to undergird Chinese modernity (see e.g., the “12 socialist core values” addressed below). In this context, the traditional concepts (imaginaries) of “Chinese civilization” and “Chinese morality” have been invigorated in order to give ethical and moral orientation to China’s modernity project, not only domestically but also contending that this project benefits the whole world. Today, numerous Chinese intellectuals are promoting the advancement of a Chinese kind of universalism and moral order, based on traditional Chinese moral values (see e.g., Zhao 2006; Xu 2015 and 2017; Qiang 2018; Dreyer 2015; Wang 2017; Heberer and Müller 2020). Political scientists Jiang Guofeng and Li Min, who investigated the current causes of the moral crisis, characterize this crisis as “a lack of social responsibility” and a “low awareness of social accountability” among members of society (Jiang and Li 2013).

In recent years, the Chinese government has undertaken enormous efforts to raise the discipline of citizens, to civilize their behavior (wenminghua) (including that of officials) and to create a new social morality. As mentioned above, this endeavor is related to two more recent issues: first, to “civilize” the behavior and minds of individuals in the direction of self-control awareness, and second, to accommodate the Chinese people to accomplish the ultimate development goal by 2050. With regard to

---

this goal, the 19th Party Congress of the CCP in 2017 decided on a three-step roadmap of modernizing China by 2049/50: (1) by 2021: replacement of the quantitative growth model by a qualitative one, poverty eradication, and creating a society with modest living standards (xiao kang); (2) by 2035: basic modernization, becoming the world's number one economic power, solving environmental and ecological problems; (3) by 2049/50: becoming both a leading world power on a par with the United States and a “comprehensive modern society.” Achieving these goals is by no means an easy task. The leadership is determined to fulfill the 2050 mission by arguing that on the one hand, this would require a “strong” party and a strong and competent leader. On the other hand, it would need both a disciplined contingent of cadres and disciplined, civilized and unified people. In this way—according to the party leadership—China could overcome various groups’ vested interests and ensure that everybody strives to contribute to the achievement of these national goals.

The political elite is not simply concerned with “preserving the power of the Communist Party,” as is so often claimed. Rather, its power is aimed at realizing the aforementioned national mission. The task of the Chinese developmental state, led by the CCP, is to ensure that this ultimate goal can be accomplished. The current strongman party leader Xi Jinping called this the realization of the “Chinese dream.” By far the majority of the Chinese share this “dream,” i.e., the vision of developing China into a comprehensively modern entity with world power status by 2050. And it is precisely this vision, i.e., the pursuit of this national core interest, which seems to legitimize the Chinese developmental and disciplining state.

Due to the existence of various “risks,” the CCP leadership believes that a high level of discipline is required. These are, specifically, risks related to opening-up policies, the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent decline of Russia, and the changes within Chinese society that have brought about “moral decay.” In addition, the erosion of the party’s ideology and discipline and the concern that the CCP could lose control over both economy and society, and the contentious search for a new, more sustainable, yet stable developmental model have also contributed to a greater degree of political rigidity. “The government operates by
educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs,” as Li (2007, 5) has argued, so that people behave as expected by the state. We call this a disciplining or civilizing pu\,sch (German: Disziplinierungsschub).

As explained above, disciplining (or civilizing) “pushes” existed in China throughout history, not as part of modernizing processes but rather to teach the people how to behave in the interests of the rulers’ government concept and to preserve “order.” As Osterhammel (2006) has convincingly shown, disciplining or what he called “civilizing” was a continuous process in Chinese history, specifically toward classes and people perceived by the elite as being “uncivilized”: “The relentless urge of the Chinese elite to civilize others was directed at the peasantry, at non-Han Chinese (today called “ethnic minorities”) within the realm and at “barbarians” along its borders” (Osterhammel 2006, 10).

Rapid economic and social changes since the late 1970s, accompanied by mass migration of people from rural to urban areas, the dissolution of collectives (village communities and state-owned companies with a lifelong guarantee of jobs, housing and all-round social security), the commercialization of all spheres of life and the isolation of many people in urban spaces spawned an erosion of traditional values without new ones replacing them. So far, there has been little willingness among large parts of society to comply with state norms and rules, and legal awareness is rather underdeveloped. Corruption and scandals of all kinds, as well as mafia-like structures, are prevalent and have eroded the structures of both the party and the administration system right up to the top. Countless laws have been passed since the 1980s, but what is still lacking is a functioning social order. Sociologist Emile Durkheim has already pointed out that in modernizing societies in which law and a legal consciousness are still overlaid by the public’s moral ideas, the “border between what is permitted and what is prohibited,” what is right and what is not is no longer clear, but can be “shifted almost arbitrarily by the individuals. Such an imprecise and inconsistent morality”—according to Durkheim—“cannot result in discipline” (Durkheim 1992, 43).

It is therefore hardly surprising that China’s political leadership—as explained above—speaks of the need to lay the foundations for a new moral order, to create disciplined and civilized citizens, and to reinforce intra-societal trust. Five instruments have
been designed to tackle the moral crisis and to create a “culture of sincerity and honesty” and morally sound, socially minded, honest citizens\(^\text{40}\): (a) the creation of a new morality; (b) the “anti-corruption campaign”; (c) the so-called “social credit system”; (d) the cadres’ evaluation system; and (e) “civilizing” the cyberspace. In this paper, we are primarily concerned with (a), (b) and (c). It is the notion of “disciplining” which is most interesting here. The state’s ultimate objective is a process developing from “external coercion, i.e., by the state (in German: “Fremdzwang”) to self-constraints (in German: “Selbstzwang”) or self-disciplining of the people, a process examined by Norbert Elias (2000) and Michel Foucault (1977) with regard to Europe.

In the following, we examine three of the disciplining instruments employed by the current Chinese leadership: (i) the creation of a new morality by the state, (2) the anti-corruption drive, and (3) the “social credit system” to substantiate our argument of the disciplining focus of the current Chinese leadership.

**CASE STUDY 1: THE MORAL STATE: CREATING A “NEW SOCIAL MORALITY”**

As mentioned above, a “new morality” and discipline are to be created and implemented by the state in a top-down manner. Under then party leader Jiang Zemin, the “Constructing a socialist spiritual civilization” program (Shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming jianshe) was introduced in the late 1990s (Jiang 1999). This program aimed to construct a new way of thinking (sixiang jianshe), a new morality (daode) and a “scientific culture” (kexue wenhua). “New men” displaying a “high quality” (gao suzhi) should be created, characterized as “Four Have Citizens” (si you gongmin), i.e., people with high moral standards, noble ideals, and a high level of education and discipline.\(^\text{41}\)


\(^{41}\) *Shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming jianshe* (Constructing a socialist spiritual civilization). Baidu. https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E7%B2%BE%E7%A5%9E%E6%96%87%E6%98%8E%E5%BB%BA%E8%AE%BE (accessed 9 April 2020).
This program sounded rather abstract, and the issue of “civilizing” did not play a major role in the documents concerned.

Role models from which people should learn always played a special role in China. By identifying with them, people should continuously discipline themselves. In Confucian history, as described above, these were the junzi (a man of noble virtue) and in modern times various role models throughout the People’s Republic (Wei 2019; J. Zhang 2019). Since the early 1960s the disciplined soldier Lei Feng is still one of the most prominent role models (see e.g., Pan 2018, Gao and Bischoping 2019). The idea behind “models” was that people should learn to distinguish between “good” and “bad” people thus disciplining themselves accordingly. In 2015, Xi Jinping specifically emphasized the role of moral models for civilizing people:

To give full play to the role of role models, leading cadres, public figures, and advanced models must set a good example for the whole society and serve as positive role models, thus guiding and promoting all people to establish a sense of civility, strive to become civilized citizens, and display a civilized image (Xi 2015).

A further interesting point in this context is the concept of suzhi (quality) suzhi jiaoyu (quality education) put forward not only in the 1990s but also today. In official statements, people insufficiently civilized or disciplined are characterized as possessing a “low quality” (suzhi di) (Anagnost 2004; Kipnis 2006). Suzhi in this sense refers to “civilized” behavior or, from the perspective of the state, to modernity and self-discipline (see e.g., Yan 2003, 494). Suzhi education, in turn, emphasizes the role of raising a students’ personal quality (Wen 2019). The suzhi concept is also part of the state’s power concept. Its purpose is to establish new forms of social control, new patterns of rationality, and new norms and standards of behavior, while disciplining locals accordingly (in the sense of “civilizing of minds”). Concurrently, it serves as an argument used by the state to “excuse many things not getting done or not getting done well” by blaming locals for poverty and backwardness.42 However, this is true not only for Han people (China’s ethnic majority) but also for ethnic minorities (Yan, ibid.).

---

42 A lack of suzhi is frequently perceived as a “potential source of chaos,” see Sturgeon 2009, 487.
A new document adopted by the Chinese leadership in 2001 underscored the urgent need to create a new citizen morality (Zhonggong Zhongyang 2001). In 2003, 20 September was established as the “Day of Propagating Citizen Morality.” Values such as “patriotism and abiding by the laws,” “honesty and personal integrity,” “solidarity and friendliness,” “working hard and improving oneself continuously,” and “cherishing one’s work and being respectful” were at that time the focus of this campaign (see e.g., the following propaganda poster).

Under Xi Jinping, the “Socialist Core Values” (Gow 2017) were declared to figure as key points of future behavior and a new morality (2017). These core values, characterized by China as “a set of moral principles” to cultivate responsible citizens and boost social ethics (Cao 2018) and encouraged by the CCP since its 18th Party Congress in 2012 (Yuan 2008), encompass twelve (partly very abstract) points: wealth and strength (富强); democracy (民主); civilization (文明); harmony (和谐); freedom (自由); equality (平等); justice (公正); governing by law (法治); patriotism (爱国); devotion (to work) (敬业); credibility (诚

---

信) and friendliness (友善). These values are promoted almost everywhere in public spaces, in the streetscape, in public buildings, educational institutions, offices and even on small cards on restaurant tables.

These “core values” were introduced since China had “lost its moral compass during its three-decade economic miracle” (Yuan, ibid.). Originally, they were developed in the Hu-Wen period as part of the “essence of socialist ideology (ibid.). After Xi Jinping came to power, the focus was shifted toward creating a new type of morality and discipline. These values embody a mixture of Chinese values (such as harmony, patriotism, devotion and credibility) and “Western” ones (democracy, freedom, civilization) and what is understood as “Marxist” core values (equality, justice). However, terms such as democracy and freedom are defined and interpreted differently from “Western” concepts. 45 Democracy stands for “socialist democracy,” which—so the argument goes—already exists in the current political system (keyword: “people’s sovereignty”), but should be strengthened in future. Freedom, in turn, is primarily conceived of as freedom of the collective, of the community or of the state, not of the individual. This signifies that the “socialist core values” are first and foremost based on the party leadership’s interpretation of socialist-Marxist and Chinese “values.” At the same time Xi emphasizes that these core values are rooted in China’s “excellent traditional culture.” 46

At least half of these core values are related to the topical field of social discipline: civilization (self-awareness in terms of civilized behavior); harmony (in the sense of peaceable social behavior); respect for other people; dedication to work (i.e., working discipline); credibility and friendliness, since on the one hand they refer to individual behavior, but on the other hand they should contribute to re-building social

45 See e.g., the definition of democracy given by Cui Tiankai, Chinese ambassador to the US, in June 2019: “Democracy is a means to deliver a happy life to the people by constantly improving the governance of the country and society,” which in no way corresponds to the concept of political democracy in a “Western” sense. http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgxss/t16669799.htm (accessed 14 June 2019).

46 Xi Jinping zai Zhonggong Zhongyang zhengzhiju di shisanci jiti xuexi shi qiangdiao ba peiyu he hongyang ningen juqi qiangji guban (During the thirteenth collective study session of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, Xi Jinping emphasized the cultivation and promotion of the core values of socialism as the basic project of amassing strength and building a solid foundation). http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2014-02/25/content_2621669.htm (accessed 9 April 2020).
trust. However, these values are formulated in such a general way that there is significant room for interpretation. In the end, the state turns out to figure as a “moral state” which aims to establish new social values in a top-down manner, ultimately in the interests of disciplining and civilizing society.

It seems that the aforementioned document from 2001 and its follow-up policies did not bring much improvement, a point clearly implied by a more recent document from 2019. In October 2019, the Chinese leadership adopted a far more detailed document, entitled “Implementation of the outline of constructing a citizen morality in the new period,” demanding that all party members and citizens should contribute to the creation of a new system of morality and a new moral order (Zhonggong 2019). It was emphasized that solid market economic rules and orderly social governing were still lacking and that both a “moral anomie” and a loss of intra-societal trust were prevalent. The document aimed to create new societal and professional ethics, and to reinforce family ethics and personal morality. Among other things, new forms of politeness, protection of public property, ecological behavior, reforming customs and habits, social etiquette, tourist ethics and internet morality should be fostered. All party members and citizens should behave accordingly in a self-aware manner and figure as role models. All administrative levels, authorities and government bodies were requested to implement this document carefully and thoroughly (ibid.).

Let us take some examples from the local level where local disciplinary regimes are emerging. In 2019, the author visited the city of Anyang in Henan Province where everywhere in the city a reference to the local “civilizing contract” (wenming gongyue) could be found. Among the 36 items the “contract” encompassed were issues such as “love one’s work,” “obey discipline,” “abide by the law,” “pay attention to the collective,” “respect elderly people and love children,” “change old habits and customs,” “work conscientiously and meticulously,” “cherish public property and respect teachers,” “lead a healthy life,” “be honest and keep to promises,” “take up the cudgels for a just cause,” “warm-hearted charity,” “respect females,” “birth planning,” “preserve stability,” “improve one’s inner qualities,” and “find it a pleasure to help others.”

47 Even in public toilets one encounters “civilizing projects.” In “civilized toilets” (wenming cesuo), one can find the following sign 向前一小步，文明一大步 (A small step forward, a big step to becoming civilized) over the urinals, pointing out that it is more hygienic to stand as close to the urinals as possible.
Disciplining of a Society

Social Disciplining and Civilizing Processes in Contemporary China

Many of these slogans are historical idioms, including some from Confucian classics. Civilizing or social disciplining is thus related to “traditional Chinese values” in contrast to “Western” ones, so as to make them more acceptable to the Chinese people.

In March 2020, the People’s Congress of Beijing adopted the “Regulations of Beijing City for Promoting Civilized Behavior (draft),” after having requested online comments by citizens in advance for several months. Among other things, these regulations address and impose fines on “uncivilized behavior” such as littering, spitting, smoking in non-smoking areas, non-compliance with waste separation, noise disturbance, wasting water, electricity or gas, and non-compliance with regulations on fighting the coronavirus pandemic. It also refers to “uncivilized behavior”
relating to traffic, traveling, weddings, funerals, internet activities, in hospitals, public places, etc. The ultimate purpose is to improve social morality (shehui gongde), the moral character of individuals (geren pinde), public order, and citizens’ interaction with each other. The final Regulations, officially implemented from 1 June 2020, encompass nine major fields: (1) Public Health: clean and hygienic toilets, no illegal dumping of waste, no smoking in non-smoking areas, wearing masks in case of infection; (2) Public Order: be polite in everyday behavior, wait in line, do not eat in the subway; (3) Traffic Safety, including correct parking of cars and bicycles; (4) Community Harmony: no noise disturbance, taking care of pets; (5) Civilized Tourism: respect customs and rules in tourist areas; (6) Watching exhibitions in a civilized way; (7) Network Civilization: don’t stir up hate in the cyberspace; rational online posting; avoid cyber violence, do not spread rumors; (8) Medical Order: respect medical treatment arrangements and medical personnel; (9) Ecological and Environmental Protection.

The regulations adopted by the government of Shenzhen city (January 2020) are particularly interesting. They include points such as “be polite and use civilized language,” “consciously line up when you need to wait,” “obey code of conduct for public spaces,” “use environmentally friendly products and reduce the use of products causing pollution and posing major environmental risks,” and “refuse to buy or sell illegal wildlife products.” They also encourage people to actively participate in public welfare or charity activities.

Several times, these regulations mention that citizens have to abide by and obey discipline (jilü), including “working discipline,” and strive for “self-discipline” (ziqiang zilü).

---

48 Similar regulations existed in previous centuries in Germany, for example in Nuremberg; see Buchholz 1991.
49 The regulations are available here: https://www.hotbak.net/key/%E6%B5%81%E6%84%9F%E6%88%B4%E5 %8F%A3%E7%B0%A9%E5%86%99%E8%BF%98%E6%B3%95%E6%9D%A1%E5%BC%97%E4%BA%AC%E5 %B8%82%E6%96%87%E6%98%8E%E8%A1%8C%E4%B8%BA%E4%BF%83%E8%BF%9B%E6%9D%A1%E4 %BE%8B%E5%85%A8%E6%96%87%E8%BD%89%E6%A1%88.html (accessed 3 May 2020).
A further interesting point is the link between “inheriting the excellent traditional Chinese culture” by abiding by these regulations, promoting social morality, family virtues, professional ethics, and “personal character building,” since this kind of civilizing and disciplining is strongly connected to “Chinese values” and their legacy, pointing to a sinicization of disciplining in contrast to “Western” disciplining values.

**CASE STUDY 2: THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN**

In Chinese, two terms meaning corruption exist: *tanwu* (贪污) and *fubai* (腐败). *Fubai* refers in the first instance to the negative side of a system, to structures, measures, or the negative moral behavior of an actor or organization. If applied to people or a government, *fubai* means moral and ethical decadence or moral degeneration. The term is primarily applied to moral matters and stands for everything that does not conform to the ruling morality. It signifies that the behavior of an actor or organization deviates from the general norms of society and is a dereliction of duty and discipline, thus damaging or violating common interests or moral standards. This may range from crimes committed by party officials to political and ideological misdemeanors violating party norms or the current party line. Moreover, social phenomena such as gambling, visiting prostitutes, extramarital sexual relations, excessive spending on funerals, marriages or banquets, violating public morality, but also unreasonable public expenditure or wasting public funds are conceived of as part of *fubai*. As Ko and Weng (2011, 372) have shown, “the morality of state functionaries is regarded as a public issue” and is related to a “code of ethics” of the state. Accordingly, the Chinese term *fubai* differs from Western definitions of corruption, and can be defined as “publicly unacceptable misbehavior committed by state functionaries for private gain at the expense of public interests, and/or causing intentional damage to public interests and values” (ibid., 374). However, such a broad definition makes it difficult to differentiate between matters relevant to criminal investigation and moral aberrations.

The word *tanwu*, in turn, refers to the abuse of a public position to line one’s own pockets, and comes close to the English term *corruption*. Frequently, both terms are combined in signifying corruption as *tanwu fubai* (贪污腐败).
The reform process since 1979, market economic processes and the discretionary power of officials with regard to resources and their disposal concurrently caused a huge increase in corrupt behavior by those in positions of power, i.e., the discipline of many officials eroded. Material and intellectual corruption was prevalent, the armed forces, managers of state-owned enterprises and private entrepreneurs pursued their individual economic interests, and mafia-like organizations and religious sects spread. The current anti-corruption drive, the most extensive and thorough that has ever taken place, has been used as a targeted mechanism to discipline both officials and specific social groups. In China, corruption has always been conceived of as an expression of particular interests that hinders the enforcement of common interests.

The ongoing anti-corruption campaign has four major disciplining functions: (a) to contribute to the deterrence, prevention, and repression of acts of corruption, thus diminishing corrupt behavior; (b) to help consolidate the power of the current leadership and enforce its political and developmental program against all opponents; (c) to push back the growing influence of powerful interest groups on politics, thus regaining central control; (d) to prove that the Xi Jinping leadership is determined to fight corruption effectively, rigorously and as a matter of principle, thus reinforcing trust in the CCP and its political leadership.

In fact, a central goal of the anti-corruption campaign is to bring all officials into line with national (collective) interests. Thus, the drive is about implementing a new discipline and morality among party members (Yuen 2014; Pei 2016; Heberer 2020).

Basically, corruption in China has never been combated per se. Apart from deterrence, it has always had a political function in the sense of disciplining officials politically, thereby eliminating opponents of a specific political line. The current anti-corruption drive is also intended to serve the Chinese leadership by realigning the minds and behavior of party officials. Furthermore, the leadership believes that it will consolidate and create new societal trust in the party and its leadership. It is also regarded as a prerequisite for achieving the modernization goals described above.

After coming to power in 2012, the new Xi administration faced the task of ensuring that the entire party was following its economic and political line. To achieve this goal, the new leadership first launched a major “Rectification Campaign” (2013) in order to “thoroughly clean up the working style” of the members of the CCP. This
prelude to a large-scale anti-corruption drive aimed to bring the cadres and armed forces (People's Liberation Army—PLA) under stricter control by asserting the political line of the Xi leadership within the party and the PLA. In 2014, three leading generals—Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, both former members of the Politburo (Guo from 2002–2012; Xu from 2007–2012) and vice chairmen of the Military Commission of the CCP, and Gu Junshan, former deputy logistics chief of the PLA—were arrested. Party chief Xi Jinping was extremely upset about widespread corruption among the PLA leadership. He declared that the PLA completely lacked any fighting capacity and was totally corrupt (Dong 2014). Accordingly, Xi announced a complete restructuring, reform and reshuffle of the armed forces (Jundui fanfu 2014). As a first step, about two dozen new “clean” officers were promoted to military leadership positions.

The downfall of Bo Xilai, a leading and influential political figure accused of corruption and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2013, was directed not only against Bo personally but also against his powerful network, which included senior military and civilian leaders (see Heberer and Senz 2012). In addition, the 2013 “Rectification Campaign” targeted leading managers of state-owned enterprises and banks, senior officials and private entrepreneurs involved in corruption cases, i.e., people regarded as undermining the new political direction. Concurrently, the “mass line” activities of 2013/2014 represented an attempt to come to grips with the moral decay in the CCP’s cadre contingent and to create proper tools and institutions for dealing with the problem. Among other things, this required state officials to behave in a clean, non-corrupt and non-bureaucratic manner. This was to be achieved by fighting the aforementioned “four evils” (corruption, bureaucratic behavior, hedonism, and extravagance) which are part of fubai, i.e., corruption not as a criminal act but rather as the outcome of a person’s “evil” mind and behavior.

The anti-corruption drive has certainly led to the exposure of countless cases of corruption with the effect of at least temporarily diminishing corruption, waste, and immoral behavior by officials. It has also led to a significant decrease in the squandering of public funds. For instance, since 2014, official banquets and dinners including

---

52 According to official data for 2013–2017, more than 13,000 officers were punished on corruption charges, including more than 60 generals between January 2015 and July 2017 alone. See Wang 2017.
the consumption of alcohol at public expense have widely decreased. Even the practice of officials visiting bars, restaurants and dubious establishments, etc. has almost vanished. As a result, disciplining in this sense works since officials have become more cautious, anxiously attempting to avoid any suspicion of corrupt behavior. Even family members of senior officials are more careful now, and businessmen no longer dare to offer benefits or advantages to higher-level cadres. As Yang (2015) convincingly showed, the anti-corruption campaign has also spawned a new lifestyle and morality, thus underscoring its disciplining character.

However, both academic reports and our own interviews indicate that quite a large number of officials and entrepreneurs dislike the anti-corruption drive. Officials fear losing a significant share of their earnings, while entrepreneurs complain that mechanisms for influencing policies and gaining access to important resources have decreased and that they have lost opportunities created by previous investments in connections, networks and access to officials. In fact, bribery costs have risen due to the greater risks involved for cadres. New forms of payment have emerged, such as payment in foreign currency directly into offshore bank accounts or even—admittedly an extreme case—hiring, for instance, an “American professional card shark to play private high-stakes games with party bigwigs and intentionally lose to certain players” (Anderlini 2017). It remains to be seen what the final outcome of the anti-corruption drive and its disciplining effects will be.

On the other hand, the anti-corruption drive has had a negative impact on local experimenting and innovation, and on investment by private entrepreneurs, slowing down investment growth and reducing local officials’ commitment to policy innovations and policy experiments.53

However, in view of the systemic corruption in China, where the majority of officials are more or less prone to corruption, the party would eliminate itself if it were to take action against all corrupt cadres.54 The critical question, ultimately, is which actions are to be taken by the current leadership to minimize the systemic character

---

53 On the latter issue see L. Wang 2016.
54 Sun and Yuan (2017) argued that the anti-corruption drive had “less effects in controlling the types of corruption that affect citizens’ lives more directly,” i.e., at the grassroots as well as petty corruption, leading to more satisfaction with fighting corruption at the national and provincial level but less at the local level.
of corruption without totally undermining the power of the CCP. The party secretary of the city of Maoming in Guangdong province who had been arrested due to corruption declared on his blog: “If you say that I am a corrupt official, I say that all officials are corrupt. Why have you specifically selected me? . . . Today you caught me; tomorrow your own people will catch you, too.”\(^{55}\) He was pointing to the fact that most officials are corrupt in one way or another and that prosecution was handled in a rather arbitrary manner.

In the end, it is a selective fight since the leadership decides who and whose networks are considered to be corrupt or not. Cai (2015, 49) explains this phenomenon with the “political logic” of cadres’ disciplining. On the one hand, political leaders have to punish corrupt behavior in order to “show accountability” and “to protect the authority” of the CCP (Cai called this “positional responsibility”). On the other hand, there are the “cost considerations,” i.e., when punishment is regarded by higher authorities as being too costly. In addition, Zhu (2012, 9–12) distinguishes between “forgivable” and “unforgivable” errors. The former “fall within the boundary of tolerance,” while the latter are “beyond” this boundary.

The author of this paper has another interpretation:

For quite some time, the central leadership turned a blind eye to cadres who on the one hand were somewhat corrupt, on the other successful in developing a locality and improving the living standard of its inhabitants. In the case of major local protests against corrupt practices leading to disturbances of the social order and stability, repeated failure to achieve “hard” development goals, or opposing reform programs or policies adopted by the higher echelons, however, responsible cadres were charged with corruption and punished. Effective development was the focus of the central leadership and its deliberations and not corruption per se (Heberer 2020).

A more lenient approach toward corrupt cadres who were behaving in a “developmental manner” is by no means detrimental to the authority of the CCP, but can be

---

understood as a means of protecting those officials who committed less serious mistakes and turned out to be promising developers (similarly Cai 2015, 50).

Certainly, the anti-corruption drive continues to be a powerful political tool for the cleansing of opponents of the CCP leadership’s current political line. In fact, the anti-corruption drive is supported by the majority of ordinary people, who praise “strongman Xi Jinping” for his courageous line of action and disciplining capacity—the more so, as this campaign does not target these people, but primarily focuses on corrupt officials and businessmen who benefit by bribing officials. According to a survey by Harvard University’s Ash Center in 2016, 71.5% of all respondents (2011: just 35.5%) supported Xi Jinping’s efforts to combat corruption (Cunningham, Saich and Turiel 2020, 9–10).

It is widely expected that the anti-corruption campaign will be a long-term one, accompanied by a thorough follow-up reform program aimed at accelerating the modernizing and disciplining process and consolidating the power of the current leadership. Chinese economist Xu Gao (2017; see also Chen 2014) has even argued that the campaign is not detrimental to China’s further development but may contribute to improving market structures, potentially enabling the country to avoid the so-called “growth trap” (middle-income trap), i.e., losing competitive capability while being unable to compete with better-developed economies.

**CASE STUDY 3: THE “SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM”**

In this section, we deal with a phenomenon that is frequently and critically discussed in the international media (see e.g., Song 2019a and 2019b), but is partially misunderstood: a system of scoring Chinese citizens, enterprises, social organizations and authorities by assigning positive or negative points for behavior. This system shall figure as one of the major disciplining instruments.

In 2014, the Chinese State Council adopted an action plan to establish a “social trust system” (*shehui xinyong tixi*), known in Western terms as the “social credit system,” which should—according to the announcement—be implemented nationwide.
by the end of 2020. Basically, the translation of the Chinese term *xinyong* (信用) as “credit” is not accurate. The correct translations would be “trustworthiness” and “social trustworthiness system.” This would in fact be more appropriate since this is exactly in line with the official purpose. However, as it is better known as the “social credit system” in the Western media, we use this latter term in this paper.

The objective of this system is—as described above—to create a “culture of sincerity, honesty and trust” within society or at least to increase its extent in China (see pages 41–42). The necessity to establish such a system stems from the aforementioned insight that China faces a massive loss of intra-societal trust, a rather low level of civilized behavior among specific sections of the population, a moral crisis, and a very low propensity of people to comply with rules, norms and laws (see ibid.). In addition, back in 2014, the Chinese government acknowledged that a low level of legal awareness and a high level of corruption and social scandals existed (see Scheil 2017). In a similar vein, a Chinese social scientist has noted that although China has passed a large number of laws, a functioning social order is still absent (Wu 2014). The state should therefore figure as a “disciplining state.” Morally impeccable and honest citizens and institutions with social attitudes and concerns should be created, according to the action plan. As a Chinese scholar put it in an interview: “We need a society in which people no longer violate rules and norms. The first step is that people are afraid of violating these rules, norms and laws,” a statement reminiscent of legalistic ideas. However, the social credit system is viewed less as a legal instrument than as a moral and trust-building tool wielded top-down by the state. The decision to introduce such a system takes as its point of departure the conviction that social morality and discipline have to be improved, and intra-societal trust and a new morality created. A social scoring system is understood as the proper tool to serve these purposes. Similarly, Professor Wang Shuqin, who led a major research project on integrity culture and the social credit system, connects this system explicitly to disciplining and the creation of a new morality and norm system (Wang 2017).

---


57 Interview, Beijing, 4 April 2019.
At the time of completion of this article, the “social credit system” had not yet been developed into a uniform system with consistent goals, standards, regulations and databases. It is currently only implemented at a few dozen pilot sites, with differing objectives and priorities.\textsuperscript{58} The primary goal is to discipline the behavior not only of citizens, but also of civil servants, enterprises, and social organizations, and to regulate the market. For cadres, a separate ranking system has existed for many years (see Heberer and Trappel 2013). The offices responsible for the digitalization of the economy are concurrently responsible for the general implementation of the scoring system. Both positive and negative points are assigned and registered. Authorities are entitled to check the data of an enterprise, an organization or an individual, if this is necessary for fulfilling their duties. Anyone who seriously violates laws, rules, regulations or ethical standards can be put on a “blacklist” which, depending on the facts and the seriousness of the misconduct, can lead to withholding of access to bank loans, flight and train tickets, passports, trips abroad, etc. For instance, anyone who does not service her or his debts, refuses to pay administrative fines or court costs, is in arrears with payments, or in a more general sense does not comply with laws or legal obligations; companies that defraud, distort competition, circulate inferior products or violate labor laws; tax evaders or anyone who commits other criminal offenses—to mention just a few—will face points deductions and further sanctions. An official government report published in early 2019 revealed that in 2018 alone, 17.46 million people were denied access to air tickets and 5.4 million persons to high-speed train tickets due to major violations. Penalties apply to individuals, companies and officials. For example, 3.59 million companies were no longer allowed to issue shares or to participate in public tenders. The withdrawal of trade and business licenses, the exclusion from insurances and from the purchase of securities or real estate, withholding of passports, etc. are also connected to a person’s points account.\textsuperscript{59} The future plan is to register all data collected from companies and individuals in central databases.

\textsuperscript{58} In mid-2018, approximately 40 pilot locations at city and provincial level existed; cf. Kostka 2018.

\textsuperscript{59} 2018nián shíxìn héimíngdàn niàndù fēnxi bāogào fābù (Report and analysis on blacklists of untrustworthy cases in the year 2018). \url{http://www.gov.cn/fuwu/2019-02/19/content_5366674.htm} (accessed 17 April 2020). An overview of the significance of the social credit system for enterprises is provided in Meissner 2017.
The sanctions are diverse and can be divided into three major areas: government and administrative matters, business matters and individual social behavior. Different authorities maintain their own databases, including the Ministry of Environment, the tax authorities or the State Bureau for the Administration of Industry and Commerce. The provisions of the latter state that in the case of “particularly serious” or repeated violations by a firm, such as unfair competition, misleading advertising, or violation of trademark law, of consumer interests, of customers’ data privacy or of intellectual property law, a company may be placed on the above-mentioned “blacklist.” Even the “Alipay” online payment system runs a scoring system to assess and track participants’ payment record and trustworthiness (Paulo 2019). Therefore, this system can be characterized as an incentive and deterrence system.

Sometimes we find very diverse regulations in different pilot locations, as well as significant variations between urban and rural areas, larger and smaller cities (see e.g., Creemers 2018). Scheil (2018, 45–48), for instance, writes about the regulations in Shanghai, which primarily focus on the payment record and creditworthiness. Although these regulations did not originally provide for the possibility of an administrative objection or a judicial review of administrative decisions, such an option has apparently existed since 2017 (Scheil, ibid.).

A report on the pilot city of Rongcheng (Shandong province) represents another, more rural morality focus. Here, at the beginning every resident received 1,000 points as start-up capital. Citizens were divided into categories A *** (most positive) to D depending on their points. The focus was on public behavior with a detailed reward and penalty system (adding or deducting points) (see Mistreanu 2018; Paulo 2019). In rural areas, it is often about supporting the socially weak: looking after poor, sick and elderly family members or co-villagers, avoiding disputes with neighbors and within families, donations for the needy, voluntary services for the community, assisting in maintaining social order, environmental protection, cleanliness of villages, etc.

---

60 Jiédù “Yánzhòng wéi lǐ shì xīn qí yì mínghàn guǎn lì zá xíng bān fǎ” (Interpretation of the “Provisional Regulations for Dealing with non-trustful enterprises that have seriously violated legal stipulations”), 30 May 2018. [Link](http://credit.mot.gov.cn/zhengcefagui/guojia/201805/t20180522_3023596.html) (accessed 17 April 2020).

---
In 2018, the author noticed in the city of Hangzhou that drivers at a crossing slowed down and stopped from a distance, even if only one pedestrian was using the crossing. Such behavior was new to him and he wondered how the city government managed to enforce it. For years, the city had demanded that drivers stop at pedestrian crossings. But almost nobody stopped, despite the threat of a fine. The explanation was simple. In the meantime, cameras for facial recognition had been installed above the crossing. Anyone who simply drives on when pedestrians wanted to use the crossing is captured on video by these cameras, resulting in an immediate points deduction. Here, the social credit system acts as a direct instrument of disciplining. And such examples are frequently given by Chinese citizens to explain the necessity of such a system and its popularity.

In 2019, the southwestern province of Guizhou was designated a pilot province. The relevant regulation illustrates which types of violations are the main focus: tax evasion, internet fraud, the spread of fake news, environmental crimes, counterfeiting of products, non-payment of wages for migrant workers and of invoices of small and medium-sized private companies, failure to abide by court orders, insurance fraud, misuse of charity donations, fraudulent financial transactions, misleading advertising, and violations of environmental and cyberspace laws. “Loss of trust” (shixin) and “restoring trust” between companies and customers and between authorities and citizens are specifically mentioned as background for this disciplining catalog.

As illustrated above, mechanisms to monitor and discipline the population have played a specific role in China’s political culture up to the present day (see pages 33–38). These historical and past experiences enshrined in the collective memory of the people may be one of the reasons why there does not seem to be much concern about the disciplinary instrument of the social credit system, particularly as many interviewees and people we spoke to argued that only criminals or people violating rules and norms would be negatively affected by this system.

From the standpoint of legal safety, however, the social credit system raises numerous questions: Who determines what a good citizen is? Which concept of the person is behind it? Is there any form of transparency regarding the control and use of

---

61 See e.g., the aforementioned scoring system during the Ming dynasty (page 34).
the system? Who controls it in order to avoid data misuse? What remedies are available to individuals or groups? What can those affected do in the event of registration errors, injustices or wrong decisions? Ultimately, the key question is the control and use of the data collected so as to prevent a kind of technological totalitarianism. Our interviews in 2018 and 2019 revealed that many people, including intellectuals and academics, knew little or nothing about the social credit system or just welcomed it. Respondents’ most important argument was that they adhered to laws, rules and standards and therefore would not be negatively affected by this system, whereas those not abiding by the rules should be punished through points deduction: this was only just and fair, so the argument goes. As a result, many Chinese people regard this (previously fragmented) system less as a mechanism of social surveillance than as a means to steer social behavior in a direction that increases the level of trust, discipline and order within society, improves civilized behavior, and leads to more customer-friendly behavior by companies and services, and to a less fraudulent internet. The social credit system—so a further argument goes—also aims to prevent the emergence of a pure market society in which all relationships are subject to the pursuit of profit.

A Chinese social scientist told us that in the end all governments monitored their citizens, as the NSA and the Snowden case had revealed. In China, the primary task at the moment was to ensure that rules and standards were followed, to fight cybercrime and to discipline the people. Only at a later point in time would the question of data protection and human rights come up. The goal was to develop self-control and self-discipline, including self-censorship, something that had always been a Confucian educational ideal in the form of “self-cultivation.” This line of argument is reminiscent of the aforementioned concept of “governmentality” coined by Foucault, by which he characterized the disciplining “technologies of the state” par excellence, i.e., to control and influence the self, including people’s minds and behavior, so that they would voluntarily abide by the rules established by the state institutions and accept their disciplining technologies (Foucault 2005). Here, the concept of a “post-disciplinary order” predicted by Robert Castel in the early 1990s seems to become reality, i.e., that

---

it might become “technologically feasible to programme populations themselves, on the basis of an assessment of their performances, and, especially, of their possible deficiencies” (Castel 1991, 294).

FURTHER FIELDS OF DISCIPLINING

Further fields of disciplining can be identified, such as civilizing peasants (Thøgersen 2003), “state agents” or cadres (Cai 2015), “internet civilizing,” the cadres’ evaluation system (Heberer and Trappel 2014) or civilizing “ethnic minorities.” Since the fields mentioned in this final section have already been examined in some detail by other scholars, they will only briefly be addressed in the following.

Regarding the cadres’ evaluation system, the 2019 regulations specifically and repeatedly address the necessity of cadres’ political, organizational and moral discipline (jilü).63 “Internet civilizing” (banwang wenming) and a campaign called the “internet civilizing project” (wangluo wenming gongcheng) commencing in 1999 and continuing after 2012 were aimed at cleaning up the Chinese internet and regaining party control of public debates and blogging content in the cyberspace. The purpose of the campaign was to minimize rumors, pornography, violence, fraud, copyright infringement, etc. (see Yang 2017; Goldkorn 2013; Wangluo wenming gongcheng, undated). The disciplining and civilizing character of “cleaning up” the internet was further emphasized by a document in early 2017 which stated:

Guide the majority of mobile Internet users to access the Internet in a civilized manner, and actively participate in purifying the network environment and maintaining network order (Zhonggong Zhongyang 2017).

Similar regulations were adopted in 2019 for civilized, “ecological” internet content (Wangluo xinxi neirong 2019).

Concerning another field, the civilizing of ethnic minorities in China, social anthropologist Stevan Harrell, for instance, speaks of “civilizing projects”

. . . in which one group, the civilizing center, interacts with other groups (the peripheral peoples) in terms of a particular kind of inequality. In this interaction, the inequality between the civilizing center and the peripheral peoples has its ideological basis in the center’s claims to a superior degree of civilization, along with a commitment to raise the peripheral peoples’ civilization to the level of the center, or at least closer to that level (Harrell 1995, 4).

Similarly, Gladney (2004) in line with Scott (2009, 116–126) and Heberer (2001 and 2013) also examined the civilizing mission of the “center.” The idea of a mission to “civilize” natives has been specified by Edward Said as a “duty to natives . . . for the ‘benefit’ of the natives, or for the ‘prestige’ of the mother country” (Said 1994, 130).64 The distinction between “civilized” and “barbarian” people was by no means a purely Chinese enterprise. Rather, it existed across all cultures as an asymmetric relationship and perceived distinction between “us” and “the others” (see e.g., Chen 2017, 2–9). In China, the notion of civilizing peripheral people also has strong roots in the country’s history, albeit differing from European concepts. As mentioned above (see page 16), Wang (1982, 23) has argued that traditionally, people having “wen” could also turn into civilized people if they were educated and upheld (Confucian) morality (ibid.). In a similar vein, Hirono (2008, 72) explained that the basic idea of traditional Chinese policies toward ethnic minorities was the Chinese state’s conviction that these minorities could “change their status from uncivilized to civilized by achieving greater proximity to the center of civilization and therefore the prevailing civilizational ideology,” and that this principle has not changed much during Chinese history. Or, as Leibold puts it:

The ability to maintain peace along the frontier was the ultimate signifier of a government’s strength, authority, and majesty (Leibold 2007, 79).

This points to two kinds of disciplining or civilizing: to disciplining conducted by internal elites with regard to the “We group” or “national self,” and disciplining carried out

64 On the concept of civilizing missions in China see also Hirono 2008.
by external elites, i.e., the “They group” or “the others” (see also Vickers 2015). As Leibold and Grose (2019) have shown, the education system plays a specific role in disciplining children from ethnic minorities.

A recent and specific example of civilizing is the re-education of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. A government document of 2017 leaked in the West in 2019 under the name “China Cables” reveals that the “vocational education and training program,” i.e., re-education of Uighurs (see Jacobs 2018) and other members of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, is strongly connected to the issue of disciplining and civilizing. Specifically, points 12, 13, 15 and 16 relate to disciplining (“industrial discipline”), self-disciplining, and civilizing behavior in daily life, i.e., changing the manners, habits and hygiene of Xinjiang’s ethnic people. Point 16 even addresses the issue of scoring daily behavior and “progress.”

Wang Gungwu describes this “civilizing process” in the following way:

...the “urge to civilize” is the urge to hua, “to change others for the better.” The key criteria were moral and behavioural criteria, and in ancient times it was possible to conceive of superior people with high moral behavior among people who were not Chinese. As long as their behaviour met certain criteria, civilized people therefore could be found among non-Chinese peoples... It was not Chinese against non-Chinese, it was those Chinese who had civilization as opposed to all those who did not have it (Wang 1982, 23).

The Chinese leadership therefore concluded that Uighurs were not sufficiently civilized since Islamism, support of Islamist sects and terrorist activities had increased (see Greitens et al. 2019/20) and that such behavior was not only destroying social and political order but also deviating from “Chinese civilization” so that people infected had to be re-educated in order to be re-civilized.

Finally, even the 2020 coronavirus crisis and related policies, such as locking down entire cities, quarantining large sections of the population in major infected areas, mobile tracking of infected people, requiring people to wear face masks, or...
strictly prohibiting markets selling exotic or rare animals (such markets were claimed to have been the origin of epidemics such as SARS in 2001/2002 and the coronavirus pandemic) were part of the disciplining and civilizing policies.⁶⁶

There are even Chinese scholars who hope that the epidemic could result in “re-civilizing” of Chinese and human civilizations, i.e., with regard to fostering mutual help and support and a new awareness of the meaning of life and the importance of nature (see Wei 2020).

CONCLUSION

This paper started out from the question concerning the underlying logic and functionality of the current Chinese state. Our principal argument was that disciplining and civilizing policies are part and parcel of modernizing processes that aim to create modern citizens. We argued that modernization is a process that not only refers to economic and political-administrative modernizing but also touches upon the organization of society in general and the disciplining of both society as a whole and the individuals within it. Globally, these processes are not unilinear but vary from country to country due to different historical and cultural backgrounds and trajectories. We have shown that European scholars (Weber, Elias, Foucault, Oestreich) have analyzed and traced such processes in European countries. With regard to non-Western countries such as China, analyses of disciplining developments in the context of modernizing processes are rather rare. European disciplining processes certainly differ from those in China, since religion and the church played a major role here. However, the theories of European scholars provided a sound basis and concepts for analyzing such processes even in non-Western entities.

China’s history of ideas elucidates that concepts of disciplining and civilizing have strong roots in major Chinese world views, be it Confucianism, Daoism, Legalism or Buddhism, albeit starting from different vantage points. However, the current

⁶⁶ As Mary A. Brazelton (2019) has shown, fighting epidemics through vaccination and improving public health, hygiene and sanitary conditions in the 1950 and 1960s were concurrently part of the government’s disciplining program.
disciplining and civilizing process in China is specific. On the one hand, it is connected to a modernizing process and the objective of accomplishing modernity. On the other, it harnesses traditional ideas borrowed, for example, from Confucian concepts in order to make disciplining more acceptable to the Chinese people and to develop a modernity with Chinese features.

In addition, we showed that the top-down disciplining concept is embedded in the overarching function of the state as a developmental state. The latter is the designer, planner and key player in the modernizing process, and disciplining is one major function and task within its developmental program. Accordingly, we analyzed major instruments of the disciplining process during the Xi Jinping era, such as the function of the state as a “moral state,” the anti-corruption drive, and the social credit system. We also briefly touched upon some further fields of disciplining, e.g., regarding the cadres’ evaluation system, internet civilizing, and civilizing policies with regard to ethnic minorities or in the context of the 2020 coronavirus crisis. This paper thus contributes to the understanding of the logic and rationality of China’s political systems, its developmental goals and its disciplining and modernizing trajectories. In this way, it also enhances our knowledge of comparative modernizing processes and multiple modernities.

This paper did not analyze the implementation of the disciplining program through local disciplinary regimes, the outcome and results of this process, and the reaction and response of local people toward disciplining and civilizing policies. The latter requires fieldwork and opinion surveys, which will be left to a follow-up research project.
references


Cao, Yaxin (2018), Chinese Values: Traditional Culture and Contemporary Values, Beijing: Foreign Language Press.


Chen, Hon Fai (2017), Civilizing the Chinese, Competing with the West. Study Societies in Late Qing China, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.


DISCIPLINING OF A SOCIETY

Social Disciplining and Civilizing Processes in Contemporary China


Foucault, Michel (2010), Kritik des Regierens, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.


Gao, Zhaoming (2015), Daode wenhua: cong chuantong dao xiandai (Moral culture: from tradition to modernity), Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe.


Han, Fei (1994), Die Kunst der Staatsführung, Köln: Komet.


Hu Yingfeng (2012), Guixun quanli yu guixun shehui (Disciplining power and disciplining society), Beijing: Zhongyang Bianyi Chubanshe.
Jaspers, Karl (1957), Die großen Philosophen, München: Piper.


Jundui fanfu (2014), “Jundui fanfu bixu zou zai qianmian” (Fighting corruption within the armed forces has to proceed further). *Huanqiu Shibao* (Global Times), 12 May.


Liang, Qichao (1902–06), *Xinminshuo* (On new Citizens), https://zh.wikisource.org/zh/%E6%96%B0%E6%8E%91%E8%AA%AA (accessed 10 April 2020).

Liang, Qichao (2005), “Xinmin shuo” (On new citizens), shortened version, *Liang Qichao zuopin jingxuan* (Liang Qichao’s Selected Writings), Wuhan: Changjiang Wenyi Chubanshe, 322–326.


Mo Ti (1975), Solidarität und allgemeine Menschenliebe, Köln: Diederichs.


Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), Beijing.


Shuodao zuodao (2014), “Shuodao zuodao duixian chengnuo quxin yu min ba jiaoyu shijian huodong chengxiao luoshi dao jiceng” (Keep to one’s promises, get the trust of the people, bring the effects of the education practice to the grassroots), speech by Liu Yunshan at the Session of the Leadership Group of the Mass Line Education Activities Group of the Central Committee. *Renmin Ribao* (People’s Daily), 31 July.


Disciplining of a Society
Social Disciplining and Civilizing Processes in Contemporary China


*Wangluo Wenmin Gongcheng* (Project civilized internet) (undated). [https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%BD%91%E7%BB%9C%E6%96%87%E6%98%8E%E5%B7%A5%E7%A8%8B](https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%BD%91%E7%BB%9C%E6%96%87%E6%98%8E%E5%B7%A5%E7%A8%8B) (accessed 28 April 2020).


Xu, Jilin (2017), *Jiaguo tianxia* (Family-country under the Heaven), Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe.


DISCIPLINING OF A SOCIETY

Social Disciplining and Civilizing Processes in Contemporary China