The Venezuelan Migration Wave to Bogota, Colombia: Scaling Up Local Response and Innovating Towards Better Urban Inclusion

Angelo Paolo T. Kalaw

Written in fulfillment for the degree requirements of the Masters in Public Administration in International Development Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Advisor: Quinton Mayne
Section Leader: Carmen Reinhart

Client: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogota, D.C.

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Acknowledgements

When I was looking for topic inspirations for SYPA, I remembered my time as an intern in Bogota, Colombia in the summer of 2018, and my experiences taking the city’s Transmilenio. I would often see Venezuelans boarding the buses, telling their stories, sometimes bringing a basket of snacks, sometimes singing with a guitar and portable microphone, and then asking for little colaboración from commuters to help them get by in the city. Many would perhaps be moved by mercy or pity, urging them to draw a coin from their pockets or hand a 2,000-peso bill as an expression of solidarity. In my case, I was always stirred by admiration and profound respect. The Venezuelan resilience and courage is unbelievable, and they represent every human being’s aspiration for a good life. They remind me that I myself am a migrant in an uncertain journey – I left home in 2017 to pursue a graduate degree at Harvard, full of hope that a new place will welcome and believe in me. I dedicate this paper to the Venezuelan people, confident that your courage and love for fatherland will soon be rewarded with genuine freedom.

In writing this paper, I was definitely not alone, aided by the generosity of many classmates and friends in Cambridge and Bogota. I often left them confused of why a Filipino former central banker is suddenly researching about forced displacement in Colombia. Yet they have indulged in me, and helped me produce this output. I wish to thank Carlos Rodriguez, Jeffrey Manjarres, Carlos Reyes Plazas, Juan Pablo Caicedo, Simon Gaviria, Juan Felipe Olano and Valentin Sierra for all your help. Colombia is a country of kind-hearted and warm people, and it reminds me so much of home. I am also grateful to Maria Lucia Florez and Daisuke Fukuzawa for being my honorary SYPA partners.

This SYPA has been an enriching intellectual journey for me, of straying into urban development, politics, and migration, of using different methodologies, of improving my Spanish, and of being open to learn. It would have been impossible without my advisor, Professor Quinton Mayne, and our bi-weekly 1.5-hour consultations that really pushed me towards excellence. I am also thankful to Professor Carmen Reinhart for her guidance and trust. I am also grateful to the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation and the Carr Center for Human Rights for the financial support to this research.

Finally, this is for everyone, especially my parents and sisters in Manila, who truly believed in me, and made this Harvard dream come true.

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Executive Summary

The City of Bogota is currently at the epicenter of the migration wave of Venezuelans to Colombia, hosting 22% of the total 1.17 million recorded migrant population. This phenomenon is unprecedented in volume and velocity, and is putting considerable strain on the city government (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogota) and its institutions. In this policy analysis, we take the perspective of the Alcaldía as our hypothetical client and analyze its context and policy environment to assess their current response and recommend actions to respect the human rights and achieve better integration of migrants in Bogota.

Our quantitative and qualitative research shows that the city government is facing key challenges in the design and implementation of a response plan, including the gaps in the national normative framework for migration governance, the high fiscal and administrative cost of service provision, and the difficulty of balancing the response with the local development agenda.

In particular, we estimate that the Alcaldía may require US$16.5 million to fund its current response for 2019. Given its remaining nine months in office, obtaining resources to scale up and reach current and incoming migrants will require collaboration from the private sector and civil society. Moreover, there is a need to help migrants find work to allow them to stabilize and decrease their dependence on public services, amidst the frictions in the local labor market. Finally, the Alcaldía needs to address citizens’ perception of migrants as threats to security and welfare. Without a response, this can generate discriminatory and negative attitudes towards Venezuelans.

Applying Ager and Strang’s framework on domains of integration, we argue that the priority for the mayor is to (1) scale up existing action to solve the information problem and provide humanitarian assistance, and (2) innovate for employment and social connections to enhance migrants’ integration into Bogota. We recommend the following actions:

- Push for the Resolution from the City Council to authorize the Alcaldía to receive funding and implement migrant programs of NGOs and GIFMM.
- Convene an inter-city Forum of Mayors
- Expand access to labor services even for migrants without PEP and increase collaboration with Venezuelan associations and the Chamber of Commerce to help migrants find work
- Use ‘pedagogical urbanism’ and integrate Somos Panas, the anti-xenophobia campaign of UNHCR, in the public infrastructure and culture & arts program of the city.
Introduction

The profound economic and social crisis in Venezuela has led to a mass exodus of at least 3 million people.¹ Hyperinflation, food and medicine shortage, crime and political instability have forced millions of Venezuelans to flee, with the majority of them going to its neighboring country, Colombia. According to Migración Colombia, there is an estimated 1.17 million Venezuelans in the country as of 31 January 2019 (Figure 1),² putting Colombia as the top country in the Latin American region receiving migrants from Venezuela (Figure 2).

Figure 1. Venezuelan Migration to Colombia

Figure 2. Venezuelan Migration to Latin America, Top Destination Countries

Sources: Migración Colombia, UNHCR, author’s elaboration

¹ UNHCR, 2018
² Migración Colombia, 2019
The velocity and volume by which Venezuelans arrive in Colombia is unprecedented, resulting in considerable strain on the host country and its institutions. Recorded migrants jumped by 6 times in a span of 1.5 years (from May 2017 to January 2019), making this migration wave comparable to previous episodes of global mass migration such as Syria.\(^3\) Historically being a net sending country in terms of immigration, this sheer number is exerting pressure on Colombia’s institutions to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants, respect their human rights and facilitate their integration. The World Bank estimates that the cost of additional public services caused by migration including education, health, employment services and institutional strengthening would amount between 0.23% and 0.41% of Colombia’s GDP.\(^4\)

Figure 3. Comparison to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

![Figure 3. Comparison to the Syrian Refugee Crisis](image)

Source: Migracion Colombia, DNP, author’s calculations

Figure 4. Index of Concentration per Department, as % of total Venezuelan migrants

![Figure 4. Index of Concentration per Department, as % of total Venezuelan migrants](image)

Source: Migración Colombia, author’s elaboration

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\(^3\) Migracion Colombia, 2018; UNHCR, 2018

\(^4\) World Bank, 2018
The City of Bogota is at the epicenter of this unprecedented influx of Venezuelan migrants to Colombia. Of the total Venezuelans estimated in Colombia, 22.23% or 261,000 are estimated to be in Bogota (Figure 4). While this only represents 3.2% of the city’s 8 million population, the city government and the people of Bogota need to confront the complex set of challenges in receiving and integrating migrants while pursuing its own development agenda.

Around the world, the refugee (forced displacement) crisis is a city crisis. According to the UNHCR, roughly 60 percent of the world’s 22 million refugees reside in cities rather than in camps. Cities are in the frontline dealing with displaced populations, and local governments need to design, deliver and finance effective emergency response as well as long-term integration. The same is true for Bogota, notwithstanding the unclear refugee status of Venezuelans in Colombia.

The hypothetical client of this policy analysis is the Alcaldía Mayor de Bogota, D.C. (the city government, hereinafter referred to as Alcaldía), headed by Mayor Enrique Peñalosa Londoño. Mayor Peñalosa and the Alcaldía declared an open-doors policy and announced a set of comprehensive measures that it will take to assist and integrate Venezuelan migrants into the city. The goal of this policy analysis is to assess the context and policy environment of Bogota and examine the Alcaldía’s response in order to provide concrete policy recommendations for the remainder of the Mayor’s term.

Problem Statement

This policy analysis will focus on two key questions. First, what is the objective of the Alcaldía’s response and how can it adjust, build on and scale up its existing policy? Can it muster political and fiscal resources to support these actions? Second, what kind of integration should the Alcaldía aspire for, and what levers and innovation can it use to achieve it?

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5 Katz and Brandt, 2018
6 Bahar, 2018
7 Secretaria de Integracion Social, 2018
8 Secretaria General, 2018
Conceptual Framework and Methodology

In analyzing the Venezuelan migrant phenomenon in Bogota and the city government’s response, we draw from the framework on core domains of integration proposed by Ager and Strang (2008). Integration is a vague concept that the Alcaldia has embraced both as a stated policy goal and a targeted outcome. The pronouncements convert the work towards integration as an official agenda, despite integration being a chaotic concept that is often individualized, contested and contextual. International experience also shows that there is no single, generally accepted definition, theory or model of immigrant and refugee integration. Given this, Ager and Strang proposes a useful framework because it does not offer a description or definition of integration but instead identify ten core domains reflecting normative understanding of what constitutes ‘successful’ integration in a range of relevant stakeholders. The task then is to understand what relevant domains are applicable to Colombia and the City of Bogota, and derive pathways for policy action based on this diagnosis. (Figure 5; Annex 2 for expanded discussion).

Figure 5. Conceptual Framework Defining Core Domains of Integration

Means and markers
- Employment
- Housing
- Education
- Health

Social Connections
- Social bridges
- Social bonds
- Social links

Facilitators
- Language and cultural knowledge
- Safety and stability

Foundation
- Rights and citizenship

Source: Ager and Strang (2008)

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9 Robinson, 1998
10 Castles, et.al. 2001
11 Ager and Strang, 2008
The framework is applied to the case of a local government, Bogota. This approach puts cities instead of national governments at the center based not on their capacity, but on their willingness to host displaced residents, and their legitimacy to oversee the delivery of services within their jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{12} We argue that the decision of a city government is not only contingent on availability of resources, but instead on a vision to be a key actor in migration governance and integration, recognizing the reality that migrants will continue to arrive to the city in search of safety and better economic opportunity.

We employed a mix of quantitative and qualitative methodologies in this policy analysis. The research began with a review of academic papers on local governance and migration, official government documents, newspaper reports and published third-party reports and situationers on Venezuelan migration to Bogota and Colombia. This was then elaborated and analyzed using primary data collected during the fieldwork to Bogota, Colombia, consisting of observation of public spaces, in-person interviews and focus group discussions with city officials and bureaucrats, civil society leaders, and migrants. We likewise employed secondary analysis of various citizen surveys, budget documents and the Household Survey of Colombia to strengthen our diagnosis and recommendations.

Among these domains, we argue in this policy analysis that employment and social connections can facilitate the effective integration of Venezuelan migrants to Bogota. Given the policy environment and nature of the migration problem, the Alcaldía should (1) scale up its current information provision network and humanitarian assistance, and (2) focus on helping migrants find work and facilitating social connections. The succeeding section will build this argument based on diagnostics of the migration problem and the context of the city, as well as an analysis of the lessons learned during the initial implementation of their response plan. The remainder of the paper will elaborate on policy recommendations for the Alcaldía.

\textsuperscript{12} International Rescue Committee, 2018
Diagnostics: Understanding the Challenges and Defining the Response Architecture of the Local Government

The City of Bogota is the economic and political capital of Colombia. The 1991 Constitution of Colombia provides for Bogota to be the Capital District, that is the capital of the country and of the Department of Cundinamarca. This gave the city government a special administrative, fiscal and political status comparable to that of a Department, the highest political and administrative subdivision of government below the national level.\textsuperscript{13} A Colombian Department is headed by a Governor and led by a Department Assembly, which in the case of Bogota corresponds to the City Mayor (Alcalde Mayor) and City Council (Consejo de Bogota).

Decree 1421 of 1993 increased the fiscal strength and administrative capacity of the Alcaldía Mayor de Bogota. Also known as the Organic Statute of Bogota (Estatuto Orgánico de Bogota), this national law granted autonomy to the city government to control its local taxation and manage its budget system. This enabled the city to raise revenues through a wide range of taxes, without precluding transfers from the National Government through the General System of Participation (Sistema General de Participaciones). It also conferred to the Alcaldía the power to incur debt up to the equivalent of six times of its incremental revenue.\textsuperscript{14} Decree 1421 also restructured the administration of the city, separating legislative and administrative functions specifically by transferring the power of the City Council over appointments, contracts and budgeting to the Mayor. This empowered the Mayor to overcome political stalling or blockades and avoid clientelism that previously plagued the administration of the city.\textsuperscript{15} It also allowed mayors to appoint competent public managers and reform the human resource program of the Alcaldía. On the balance, this increased the Alcaldía’s efficiency to deliver services, address corruption and gain respect from citizens.

\textsuperscript{13} 1991 Constitution of Colombia
\textsuperscript{14} Decreto 1421 of 1993
\textsuperscript{15} Pasotti, 2013
Bogota is a story of remarkable urban transformation. From being a crime-infested, corrupt and bankrupt city in the early 1990s, the election of Antanas Mockus (1995-1997 and 2001-2003) and Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2000) as mayors ushered a continuous period of competent administrations that ‘put the public finances in order, invested heavily in public works, improved public transport and upgraded and serviced many low-income settlements.’ These mayors took advantage of the Organic Statute to transform the city towards higher quality of living standards. Among Antanas Mockus’ main legacies was the Citizen Culture (Cultura Ciudadana) program, which sought to stimulate an inclusive sense of belonging and responsibility via a cultural intervention and communication strategy focused on social coexistence. As Mockus started to repair the city’s fiscal position and bureaucratic efficiency, the Citizen Culture program promoted a new civic culture and city identity. Within a decade, the city government was able to reduce the homicide rate from 81 per 100,000 in 1993 to 35 per 100,000 in 2000, attributed to the investment in civic education and institutional reform.

Bogota’s massive investment in public spaces and infrastructure was also pivotal in its transformation. By the time that Enrique Peñalosa assumed the mayoralty in 1998, Bogota was ready to undertake megaprojects that reinforced civicness and equality. Mayor Peñalosa’s district development plan, dubbed “For the Bogota We Want” (Por la Bogota que Queremos), led to the creation of an integrated mass transportation system (Transmilenio Bus Rapid Transit), a bike route (Ciclovia), 1,100 district parks, a district library system, and substantial investments in public housing and infrastructure. These investments were continued in the second term of Mockus, such that by the end of 2003, Bogota is now described as a model of progressive development, and a place where one actually might want to live. (See Annex 5). We will return to this urban transformation story in our recommendations section.

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16 Gilbert, 2015
17 Cultura Ciudadana sought to promote social coexistence from the relation to public employees to the respect of traffic signals to the peaceful resolution of conflicts among neighbors. It involved various slogans such as “Todos Ponen, Todos Toman” (All pay, all gain) to encourage payment of taxes, “Recursos Publicos, Recursos Sagrados” to bolster citizen participation in public finance, and culture and arts intrusions such as deployment of 420 mimes to encourage the use of pedestrian crossings, and Knights of the Zebra to recognize honest taxi drivers. (Caballero, 2004; Pasotti, 2013)
18 Pasotti, 2013; Martin and Ceballos, 2004
19 Pasotti, 2013
20 Jones, 2002
Key Issues in the City Response for Migrants

The Venezuelan migrants in Bogota are young. Using the latest data on Venezuelan migrants with Special Permanency Permits (Permiso Especial de Permanencia, PEP), the statistics show that the migrants are relatively young, with the age bracket of 18-29 years old representing 45%. Males and females are roughly of equal proportion (Figure 6). This does not capture however the statistics about migrants with irregular status or the Venezuelans that use Bogota as a transit point for further travel to other Latin American countries.

Figure 6. Demographics of Venezuelans in Bogota (PEP Holders)

![Demographics of Venezuelans in Bogota (PEP Holders)](image)

Source: Migración Colombia, author’s calculations

Political and fiscal independence combined with bureaucratic quality enables the Alcaldía to respond better to the migration of Venezuelans. In September 2018, the Alcaldía announced a Plan of Integral Attention for Venezuelan Migrants (Plan de Atención Integral para los Migrantes Venezolanos) and outlined the array of services that will be extended to the said migrants in Bogota. These include the appointment of a Manager for the Plan, establishment of an information center for arrivals, and access to health, education and labor services.21 With this announcement, Bogota became the first Colombian local government to institute an integrated response to the migration wave. The Plan assigned responsibilities to specific District Secretariats (sectoral ministries) of the city to take measures for migrants, as illustrated in Figure 7.

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21 Secretaria General, 2018
Responding to the unprecedented migration wave for a local government is essentially an adaptive challenge.\textsuperscript{22} It is a problem that is difficult to identify and fully map out, requires change across organizational boundaries, and requires changes in values, beliefs, and approaches to work in dealing with a foreign population. The Alcaldía’s initiative is pioneering for a local government in Colombia, but it inevitably finds itself in a matrix of multiple and overlapping challenges in policy design and implementation. In our assessment, three areas are critical, namely: national migration policy, fiscal and institutional capacity, and overlap with the local politics and development agenda.

National Migration Policy
There is a gap in the national migration policy framework in Colombia, specifically the powers and responsibility of the local government in receiving migrants. Applying Ager and Strang’s framework, rights and citizenship of migrants are the foundation for integration, an area where the national government has exclusive domain. However, as a historically net migrant

\textsuperscript{22} Heifetz and Linsky, 2002
country, most of the laws and presidential priorities on migration are oriented towards attending to Colombians abroad and encouraging their return.\(^{23}\) This becomes a constraint for local governments, because a coherent and integral framework is a vital legal and operational basis to back decisions of subnational governments on the level of goods and services it can provide to migrants.\(^{24}\) Colombia is also a signatory to international conventions such as the American Convention on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, and the UN Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, and the city governments could be seen to be the actual implementation arm of these laws (See Annex 6). The national government under President Ivan Duque expressed solidarity with the Venezuelans and appointed key officials to develop and implement policies for response,\(^{25}\) yet a more coherent approach requires further articulation because the present frameworks for reception of migrants, public spending, asylum and regularization system cannot accommodate the volume of Venezuelan arrivals (See Annex 3 for timeline of key events).\(^{26}\)

**The National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES) outlined the government’s strategy in attending the migration from Venezuela, but it requires further articulation for local governments.** CONPES Document No. 3950 published in November 2018 recognizes the problem that the migration wave presents and defines the government’s priority to provide attention to migrants from Colombia in the medium-term through 68 specific actions, with the goal of strengthening institutions for the response.\(^{27}\) The CONPES categorized municipalities into three areas of influence based on the number of migrants received from Venezuela (Figure 8). Bogota is classified under Area of Influence 2, or territories characterized as attractive for long-term stay given its stronger institutional capacities. The CONPES however, remains to be a strategy paper that requires further action, specifically with regard to defining the powers of the local governments and channels for fiscal transfers for migration response.

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\(^{23}\) A comprehensive migration policy to include immigration and not only Colombian communities abroad was initiated in the second term of the Alvaro Uribe presidency (2006-2010), which culminated in the National Council of Economic and Social Policy (CONPES) Document No. 3603 dated 24 August 2009 (OAS, 2017). However, while the policy outlines the principle of consistency in the treatment of domestic migrants or foreign nationals and their families, it is still heavily focused towards Colombians abroad and their return.

\(^{24}\) Rodriguez and Robayo, 2018

\(^{25}\) Semana, 2018

\(^{26}\) UNHCR Colombia notes that the system for asylum is a particular challenge for Colombia, amidst its concurrence to the Cartagena Declaration. The Declaration extends the definition of refugees to cover the indirect effects such as poverty, economic decline, inflation, and violence as justification for asylum-seeking – situations which many Venezuelans faced in their homeland. However, as of March 2018, Colombia only hosted 277 refugees, 625 asylum-seekers and 11 stateless people (UNHCR, 2018), versus the 2,073 applications received from 2010-2017.

\(^{27}\) Consejo Nacional de Politica Economica y Social, 2018
In the local level, this implies that local governments need to exercise political will, utilize existing resources, and innovate on their own strategies for response and integration. Table 1 shows the wide-ranging responses of various local governments in Colombia to Venezuelan migrants. It can be observed that local governments generally sought to provide humanitarian assistance via accommodation and food, consistent with the overall welcoming attitude and laws of the national government for migrants. However, the official local policy towards migrants with intention of long-term stay is not consistent, with Cucuta openly declaring that the city does not have enough resources to attend to this population, while Medellin being relatively open. Absent an articulation of migration policy for local governments, mayors take positions based on the availability of resources and political will. The same applies to Bogota, as city officials emphasize the fact that amidst relative availability of resources, Mayor Peñalosa’s political will for an open-doors policy is the backbone of the Alcaldía’s action to dedicate resources and reorganize capabilities to attend to migrants.

**Table 1. Selected Responses of Colombian Local Governments to Venezuelan Migrants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Government</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Cucuta (Border city with Venezuela) | • Mayor Cesar Rojas called the phenomenon a crisis and officially asked for national government funds to help provide humanitarian assistance to migrants.\(^{28}\)  
• Maintained that Venezuelans should not stay long term in the city.  
• Opened accommodation with 2,000 slots exclusively for transit travelers.\(^{29}\) |
| Medellin, Antioquia (Colombia’s second major city) | • Created a special fund together with UNHCR to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants\(^{30}\)  
• Signed an agreement with UN to provide temporary housing for Venezuelans living in the streets.\(^{31}\)  
• Opened 1,000 slots for Venezuelan children in the city’s schools\(^{32}\) |
| Barranquilla (Colombia’s major port city) | • Dismantled an informal migrant camp of 500 Venezuelans and gave transport to return to Venezuela\(^{33}\)  
• Co-organized two job fairs together with local chambers of commerce for Venezuelans and returning Colombians\(^{34}\)  
• Signed an agreement with the World Food Programme for daily feeding of 850~ Venezuelan children enrolled in district schools.\(^{35}\) |

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\(^{28}\) Castillo Arenas, 2019  
\(^{29}\) Semana, 2018  
\(^{30}\) Zambrano Benavides, 2018  
\(^{31}\) Caracol TV, 2018  
\(^{32}\) Quiceno, 2018  
\(^{33}\) De La Hoz, 2019  
\(^{34}\) El Heraldo, 2018  
\(^{35}\) Colprensa, 2019
Figure 8. Map of Areas of Influence, CONPES 3950

Source: DNP

Figure 9. Registration Rate (Venezuelans registered in RAMV and with PEP)

Source: Migración Colombia, author’s elaboration
Registering and regularizing Venezuelan migrants is a key issue for the Alcaldía. Getting migrants registered is a national priority for migration control. In response to the wave of migration, the national government started issuing Special Permanency Permits (Permiso Especial de Permanencia, PEP) that allow a Venezuelan to stay in Colombia for two years from the date of issuance. The PEP has a temporary nature that provides time for a Venezuelan to reside in Colombia while processing their resident/immigrant visa. Besides PEP, the national government also initiated the Administrative Registry for Venezuelan Migrants (Registro Administrativo de Migrantes Venezolanos) to encourage migrants to register and obtain PEP, especially for those that do not have sufficient documentation (e.g. passport or birth certificate). The current coverage of RAMV is not yet full, especially for those that entered Colombia illegally. Moreover, among those registered in the RAMV, not everyone possesses PEP. In Bogota, only 16% of Venezuelans in RAMV holds PEP (Figure 9).

The Alcaldía needs migrants to obtain PEP to be able to assist them. The possession of PEP is relevant for the city government because the law does not allow public funds or services to be extended to entities with illegal or irregular status (in this case, no PEP). The PEP is a key mechanism to formalize a Venezuelan’s status in Colombia, and allows him/her to access services and privileges as shown in Figure 10. Otherwise, the Alcaldía may not fully attend to a migrant as it is subject to audits and legal action by the National Comptroller (Contraloría) and the Attorney General (Fiscalía General).

Figure 10. Benefits of PEP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>HEALTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Registration of the student’s degree System Database – SIMAT</td>
<td>• Validity of the PEP as identification document in the social protection system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Table of equivalences between the Educational System of Colombia and Venezuela</td>
<td>• Access to the Health System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Urgent care for the irregular population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FINANCIAL SERVICES</th>
<th>WORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Validity of the PEP for the opening and contracting of financial products and services</td>
<td>• Employment management and placement services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Exercise any legal activity or occupation in the country, including those from a work relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Migración Colombia, author’s elaboration
Fiscal and Institutional Capacity

Providing assistance to migrants comes with a price tag, which puts pressure on the fiscal standing of the government. At the national level, the CONPES projects that the country will need to spend 422.78 billion pesos (US$140.24 million) to effectively achieve integrated support for migrants from 2018-2021 (See Annex 7A). This is estimated to represent 0.26 to 0.43% of GDP.\textsuperscript{36} For Bogota, by the end of 2018, estimates put the total spending of the Alcaldía around COP26,000 million (~US$8.67 million), which represents less than 1% of the budget (Table 2).\textsuperscript{37} A single amount is challenging to consolidate, given that migrant response is not mainstreamed in the development and budget planning of the city.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lll}
\hline
\textbf{Category} & \textbf{Amount in COP million} & \textbf{USD million equivalent} \\
\hline
Education & 14,000 & 4.6 \\
Health & 4,400 & 1.3 \\
Social Integration (pre-school, encampments) & 7,800 & 2.6 \\
Administration (e.g. SuperCADE)* & 200 & 0.6 \\
\hline
\textbf{TOTAL} & \textbf{26,400} & \textbf{8.8} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Estimates of City Expenditure for Migrant Attention, Calendar Year 2018}
\end{table}

The Alcaldía managed to spend for migrant response by utilizing secretariat surpluses or expanding existing line of services. We observe that the financing of the city government response is ad hoc in nature, rather than emanating from a dedicated budget or fund. City officials explained that each respective city secretariat uses their existing budgets to accommodate the need by either deploying surplus or expanding existing services to include Venezuelan migrants.

Consolidating a single dedicated fund for the response is politically and administratively difficult. It is challenging to allocate specific budget for migrants across the entities of the Alcaldía for two reasons. First, any repurposing of funds within the approved budget is subject to City Council approval, which means it will be conditional on political scrutiny and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} Consejo Nacional de Politica Economica y Social, 2018
\item \textsuperscript{37} Portafolio, 2018
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
will take time. The City Council allows reallocation within approved spending categories, e.g. any surplus for education cannot be used for health. Second, there are no new funds coming from national government transfers, and the Alcaldía has to work within the approved parameters of revenue in its budget for all the actions it wishes to undertake.

The ad hoc nature of fiscal resources raises the issue of sustainability of the response in Calendar Year 2019. Using the most recent information on Venezuelans in Bogota and available figures on expenditures in 2018, we estimate that the potential expenses of the Alcaldía to attend to the Venezuelan migrants will amount to COP 49,490 million (US$16.5 million) in Calendar Year 2019. The projection is 87% higher than the estimated expenditures in 2018, although it remains below 1% of total revenues and investments for 2019. However, it leads to roughly 30 percentage point increase in the financing requirement of the government (See Annex 7 for detailed discussion on the estimation).

Table 3. Estimates of City Expenditure for Migrant Attention, Calendar Year 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount in COP million</th>
<th>USD million equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>28,870</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5,263</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Integration</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration and Others</td>
<td>2,356</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>49,490</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As % of 2019 City Revenues | 0.26%
As % of 2019 City Investments | 0.26%
As % of 2019 City Financing Requirement | 1.32%

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2019 Budget

This implies that the Alcaldía needs to find sources to support its response, considering also the relative inflexibility of the budget and national transfers. The 2019 estimate conservatively assumes that expenditures will be above existing and approved items, and is likewise based on the current stock of Venezuelans in Bogota as of January 2019. It also does not cover other services listed in Figure 7 that provides services by expanding existing programs, such as counselling from the Secretariat for Women. Therefore, the Alcaldía does not have sufficient administrative and fiscal leeway should it desire to expand its services or should there be a sudden surge of arrivals. Neither does the transfers from the national government through the General System of Participation (SGP) give recourse because it is already allocated to specific purposes (Figure 11).
The response also has organizational implications to the Alcaldía in terms of norms, procedures, personnel count and capacity. The city needed to hire additional professionals such as administrative assistants, health workers, lawyers, psychologists and social workers to staff its programs, while existing employees cited the need to extend hours to attend to migrants. In a focus group discussion with city government employees in the SuperCADE in Salitre, they cited that while manpower, equipment and supplies are available, there is a need for additional training and orientation specifically for dealing with migrants in vulnerable conditions (e.g. under trauma).

The Alcaldía has collaborated with civil society, the private sector and international organizations to align on priorities for migrant response. The city government has convened working group meetings with the national government, the Bogota Chamber of Commerce, and non-government and international organizations to harmonize the assistance provided for Venezuelan migrants.\(^{38}\) The working group functions as a coordination platform for actors dealing with the issue at the city level, but does not involve any transfer or exchange of fiscal resources. The non-government organizations further collaborate via the Inter-agency Group on Mixed Migration Flows (Grupo Interagencial sobre Flujos Migratorios Mixtos, GIFMM). GIFMM is led by the International Organization for Migration and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to be the coordinating mechanism for the response to the situation of refugees and migrants to Colombia. It is composed of 46 organizations of the United Nations, non-government

\(^{38}\) Secretaria General, 2018
organizations, and the Red Cross.\textsuperscript{39} A local GIFMM has been established in Bogota in December 2018 to translate the group’s national initiatives in the local level.\textsuperscript{40} This is a potential channel for collaboration that the city government can utilize.

**Local Politics and Development Agenda**

The term of Mayor Enrique Peñalosa and his administration is ending by December 2019. At the time of writing, the current Alcaldía has nine remaining months to execute the Plan. This timeframe is an important consideration, because we expect the migration phenomenon to be an election issue for the upcoming October 2019 mayoralty election in Bogota. The performance of the Alcaldía could be associated to the candidate of the mayor’s party (Cambio Radical) and coalition, and its evaluation may become a winning or losing point. Secondly, December 2019 serves as a natural boundary for the political will that underpin the Plan announced last September 2018. The Alcaldía needs to factor in the remaining time in its decision to scale up or design new services for Venezuelans, or more importantly institutionalize its open-doors policy, considering that the next mayor has the power to either continue or terminate it.

The Alcaldía’s response to Venezuelan migration will be adjudged by voters based on its impact on the development needs of Bogota. At the national level, the World Bank estimates that for every increase of 1% in the immigration rate to Colombia, national poverty rate would increase by 2\%, largely owing to the inability of labor markets to quickly absorb migrants.\textsuperscript{41} The same dynamic could be at play in Bogota. Bogota citizens will form an opinion of migrants based on how their arrival affects the socioeconomic outcomes in the capital.

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\textsuperscript{39} The members include Acción Contra el Hambre (ACH), ACNUR (co-lead), Agencia Adventista para el Desarrollo y Recursos Asistenciales (ADRA), Americare, Ayuda en Acción, BLUMONT, Caritas Germany, Caritas Suiza, Consejo Danés para Refugiados (DRC), Consejo Noruego para Refugiados (NRC), Cruz Roja Colombiana, Cruz Roja Noruega, Diakonie, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Fundación Panamericana para el Desarrollo (FUPAD), Halu, Humanit y & Inclusion, ICRC, IFRC, ILO, iMMAP, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Mercy Corps, OCHA, OIM (Co-lead), OHCHR, ORC, OXFAM, PAHO/OPS, Plan International, Pastoral Social, RET International, Save the Children, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados (SJR) Latin America and Caribbean, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados (SJR) Colombia, Terre des Hommes Lausanne (TdH), TECHO, UNFPA, UN Women, UNICEF, UN Habitat, UNDP, War Child, World Vision

\textsuperscript{40} GIFMM, 2019

\textsuperscript{41} World Bank, 2018
Figure 12. Socioeconomic Indicators for Bogota

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty Rate (in %)</th>
<th>Extreme Poverty Rate (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Source: DANE, author’s calculations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Employment

Work for migrants is a key issue given its immediate impact on the city’s unemployment and informality rate. While poverty rates have decreased, city unemployment rates have obviously surpassed the national rate starting 2017, coincidental with the increased arrivals of migrants in city. Informality rates likewise exhibited fluctuation by as much as 3 percentage points in 2017. As such, Bogota citizens may perceive migrants as threat to their welfare and correlate their presence to the worsening socioeconomic outcomes in the capital.

Migrants’ employment is critical in promoting their economic inclusion. Venezuelans come to Bogota to find work (see Annex 9). According to the UNHCR, economic inclusion is a key component towards achieving protection and solution outcomes for migrants. Economic inclusion contributes to migrants’ self-reliance and resilience, empowering them to meet their needs in a sustainable and dignified manner; avoids aid-dependency and negative coping
mechanisms; contributes to host economies; and prepares them for the future whether they return home, integrate in their host country or resettle in a third country.42

The national government restricts the right to work in Colombia only to Venezuelans who hold PEP. The national government has exclusive policy domain on the issue of employment, as provided for by the Colombian Constitution.43 On one hand, the 1951 Convention on Refugees (to which Colombia is a signatory) provides for the rights of refugees to work,44 but its applicability to migrants without refugee status is unclear. On the other hand, part of the national government’s flexibility in the face of the migration wave is to permit Venezuelans to work as long as they have PEP. Formal work therefore becomes contingent on registration, and irregular migrants would have no other resort but informal labor.

Employment is a key priority of the city government. In the Plan del Desarrollo 2016-2020 of the Alcaldía, the city government aims to achieve knowledge-based economic development for Bogota, where access to work and alternative incomes is considered a pillar of citizens’ welfare. Even prior to the arrival of migrants, the city’s labor market faces several significant challenges, including the following:

- Decreasing level of unemployment accompanied by increased level of informality
- Most vulnerable populations such as senior citizens, disabled population, LGBTI, victims of armed conflict resorting to informality
- Prevalence of demand-supply mismatch, poor responsiveness of training and formation programs to market needs, lack of industry-academe linkages
- Increased pressure from migration of other Colombians to Bogota to look for work45

An analysis of the demographics of arriving citizens shows that Venezuelans can have high potential contribution to the city economy.46 As compared to the Bogota labor force, the majority of the migrants in Bogota are young (between the ages 18 to 49) with university level

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42 UNHCR, 2018
43 Article 25 of the 1991 Constitution of Colombia states that work is a right and a social obligation and enjoys, in all its forms, the special protection of the State. This is interpreted that all policymaking related to employment remains to be the exclusive domain of the National Government. Therefore, the universe of local government actions with respect to work is limited
44 UNHCR 1951 Convention
45 Plan de Desarrollo, 2016-2020
46 We used data from Migración Colombia on PEP holders in Bogota. For educational attainment, we used data extracted from Facebook as a proxy, which closely resembled the characterization provided during the City Council meetings. To compare to the Colombian labor force, we use the data from DANE’s Grand Integrated Household Survey of Colombia 2018.
education (Figure 13). This is consistent with the recent characterization of Bahar (2018) that the overall migrant population of Venezuelans to Colombia are younger and more educated. For Bogota, it is even more advantageous because the majority of Venezuelans coming to the city has university education compared to the average basic secondary education for the rest of the Venezuelan migrants in Colombia. Taking educational attainment as an indicator of human capital quality, this suggests that integrating them into the local economy can generate significant benefits, particularly for economic growth and labor productivity.

**Figure 13. Comparison of Migrants to the Labor Force in Bogota**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Distribution (% share of overall population)</th>
<th>Highest Level of Education (% share of active labor force, 15-64)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ![Graph showing age distribution and highest level of education](chart)

Source: DANE, Migración Colombia, Facebook data, author’s calculations

However, qualitative interviews with Venezuelan migrants reveal key barriers they experience in the Bogota labor market. These are as follows (see Annex 9 for testimonials):

1. **Recognition of skills and authorization to work.** As previously mentioned, the national government mandates all firms to only hire migrants with PEP or a valid work visa. In addition, employers tend to ask for verification of degrees of the migrants, which adds to the cost and barriers to hiring considering the difficulty to obtain certification of equivalence from the Venezuelan bureaucracy.

2. **Willingness of local firms to hire migrants.** While it is clear that migrants need to obtain PEP to be able to work in Colombia, there seems to be lack of information among firms on how to engage Venezuelan labor, specifically in terms of taxation, social security payments, and legal contracting. Therefore, most employers refuse to hire migrants to avoid the hassle of these bureaucratic procedures.

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47 Bahar, 2018
3. **Labor protection.** There is no clear recourse system to ensure fair wages and treatment for Venezuelan workers. Many of them obtain short-term contracts or remain under the mercy of employers with regard to termination. A survey of small and medium enterprises in 2018 conducted by the Center for Economic Studies of the National Association of Financial Institutions likewise provides evidence to trends with regard to difficulty to get hired and uncertainty over contracts and wages (Figure 14).

**Figure 14. Survey of Small and Medium Enterprises in Colombia, 1st Semester 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have you hired a Venezuelan worker in the last six months? (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the type of contract? (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Term Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Provision Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefined Contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do Venezuelan workers earn less than their Colombian counterparts? (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ANIF, author’s elaboration

**A key issue in any policy discussion is whether migrants are complements or substitutes to Colombian workers.** 48,49 If they are substitutes, then they are expected to exert downward pressure on wages as they increase the supply of the labor force. An empirical verification of this phenomenon is an inherently difficult exercise given that the available data on migrants are incomplete and not granular. The data in Figure 13 above somewhat suggests

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48 Grossman, 1982  
49 Bahar, 2018
differences in age and education, therefore less competition. Moreover, many research show that migrant inflows have little to no effect on employment in the host country, suggesting that migrants and refugees complement the local labor force on unobservable or hard-to-measure characteristics.\textsuperscript{50} The Colombian Central Bank likewise reported that there is no evidence that the migration wave has generated material impact on employment in Colombia.\textsuperscript{51}

**Migration presents a rich potential for economic development and growth, even at the local level.** When migrants join the formal labor force, they increase their incomes and reduce their reliance on social welfare programs of the city.\textsuperscript{52} We should also consider the tendency for migrants to be more entrepreneurial,\textsuperscript{53} which in turn could create more jobs and value-add.\textsuperscript{54} More importantly, research in Italy, the United Kingdom, and Malaysia shows that migrant employment reduce their probability of engaging in criminal activity.\textsuperscript{55}

**Social Cohesion**

**Figure 15. Citizens’ recommendation to the city government to address the growing migration of Venezuelans to the city**

![Bar chart showing citizens' recommendations in 2017 and 2018](image)

Source: Bogota Como Vamos

**Citizen surveys indicate low support of Bogotanos for migrant support to Venezuelans.** The Annual Perception Survey, Bogota Como Vamos, indicates that only 30-35\% of Bogotanos agrees that the Alcaldía should extend food, housing, health and education services

\textsuperscript{50} Clemens and Hunt, 2017 in Bahar, 2018
\textsuperscript{51} Semana, 2019
\textsuperscript{52} Marbach, et. al., 2018
\textsuperscript{53} Vandor and Frank, 2016
\textsuperscript{54} Pekkala Kerr and Kerr, 2016
\textsuperscript{55} Bell, et al., 2013; Ozden, et al., 2018; Pinotti, 2017
to migrants. Moreover, there is also disparity on the type of support, with less citizens agreeing to the city extending the full array of services of the Alcaldía to migrants (13%) (Figure 15). Against this socioeconomic backdrop, it will be challenging to justify a high level of assistance or fiscal allocation for Venezuelan migrants.

The City Council (Consejo de Bogota) also recognizes the problem but definite action or support could be challenging because of party fragmentation. The City Council is composed of 45 members from 12 political parties in the city. Its main function is to provide administrative and political oversight on the executive actions of the Alcaldia Mayor of the city. While the majority of the Council is led by Mayor Enrique Peñalosa’s party, Cambio Radical (9 members), coalitions are generally loose and formation may take time considering the unprecedented nature of the issue. The City Council likewise included Venezuelan migration in its agenda on February, but it did not elaborate a plan or authorization to utilize city resources for the issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Majority Bloc</th>
<th>Minority Bloc</th>
<th>Unipersonal Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambio Radical</td>
<td>Partido U</td>
<td>Colombia Justa Libres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Liberal</td>
<td>Partido Conservador</td>
<td>Movimiento Progresistas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza Verde</td>
<td>MIRA</td>
<td>Alianza Social Independista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro Democratico</td>
<td></td>
<td>Opción Ciudadana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polo Democratico Alt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Benches (Bancadas) of the City Council per party and number of seats

Source: Consejo de Bogota

Migration will always stoke tendencies towards xenophobia and aporophobia (fear of poor people). Around the world, large waves of migration incite feelings of resentment, competition and intrusion. Xenophobia may emerge as a result of increased competition for limited space and services. Unless managed, this fear becomes the basis to reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity. Media coverage of Venezuelans apprehended for crime likewise reinforces these ideas and runs the risk of being the basis for sweeping generalizations about the threat that migration flows pose to local and national security.

56 Bogota Como Vamos, 2019
57 Miller, 2018
58 World Migration Report 2018
The migration wave is also occurring parallel to Colombia’s fragile peace process. This human movement happens at a time when Colombia is in a critical juncture in its social and political transition, particularly when the peace process is taking root. In November 2016, Congress approved a Peace Accord to put an end to the 52-year-conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and attend and provide reparation to victims of the armed conflict.59

Amidst a well-articulated national policy on reintegrating victims of armed conflict, Venezuelan migration may foster perceptions of competition and threat for Colombians. These concerns have to be quantified, but they are risks that need to be considered in conceptualizing an integral migration response. Moreover, note that a significant part of arrivals from Venezuela are returning Colombians ( retornados), some of which have left the country at the height of the armed conflict. As such, this subset of migrants qualifies for rights under the Victims’ Law but also add to the pressure of incoming migration.60

In the case of Bogota, there is an estimated 705,000 victims of the armed conflict residing in the city. Bogota is the second largest department, and by extension the largest city in Colombia hosting victims of the armed conflict, including internally displaced people (See Figure 16). Many are also searching for opportunities to rebuild their lives. The Alcaldía has a comprehensive set of actions and services made available to victims of the conflict and the internally displaced. However, with the arrival of Venezuelans as another vulnerable population of interest, the city is now confronted to balance the interests of stakeholders involved, and ensure that its role in the construction of peace in Colombia will not be affected.61

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59 In particular, Decree 691 of 2017 outlines a comprehensive policy that covers treatment of the victims of the conflict, an end of the conflict, a solution to the problem of illegal drugs; rural reform; and democratic participation. The long and protracted conflict has displaced an estimated 7.7 million Colombians, with a considerable number even migrating to Venezuela to escape the violence. The National Government commits a specific national budget to maintain institutional arrangements, provide humanitarian assistance, and give monetary compensation to Colombians affected by the war (Presidencia de la República, 2017).

60 An interview with Pastoral Social Colombia, the NGO arm of the Catholic Church of Colombia, also claimed that a weak response to the Venezuelan migration presents concrete risk to the Colombian peace process. Considering that some guerilla groups who refuse to recognize the Peace Accord continue to strengthen their ranks, Venezuelans could be subjects of forced recruitment. Moreover, Venezuelans unable to find formal employment may resort to the circles of informality and crime in the country [Peña (2019, January). Personal interview].

61 The Alcaldía has set up a District System of Attention, Assistance and Integrated Reparation of Victims (Sistema Distrital de Atencion, Asistencia y Reparacion Integral a las Victimas) as part of the city’s High Council for the Rights of Victims, Peace and Reconciliation (Alta Consejería para los Derechos de las Victimas, la Paz y la Reconciliación) to lead its efforts towards the issue.
Citizen perception is a critical anchor of the Alcaldia’s response, and citizen tolerance and acceptance will be a key factor in the successful integration of migrants. As Ager and Strang argues, a harmonious relationship between migrants and host communities (social bridges) is important to prevent migrants’ social marginalization and allow them to benefit fully from available opportunities as per their abilities and aspirations. Their acceptance and full participation is crucial to allow them to contribute more positively to the city’s development.

**Early Lessons from the Adaptive Challenge**

The discussion above reiterates that the migrant wave from Venezuela is an adaptive challenge. This is a shock to the Alcaldia with no quick technical fix and involves significant institutional experimentation and learning. The open doors policy of the Mayor is anchored on political will but with real material repercussions and impact on the local governance dynamics.

The city government documented key learnings since the Plan’s announcement in 2018 until the closing of migrant camps in January 2019. Secretary General Raul Buitrago, Secretary for Social Inclusion Maria Cristina Velez and Manager Maria Angelica Trujillo all

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62 Ager and Strang, 2008
emphasized that the city is engaged in a learning process, and their actions have taught the Alcaldía valuable lessons in managing the migration. We summarize three key insights as follows:

1. **Enhancing citizen welfare should be the basis of migrant response.**

   In crafting a policy response, the Alcaldía needs to decide on the level of goods and services for Venezuelans, balancing migrant needs with the sentiment of the voters and citizens of Bogota. At the baseline, the national government requires local governments to comply with the law to provide access to emergency healthcare for all migrants and basic education for their children. The challenge lies in justifying any other city government action above the baseline, because it implies spending taxpayer money for foreigners and non-taxpayers.

   One pragmatic reason is to control externalities. Social Integration Secretary Cristina Velez explains that the choice to offer more (in her case, free vaccination for children) is based on the idea that the welfare of Venezuelan migrants will inevitably spill over on the welfare of the citizens of Bogota. For example, a Venezuelan child that contracts measles may start an epidemic in a Bogota neighborhood unless he/she is vaccinated or attended. The response asserts that migration has externalities with political and financial costs. Secretary Velez argues that in an event of an outbreak, the people of Bogota will no longer discriminate the origin’s nationality but only assign blame to the city government for neglect.

   On the other hand, public opposition surfaced when residents felt that a city action or inaction threatens their welfare. In particular, residents living near the Salitre Bus Terminal where most migrants set up informal houses expressed their dismay to the government for not acting on the ‘disorder.’ However, when the city government decided to set up the camp in Engativa, the residents of that area became the new dissenters, complaining about the lack of consultation and fearing that the migrants are a security threat to their district. According to Secretary General Buitrago, acting and not acting both elicited opposition, but it was imperative for the Alcaldía to respond in order to contain risks and avoid the perception of government incompetence among citizens.

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64 El Tiempo, 2018
This experience shows that the welfare of the city residents will always be the anchor of city government response, and every action would be validated to the extent that it promotes the interest of citizens and voters. This is also consistent with the academic literature linking perception of citizens to public support for policy.66

2. **The city’s highest value-add for migrants is solving the information problem.**

The experience of the Alcaldía in the management of the campamento also reveals an important dimension in this iteration process. In November 2018, city authorities opened a camp for Venezuelan migrants in Engativa. The camp was able to accommodate roughly 500 Venezuelans, mostly low-income and vulnerable migrants who were living in an open park near the Salitre Bus Terminal. It was an initiative to reduce the risk to security and public health if migrants continue to reside in the streets of the city. As Secretary General Buitrago explained, it aimed towards the stabilization of the vulnerable situation of migrants, many of which come to Bogota without family members or residents. This is also particularly important for families with young children and pregnant women.

By January 2019, after two months of operation, the Alcaldía decided to permanently close and dismantle the camp, as also promised to area residents. City officials found it challenging to manage the migrant population residing in the camp, with many treating officials badly or resorting to petty crimes such as theft against co-residents. Most of the migrants also considered the camp as their permanent residence, rather than its purpose to be a temporary bridge for them to look for housing to rent.67 The objective towards stabilization only resulted in extra costs to the city to reinforce security notwithstanding the citizens’ discontent towards the presence of the camp.

66 For example, using data on a nationally representative sample of British people, Stansfield and Stone showed that perceptions of migrants as a criminal threat have a greater effect on support for curtailing rights of EU migrants, more so than economic threat, suggesting that British citizens invoke deep rooted stereotypes about EU migrants as criminal when choosing their preferences. (Stansfield and Stone, 2018)
67 Redaccion Bogota, 2019; Photo Credit: El Tiempo.com
This is in contrast to the information service provided by the city government through the SuperCADE de Información located in the Salitre Bus Terminal, and the Centro Integral de Atención al Migrante (CIAM) in Teusaquillo. The SuperCADE in the bus terminal was remodelled to be an information center and first point-of-contact for migrants regarding registration and resettlement. Likewise, the city has provided desks for non-government organizations such as the UNHCR and the Catholic Church to extend assistance like food, transport and temporary accommodations to migrants. The CIAM on the other hand is an office that offers legal, psychological and employment assistance to migrants. The latter is distinguished to cater to migrants with intention to stay longer in the city.\footnote{Secretaria de Integracion Social, 2018}

We observed from the field that most migrants that come to the SuperCADE and CIAM are Venezuelans that walked from the Colombia-Venezuela border in Cucuta (400 kilometers from Bogota) and/or without any family member or relative in the city. Thus, there is high value-added for a migrant to be able to map his/her options in the city, aside from the immediate humanitarian assistance after the long journey. It is also an initiative that did not receive any documented complaint or opposition from citizens.

This service turned out to be a successful policy action, given the effectiveness in its design and implementation. Facilitating information dissemination is a low-touch intervention for the city that is technically correct for addressing a common need for all migrants (information) regardless whether they are in transit or desiring to stay longer in Bogota. Information empowers migrants to thrive and be resilient in the city. Moreover, considering that the Alcaldía already has the physical and institutional infrastructure for SuperCADEs, this service was also administratively feasible compared to the experimental migrant camp.
3. The policy response should address both imminent and perceived risks of migration.

Perceptions and beliefs shape policy. Consider the issue of security. When migrants move into cities, there is often a perception that they represent a threat to public order or are linked to extremist violence. In Europe and the United States, news on attacks perpetrated by migrants have led to the hardening of attitudes on immigration. In Bogota, the campamento sparked demonstrations and protest largely because of the said view.

In February 2019, the City Council (Consejo de Bogota) discussed the Venezuelan migration in Bogota for two consecutive weeks, of which a key observation was the increasing perception of insecurity due to the increased presence of foreigners. In fact, opinion on city security is deteriorating, based on the 2018 Annual Survey of Citizen Perceptions conducted by Bogota Como Vamos (Figure 17).

![Figure 17. Bogotanos’ Perception of Security of the City](image)

When analyzed based on the districts, it can be observed that the perception of insecurity increased by at least 2 to 14 percentage points in areas where most Venezuelans have been located (Santa Fe [Center], Suba [North], Kennedy and Fontibon [West], Figure 18).

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69 YouGov, 2016
70 El Tiempo, 2018
71 Bogota Como Vamos, 2019
However, the Council itself noted that there is no indicator to prove that the presence of migrants has increased the incidence of violence in the city.\textsuperscript{72} Most of the media coverage on crimes committed by Venezuelans remain anecdotal but do not point to a systematic link to the population and the increase in violence or theft.

There is some evidence that discrimination is rising. In another survey sponsored by the Camara de Comercio de Bogota, 12\% said that they would not want to have a neighbor with a different nationality, four times the level registered two years ago.\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, as previously discussed, mismanaged beliefs run the risk of developing into xenophobia or discrimination, which can become a political resource to block efforts towards integration.

**Key Priorities for Action**

*Given the foregoing discussion of challenges and early lessons, we propose that the Alcaldía should focus on two issues for the remainder of its term.* First, the city has the capacity and resources to scale up existing action to solve the information problem and provide immediate humanitarian assistance. Second, applying Ager and Strang’s framework, we argue that innovating for employment and social connections will lead to enhanced migrants’ integration into Bogota.

\textsuperscript{72} Bogota Como Vamos, 2019

\textsuperscript{73} Corpovisionarios, 2018
Work will empower migrants and alleviate pressures on the Alcaldía. Migrants come to Bogota primarily in search for work, and the labor market has a lot of barriers that need systematic policy response. Without employment, they resort to informality and/or depend on communities and the government for material services such as housing, health and education. Helping them find work will allow them to stabilize and reduce their vulnerability, contribute to city growth and development, while decreasing the pressure for local government spending [1].

Social connections will broaden the support coalition for the Alcaldía’s initiatives and manage the risks of policy experimentation. The city government has to continuously demonstrate the public value of its policies to its constituents, disprove perceptions of competition and insecurity, and reduce risks of xenophobia and discrimination. By building mutual connections between migrants and the host community, we argue that it will foster safety and stability for migrants [2] and create legitimacy for services that the city may wish to extend to migrants [3].

This approach can also enable the Alcaldía to ‘unlock’ other domains of integration and influence national policy. While we recognize that the domains could be mutually dependent and the ordering can be non-linear and dynamic given the city’s shifting context and circumstances, we argue that these are the areas where the Alcaldía has the political support and organizational capability to act on. Moreover, we believe that it can have a powerful demonstration effect to other cities and the national government on the possibilities of migration governance, thereby influencing the process of defining their rights and citizenship [4]. In the following sections, we elaborate on policy recommendations to concretize this approach, confident that it will achieve better integration of Venezuelans into the City of Bogota.
Scaling Up Effective City Action: A Multi-Sectoral Mobilization

To increase the effectiveness of its current response, the Alcaldía should focus on scaling and sustainability. Table 5 shows the estimates of results of the city government’s response in 2018. The information centers are functional in addressing asymmetric information, while the health and education system is able to accommodate a significant number of migrants. However, there remains to be undercoverage. For instance, only 8% of the total Venezuelan population in the city are registered in the health system. With regard to sustainability, it is a reality that the change in administration can mean shift in priorities of migrant response, but the current mayor can institutionalize good practices for the next mayor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Number of Reported Beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>20,000 transactions; 52,000 vaccinated individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>7,709 children enrolled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SuperCADE and CIAM</td>
<td>~650 daily transactions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Consejo de Bogota, Migración Colombia, author’s estimates

There are two barriers to scale: organizational and finance. As previously discussed, the Alcaldía will require additional organizational capacity including personnel recruitment and procurement to cater to more migrants. Moreover, given that the 2019 budget has already been approved and financial support from the national government is uncertain, the current arrangement to utilize agency surplus may not be sufficient.

The GIFMM presents a potential scaling pathway for the Alcaldía. We discussed in the Diagnostics section (p. 19) that the Inter-agency Group on Mixed Migration Flows (GIFMM in Spanish) has started a local working group in the City of Bogota to be the platform for articulating the non-governmental national response strategy in the local level. Therefore, the Alcaldía should take advantage of this forum for synergies and collaboration.

Policy Recommendation A.1: Push for the Resolution from the Consejo de Bogota to authorize the Alcaldía to receive funding and implement migrant programs of NGOs.

An authorization from the City Council will allow the Alcaldía to accept financial resources and expand migrant response without using taxpayer money. The Secretariat for Government (Secretaria Distrital de Gobierno) has tabled a Resolution in the City Council to this
effect, given that the City Council has legislative oversight on the city’s conduct of finance. Approving this has two institutional effects:

1. It provides and confirms legislative buy-in to the current response of the city government. Furthermore, with such resolution, the Alcaldía can enhance its organizational framework and institutionalize the role of the Manager for Venezuelan Affairs.

2. The resources will also enable the Alcaldía to collaborate more closely with GIFMM members and direct their resources to the identified gaps of city response. We estimate that through the resolution, the city can tap some additional $60 million from GIFMM.

The Resolution will also be the foundation of sustainability. Upon the assumption of the new mayor, this authorization will allow the new administration to build on the current response architecture and relationships with the non-governmental sector, guaranteeing continuity.

This multi-stakeholder coalition approach has proven to be useful in other cities that have been recipients of migration waves. We feature below the example of the Durable Solutions Unit in Somalia.

Mogadishu, Somalia: Durable Solutions Unit

The Benadir Regional Authority (BRA), which governs Mogadishu, is leveraging on partnerships to serve the city’s estimated 486,000 internally displaced people (IDP). The BRA established the Durable Solutions Unit, which is supported by UN agencies and whose mandate is to coordinate donor action and integrate IDPs into the city through employment and entrepreneurship programs.

The unit includes IDPs among its staff and provides fellowships to IDPs allowing them to participate in city government. The unit facilitated collaboration and joint problem-solving between the city government, humanitarian organizations and the private sector to be able to mainstream IDPs into the city’s development agenda.

Policy Recommendation A.2: Convene an inter-city Forum of Mayors

Moving forward, a multi-stakeholder collaboration will also involve other local governments in Colombia. Given the diversity of experience of local governments, there are potential synergies that can be exploited to further increase the efficacy of the response. We propose to convene a forum for mayors to coordinate best practices and share information on the

75 See Annex 7E
76 International Rescue Committee, 2018
migration issue. In the absence of a national normative framework for Venezuelans migrants, this cooperation can also solve the scaling problem by possibly engaging in a dialogue and joint problem-solving with other local government entities. The Alcaldía can offer to manage the forum where leaders can explore replication of good practices in other jurisdictions, and share evidence and statistics to improve decision-making.\footnote{This is akin to the Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development (“Mayoral Forum”), the annual City-led dialogue supported by local, regional and international partners. It provides an incubating space where local leaders can share practical and inventive solutions for governing migration, protecting rights and promoting inclusive urban economic growth. (http://www.migration4development.org)}

One potential idea that can be discussed is the development of a migrant redistribution scheme in Colombia. Local governments can create a system to match migrants in areas where they have the highest likelihood to succeed. This can be a developmental tool for local governments to seize the opportunity for migrants to fulfill city needs. For example, the seasonal demand for coffee pickers in the Coffee Region (Eje Cafetero) may be a destination for manual Venezuelan labor. This effort to build an internal distribution and burden-sharing mechanism can be developed to match migrants to areas where they can be more productive.

The inter-city forum may also strengthen the influence of local governments on the development of national migration policy. The collective experience of local governments shared and concretized through this forum can be used as a critical input to the articulation of the national government’s CONPES.

**Helping Migrants Find Work**

Helping migrants find work is a key priority and a two-fold task: (1) getting them registered, and (2) matching them to opportunities. The Diagnostics section discussed the necessity for migrants to get PEP to enjoy its benefits and regularize their stay (p. 16). Meanwhile, PEP holders also face significant labor market barriers (p. 23). We believe that the existing labor market programs of the city can be expanded to address both of these tasks.

It is important however to ensure that the same services will be available to Bogota citizens. We need to be always conscious about the perception of competition, thus these services should remain open to all Colombian citizens. The unemployment level in Bogota being higher than the national rate is a political resource for citizens to oppose assistance to Venezuelans and hinder the city from realizing the benefits from migration.
**Policy Recommendation B.1:** Expand access to labor services even for Venezuelan migrants without PEP

We recommend that the Differential Route for Employment Program of the Alcaldía should also be extended to migrants without PEP. At present, the Secretariat for Economic Development’s Public Agency for Employment has created a route for Venezuelans in their labor matching program, but requires PEP prior to access. In-depth interviews with Venezuelan migrants reveal that the PEP has been associated with the risk of deportation, especially for those that entered the country without sufficient documentation. Because of this self-selection process, they deprive themselves of channels to regularize their status and reduce vulnerability.

**Expanding access can increase incentives for registration and correct the information asymmetry for migrants.** This small adjustment addresses the misperception of deportation risk surrounding the PEP registration process as well as help increase information on the availability of jobs for Venezuelans. Therefore, it becomes a tool for the city government to help increase registration of migrants. The figure below illustrates the recommendation.

The recommendation seeks to uphold the national regulation on registration while empowering migrants to find their fit channel to work. This is also very implementable considering that it is a small adjustment in the protocol of the dedicated route for Venezuelans, which does not encroach on the routes for other populations of interest in Bogota.
Policy Recommendation B.2: Increase collaboration with Venezuelan associations and the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota in private sector mobilization, skills training and information campaigns.

For migrants with PEP, we recommend to strengthen routes of employability together with the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota. We return to our findings of the young and highly educated Venezuelan migrants in Bogota, which implies that we need to prioritize putting them to areas that cannot be filled by the Colombian labor force. Working with the Chamber will help organize member firms into job fairs, identify sectors that need employment, augment resources for training as well as consolidate partners who may be willing to fund Venezuelan ventures. We assume that the Chamber has a better grasp of industries with hiring gaps, and many members will be interested to help as part of their corporate social responsibility campaigns.

The Alcaldía should also solicit help from the Chamber and Venezuelan associations such as Fundación Colombo-Venezolana to disseminate information on hiring and increase labor protection channels for migrants. A constant outreach to firms, especially small and medium enterprises, is necessary to increase awareness about the processes in hiring and honoring the labor rights of migrants. For cases of mistreatment or abuse, it should also extend the same channels available for other citizens to complain and obtain resolution.

This solution is implementable and supportable because it leverages on partnerships. We will continue to provide the same access to Colombian citizens, and then we tap on the organizational strength of the Chamber and Venezuelan associations to identify market-based solutions to migrant employment. The case of Rescuing Futures and Care.com demonstrate the power of government-industry partnerships and market-based employment programs.

Greece, Jordan and Nigeria: Rescuing Futures

Rescuing Futures is an employment training program sponsored by International Rescue Committee and Citi Foundation for refugees, displaced persons and vulnerable youth in Athens, Greece; Amman, Jordan; and Yola, Nigeria. The program intentionally provides services to refugee and local residents alike, including entrepreneurship training, mentorship and seed grants to aspiring business owners seeking to enter the local economy and build economic resilience.

The program is training a total of 990 individuals and provide seed funding to 161 businesses across the three cities. In Amman, the program is run through a community center jointly managed by the IRC and the Greater Amman Municipality. Through this collaboration among city governments, humanitarian actors, and the private sector, Rescuing Futures leverages each institutions’ strengths to implement a stronger, more effective program overall.

78 International Rescue Committee, 2018
The International Rescue Committee partnered with Care.com, an online company in Germany for managing family care, to train refugees and asylum seekers in Germany, with a special focus on women, with skills in childcare or nursing. This is based on an assessment of the country’s current shortage of over 125,000 childcare providers that is projected to reach 500,000 by 2030. After the training, the women are linked with internships or job placement opportunities and one-on-one mentoring.79

Facilitating Social Connections: Cultura Ciudadana Revisited

Community-building is a difficult and delicate task in the integration process of migrants in Colombia. Colombia has been generally welcoming of migrants, as citizens and politicians often appeal to the historic relationship with Venezuela – when many Colombians fled to Venezuela in the wake of extreme violence and economic crisis in the 1980s. However, being generally unaccustomed to migration, Colombians are not used to living with other nationalities.

As Ager and Strang argues, social connections are important because integration is a two-way process of change.80 At the local level, integration is not an ‘insertion’ of one group to another, but a process of mutual accommodation. Thus, it needs to consider means of social connection between migrants and those other members of the communities within which they settle.81 Ager and Strang further argues that social connections provide the ‘connective tissue’, between foundational principles of citizenship and rights on one hand, and public outcomes in sectors such as employment, housing, education and health.

Previous history shows that city can be an instrument to promote norms and culture. The Diagnostics section discussed how the Cultura Ciudadana (Civic Culture) program, starting with Mayor Antanas Mockus, helped transform the City of Bogota. Furthermore, Mayor Peñalosa’s heavy investment in public infrastructure such as parks, libraries and the Bus Rapid Transit, reinforced this civic culture and provided a material manifestation for its ideals.

This ‘pedagogical urbanism’ is the same instrument which the Alcaldía can use to redefine the thrust of “Bogota Mejor Para Todos.” The city has the ability to promote culture

79 International Rescue Committee, 2018
80 ECRE, 1999
81 Ager and Strang, 2008
of acceptance for migrants and increase political support for the response. Berney coined the term to describe the case of Bogota, where urban planning was actively focused on education and reform to produce new norms towards the reformation of civil society. Moreover, the mayors used public space as a setting and tool to reinvent a culture of citizenship as well as to demonstrate competency. The strategy was largely successful as Bogotá has experienced ‘a move from individualism to collective spirit, and citizens report improvements in civility, friendliness and quality of life.’

The core of this pedagogical urbanism should be human rights. The Alcaldía can appeal to its citizens for political support by emphasizing the message that we are helping Venezuelans not because of compliance with international and national law, but because we aim to respect their human rights and uphold their fundamental dignity, just as the same way that we wish Colombians abroad to be treated.

The Somos Panas (We Are Pals) program of UNHCR and IOM provides workable materials for promoting anti-xenophobia in the city. The campaign’s strategic approach is to show that Venezuelans are people who had to leave their country and, who are thankful for being accepted in Colombia. Since its launching, it has achieved more than 6.393.192 interactions and reached over 235,000 opinion and government leaders that together with other audiences amount up to 41 million individuals. (See Annex 8 for expanded discussion). We recommend the city to embrace this program and adopt it in the infrastructure and cultural plan of the city.


The focus of Mayor Peñalosa on public spaces and urban transformation can actively integrate the agenda to promote a culture of tolerance and non-discrimination. As an extension of the Cultura Ciudadana, the city can use public spaces as points of visibility, contact and interaction between citizens and Venezuelans. This is premised on interaction and contact theory, which argues that meaningful interactions between host communities and migrants in public spaces can help overcome misperceptions and stereotypes.

The library network of Bogota is a low-hanging fruit. The case of New American Centers in Los Angeles, USA shows how a public space can be used to mainstream migrant

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82 Berney, 2010; Berney, 2011
83 UNHCR, 2019
84 Matejskova and Leitner, 2011
policies. Figure 20 shows Bogota’s public libraries, some of which are strategically located in areas where there is a higher concentration of Venezuelans. These libraries can become a site for members of the communities to interact and engage with one another, with activities such as public film screenings.

The Alcaldía can also put up Somos Panas campaign materials in the stations of the Transmilenio. The citywide coverage of Transmilenio stations is another opportunity for public spaces where Somos Panas posters and advertisements can be added. Many Venezuelans actually board Transmilenio buses to sell small items or share a talent to ask for little financial help from commuters. Strategically places posters may help communicate positive messages of acceptance.

Los Angeles, USA: New American Centers
In Los Angeles, one of the key initiatives of the Mayor’s Office for Immigrant Affairs (MOIA) is the “New Americans Centers” in six public libraries where immigrants can access free information from MOIA-trained librarians on immigrant rights and citizenship eligibility. MOIA purposefully established these centers in libraries as they are community spaces open to all city residents to also foster interaction especially among children. To date, the centers have had almost 100,000 visitors.85

Policy Recommendation C.2. Integrate messaging into the city’s culture and arts program.

The city’s heavy investment in the culture and arts program can be used as another platform to build social connections. The City of Madrid’s Plan on Social and Intercultural Existence is an example of how to program outreach activities, awareness campaigns, and forums for social participation for migrants.86 Regular activities such as community clean-up, sports festivals and/or concerts are opportunities to bring people together and foster dialogue between Venezuelans and Bogotanos. Integrating the messaging on the culture and arts calendar leads to a sustained effort over a considerable time period to combat discrimination and xenophobia.

85 International Rescue Committee, 2018
86 Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2008
We recognize however that pro-migrant programming can backfire. Miller argues that ‘these programs can isolate migrants or minorities within the host population by reinforcing existing boundaries and fueling tensions.’87 Landau and Achiume also notes that ‘heavy-handed anti-xenophobia campaigns aimed at protecting the rights of foreign minorities risk drawing them out into the open, enhancing their visibility, and making their foreignness the issue where it might not have been.’88

Therefore, the goal of the Alcaldía should be emphasizing the shared culture and humanity between Colombians and Venezuelans. We recognize that the roots of anti-immigrant sentiment are complex. Hence the strategy of the city should be to provide platforms rather than openly advocate, and let citizens understand the conditions of migrants, their reason for arrival, and their request for help. By harping on the closeness of the cultures of Colombia and Venezuela, the city can also appeal on the need to help and collaborate with our brothers/sisters in need.

**Conclusion**

This policy paper analyzed the context and policy environment faced by the Alcaldía Mayor de Bogota to assess its current response and provide policy recommendations that will help the successful integration of Venezuelan migrants in the City of Bogota. The city government needs to increase its collaboration with the private sector and civil society to scale up its effective actions and find innovative ways to help migrants find work and connect with the local community.

As a concluding remark, the policy recommendations we put forth in this paper are consistent with the spirit of the current Peñalosa administration’s Development Plan, which is to create a Bogota that is Best for All (Bogota Mejor para Todos). Indeed, the city is faced with a task and opportunity to redefine this development thrust, and take advantage of the immense potential benefits of welcoming and bringing Venezuelans into the city’s fold. Its historic transformation and continued growth has shown that Bogota is capable of reimagining the city, and revolutionizing its physical environment and social communities towards modernity and shared prosperity. The decisions that the city government and the Bogotanos will make in this critical juncture will indeed redefine its future.

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87 Miller, 2018
88 Landau and Achiume, 2016
Bibliography


**Official Documents**

Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota. *Plan de Desarrollo, 2016-2020*. Bogota, Colombia


**News Articles**


Annex 1: List of Officials and Experts Interviewed

**Officials of the City Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secretariat General</th>
<th>Raul Buitrago</th>
<th>Secretary General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat for Social Integration</td>
<td>Cristina Velez</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maria Angelica Trujillo</td>
<td>Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat for Government</td>
<td>Francisco Pulido</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chancellery of Colombia</td>
<td>Vicente Echandia</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SuperCADE Social Salitre</td>
<td>Claudia Cardozo</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hans Prieto</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Johan Castelblanco</td>
<td>Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bogota Chamber of Commerce**

| Maria Monica Conde | Vice President |

**Civil Society Organizations**

| La Cruz Roja Colombiana | Margarita Arias | Vice President |
| Pastoral Social/Caritas Colombia | Lina Peña | Coordinator |
| UNHCR Colombia | Holmes Trujillo | Communications Officer |

**Academia**

| Semillero de Migraciones Colombia al Exterior (SEMICOEX) | Sebastian Polo Alvis | Coordinator |
| Universidad de Rosario | Maria Clara Robayo | Professor |

**Venezuelan Community**

| Fundacion Colombia-Venezuela | William Meza | President |
Annex 2: Domains of Integration Framework
Adapted from: Ager and Strang (2008)

Integration is a term for which it is difficult to find a definition with which everyone agrees. This framework identifies ten core domains, each of which considers one aspect of integration. These domains were identified after both extensive study of attempts to define integration and discussions with refugees and other members of refugee-impacted communities. The domains link with each other in many different ways – the way they are presented does not seek to suggest a hierarchy of their relative importance.

Means and markers are key areas for the participation of refugees in the life of communities. They serve as markers of integration in so far as they show evidence of achieving or accessing things that are valued within the community. They also serve as means to those ends, in that they will often help achieve other things relevant to integration.

Social connection involves the different social relationships and networks that help towards integration. Those connections may be with people who share your own experiences and values through ethnicity, religion or country of origin. These connections are defined as bonds within communities. Connections with other groups are seen as bridges between communities. Finally, connections that help to access services and be fully involved as a citizen are defined as links to services and government. All serve to connect an individual or group into the wider community.

Facilitators are the key skills, knowledge and circumstances that help people to be active, engaged and secure within communities.

Foundation refers to the principles that define what you have a right to expect from the state and from other members of your communities and what is expected of you. These principles include the rights given to individuals, and the expectations and obligations of citizenship.
Annex 3: Timeline of Key Events – Venezuelan Migration to Colombia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered Situations</th>
<th>Institutional Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Unilateral closure of the Venezuelan border</td>
<td>• Establishment of two new Migration Control Posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expulsion of 22,000 Colombians</td>
<td>• Permission for humanitarian passage in the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Binational meetings between Colombia and Venezuela regarding migration</td>
<td>• Formulation of a contingency plan to assist irregular migrants in the border area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• New types of migration recorded</td>
<td>• Issuance of Migratory Transit Cards (TMF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Massive exit due to economic crisis</td>
<td>• Issuance of first Special Permanency Permits (PEP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Venezuela implements new economic and political measures that worsen the crisis</td>
<td>• Establishment of the Migration Special Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Meeting of migration authorities of Latin America: Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru</td>
<td>• Start of the Administrative Registry for Venezuelan Migrants (RAMV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• PEP Round II and III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Implementation of biometric recognition system for foreigners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Quito Declaration on Mobility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Migración Colombia

Annex 4: Bogota at a Glance

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>8,181,047</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>US$82.99 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per Capita GDP</td>
<td>US$10,270</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
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<td>Major Sectors</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Govt, health, educ (18.8%)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax revenue (9.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DANE, author’s calculations
Annex 5: *Cultura Ciudadana* and the Transformation of Bogotá

**Citizen Pedagogy (Pedagogia Ciudadana)**

*Antanas Mockus Administration*

- Use of mimes to regulate traffic

*Mayor Mockus as “Super Ciudadano”*

**Infrastructure Investment - “For the Bogota We Want” (Por la Bogota que Queremos)**

*Enrique Peñalosa Administration (First Term)*

- Ciclovia (Citywide Bike Routes)
- Transmilenio (Bus Rapid Transit)

**Continuation of Cultura Ciudadana**

*Enrique Peñalosa Administration (Second Term)*

- Human Cones against Illegal Parking
- “Everyone Pays the Duck (El Pato)” Campaign against Non-Payment in Transmilenio

Sources: Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota, El Tiempo, Las Noticias en Red.com, Kienyke.com
Annex 6: Legal Basis of City Action

Source: Circular 028 of the Secretariat for Social Integration, 19 September 2017

- **Article 13 of the Constitution:**
  “…All individuals are born free and equal before the law, will receive equal protection and treatment from the authorities, and will enjoy the same rights, freedoms, and opportunities without any discrimination on account of gender, race, national or family origin, language, religion, political opinion, or philosophy. The State will promote the conditions so that equality may be real and effective and will adopt measures in favor of groups that are discriminated against or marginalized. The State will especially protect those individuals who on account of their economic, physical, or mental condition are in obviously vulnerable circumstances and will sanction the abuses or ill-treatment perpetrated against them.”

- **Article 100 of the Constitution:**
  “…Aliens in Colombia will enjoy the same civil rights as Colombian citizens. Nevertheless, for reasons of public order, the law may impose special conditions on or nullify the exercise of specific civil rights by aliens. Similarly, aliens will enjoy, in the territory of the Republic, guarantees granted to citizens, except for the limitations established by the Constitution or the law.”

- **On the protection of children – Law 1098 of 2006, Code for Infants and Adolescents:**
  “…the present code applies to all children and adolescents, nationals or foreigners that are found in the national territory, to all children that are outside the country, and to those with dual nationalities…”

- **On honoring international conventions – Sentence T-073, Constitutional Court of Colombia:**
  “…The Colombian state cannot unrecognize the international norms in terms of the protection of migrants, even for these persons that are in our territory in an illegal manner. We should value the reasons for them to decide to come to Colombia, the risks they run if they are expelled from the country, and the concrete situation that they would face in Venezuela if they return. In consequence, Migración Colombia, the Office of the Ombudsman, and any competent authority in the issue should seek that the migrants be protected in a full manner, that they may exercise their rights, obtain documentation to stay in the Colombian territory, and if the case may be, be qualified as refugees…”

**Some International Conventions that Colombia signed:**

- **American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San Jose), Article 1:**
  “…The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition. For the purposes of this Convention, "person" means every human being…”

- **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN General Assembly, Article 2:**
  “…Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status…”

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89 Author’s translation  
90 Organization of American States  
91 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Annex 7: Fiscal Implications of Venezuelan Migrant Assistance

7.A. Estimated National Cost of Venezuelan Support, per ministry/department

In thousand US dollars

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<td>9.33</td>
<td>71.00</td>
<td>71.00</td>
<td>71.00</td>
<td>222.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>61.67</td>
<td>716.67</td>
<td>716.67</td>
<td>716.67</td>
<td>2,211.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>125.33</td>
<td>85.33</td>
<td>12.67</td>
<td>223.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Disaster Risk Unit</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,273.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,273.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>140,235.67</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DNP, author’s calculations (USD1 = COP3,000)

7.B. City Budget for Financial Year 2019, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogota

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>in COP thousands</th>
<th>in US$ million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total Revenue</td>
<td>18,498,253</td>
<td>6.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Revenue</td>
<td>10,005,717</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers</td>
<td>3,129,096</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Revenue</td>
<td>5,363,441</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Current Expenditures</td>
<td>3,133,911</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Debt Service</td>
<td>156,914</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Investment</td>
<td>18,941,406</td>
<td>6.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing Requirement</strong> ((1)-(2+3+4))</td>
<td><strong>3,733,977</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.24</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Secretaria Distrital de Hacienda, author’s calculations (USD1 = COP3,000)

7.C. Allocation of National Government Transfers to Bogota, D.C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>in COP thousands</th>
<th>in US$ thousands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>3,068,546</td>
<td>1,022.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General System of Participation (SGP)</td>
<td>3,037,338</td>
<td>1,012.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2,138,296</td>
<td>712.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>540,202</td>
<td>180.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Purpose</td>
<td>212,802</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School feeding centers</td>
<td>7,345</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and sanitation</td>
<td>114,286</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogota River</td>
<td>24,408</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other national transfers</td>
<td>31,208</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District entities</td>
<td>60,549</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total transfers</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,129,096</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,043.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Secretaria Distrital de Hacienda, author’s calculations (USD1 = COP3,000)
### 7.D. Estimation of Potential Costs to the City Government of Bogota for 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amount in COP million</th>
<th>USD million equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>28,870</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5,263</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Integration</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration and Others</td>
<td>2,356</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>49,490</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As % of 2019 City Revenues: **0.26%**  
As % of 2019 City Investments: **0.26%**  
As % of 2019 City Financing Requirement: **1.32%**  

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2019 Budget

**Assumptions**

- For education, we use the figures from Portafolio that the Secretariat for Education spent an average COP3.74 million per student in 2018. This is multiplied to the current enrollment rate of Venezuelan children in Bogota as per the City Council figures.
- For health, we approximate an average per capita expenditure by dividing the figures from Portafolio by the total number of Venezuelans attended in 2018. Then we use the current estimate for Venezuelans from RAMV of Migración Colombia. We made an assumption that 30% will avail of health services in 2019.
- For social integration, we include the cost of per children in the Secretariat’s kindergarten centers and multiply by the latest estimate of Venezuelan toddlers from the city council.
- Finally, to conservatively approximate the administrative costs of migrant response, we take 5% of the total COP equivalent of the first four items in the budget. This does not itemize the actual costs of operations of a SuperCADE or other centers for migrant attention.

### 7.E. Estimation of Potential Resources to be Allocated by GIFMM for Bogota

The Inter-agency Group for Mixed Migratory Flows (GIFMM in Spanish) has published a Regional Refugee and Migrant Plan (RRMP) to estimate the cost of attending to the migrant population from Venezuela in Latin America.

(1) Total Financial Need for the Region: $737,611,378  
(2) Total Allocation for Colombia: $315,467,200 [(1) * 43%]  

Assume that GIFMM will allocate based on the index of concentration (number of migrants in a city as share of total migrants). Bogota’s share is 22%.

(3) Potential Allocation for Bogota: $69,402,784 [(2) * 22%]  

Then we use the percentage of budget per area of intervention, i.e. 45% for direct emergency assistance, 14% for protection, and 30% for socio-economic and cultural integration, totaling 89%.

(4) Potential Net Resources for Bogota: $61,768,477 [(3) * 89%]  

Source: Regional Refugee and Migrant Plan, GIFMM
Annex 8: Somos Panas Campaign

Source: ReliefWeb.int

Somos Panas (We Are Pals) Colombia was launched on 20 December 2017 and its main line of action is a content strategy aiming to reduce expressions of xenophobia and promote solidarity between Colombians and Venezuelans. The campaign's strategic approach is to show that Venezuelans are PEOPLE who HAD to leave their country and, who are THANKFUL for being accepted in Colombia.

The content is transmitted though radio and digital ads, publications in mass media, free press, massive mailings, organic content in social media, workshops for journalists, specialized and community-based events, and institutional relationships. This has allowed us to create a direct impact, achieve more than 6,393,192 interactions with our audience and reach over 235,000 opinion and government leaders that together with other audiences amount up to 41 million individuals, (number of individuals who had at least one exposure to all campaign direct communication efforts).

Target Audience

Phase 1:
Mass audience: Individuals from all over the country, between 16 and 55 years old, with a low educational level corresponding to a 2 or 3 socioeconomic level, highly prone to generate conflict.
Opinion and government leaders: People related to the government (Presidency, Ministries, Senate, House of Representatives, Departments Governor's Offices, Majors Offices, Municipal Councils, amongst others), media and journalists.

Phase 2: In addition to the continued incidence in the previously mentioned audiences, we have broadened our outreach among our groups of interest:
1. Venezuelans and organizations of Venezuelans in Colombia.
2. Citizens in Colombia willing to be supportive, and who are interested in social, humanitarian and migration topics, as well as potential donors.
3. Colombian and Venezuelan children and youth.

Sample Poster Material
Annex 9: Testimonials

These are testimonials which the researcher gathered during the field work in Bogota and Cucuta, Colombia in January 2019. They speak of the admirable courage and resilience of migrants amidst the difficult challenge of leaving their home, Venezuela.

Veronika Barinas
Veronika is among the first recipients of the government’s PEP, which is due to expire this July 2019. In her stay in Bogota, it allowed her to find a job at an international consultancy firm based in the city as well as secure access to schooling for her daughter.

There is uncertainty however on the government’s stance regarding the expiry of the PEP. Their family likes Bogota and wants to stay in the city for longer term. “We do not want to start again from scratch.”

Siskiu Fernandez and Manuel Rodriguez
“Cada tres meses, necesito fisioterapia y consulta (Every three months, I need physiotherapy and check-up),” Siskiu said. “Pero aca en Bogota no puedo (But here in Bogota I cannot).”

Venezuelan migrants can only access emergency care, as the host country develops its migration policy mindful of the fiscal impact of the influx. She also tried Sisbén, Colombia’s targeting system, but she did not reach the threshold for free healthcare. “Gracias a Dios que no me he enfermado (Thank God I have not gotten sick).” It has been 5 years since her last treatment.

Employment isn’t easy either. Her partner Manuel Rodriguez, a chef, has been switching from kitchen to kitchen, since permanent work for Venezuelans is elusive. “Soy una abogada, pero ni un centro de llamada me emplea porque estoy sobrecalificada (I am a lawyer, but not even a call center would employ me because I am overqualified).”

Jianpedro Santiago
“Me regresé porque no me ayudaba nadie (I returned because nobody was helping me)”

Jianpedro from Caracas already went to Bogota to work as a construction worker in a housing repair project. After the house was completed however, it was difficult to find another job. Nobody would help him, and he did not have relatives in the capital. Worse, he felt discrimination, as some people in shops or in public places, would turn him
away for being a Venezuelan. He decided to return to Cucuta, where at least he could help make artisanal crafts from Venezuelan bolivares. “I like to work, and here at least I can do it.”

**Gilbert**

On the date of the interview, it was his first day to do Rappi, Bogota’s popular app that offers various home delivery services. Colombia’s culture of domicilio created a space for young Venezuelans like him to earn a living in a rather tough labor market.

“Trabajaba en un almacén chino pero a finales de diciembre me despidió. No sé por qué. (I was working at a Chinese store but by the end of December he fired me. I don’t know why).” It is a harsh reality though, that they have to work in a society where “si no trabaja, no come (if you do not work, you won’t eat)” — a sharp contrast to the Venezuelan system of state paternalism and subsidies.

“Estudiaba comunicación social allá y me gustaría continuar aquí (I was studying journalism there and I would like to continue here).”

**Gilda, Yhonatan, Hino, Gilberto and Jose**

“I’ve never been to Venezuela,” I said. “¡Ni vaya! (Don’t go!),” they replied in chorus. “Pero cuando vaya, visita las playas de Venezuela. Cualquier playa es buena. Y pide un patacon, pescado y una birra. (But when you go, visit the beaches of Venezuela. Any beach is good. And ask for patacon, fish and a beer.)”

They just knew each other that day on the road from the border. Two came from Carabobo, another from Yaracuy, the other from Maracay. They just reached the first milestone at Los Patios, Cucuta’s exit, and they will go together to Bogota, the capital—believe it or not—by foot. They don’t know the route actually, and will just keep asking and following other caminantes. It will be a 650-kilometer trip.

Meanwhile, these are a few of the many Colombians I have met who are dedicating themselves and their craft in service of Venezuelan migrants.