


Voting rights restoration in Florida: Amendment 4 - Analyzing electoral impact & its barriers

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
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
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The passage of Amendment 4 in Florida marked a monumental event for more than 1.4 million Floridians who could regain their voting rights. However, our findings suggest that only 3.3% or ~49,000 of them will turn out to cast their ballot in 2020 if all associated legislation stays in place. We would expect it to rise to 146,000 or 13% in case SB 7066 is repealed.

This paper estimates the impact Amendment 4 and its associated legislation will have on Florida's 2020 general election. It uses these estimates to quantify and explore the barriers that diminish turnout and puts forward recommendations to modulate them.

Our findings suggest no partisan impact by the Amendment and associated legislation on the electoral map in 2020. Although most counties in our model become increasingly Democratic, we predict no change in partisan control in any county or at the state level.

Medium: Expected additional votes through
voters enfranchised by Amendment 4
as % of decisive margin in 2016



Our predictive model allows us to quantify the relevance of the barriers during the journey from post-sentencing disenfranchisement to the ballot box on election day. Most notable is the requirement to repay all Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs), as set forth by SB 7066. It single-handedly disenfranchises more than 1 million citizens who could participate in our

democracy. Second to this is the barrier that enfranchised individuals will not exercise their right to vote. We predict this to be the case for ~300,000 returning citizens, demonstrating that uncertainty around the right to vote is depressing turnout.

	Post-sentencing disenfranchised voters	Qualified offenses acc. to literal Amendment	Qualified offenses acc. to SB 7066	Qualified by having fulfilled all LFOs	Turned out to vote (Medium)
Individuals in Florida	1,487,847	1,454,156	1,435,033	362,614	48,680
Total share	100%	98%	96%	24%	3.3%

For greater exploration, we reframed the barriers into three broader categories: Informational Barriers, Financial Barriers, and Mobilizing Barriers. Informational Barriers center around the lack of a centralized process to determine what an individual owes, difficulty in discovering one's eligibility, and lack of awareness of legal options afforded. Financial Barriers stem from an individual's inability to pay their LFOs. Mobilizing Barriers stem from apathy towards the democratic process, lack of engagement with the population, and standard turnout issues.

For each of these categories of barriers, we then outlined recommendations that we hope will help inform The Sentencing Project's goals of returning rights to the disenfranchised in this country.



INFORMATIONAL BARRIER

Recommendations

- Centralized Informational Process
- Change Burden of Proof
- Change Registration Language
- Information Packet at Last Contact



FINANCIAL BARRIER

Recommendations

- Repeal SB 7066
- Change Sentencing
- Increase Fundraising
- Partner with Counties
- Exempt 10+ years from LFO requirement



MOBILIZING BARRIER

Recommendations

- Streamlined Engagement Strategy
- RC to RC outreach
- Spillover Community outreach

INTRODUCTION

In 2016 an estimated 6.1 million people were disenfranchised because of felony convictions.¹ This is almost 5 million more than in 1976.² The consequences of these policies go beyond the prohibition to vote - they institutionalize racism, disempower communities and hinder reintegration.

Through the close ties between felony disenfranchisement and the criminal justice system, the racist nature of the latter manifests itself in the former. This is to say that a disproportionate number of Black and Hispanic Americans being incarcerated results in a disproportionate number being disenfranchised. In line with that, Black Americans over 18 are four times as likely as the rest of the US population to lose their voting rights as 1 in 13 or ~ 2.2 million black adults are disenfranchised.³

Further, disenfranchisement is a painful mechanism of exclusion at the community and the personal level and often contributes to political apathy for both the individual and the people around them. Reversing disenfranchisement laws and engaging returning citizens is therefore crucial to the inclusiveness of American democracy and individual reintegration.

On the back of these insights, states have started to move to less punitive disenfranchisement legislation. The 2018 passage of Amendment 4 in Florida is the single largest attempt to reverse these laws. We therefore seek to answer:

1. What is the projected electoral impact of Amendment 4 and associated legislation in Florida's 2020 general elections?
2. What barriers are diminishing its electoral impact and how can they be modulated?

From these a series of sub-questions arise. These include: how reliable is the data in our sample from the Florida Department of Corrections? What is the size of the population eligible to vote and how many of them are going to turn out on election day? Who is it that will turn out to vote and how will that impact the governance of the state? What are the barriers diminishing turnout and how significant are they? How do these barriers manifest themselves in the journey from post-sentencing disenfranchisement to the ballot box on election day? What actions can state legislatures and organizations like The Sentencing Project take to modulate these barriers? What are the spillover effects in the rest of the community?

While we use Amendment 4 in Florida and the partisan nature of the 2020 general election as the prism of our analysis, our concern is the persistence of disenfranchisement and the wellbeing of the US democracy. By using a case of particular relevance at this moment in time, we hope to elucidate systemic considerations of enfranchisement efforts while encouraging more concern for the newly enfranchised.

¹ Uggen, Christopher. *6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, 2016*. (The Sentencing Project, 2016), 3. <https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-estimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016/>.

² Ibid.

³ Uggen, *6 million*, 3.

BACKGROUND

By 2016, Florida accounted for 27% of the national disenfranchised population, with Black Americans making up 21% of this (only 16% of general population).⁴ Florida's estimated 1.4 million post-sentencing disenfranchised voters were greater than the population of 11 states and the District of Columbia, highlighting the consequential impact of Florida's disenfranchisement laws on our democracy.⁵

At the end of the Civil War, the Florida state legislature began enacting laws that would prevent freed Black men from participating in the democratic process while maintaining white supremacy as the order of society. After initially refusing to adopt the 14th Amendment, Florida was forced to draft a new constitution in 1868.⁶ However, the new constitution maintained means of excluding or minimizing the power of Black American citizens.

Under Article XIV Section 2, the constitution instituted its provision of felony disenfranchisement by stating, "No person under guardianship *noa compos mentis*, or insane, shall be qualified to vote at any election, nor shall any person convicted of felony be qualified to vote at any election unless restored to civil rights."⁷ While the Florida constitution underwent a variety of changes over the last century, the clause disenfranchising those with felony convictions remained on the books until 2018 when Amendment 4 was passed through a referendum.

After an extensive campaign by the Florida Rights Restoration Coalition (FRRC) and partners, voters in Florida passed Amendment 4 with 64% of the vote.⁸ Amendment 4 stated that "any disqualification from voting arising from a felony conviction shall terminate and voting rights shall be restored upon completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation".⁹ The amendment however kept in place restrictions on those "convicted of murder and felony sex offenses".¹⁰ The passage of the amendment restored voting rights to more than 1.4 million Florida residents.

Yet the history of right marginalization repeated itself after the election, as the legislature and newly elected Governor DeSantis introduced and passed SB 7066 which instituted an LFO therefore significantly limiting the number of people included in the amendment.

The ACLU brought a lawsuit against the state in opposition to this modern poll tax. In a statement Julie Ebenstein of the ACLU said, "Over a million Floridians were supposed to reclaim their place in the democratic process, but some politicians clearly feel threatened by greater voter participation. They cannot legally affix a price tag to someone's right to vote."¹¹ Most recently the U.S. Court of Appeals for 11th Circuit in Atlanta ruled in favor of the 17

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Data Access and Dissemination Systems. "American FactFinder - Results." American FactFinder - Results. October 5, 2010.

<https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tables/services/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk#>.

⁶ Wood, Erika. "Florida: An Outlier in Denying Voting Rights." Brennan Center for Justice, 2016. https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Florida_Voting_Rights_Outlier.pdf

⁷ Florida constitution Art XIV Section 2 retrieved from <https://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/189095?id=23>

⁸ Alejandro de la. Garza. "Florida Passes Amendment 4, Restoring Voting Rights for Felons." Time. November 7, 2018. <https://time.com/5447051/florida-amendment-4-felon-voting/>.

⁹ Florida Constitution. Amendment 4. Article VI Section 4. Retrieved from <https://www.aclufil.org/en/voter-restoration-amendment-text>

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ "Groups Sue to Block New Florida Law That Undermines Voting Rights Restoration." 2019. ACLU of Florida. July 17, 2019. <https://www.aclufil.org/en/press-releases/groups-sue-block-new-florida-law-undermines-voting-rights-restoration>.

plaintiffs to be allowed to vote.¹² However, it is possible that this case may end up in the U.S Supreme Court.

Courts can modify an individual's sentences, eliminate or reduce their fines and convert fines into community service. The implementation of this provision however has not been done throughout the state. Only four counties, Miami-Dade, Broward, Palm Beach and Hillsborough have implemented processes to enact it.¹³

Therefore, as the government and electoral officials navigate this implementation process, thousands of residents will be left unable to decide who will represent them in the upcoming Presidential election.

¹² Periera, Ivan. "Federal Appeals Court Rules against Florida's Restriction on Former Felons from Voting over Fines." ABC News. ABC News Network, February 19, 2020. <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/federal-appeals-court-rules-floridas-restriction-felons-voting/story?id=69073124>.

¹³ Rivero, Daniel. "People Across Florida Are Getting Their Voting Rights Back. Few Republicans Could Benefit." WLRN, January 5, 2020. <https://www.wlrn.org/post/people-across-florida-are-getting-their-voting-rights-back-few-republicans-could-benefit#stream/o>.

METHODOLOGY

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

DATA SOURCES

To build a predictive model of the electoral impact Amendment 4 will have on the 2020 general election in Florida, we analyzed more than 12.5 million individuals in Florida, combining various sources. These included:

- Official Florida voter registration and unofficial voting history information by the Florida Division of Elections (last updated: 03/20)¹⁴
- Public records of OBIS offender data base in Florida by the Florida Department of Corrections (last updated: 01/20)
- Historic Florida election results on county and precinct level by the MIT election lab (last updated: 12/19)
- 2016 Actuarial Life Table by the Social Security Administration¹⁵
- Statute table by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (last updated: 12/19)¹⁶
- Statistics on imposed sanction by offense type in the 2019 Florida's Criminal Punishment Code: A Comparative Assessment by the Florida Department of Corrections (last updated: 10/19)¹⁷

Please refer to Appendix A for a detailed description of the sources, the data and the variables included.

We encountered significant data limitations due to legal and financial restrictions. These limitations may be split into two groups:

- a) Not included in the sample but relating to individuals who are returning citizens and who may be eligible to vote in Florida:
 - Individuals convicted of a felony, but released from state probation / community control without serving a custodial sentence
 - Individuals who served their sentence outside the Florida state prison system (e.g. federal prisons, county jails) and reside in Florida
 - Future residence of inmates who are currently in prison, but will have served their sentence in time to register for the general elections
 - Outstanding LFOs (court-ordered fees, fines and restitutions) of individuals in sample
 - No modelling of potential recidivism among individuals in the sample
- b) Limitations on returning citizens in other states (shortlisted based on demographic, cultural and voting restrictions) to estimate expected turnout and community spillover effects: offender data and/or voter registration data inaccessible in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia

¹⁴ "Voter Extract Disk File Layout." Florida Department of State, October 18, 2018. <https://dos.myflorida.com/media/696057/voter-extract-file-layout.pdf>.

¹⁵ "Social Security." Actuarial Life Table. Accessed March 22, 2020. <https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html>.

¹⁶ FDLE's Statute Table. Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Accessed December, 2019. <https://web.fdle.state.fl.us/statutes/about.jsf>.

¹⁷ "Florida's Criminal Punishment Code: A Comparative Assessment ." Florida Department of Corrections, October 2019. <http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/scoresheet/Criminal Punishment Code 2019.pdf>.

To address the data restrictions under b) we decided to rely on assumptions from expert interviews and literature. To address the data restrictions under a), we took the following (imperfect) measures:

- Treat available data points as a sample of the overall post-sentencing disenfranchised population (estimated to be at 1,487,847). When reduced to post-sentencing disenfranchised voters (excl. individuals who will still be serving non-financial legal obligations of their sentence at general election voter registration date, do not reside in Florida, are fugitives, deported, likely dead, etc.), this sample includes 396,104 individuals.¹⁸ To reflect the differences of offense types between the population convicted of a felony who had to serve a custodial sentence and the population that didn't have to serve a custodial sentence, we adjust the scaling from our sample to the population based on the data published by the Florida Department of Corrections on the sanctions imposed by offense type.¹⁹
 - There is additional concern around the representativeness of the sample for the overall population (an example is pointed out by the Crime and Justice Institute (2019)): "One of the main principles of the CPC is neutrality with respect to race, gender, and social and economic status. Despite this stated goal of fairness, defendants with similar criminal conduct and criminal histories experience vastly different outcomes."²⁰ Therefore, we must expect the population that is convicted of a felony, but released without serving a custodial sentence to also differ from the one that is not released in terms of judicial circuit, county, economic status, county of residence, race, etc.).
 - Only the 2019 publication of Florida's Criminal Punishment Code included the sanctions imposed by offense type on a level granular enough to match it to the offenses excluded under Amendment 4 and SB 7066. The split for that particular year may deviate from the historic average.
- Approximate county of future residence for currently active prisoners as the county in which most felonies have been committed (if an equal number of felonies have been committed in multiple counties, we go by alphabetical order of counties)
 - The proxy may be flawed, because individuals move, have committed felonies in counties in which they don't live, etc.
 - Note: this limits the granularity of our analysis to the level of counties (no longer possible to have analysis at level of individual elections)
- Estimate outstanding LFOs at county level based on racial and county metrics outlined for 58 counties in Expert testimony by Daniel A. Smith in September 2019.²¹
 - This forces us to make a concerning oversimplification of individual circumstances based on county affiliation and race
 - Average unlikely representative for 9 outstanding counties, because of size and enfranchisement efforts (Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, Hillsborough with systematic effort to reinstate enfranchisement by waiving/transferring fees and fines in exchange for community service)

¹⁸ Uggen, Christopher. 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, 2016. (The Sentencing Project, 2016), 3. <https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-estimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016/>.

¹⁹ "Florida's Criminal Punishment Code: A Comparative Assessment." Florida Department of Corrections, October 2019. [http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/scoresheet/Criminal Punishment Code 2019.pdf](http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/scoresheet/Criminal%20Punishment%20Code%202019.pdf).

²⁰ Marguiles, Lisa, Sam Packard, and Len Engel. "An Analysis of Florida's Criminal Punishment Code." Crime and Justice Institute, June 2019. <https://www.crj.org/assets/2019/06/An-Analysis-of-Florida-CPC-June-2019.pdf>.

²¹ Dan A. Smith, on behalf of plaintiffs Consolidated Case No. 4:19-cv-300. August 2, 2019. https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/gruver_v_barton_-_expert_report_of_daniel_a._smith_ph.d.pdf

- Note: this limits the granularity of our analysis to the level of counties (no longer possible to have analysis at level of individual elections)

In addition, there is a real concern around the validity of the addresses available for individuals from the department of correction, as shall be demonstrated under “Quality of correctional data”.

DATA MANIPULATION

Using the entire offender database (active, released, supervised), we selected the population that would gain enfranchisement via Amendment 4 as postulated by SB 7066 by excluding:

- a) Individuals that will not have served their non-financial sentence by Oct. 5 2020 (Florida general election registration date)
- b) Individuals that are expected to be deceased
- c) Individuals that have committed disqualifying offenses (murder or sexual offenses) at any point in time (as defined literally by the Amendment and as specified in SB 7066)
- d) Individuals that no longer reside in Florida
- e) Individuals who are expected to have outstanding LFO's by Oct. 5 2020

We then combined this data with the Florida voter registration data to determine which enfranchised individuals have registered to vote. We did so by harmonizing naming conventions and adapting the notation (lowercase, removing all punctuation) of a person's first name, last name, name suffix, date of birth, race code, and sex code in both databases and concatenating them to match them across the data sets.

Using these inputs, we leveraged a series of assumptions (detailed in the next chapter) to model at the county and state level the number of enfranchised voters, the number of expected votes and the partisan allocation of these votes and then compared that to the margin of victory in each county in the 2016 presidential elections.

Lastly, we translated this information into four tables and four maps, estimating the electoral impact of Amendment 4 for the various counties in Florida and statewide elections:

- Potential electoral significance of Amendment 4 in 2020
- Scenario 1 – medium turnout: expected electoral significance of Amendment 4 with and without SB 7066
- Scenario 2 – low turnout: expected electoral significance of Amendment 4 with and without SB 7066
- Scenario 3 – high turnout: expected electoral significance of Amendment 4 with and without SB 7066

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

ID	Variable	Assumptions	Source
a)	Population down-scaling	According to sample with corrections for felons with / without custodial sentence	Table.1
b)	Mapping offense type to sanction imposed for felons	See Appendix B	Florida Department of Corrections, Florida's Criminal Punishment Code: A Comparative Assessment, October 2019.
c)	Disqualifying offenses acc to literal interpretation of Amendment	See Appendix B	Dara Kam, Meaning of 'murder' key in Florida felons' voting rights, January 2019.
d)	Disqualifying offenses acc to SB 7066	See Appendix B	Florida Senate Bill No. 7066.
e)	Legal Financial Obligations	See Appendix B	Dan A. Smith, on behalf of plaintiffs Consolidated Case No.4:19-cv-300. September 17, 2019.
f)	Life expectancies	See Appendix B	Social Security Administration, Actuarial Life Table 2018.
g)	Voter turnout	High: 35% Medium (Expected): Black: 16%, Others: 12% Low: 5%	See Appendix B
h)	Spill-over effect	1.72	Expert interviews
i)	Party predilection pattern 1	Observations among 150,000 ex-felons for which governor Crist restored voting rights in 2007 convicted of less serious offenses	Marc Meredith and Michael Morse, Why letting ex-felons vote probably won't swing Florida, November 2018.
j)	Party predilection pattern 2	Party affiliation of matched registered enfranchised voters	Table.4
k)	Total population estimate	1,487,847	Uggen, Christopher. 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, 2016.

Please refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of the assumptions.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

A portion of our qualitative work relied on interviews. These interviews were influential in providing a landscape of the issues, comparative analysis to other states, and a means of verifying certain legal aspects regarding felony disenfranchisement. Academics, advocates, and elected officials were the three categories of individuals that we interviewed. Interviews were conducted by phone as well as face-to-face and were recorded with the permission of the interviewees. Interviews were conducted both in a semi-structured and unstructured format.

FINDINGS

ELECTORAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

The analysis found interesting findings in five areas:

- a. Quality of correctional data (used as a source by majority of researchers on this topic)
- b. Size of population eligible to vote
- c. Voter registration patterns
- d. Estimation of electoral impact
- e. Spill- over effects

QUALITY OF CORRECTIONAL DATA

A comparison of the addresses from registered enfranchised individuals in the Florida Department of Correction OBIS Offender Database and the voter registration data, indicated that their overlap is low. Of the 23,843 individuals that we could match across the data sets, only 76% had a matching county, 38% a matching Zip Code and 12% a matching address. Of these 23,843 individuals, 13,092 registered to vote after Amendment 4 was enacted. This is 55% of the matched individuals thus raising concerns on the reliability of the correctional data that the majority of researchers in this space rely on.

SIZE OF POPULATION ELIGIBLE TO VOTE AFTER AMENDMENT 4 AND SB 7066

In the media and most academic research, the population to be enfranchised by Amendment 4 is estimated to stand at around 1.5 million. This number originates from an estimate by the Sentencing Project on the number of post-sentencing disenfranchised individuals in Florida.²²

As detailed before, Amendment 4 outlines 3 limitations to the right to vote:

- Completion of all terms of the sentence including parole or probation
- Doesn't apply to those convicted of murder
- Doesn't apply to those convicted of sexual offenses

The almost 1.5 million does not yet consider the latter two. They may be interpreted literally according to the text in Amendment 4 or more stringently as outlined in SB 7066. In the latter, case murder includes only first-degree murder and sexual offenses include only rape and sex offenses against children. In the broader interpretation according to SB 7066 murder also includes second degree murder and homicide, and sexual offenses include anything that leads to a listing on the sex offender list. (Please see Appendix B Disqualifying offenses acc to SB 7066 for details).

As Table.1 below indicates, a literal interpretation will exclude around 2% or ~32,000 individuals from political participation. This number rises by another ~20,000 individuals or 1.5% when broadening the extent of the interpretation along the lines of SB 7066. These estimates result from classifying individuals based on the description in their adjudication charge (see appendix A c) and d) for details).

However, the main point of contention is how to interpret "all terms of the sentence". The ballpark around how many individuals may regain their right to vote changes significantly when LFOs are included. The share remaining of the sample drops from around 96% to just 24%. If applied as an estimate for the entire population, it disenfranchises more than 1 million individuals. This estimate follows when we allocate the individuals in our sample to counties based on their addresses (in voter registration files, in OBIS database or if neither was available for current inmates approximated as described under "Data Sources") and then apply the county level assumptions for outstanding LFO's and ability to repay (see Appendix B e) for details).

An expected turnout rate of around 14% among this population (see medium scenario) would then result in 48,680 additional votes, or about 3.3% of the people who originally had the prospect of regaining their right to vote.

As we are working with a sample that covers around 27% of the entire estimated population, there is significant uncertainty around these estimates.

²² Uggen, Christopher. 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, 2016. (The Sentencing Project, 2016), 3. <https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-estimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016/>.

Table 1: Barriers to electoral impact for enfranchised

	Post-sentencing disenfranchised voters	Qualified offenses acc. to literal Amendment	Qualified offenses acc. to SB 7066	Qualified by having fulfilled all LFOs	Turned out to vote (Medium)
Individuals in Florida	1,487,847	1,454,156	1,435,033	362,614	48,680
Total share	100%	98%	96%	24%	3.3%
Sample individuals	396,104	363,210	350,136	59,602	
Share of sample	100%	92%	88%	15%	
Non-sample individuals	1,091,743	1,090,946	1,084,897	303,012	
Share of non-sample	100%	100%	99%	28%	


VOTER REGISTRATION PATTERNS

Uncertainty around the right to vote is a significant depressor of voter turnout among the enfranchised. The punishments for voting illegally is too severe to risk when an individual is uncertain of their voter status.

The legal obscurity around the interpretation of Amendment 4 is a prime source of uncertainty. This also expresses itself when we look at the voter registration patterns among the 13,092 individuals that we matched as having registered since the Amendment was enacted on a timeline together with the major legal decisions around the bill:

1. 2018-11-06: Amendment 4 passes
2. 2019-01-08: Amendment 4 takes effect
3. 2019-05-03: SB 7066 passes
4. 2019-07-01: SB7066 is signed into law
5. 2019-10-18: Federal District Court declares inclusion of FLOs in SB 7066 unconstitutional and allows the 17 individuals plaintiffs with FLOs in the case to register
6. 2020-01-16: Florida Supreme Court declares SB 7066 and inclusion of FLOs constitutional
7. 2020-02-19: Eleventh Circuit Court declares inclusion of FLOs in SB 7066 unconstitutional

Graph 1: Timeline of matched enfranchised voter registrations



The graph shows a first smaller rise in registrations upon the passing of the Amendment (1). This can be interpreted as an increased interest resulting from the public attention around the Amendment by individuals convicted of less serious offenses that had regained their right to vote in 2007 with Governor Crist's executive order. There was an immediate spike in registrations after the Amendment took effect in January 2019 (2) that decreased over the ensuing months. However, as the public discussion around the Amendment escalated prior to SB 7066 being enacted, the number of registrations increased again until then (4). The circuit court's decision to challenge the inclusion of LFOs in "serving a sentence" and extend protection to individuals potentially enfranchised under Amendment 4 was followed by a further increase in registration numbers (5). An overall upwards trend remained (with strong fluctuations) until the Florida Supreme Court declared that LFO's would be included in their interpretation of "serving a sentence" in January 2020 (6), which resulted in a drop of registrations. As the primary registration season began ramping up, so did the number of registrations, which shows the correlation between voter registrations and legislation uncertainty.

A comparison of characteristics among the individuals in our sample who registered and the individuals in our sample who have not registered indicates a high proportion of African American registrants. While only 44% of the sample population is African American, 60% of the matched registrants are. The opposite is true for the White population (see Table.2), where 52% in the sample compare with 39% among the registered matched individuals. In terms of gender the pattern of registrants roughly matches that of the overall sample (See Table.3). It also stands out that there is a predilection for the Democratic party (55%) among the enfranchised registered to vote of more than 2 to 1 compared to the Republican party (21%). The block of no or other affiliations (24%) is significant (See Table.4).

Table 2: Racial split of registered and total enfranchised population

Racial split b/w matched registered enfranchised voters and all enfranchised voters in sample (March)				
	All enfranchised voters in sample		Registered enfranchised voters in sample	
Race	Absolute number	Share	Absolute number	Share
White	170,764	52%	5,276	39%
Black	146,870	44%	8,145	60%
Hispanic	12,042	4%	216	2%
All others/unknown	872	0%	3	0%
AAPI	265	0%	6	0%
Asian or pacific islander	51	0%	2	0%
Total	330,864	100%	13,648	100%
Source: Florida Division of Elections, Florida Department of Corrections, own analysis.				

Table 3: Gender split of registered and total enfranchised population

Gender split between registered enfranchised voters and all enfranchised voters in sample (March)				
	All enfranchised voters in sample		Registered enfranchised voters in sample	
Sex	Absolute number	Share	Absolute number	Share
Male	279,632	85%	11,330	83%
Female	51,232	15%	2,318	17%
Total	330,864	100%	13,648	100%
Source: Florida Division of Elections, Florida Department of Corrections, own analysis.				

Table 4: Party affiliation of registered enfranchised voters

Party affiliation for registered enfranchised voters in sample (March)		
Party	Absolute	Share
DEM	7,522	55%
NPA	2,952	22%
REP	2,916	21%
IND	225	2%
LPF	20	0%
CPF	7	0%
REF	5	0%
PSL	1	0%
Total	13,648	100%
Source: Florida Division of Elections, Florida Department of Corrections, own analysis.		

ESTIMATION OF ELECTORAL IMPACT

Potential impact

Amendment 4 has the potential to change the future of Florida's electoral landscape. Regardless of the restrictions outlined in SB 7066, we estimate that more than 360,000 new votes could be cast. The newly enfranchised will be able to swing votes both on the state level and in 5 of the 67 counties (all of which are controlled by the Republican party). This uses the 2016 Presidential elections as a baseline and works under the assumption that all other variables (voter turnout, voting location, which party to vote for, etc.) would remain the same.

What could further strengthen the impact of the Amendment are the implications for the communities that the enfranchised individuals are part of. Many of these tend to be communities of low voting propensity. A Randomized Control Trial in the Orlando Mayoral election suggests that the spill-over effects combined with an outreach effort could be as high as 1.72 times the original vote.²³ When we consider this very optimistic spill-over effect, we would be looking at almost 1,000,000 additional votes in Florida, enough to change the outcome of the last 7 elections for president in Florida and flip 11 counties (2 of which controlled by the Democratic party and 9 of which controlled by the Republican party) in relation to their 2016 outcomes (See Table.5 for details).

Table 5: The electoral significance of Amendment 4 in 2020 – Potential

The electoral significance of Amendment 4 in 2020						
County	2016 results		2020 estimate			
	Incumbent	Victory margin	Enfranchised voters	Enfranchised & spillover	Potential to swing (enfranchised)	Potential to swing (enfranchised & spillover)
Duval	Republican	5,968	16,348	44,467	Yes	Yes
Gadsden	Democratic	8,292	3,145	8,554	No	Yes
Hendry	Republican	1,580	803	2,184	No	Yes
Hillsborough	Democratic	41,026	28,753	78,208	No	Yes
Jefferson	Republican	389	785	2,135	Yes	Yes
Monroe	Republican	2,933	1,703	4,632	No	Yes
Pinellas	Republican	5,500	21,641	58,864	Yes	Yes
Polk	Republican	39,997	17,315	47,097	No	Yes
Seminole	Republican	3,529	8,329	22,655	Yes	Yes
St. Lucie	Republican	3,408	11,401	31,011	Yes	Yes
Wakulla	Republican	6,164	3,237	8,805	No	Yes
Statewide	Republican	112,911	362,611	986,305	Yes	Yes
Source: See assumptions and own analysis.						

²³ Desmond Meade and Neil Volz, January 2020.

We subsequently explore three scenarios of voter turnout among returning citizens, while we keep all other assumptions stable. These assumptions are based on various papers and expert interviews that suggest a turn out range between 5% and 35%. However, these papers fail to consider the impact the presence of FRRC will have on voter turnout. Their statewide organizing efforts to support the newly enfranchised population's rights to vote is unique and therefore not reflected in the academic papers drawing inferences from felon turnout in past elections.

Graph 2: The electoral significance of Amendment 4 in 2020 – Potential

Expected additional votes through
voters enfranchised by Amendment 4
as % of decisive margin in 2016




Table 6: Overview of assumptions on turnout scenarios

Scenarios	Turnout	Sources
High	35%	1. RCT by FRRC 2. Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza in Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the US
Medium	Black: 16% White: 12%	1. Meredith and Morse in Why letting ex-felons vote probably won't swing Florida 2. Traci Burch in Turnout and Party Registration among Criminal Offenders in the 2008 General Election
Low	5%	Michael V. Haselswerdt in Con Job: An Estimate of Ex-Felon Voter Turnout Using Document-Based Data

For each of these scenarios we are comparing two potential patterns of party affiliation. The first is based on the voting pattern among the 150,000 returning citizens convicted of less serious offenses that regained their right to vote in 2007 by executive clemency of Governor Charlie Crist. 87% of black voters registered as Democrats while 40% of non-Black voters registered as Republicans, 34% as Democrats and 26% with neither of the two parties. Just 16% of Black and 12% of nonblack returning citizens voted.²⁴ The second is based on the pattern among the matched registrants (See Table.4 in f).

²⁴ Meredith, Marc, and Michael Morse. "Why Letting Ex-Felons Vote Probably Won't Swing Florida." Vox. Vox, November 2, 2018. <https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/11/2/18049510/felon-voting-rights-amendment-4-florida>.


Scenario: 1 – Medium Turnout: Expectation of Amendment 4 to swing the vote

In the medium scenario (the most likely), with a turnout between 12% and 16%, our predictions show that no counties would change control. In this scenario just 3.3% or ~49,000 of the almost 1.5 million post-sentencing disenfranchised voters actually turn out to cast their votes. The governance of the state would remain with the incumbent party. Looking at the predictions on a county level according to party affiliation pattern 1 (modelling affiliation after 150,000 returning citizens enfranchised in 2007), the marginal vote would turn more Republican in 2 counties, would remain stable in 5 counties and would become more Democratic in the remaining 60 counties as well as at state level. The root of this can be traced back to the higher registration rate among matched African American registrants. Graph 3 illustrates these predictions by visualizing the additional votes through the Amendment (enfranchised & spillover as a % of the decisive margin in 2016).

It is noteworthy that state-wide elections are more prone to flip than most county level races.

Graph 3: The electoral significance of Amendment 4 in 2020 - Medium

Medium: Expected additional votes through
voters enfranchised by Amendment 4
as % of decisive margin in 2016



The electoral consequences of SB 7066 are highlighted by Table 7. The table depicts our predictions without SB 7066 in place. We would expect ~195,000 returning citizens to vote instead of 49,000, an increase of 146,000 votes. This would constitute ~13% of the post-sentencing disenfranchised population in the state instead of 3.3%. In terms of partisan politics this would translate into 5 counties flipping from Republican to Democratic control. In addition, the statewide results would change from Republican to Democratic (Table 7).

Table 7: The electoral significance of SB 7066 in 2020 – Medium scenario

The electoral significance of SB 7066 in 2020										
County	2016 results		2020 estimate							
	Incumbent party	Victory margin	Enfranchised voters	Enfranchised & spillover	Shift in votes (pat. 1)	Advantage (pat. 1)	Partisan swing (pat. 1)	Shift in votes (pat. 2)	Advantage (pat. 2)	Partisan swing (pat. 2)
Duval	Rep	5,968	9,222	25,084	10,486	Dem	Yes	8,429	Dem	Yes
Jefferson	Rep	389	439	1,194	530	Dem	Yes	397	Dem	Yes
Pinellas	Rep	5,500	11,565	31,457	7,964	Dem	Yes	10,619	Dem	Yes
Seminole	Rep	3,529	4,489	12,210	3,650	Dem	Yes	4,113	Dem	Yes
St. Lucie	Rep	3,408	5,977	16,257	2,921	Dem	No	5,508	Dem	Yes
Statewide	Rep	112,911	195,205	530,953	146,464	Dem	Yes	179,062	Dem	Yes
Source: See assumptions and own analysis.										


Scenario: 2 – Low Turnout: Expectation of Amendment 4 to swing the vote

In the low scenario, with a turnout of just 5%, we would expect no county to change control and the governance of the state to remain with the incumbent party. Employing party affiliation pattern 1 (modelling affiliation after 150,000 returning citizens enfranchised in 2007), the vote would turn more Republican in 2 counties, would remain stable in 12 counties and would become more Democratic in the remaining 53 counties as well as at state level. Of the post-sentencing disenfranchised voters only ~1.45% would cast their votes.

If SB 7066 were repealed in this context, the number of enfranchised voters that cast their vote would go up to ~5% or ~73,000. There would be no partisan impact on county or the state level.

Graph 4: The electoral significance of Amendment 4 in 2020 – Low

Low: Expected additional votes through
voters enfranchised by Amendment 4
as % of decisive margin in 2016



Scenario: 3 – High Turnout: Expectation of Amendment 4 to swing the vote


Even in a high scenario the expected voter turnout among the enfranchised population would reach only 35%. With SB 7066 in place, two counties and the statewide elections might flip from Republican to Democratic control. Depending on the party pattern employed (true only for pattern 2) these predictions differ (Table 8). We would predict ~127,000 new voters to cast their votes or 8.5% of the post-sentencing disenfranchised population in Florida. Looking at the predictions on a county level according to party affiliation pattern 1 (modelling affiliation after 150,000 returning citizens enfranchised in 2007), the marginal vote would turn more Republican in 2 counties, would remain stable in 2 counties and would become more Democratic in the remaining 63 counties as well as at state level.

Table 8: The electoral significance of Amendment 4 in 2020 – High scenario

The electoral significance of Amendment 4 in 2020										
County	2016 results		2020 estimate							
	Incumbent party	Victory margin	Enfranchised voters	Enfranchised & spillover	Shift in votes (pat. 1)	Advantage (pat. 1)	Partisan swing (pat. 1)	Shift in votes (pat. 2)	Advantage (pat. 2)	Partisan swing (pat. 2)
Pinellas	Rep	5,500	7,574	20,601	3,988	Dem	No	6,952	Dem	Yes
St. Lucie	Rep	3,408	3,985	10,839	1,390	Dem	No	3,656	Dem	Yes
Statewide	Rep	112,911	126,841	345,003	74,617	Dem	No	116,483	Dem	Yes
Source: See assumptions and own analysis.										

Graph 5: The electoral significance of Amendment 4 in 2020 - High

High: Expected additional votes through
voters enfranchised by Amendment 4
as % of decisive margin in 2016



The electoral consequences of SB 7066 are highlighted by Table 9. The table depicts our predictions without SB 7066 in place. We would expect ~509,000 returning citizens to vote instead of ~127,000 an increase of ~382,000 votes. This would constitute ~34% of the post-sentencing disenfranchised population in the state instead of 8.5%. In terms of partisan politics, this would translate into 5 counties flipping from Republican to Democratic control. In addition, the statewide results would change from Republican to Democratic (Table 9).

Table 9: The electoral significance of SB 7066 in 2020 – High scenario

The electoral significance of SB 7066 in 2020										
County	2016 results		2020 estimate							
	Incumbent party	Victory margin	Enfranchised voters	Enfranchised & spillover	Shift in votes (pat. 1)	Advantage (pat. 1)	Partisan swing (pat. 1)	Shift in votes (pat. 2)	Advantage (pat. 2)	Partisan swing (pat. 2)
Duval	Rep	5,968	22,958	62,446	10,486	Dem	Yes	21,102	Dem	Yes
Jefferson	Rep	389	1098	2,987	530	Dem	Yes	995	Dem	Yes
Pinellas	Rep	5,500	30,375	82,620	7,964	Dem	Yes	27,872	Dem	Yes
Seminole	Rep	3,529	11,687	31,789	3,650	Dem	Yes	10,750	Dem	Yes
St. Lucie	Rep	3,408	15,981	43,468	2,921	Dem	Yes	14,666	Dem	Yes
Statewide	Rep	112,911	508,644	1,383,512	299,164	Dem	Yes	467,111	Dem	Yes
Source: See assumptions and own analysis.										

See Appendix D for detailed predictions.

In conclusion, our analysis indicates that the impact of Amendment 4 on the electoral map of 2020 is significantly dampened if SB 7066 remains in place. If however it is repealed, we expect the Amendment to swing the vote at the state level in the 2020 Presidential election.

SPILL-OVER EFFECTS

A key assumption in our modelling is the large spill-over effect that voter participation of returning citizens will have on the people around them. The current literature suggests that enfranchised individuals who live in communities with a high percentage of disenfranchised individuals have a lower than state average voter turnout. This dampening effect was first studied by Marc Mauer and Ryan King for the Sentencing Project. Their analysis focused on specific districts in Georgia where Black Males had a 5% lower turnout rate compared to their White Male counterparts.²⁵ Building on this research, Browsers and Preuhs used a statistical analysis to further demonstrate that the negative effect of felony disenfranchisement on the political participation of non-felons was statistically significant in Black communities.²⁶

Anecdotally, Desmond Meade said this effect was common sense to him. “Back in the Civil Rights Era, when dad went to vote he took his whole family. That civic engagement was part of the conversation at the dinner table for the family... When you strip dad and mom the right to vote then you’re not having those conversations.” This emphasizes the point that the impact on felony disenfranchisement laws expands beyond those who are directly impacted (returning citizens) but includes those in their families and communities and specifically has an increased impact on those in Black communities.

Understanding the literature and contextual background to the dampening effects of felony disenfranchisement laws on the broader community and electorate, we expected the opposite to occur through Amendment 4. This is to say, that with the restoration of voting rights for a specific population, that their family members and community will find themselves more responsive to the democratic process than they previously were. Sean Shaw, former State Rep and Democratic AG candidate in 2018, commenting on this effect:

“If people go through the effort of getting their rights restored then it certainly seems to me that you’re going to have that inverse kind of thing be true where people in that household are now going to take voting that much more serious because they got someone who had it stripped away and now have it restored... If an individual has jumped through the hoops to get their rights restored they are going to be anything but apathetic [about voting] and that affects the people around them.”²⁷

This underscores that the impact is not limited to returning citizens alone but includes family and community level impact.

²⁵ King, Ryan S., and Marc Mauer. 2004. *The Vanishing Black Electorate: Felony Disenfranchisement in Atlanta, Georgia*. The Sentencing Project. Available at <http://www.sentencing-project.org>

²⁶ Bowers, M. and Preuhs, R.R. (2009), *Collateral Consequences of a Collateral Penalty: The Negative Effect of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws on the Political Participation of Nonfelons**. *Social Science Quarterly*, 90: 722-743. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6237.2009.00640.x

²⁷ Sean Shaw, in expert interview. February 2020

BARRIERS TO REACHING THE BALLOT BOX FOR THE ENFRANCHISED


Table 10: Barriers to electoral impact for enfranchised

	Post-sentencing disenfranchised voters	Qualified offenses acc. to literal Amendment	Qualified offenses acc. to SB 7066	Qualified by having fulfilled all LFOs	Turned out to vote (Medium)
Individuals in Florida	1,487,847	1,454,156	1,435,033	362,614	48,680
Total share	100%	98%	96%	24%	3.3%
Sample individuals	396,104	363,210	350,136	59,602	
Share of sample	100%	92%	88%	15%	
Non-sample individuals	1,091,743	1,090,946	1,084,897	303,012	
Share of non-sample	100%	100%	99%	28%	

Based on our estimate of the population eligible to vote after Amendment 4, SB 7066 and expert interviews, we further detailed the barriers to the impact of Amendment 4. The subsequent infographic illustrates the road for returning citizens to reclaim their vote, placing the above in the larger context while extracting the barriers in more detail based on the interviews.

We identified three cross-cutting barriers:

- a. Informational barrier
- b. Financial barrier
- c. Mobilizing barrier



INFORMATIONAL BARRIERS

The informational barrier persists throughout the entire “road” to reach the ballot box. The difficulty accessing relevant information or the ignorance on the options available are main focal points that need to be addressed.

What is Owed

In the Financial Barrier section of the roadmap, we mention that LFOs are an automatic indicator of whether an individual is eligible to have their voting rights restored. As such, accessing how much is owed is an integral step in the realization of one’s rights being restored. But, in the state of Florida there is no centralized method of accessing this information. Most of the LFOs are owed to and collected by the county in which an individual was convicted. Each county therefore has an account of what is owed to it, although county records are often incomplete. While many returning citizens will be aware of their debt due to collection solicitations, accessing that information in lieu of these solicitations are a significant barrier, especially if it is spread out across multiple counties. This barrier is compounded for individuals who completed the terms of their sentence prior to the digitization of this information. Recovering the paper trail is particularly difficult in these cases.

As LFOs are often the responsibility of a county, if an individual no longer lives in that particular county, was convicted in federal court, or convicted in a different state, contacting the relevant officials to obtain a precise tabulation of what is owed can be difficult.

Eligibility

Beyond LFOs, there are two eligibility related barriers that currently exist in the process. The first is based on what convictions are excluded from the restoration of voting rights under Amendment 4. The text of the Amendment kept in restrictions for those convicted of murder and felony sex offenses. However, as was referenced in the development of the predictive model and shown in the appendices, there are a significant number of convictions that may fall under each. The second is the uncertainty around the completion of the terms of one’s sentence. The current laws lay out that the completion of prison, parole, probation, and most recently fines and fees are required before the restoration of voting rights. Yet, an individual may be concerned whether their court mandated substance abuse counseling is included in that.

These two informational components stand as barriers for returning citizens due to their limited access of information, especially in the absence of nonprofit advocates or legal aid. A demonstration of how difficult this process can be is shown below.

An initial google search of “how do I get my voting rights restored in Florida” does not reveal any up to date information on what the process is post Amendment 4 and SB7066. As such, we expect someone to decide to go to the Secretary of State’s website as they are responsible for elections in Florida.

On the Secretary of State website, finding information on if one is eligible to vote is *not an easy process*. On the Elections page of the website, there is no clear tab or option targeted towards returning citizens on information related to their voting rights. If one uses the website’s search bar and searches for phrases such as “how do I get my voting rights restored?” “voting restored” or “disenfranchised”, no hits are found. It is only when one searches the word “felon” that a link for a voting FAQ which contains a paragraph for those seeking to have their rights restored (below).

15. How does a felon get voting rights restored?

- If convicted of murder or felony sexual offense, voting rights in Florida can only be restored through clemency pursuant to section 8, Art. V of the Florida Constitution. To [apply for clemency](#), search for grant of clemency and certificates, and/or find out more information about clemency, visit the website for the [Florida Commission on Offender Review](#).
- If convicted of any other felony offense, voting rights are restored upon completion of all terms of a sentence including parole or probation pursuant to section 4., Art. VI of the Florida Constitution. Such convicted felon may alternatively apply for clemency to restore voting rights.
- To determine if you have completed all the terms of your sentence including parole or probation as to one or more felony conviction(s), contact one or more of the following offices as may be applicable: [Florida Department of Corrections](#), and /or the clerk of the court in the jurisdiction(s) in which you were convicted whether that be a [circuit court in Florida](#), a court in another state, or a federal court.

Clicking on the first link provided simply takes you to the home page of the Florida Department of Corrections. There is no indication on the DOC website of how to see one's eligibility regarding voting rights. In fact, a search in the "offender search" tab, which requires a name and DC number, reveals only a person's specific convictions and the release date from prison.

The next step would be to visit the county clerk's website, which neither provides concrete information on one's status. This means that one must visit the county clerk's office, that also could be a barrier dependent on an individual's ability to visit the office during business hours.

As was hopefully demonstrated in this brief example, the process of determining your eligibility can be a discouraging and seemingly insurmountable process.

Options available

The last major subcategory of informational barriers deals with an individual's awareness of the specific legal options in restoring their rights. This is particularly relevant regarding the options surrounding LFOs. As previously mentioned, an individual can petition the court to have their fines and fees waived, reduced or converted into community service. While this option is open to all returning citizens, only four counties (Miami-Dade, Broward, Palm Beach and Hillsborough) have instituted a process of grouping petitioners and processing the requests simultaneously to expedite the process. Although these counties represent around 35% of Florida's total population, those who do not live in these counties must wait indefinitely for their case is heard. More importantly, knowledge of this legal option is not widespread, especially for returning citizens who may live in rural or other areas not covered by advocacy groups.

Uncertainty created

Each of these informational hurdles increases the uncertainty around voting right restorations. While reclaiming your voting right is a significant step in restoring an individual's citizenship within society the returning citizen's efforts to have her/his rights restored are inhibited by this uncertainty. This is exacerbated by the fact that the benefit associated with voting is outweighed by the punishment of voting illegally, that is the impact of a single vote is generally small however, should an individual erroneously cast a vote the punishment is

third-degree felony carrying a maximum sentence of 5 years.²⁸ In 2018, a Texas woman who believed her rights had been restored, voted in the election and was sentenced to 5 years in prison.²⁹ This imbalance is compounded by placing the responsibility to know your right to vote on the returning citizen. Election officials will not be able to confirm eligibility at the time of registration. As such, the uncertainty surrounding the information of one's status and the outsized impact of being wrong may keep many from attempting to register to vote.

Additionally, the current legal battle that is ensuing around SB 7066 has served only to increase the uncertainty around who is eligible or not. With every ruling and appeal, Floridians are left unsure and confused on what the state of the legislation is. The impact of this uncertainty can have a permanent effect on an individual and is what Bruce Riley of Voice of the Experienced, in Louisiana, describes as the power of "word on the street". "Word on the street actually has power. If word on the street says you don't have the right to vote it actually doesn't matter if you have the right to vote or not because you are going to listen to word on the street."³⁰ Once individuals are convinced that they are not eligible to vote, it is difficult to change their minds. This barrier highlights that regardless of the outcome of the legal battle surrounding SB 7066, we expect that the uncertainty created by the law will have a lasting impact.

FINANCIAL BARRIERS

Perhaps the most intuitive barrier is the financial cost due to SB 7066. As previously mentioned, we expect the enactment of this law to result in the disenfranchisement of ~70% of the previously enfranchised individuals. This cohort holds billions of dollars in outstanding fines and fees. For most returning citizens this financial burden is prohibitive.³¹ This barrier is binary in nature – you're either disenfranchised because you have LFOs or you are not. This can only be resolved by one's ability to pay off their fines and fees or by having them reduced or converted into community service by the courts.

It should be noted, irrespective of SB 7066, that Florida's LFO system has been one of the most punitive in the nation. The current system makes no exemptions for indigent individuals and traps them in a vicious cycle of debt to the state. For an in-depth analysis of Florida's LFO system, we suggest referencing the Brennan Center's publication on the topic.³²

MOBILIZING BARRIERS

Once an individual has determined their eligibility, there are still barriers that exist in getting out the vote. They will manifest themselves at different stages throughout the process. The three main subcategories identified were apathy, lack of engagement, and standard turnout issues.

Apathy

²⁸ S. 775.082

²⁹ Romo, Vanessa, and Sasha Ingber. "Texas Woman Sentenced To 5 Years For Illegal Voting." NPR. NPR, March 31, 2018. <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/31/598458914/texas-woman-sentenced-to-5-years-for-illegal-voting>.

³⁰ Bruce Riley, in expert interview. March 2020

³¹ Sweeney, Dan. "South Florida Felons Owe a Billion Dollars in Fines - and That Will Affect Their Ability to Vote." sun, May 31, 2019. <https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-ne-felony-fines-broward-palm-beach-20190531-5hxf7mveyree5cjhk4xr7b73v4-story.html>.

³² Diller, Rebekah. "The Hidden Costs of Florida's Criminal Justice Fees." Brennan Center for Justice, 2010. https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_The Hidden-Costs-Florida's-Criminal-Justice-Fees.pdf.

A significant barrier is apathy towards the political system. Many Americans believe that participation in the democratic process does not have an impact on governance or are uninterested in the governance because they perceive it as hostile towards them. However, for many returning citizens the apathy is deeper than a simple distaste for politics. Desmond Meade, founder of FRRC and a returning citizen himself, had an acute description of the psychological factors at play.

“There is a level of belonging that is damaged when you take someone’s right to vote away and, in my experience, its personal and professional. When a person can’t vote that is something painful. Whether they want to vote or not, the fact that they’re told they can’t vote is a stark reminder that you are not a part of our society. And that’s painful. Because the human instinct, the natural human instinct, is to be a part of this group, to be a part of something and to be told you’re that you’re not right is something painful. So we mask that, with an indifference we find the way to dull or nullify the pain. What comes out of this is “I don’t give a damn about voting don’t matter who gets in office, we’re still gonna be messed up, my vote don’t count.”³³

This barrier does not have a technical solution but requires significant engagement on an individual level to be overcome.

Lack of Engagement

Lack of engagement efforts and the nature of these efforts hinder the turnout of returning citizens. Many returning citizens are concentrated in districts with low voting propensity. This often leads to reduced attention by electoral engagement efforts. Additionally, with returning citizens as a new voting population, the engagement infrastructure is often not yet in place. The efforts around this may increase as organizations and political parties recognize the potential impact the population can have.

The method of engagement determines its success. It is important to recognize that the restoration of voting rights is greater than the transactional nature of turning out to the polls and voting for a specific candidate. In conversations with advocates that are working in this area, there was an emphasis that the restoration of voting rights was about restoring an individual’s dignity and their status as a first-class citizen.

This sentiment was echoed with individuals who worked with voter engagement of returning citizens from Louisiana to Alabama. Restoration of citizens’ rights and one’s dignity must be front and center to any strategy aimed at mobilizing and organizing returning citizens. Neil Volz, FRRC board member, explained that for their mission “it is about returning citizens lives, it’s about getting people plugged into the community, it’s about people educated on the issues.”³⁴

Any engagement and organizing effort that isn’t centered around issues of dignity and citizenship, will not be successful.

Standard Turnout Issues

The previously mentioned barriers were all specific to returning citizens, they however also face the same barriers as the general population. This includes a lack of transportation, voter suppression, long voting lines, lack of early voting, and myriad of other factors. Resolving these issues will increase the impact of both returning citizens and the general population.

³³ Desmond Meade, in expert interview, January 2020.

³⁴ Neil Volz, in expert interview, January 2020.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Our research shows that Amendment 4 will have a positive impact on democratic participation in Florida by returning citizens and their communities. Below are recommendations for the Florida legislature, the Sentencing Project, and other advocates to push that even further. We want to caveat that our position is that there should be no limitations on an individual's right to vote, however, we recognize that some changes must be done incrementally to be successful politically. As such some recommendations may not be fully in line with that ethos on disenfranchisement but are rather *pragmatic* solutions.

Our recommendations are categorized in line with the barriers. There is some overlap across categories, demonstrating the interplay between them

INFORMATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Create a centralized informational process

As was demonstrated previously, obtaining information on one's eligibility can be a difficult and complicated process. This informational barrier necessitates the creation of a streamlined process that combines the requirements of the Secretary of State, the Department of Corrections and county clerks. Providing clear and actionable steps for returning citizens to have their voting rights restored will decrease the concerns that are associated with the current system.

We recommend that the State of Florida develop a centralized system with which an individual can input their name and DC number and immediately find out what is owed and if they are eligible. With the state potentially being hesitant to invest in such a process, this is also an opportunity for a third party, although administration through a non-governmental organization has obvious draw backs. Nonetheless, the data Dan Smith's team has collected is a fantastic starting point although it is currently being treated as proprietary information.

It is important to emphasize that the creation of a database is addressing two issues – LFOs and conviction eligibility. These two issues have inputs from very different sources. Gaining access and combining these inputs comes with a degree of difficulty, that must be thoughtfully managed.

Change the burden of proof

A significant barrier preventing individuals from registering to vote is that the burden of proof for eligibility falls on the returning citizen as Florida does not maintain a system of determining eligibility at the point of registration. This creates huge uncertainty that will discourage returning citizens.

We recommend that the burden of proof should be changed from the returning citizen to the state. Registration to vote may only be successfully completed should the individual legally qualify, thus protecting the returning citizen from prosecution if it is later determined they were not eligible. It would be the fault of the system not the individual.

Change language in registration process

When an individual decides to register to vote, whether online or with a physical form, they are met with the following language:

“If I have been convicted of a felony, I affirm my voting rights have been restored pursuant to s. 4 , Art. VI of the State Constitution upon the completion of all terms of my sentence, including parole or probation.”

We recommend that the Secretary of State changes the language of the registration form from “including parole or probation” to “including parole, probation, and the payment of fines and fees.” This change is necessary for individuals who might not be aware of the details postulated in SB 7066. It is possible for a returning citizen to be aware of the passage of Amendment 4 granting them their voting rights and when they go online to register see only the mention of parole or probation. This would suggest to them that they are eligible, despite the possibility that they still owe fines and fees. Changing the language is a simple way to ensure that returning citizens are not registering despite being ineligible.

Provide information at last official contact with the system

Access to information has been shown to be a difficult process for many returning citizens. Since some individuals might not be aware of the options available to them or the restrictions they are under, it is important that this information is provided in an accessible method. We recommend that returning citizens are provided an information packet regarding their voting rights at their last official contact with the criminal justice system. Whether this is released from prison or the last meeting with a parole or probation officer, an individual should be provided with relevant information on how they can get their rights restored.

FINANCIAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Repeal SB 7066

While it is unlikely, unless by court order, we recommend that Governor DeSantis and the Florida legislature repeal SB 7066. The implementation of SB 7066 has had an outsized impact on how many people are disenfranchised. Repealing the law will not only grant back the voting rights of the approximately 1,000,000 disenfranchised but will also result in a positive spill over effect in their communities.

Change in Sentencing

The possibility to convert or reduce LFOs has been prioritized by previously mentioned counties. Streamlining this process provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the repercussions of the de-facto poll tax. The willingness of certain counties to petition the modification of one's sentence post-release to help restore voting rights provides an opportunity to change sentencing. This is to say, that if the court knows that the individual will be unable to pay their fines and fees post-release, they might advocate to have the fines and fees dropped or changed to community service at the time of sentencing. Currently in Florida, there are certain categories of offenses in which the assessment of fines is discretionary.³⁵ Leveraging both the discretionary nature and the provisions allotted in SB 7066, will allow the reduction of fines and fees for any individual prior to serving their sentence. Addressing their LFOs at this juncture will ensure the process of restoring their voting rights is less complicated post-release.

Increase Fundraising Efforts

With the implementation of SB 7066, the financial burden to voting is the most limiting factor to the impact of Amendment 4. As Floridians wait for the legal battle to be settled in the courts, an effective action in restoring individual's rights is paying off their fines and fees. Currently, FRRC created a "Fines and Fees Fund" that has raised \$500,000 and has paid the legal obligations for 200 individuals.³⁶ With billions of outstanding fines and fees, addressing this financial burden can be a daunting task.³⁷ It is therefore crucial to approach this effort strategically. This can mean developing a methodology that prioritizes the repayment of LFOs in a way that maximizes the number of individuals the fund helps. For instance, financial assistance is particularly influential for returning citizens who don't live in the counties that have made the transformation of LFOs a priority.

Given the high cost associated with paying one's LFOs, it should be noted that using those funds to support organizing efforts may result in higher democratic participation from returning citizens. We suggest that future study is conducted on the turnout rates for returning citizens who have their fines and fees paid for. Tracking this information would better inform decisions on how to allocate the limited resources.

³⁵ Diller, Rebekah. "The Hidden Costs of Florida's Criminal Justice Fees." Brennan Center for Justice, 2010. https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_The Hidden-Costs-Florida's-Criminal-Justice-Fees.pdf.

³⁶ Perry, Mitch. "Early Christmas Gift for 31 Hillsborough Co. Felons: Right to Vote Restored." Early Gift for 31 Hillsborough Felons Right to Vote Restored, December 20, 2019. <https://www.baynews9.com/fl/tampa/news/2019/12/20/in-hillsborough-county--an-early-xmas-gift-for-31-felons---their-right-to-vote-is-restored>.

³⁷ Sweeney, Dan. "South Florida Felons Owe a Billion Dollars in Fines - and That Will Affect Their Ability to Vote." sun, May 31, 2019. <https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-ne-felony-fines-broward-palm-beach-20190531-5hxf7mveyree5cjhk4xr7b73v4-story.html>.

Partisan interests in counties

Our impact map allows us to identify the county parties that have a partisan interest in facilitating the process of translating LFOs into community service. This may result in partisan interest groups pushing the process streamlining of LFO transformation as modelled by Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach and Hillsborough along.

The respective counties for the Democratic party are:

- Alachua
- *Broward*
- Gadsden
- *Hillsborough*
- Leon
- *Miami-Dade*
- Orange
- Osceola
- *Palm beach*

The respective counties for the Republican party are:

- Citrus
- Dixie
- Gilchrist
- Hardee
- Holmes
- Okeechobee
- Santa Rosa

Exempt 10yrs + from LFO Requirement

During our research, we discovered the added difficulty of discovering what is owed for individuals who completed their sentences prior to their records being digitized. As a result of this added barrier, we recommend that Florida enact an exemption of the LFO requirement for those who have completed their sentencing over 10 years ago. This legislation would not remove the requirement to pay one's LFOs but would mean the LFO requirement assessed to the restoration of voting rights would no longer apply. In the immediate term, this would enfranchise a significant number of returning citizens who may find it difficult to determine if they have LFOs.

A critique of this recommendation centers around its usefulness beyond the initial implementation. The proposed recommendation's primary objective is providing a means of mitigating the issue of returning citizens whose documentation may not have been digitized and potentially lost. Yet, for future returning citizens there is no basis for the argument since their information will be available in new processes. Long term, we recommend that this legislation would serve as an incentive or reward for those who have avoided interactions with the criminal justice system. This would be similar to Louisiana's law that restores voting rights to returning citizens who have been out of prison for five years but remain under probation or parole.³⁸

³⁸ Crisp, Elizabeth. "Gov. John Bel Edwards Signs Law Restoring Felon Voting Rights after Five Years." *The Advocate*, May 31, 2018.
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/legislature/article_8f432008-6515-11e8-a42c-4f773f2862c5.html.

MOBILIZING RECOMMENDATIONS

Create a streamlined engagement strategy

The quantitative and statistical modelling is useful in helping us predict the impact of the Amendment on future elections. However, this impact can only be realized, and expanded, if individuals are engaged, their rights restored, and turned out to vote. Therefore, we recommend creating a playbook that can be used by various groups to engage returning citizens. This strategy should be created in coordination with various advocacy groups and stakeholders to ensure that it is centered around dignity and citizenship. The creation of a strategy template will allow for those who wish to engage with returning citizens to do so in an effective manner.

Increase use of returning citizens to returning citizen canvassing

As previously mentioned, engaging returning citizens in a purely transactional form may lead to pushback therefore an effective strategy must be centered around dignity and citizenship. Combined with this is ensuring that returning citizens are a central component to any engagement campaign. During their campaign to gather signatures to get Amendment 4 on to the ballot in 2018, FRRC was intentional about having returning citizens be a driving force in these efforts. According to Neil Volz, FRRC has continued to strive to have returning citizens be the main contacts to other returning citizens in their voter registration and mobilizing efforts.³⁹ While seemingly intuitive that those closest to the issue will be able to speak most convincingly about dignity, citizenship, and the importance of voting, this principle has basis in voter engagement literature. Experimental research on door-to-door canvassing found that a canvasser simply being from the same zip code had a statistically significant impact.⁴⁰ Mobilizing and organizing campaigns around voter registration and turnout for returning citizens must employ and support returning citizens as a central component. This is particularly influential in combatting the apathy that many returning citizens feel towards the democratic process.

Also focus on individuals not convicted of a felony

Given the limiting factor of SB 7066 on the direct impact of Amendment 4, spillover effects pose a unique opportunity to expand the impact of the Amendment. For those interested in expanding democratic participation, there is a benefit to focus on these often-neglected communities as they are positioned for a resurgence in political involvement. Often, political campaigns create their mobilization and turnout strategies based on past turnout trends in specific districts or precincts, thus allocating resources and attention to areas that traditionally have high turnout. However, this can result in a self-fulfilling prophecy, as communities that have low turnout rates become neglected leading to less political engagement. Because of the impact of spillover effects, both positive and negative, we expect that a majority of these low turnout precincts will see a rise in willingness to engage in the political process due to individuals in their families and communities who get their rights restored.

³⁹ Neil Volz, in expert interview, January 2020.

⁴⁰ Green, Donald P., and Alan S. Gerber. *Get out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2019.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS



INFORMATIONAL
BARRIER

Recommendations

- Centralized Informational Process
- Change Burden of Proof
- Change Registration Language
- Information Packet at Last Contact



FINANCIAL
BARRIER

Recommendations

- Repeal SB 7066
- Change Sentencing
- Increase Fundraising
- Partner with Counties
- Exempt 10+ years from LFO requirement



MOBILIZING
BARRIER

Recommendations

- Streamlined Engagement Strategy
- RC to RC outreach
- Spillover Community outreach

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A – DATA SOURCES

a) Official Florida voter registration and unofficial voting history information by the Florida Division of Elections (last updated per 03/20)⁴¹

Official voter registration information: Data is extracted from the Florida Voter Registration System and includes information on voters who are officially registered as of the end of the prior month. Public information is included except in those cases in which an exemption applies, including if a registered voter requested exemption from public disclosure pursuant to Section 119.071, Fla. Stat. (Section 97.0585, Fla. Stat.). All information on registered voters who are participants in the Attorney General’s Address Confidentiality Program pursuant to 741.401 – 741.465, Fla. Stat., is excluded.

Unofficial voting history information: Data is extracted from independently reported voting history from the 67 county supervisors of elections. The data is captured at a fixed point in time and may not always correspond to information in a county’s voter registration file because the voter may have moved to another county after voting. You must look to the voter’s registration information in that county-specific voter registration file. Disclaimer: The Division of Elections cannot warrant the content or accuracy of the unofficial voting history extract. The most accurate and current official voting history resides with the supervisors of elections. Any discrepancies in this extract must be resolved in favor of the official voting records in the county where the voter actually voted.

For details on contact and variables, please visit the Florida Division of Elections voter extract disk file layout at: <https://dos.myflorida.com/media/696057/voter-extract-file-layout.pdf>.

b) Public records of OBIS offender data base in Florida by the Florida Department of Corrections (last per 01/20)⁴²

The OBIS offender database compiles Florida Department of Correction data for current inmates, released and supervised populations. This data is accessible at: http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/obis_request.html.

Inmate Population Information

In the interest of public safety, the Florida Department of Corrections makes available to the Department of Corrections staff and the criminal justice community, information and photographs of inmates who are incarcerated. This information is completely refreshed weekly, with the exception of release dates and location changes which are nightly. For additional information, please contact the Department of Corrections, Bureau of Classification and Central Records, Policy and Systems Development Section, at (850) 488-9859 or central.classification@fdc.myflorida.com.

Inmate Release Information

In the interest of public safety, the Florida Department of Corrections makes available to the Department of Corrections staff and the criminal justice community, information and photographs of inmates who either have been released or are scheduled to be released. This information is updated nightly. For additional information, please contact the Department of Corrections, Bureau of Admission and Release, at (850) 488-9167 or dc.release@fdc.myflorida.com.

⁴¹ <https://dos.myflorida.com/media/696057/voter-extract-file-layout.pdf>

⁴² http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/obis_request.html

Supervised Population Information

In the interest of public safety, the Florida Department of Corrections makes available to the Department of Corrections staff and the criminal justice community, information and photographs of offenders who are under supervision. This information is completely refreshed weekly, with the exception of termination dates and location changes which are updated nightly. For additional information, please contact the Department of Corrections, Probation and Parole Field Services, at (850) 717-3444 or co-supervision@fdc.myflorida.com.

An overview of the variables included in the respective data bases, can be accessed at: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1TbBF-FhQ7fj3JwogTBBZqzLwVPToiVzQ/view?usp=sharing>.

c) Historic Florida election results on county and precinct level by the MIT election lab (last updated: 12/19)⁴³

The MIT election lab supports advances in election science by collecting, analyzing, and sharing core data and findings.

The data on the results of the 2016 presidential election that we used as our baseline is available at: <https://electionlab.mit.edu/data>.

d) 2016 Actuarial Life Table by the Social Security Administration⁴⁴

A life table is a concise way of showing the probabilities of a member of a particular population living to or dying at a particular age. In this study, the life tables are used to examine the mortality changes in the Social Security population over time. For this table, the period life expectancy at a given age is the average remaining number of years expected prior to death for a person at that exact age, born on January 1, using the mortality rates for 2016 over the course of his or her remaining life.

The table is accessible at: <https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html>.

e) Statute table by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (last updated: 12/19)

The FDLE Statute Table is a comprehensive legislative resource containing current and past Florida criminal offenses. It was developed for use in various criminal justice applications in conjunction with the Office of State Courts Administrator, the Florida Court Clerks and Comptrollers, the Department of Juvenile Justice, and the Department of Corrections.

The Clerk and Arrest versions of the Florida Statute Tables are updated annually by laws that create, amend, or repeal statutory material. The offenses and violations are listed by Florida statute number.

The Arrest Statute Table used by law enforcement agencies contains only the current arrestable offenses. The Clerk Statute Table used by the Clerks of Court contains the arrestable offenses in addition to statutory history, such as when a statute was repealed or renumbered.

For more information on the 2019 release of the Statute Table, please refer to the CJIS Memorandum that was distributed by FDLE.

The table used in our analysis to establish the connection between statute and code value, is accessible via: <https://web.fdle.state.fl.us/statutes/about.jsf>.

⁴³ <https://electionlab.mit.edu/data>

⁴⁴ <https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html>

f) 2019 Florida’s Criminal Punishment Code: A Comparative Assessment by the Florida Department of Corrections (last updated: 10/19)⁴⁵

The intent of the report is to address the requirement set forth in Florida Statute 921.002(4)(a) to analyze sentencing events under the Florida Criminal Punishment Code. Each year, the Department of Corrections is required to report on trends in sentencing practices and sentencing score thresholds, and provide an analysis of the sentencing factors considered by the courts. On October 1, 2018, the digitized criminal punishment code scoresheet system was implemented statewide. This report details the 92,730 scoresheets received with sentence dates in FY 2018-2019 received by the Florida Department of Corrections, for felony offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998.

The information relevant to this analysis can be found on page 32 and the following pages in the table titled “Offense Type Based on Best Match to Statute or Primary Offense Code on Scoresheet using Offense Categories Specific to the Department of Corrections”.

⁴⁵ <http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/scoresheet/Criminal%20Punishment%20Code%202019.pdf>

APPENDIX B – ASSUMPTIONS

b) Mapping offense type to sanction imposed for felons⁴⁶

Source: f) Florida's Criminal Punishment Code.

Utilizing the 2019 Florida Criminal Punishment Code, we drew out the table below, which depicts the number of offenses in the FY 2019 by offense types and sanctions imposed. Below shows the offense types most relevant for our analysis. On this crude level, we differentiated roughly whether disqualification would be applicable at a literate reading of the Amendment or as specified in SB 7066. We didn't level this out over a series of years, because only starting from the latest report the granularity was available at this level. We used this information to determine disqualification for the population that was not included in our sample.

Offense Type	County Jail	Probation	Community Control	Literal	Bill
01-Capital Murder	0	6	1	x	x
02-2nd Degree Murder	2	1	5		x
04-Homicide, Other	2	6	1		x
07-Capital Sexual Battery	1	2	3	x	x
08-Life Sexual Battery	7	3	1	x	x
09-1st Degree Sexual Battery	3	18	3	x	x
10-2nd Degree Sexual Battery	9	49	12		x
11-Sexual Assault, Other	7	8	3		x
12-Lewd/Lascivious Behavior	36	178	49		x
Total	23300	38162	5022		
Literal	100.0%	99.9%	99.8%		
Bill	99.7%	99.3%	98.4%		

The split of sanctions imposed (County Jail, Probation, Community Control) on the post-sentencing historically disenfranchised population that was not included in our sample fell for our estimation is based on information in the criminal punishment code. To level out potential fluctuation between years, we worked with an average over the last three years.

Year	County Jail	Probation	Community Control	State Prison	Other	Total
2018-2019	23300	38162	5022	21536	315	88335
2017-2018	23252	40188	4236	16994	774	85444
2016-2017	21096	38809	4221	16768	631	81525
Average	22549	39053	4493	18433	573	85101

⁴⁶ <http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/scoresheet/Criminal%20Punishment%20Code%202019.pdf>

On this basis we split the post-sentencing historically disenfranchised population not reflected in our sample into:

County jail	Probation	Community Control	Total
34%	59%	7%	66669

c) Disqualifying offenses acc. to literal interpretation of Amendment

d) Disqualifying offenses acc. to SB 7066

Source: b) Public records of OBIS offender data base, classification according to own assessment.

Offenses	Bill	Literal
SEX BATT V12-17, NO INJURY	Yes	Yes
1ST DG MUR/PREMED. OR ATT.	Yes	Yes
SEX BAT BY ADULT/VCTM LT 12	Yes	Yes
POSS PHOTO ETC CHILD SEX PERF	Yes	Yes
USE OF CHILD, PROM.SEX PERFM	Yes	Yes
L/L MOLEST V<12 OFF 18+	Yes	Yes
PROV.OBSCENE MAT.MINOR	Yes	Yes
SECOND DEG.MURDER,COMM.OF FELO	Yes	No
SEX BAT/MINOR,FAM/CUST AUTH	Yes	No
L&L BATT FORCE/ENTICE ABUSE	Yes	No
L/L EXHIBIT. V<16 OFF 18+	Yes	Yes
ADLT SEX W/16-17 YR OLD	Yes	Yes
2ND DEG.MURD,DANGEROUS ACT	Yes	No
L/L, INDEC.ASLT CHILD U/16	Yes	Yes
SEXUAL BATTERY UNSPECIFIED	Yes	No
SEX BAT/COERCES BY THREAT	Yes	No
SEX BAT/ WPN. OR FORCE	Yes	No
SEX BAT/INJURY NOT LIKELY	Yes	No
RAPE - STRONGARM	Yes	Yes
LEWD ASLT/SEX BAT VCTM<16	Yes	Yes
L/L MOLEST V12-15 OFF 18+	Yes	Yes
L/L CONDUCT V<16 OFF 18+	Yes	Yes
L&L BATT MINOR	Yes	Yes
SX OFFNDR FAIL COMPLY PSIA	Yes	No
KIDNAP V<13/AGG.CHLD ABUSE	Yes	Yes
1ST DEG MUR,COM.OF FELONY	Yes	Yes
SEX BAT/PHYS HELPLESS RESIST	Yes	No
SEX BATT V & O 18+	Yes	No
USE OF CHILD, ENG SEX PERFM	Yes	Yes
INTERNET/LURE CHILD FOR SEX	Yes	Yes
SEND MINOR HARMFUL INFO.	Yes	No
SEX BATT V & O 18+, NO INJURY	Yes	No
FALSE IMPRISON MINOR AGA.WILL	Yes	No
VID VOYEUR-CHLD<16	Yes	Yes
1ST DEG MUR,DEATH FRM DRUGS	Yes	Yes
SEX ASSLT-SODOMY-MAN-OTHER	Yes	No
L/L BATT.CAUSE SXACT V<16	Yes	Yes
SEND CHILD PORN.	Yes	Yes
L/L BATT.SEX W/V12-15	Yes	Yes

KIDNAP MINOR AGAINST WILL	Yes	Yes
SEX ACT COERCE CHILD BY ADULT	Yes	Yes
USE OF CHILD, SEX PHOTO ETC	Yes	Yes
SEX BAT/MENTALLY DEFECTIVE	Yes	No
SEX OFFENSE-OTHER	Yes	No
SEX OFF, FALSE INFO/OMIT	Yes	No
SEX BATT V12-17 O18+	Yes	Yes
HOMICIDE,KILL UNBORN CHLD	Yes	Yes
SEX BAT BY JUVEN/VCTM UNDER 12	Yes	Yes
SEX OFF/PRDR POSS ALT DL/ID	Yes	No
SEX BATT/CARNAL INTERC. U/18	Yes	Yes
SX.OFNR.RE-REGISTR.VIOL.	Yes	No
LURE CHILD INTO BLDG/CAR	Yes	Yes
SEX PRED, TRANS RES NO REP	Yes	No
SEX.BAT/VICT O/12 INCAP	Yes	Yes
SEX OFF, TRANS NO REP	Yes	No
SEX BAT/COERCES BY RETALIATION	Yes	No
KIDNAP V<13/SEX. BATTERY	Yes	Yes
COMM SEX MINOR/MENT INCAP	Yes	Yes
POS PLAC MAN SUB/MINOR EXIST	Yes	No
SEX BATT V12+ O<18, NO INJURY	Yes	Yes
VISUALLY EXP.MINOR/SEX.CONDUCT	Yes	Yes
MANSLAUGHTER/UNBORN CHILD	Yes	No
SEX PRED FAIL TO REGISTER	Yes	No
ABUSE OF HUMAN CORPSE	Yes	No
SEX ASSAULT/BATTERY	Yes	No
SEX PRED, FALSE INFO/OMIT	Yes	No
L/L EXHBT - PRESNCE OF EMPLOYEE	Yes	No
L/L COMP. EXHIB. OFF 18+	Yes	No
SX.OFNR.NOT NOTIF.SHERIFF	Yes	No
LEWD MOLEST.-ELDER/DISABLD	Yes	No
LEWD EXHIBIT-ELDER/DISABLD	Yes	No
INCEST WITH RELATIVE	Yes	No
SEX ASSLT-OTHER/OTHER STATE	Yes	No
WWW/ASK PARENT:SEX W/MINOR	Yes	Yes
KIDNAP MINOR FOR RANSOM	Yes	No
HIV-POS.HAS SEX 2+ VIOLATIONS	Yes	No
HOMICIDE-OTHER/OTHER STATE	Yes	Yes
USE/PROD - MINOR SX MATERIAL	Yes	Yes
L/L MOLEST V12-15 OFF<18	Yes	Yes
KIDNAP V<13/L&L FS800.04	Yes	Yes
L/L MOLEST V<12 OFF<18	Yes	Yes
SEX BATT V <12 FAM CAP	Yes	Yes
SEX TRAFF-VIC<14 OR DEATH	Yes	Yes
SEX BATT V <12 FAM LIFE	Yes	Yes

1ST DG.MURDER/UNBORN CHILD	Yes	Yes
SEX BATT V 12+ , PRIOR CONV.	Yes	Yes
SX.PRED.NOT NOTIF.SHERIFF	Yes	No
FELONY MURDER-NONSEX	Yes	No
L/L EXHIBIT. V<16 OFF<18	Yes	Yes
SEX TRAFFICKING	Yes	Yes
SX OFFNDR FAIL RPT.NONMOVE	Yes	No
HUMAN TRFC:SX TRADE,CHILD<18	Yes	Yes
HUMAN TRAFFICKING:SEX TRADE	Yes	No
SEX ACT/SOLICIT OF CHILD	Yes	Yes
USE COMPUTR SEX W/MINOR	Yes	Yes
SEX PRED.FAIL RPT.NONMOVE	Yes	No
DISCLOSE SEX DISEASE INFO	Yes	No
SEX BATT/SOLICITATION OF CHILD	Yes	Yes
LEWD BATT.ON ELDER/DISABLD	Yes	No
SEX BATT V 12+ O<18	Yes	Yes
HIV-POSITIVE HAS SEX	Yes	No
PURC.CUSTODY OF MINOR/SEX.COND	Yes	Yes
FALS.IMP.V<13/SEX. BATTERY	Yes	Yes
SEXUAL BATTERY BY LEO	Yes	No
HUM TFK:SEXUAL ADULT	Yes	No
HARBR/HIDE/LIE RE SX.OFNDR.	Yes	No
FALS.IMP.V<13/L&L FS800.04	Yes	No
STAFF SEX W/INMATE/OFFENDER	Yes	No
HUMAN TRFC:SX TRADE,CHILD<15	Yes	Yes
ADLT/CUST VID VOYEUR-CHLD<16	Yes	Yes
L/L CONDUCT V<16 OFF<18	Yes	Yes
SEX BAT/VICTIM DRUGGED	Yes	No
SEND CHILD PORN-OTH STATE	Yes	No
PROVIDE FALSE REPORT STD	Yes	No
HT:SEX TRANSF STATE MINOR	Yes	Yes
SEX BATT V12+, PRIOR CONV	Yes	Yes
SEX MISC.PSYCHOTHERAPIST	Yes	No
AGG.STALK-SXOFDR VIOL.ORDER	Yes	Yes
ADLT/CUST VID VOYUER-CHLD<16	Yes	Yes
SEX OFNDR ILLEGAL RESIDENCE	Yes	Yes
BATTERY CODE INPECTOR	Yes	Yes
HUMAN TRAFFIC - VIOLENT	Yes	No
HUMAN TRFC:SX TRADE,INTRSTATE	Yes	No
STAFF SEX W/APD CLIENT	Yes	No
EMPLOYEE SEX W/DJJ OFFNDR	Yes	No
2ND DG.MURDER/UNBORN CHILD	Yes	Yes
SEX VIO INJUC VIO 2+ PRI CON	Yes	Yes
HOMICIDE-WILLFUL KILL-FMLY-GUN	Yes	Yes
RAPE WITH OTHER WEAPON	Yes	Yes

SEX ASSLT - CARNAL ABUSE	Yes	No
SEX ASSLT-SODOMY-BOY-STGARM	Yes	Yes
HOMICIDE	Yes	Yes
SEX ASSLT-SODOMY-BOY-GUN	Yes	Yes
HOMICIDE-WLFL KILL-NONFMLY-GUN	Yes	Yes
RAPE - GUN	Yes	Yes
HOMICIDE-WILLFUL KILL-GUN	Yes	Yes
HOMICIDE-WLFL KILL-FMLY-OTHER	Yes	Yes
SEX ASSLT-SODOMY-WOMAN-STGARM	Yes	No
HOMICIDE-WLFL KILL-PUB OFF-OTH	Yes	Yes
HOMICIDE-WILFUL W/VESSEL	Yes	Yes
SEX ASSLT-SODOMY-GIRL-OTHER	Yes	Yes
OBSCENE EXHIBIT/INVOLV MINOR	Yes	Yes
SELL CHILD FOR MONEY	Yes	Yes
KIDNAP/CHILD ABUSE INVES.	Yes	Yes
DETENTION STAFF SEX W/INMATE	Yes	No
SXOFDR NO CONTACT ORD VIOL.	Yes	No
SX.OFNDR.REFUSE PHOTO	Yes	No
HOMICIDE-WLFL KILL-POL OFF-OTH	Yes	Yes
SEX ASSLT-SODOMY-WOMAN-OTHER	Yes	No
OBSCENE PRESENTATION W/MINOR	Yes	Yes
CONT TO DELINQ OF MINOR	Yes	No
SEX ASSLT-SODOMY-GIRL-STGARM	Yes	Yes
SEX ASSLT-SODOMY-BOY-OTHER	Yes	Yes
HOMICIDE-WLFL KILL-POL OFF-GUN	Yes	Yes
SEX CYBERHARRASSMENT	Yes	No
TERRORISM	Yes	No
DCF STAFF SEX W/PATIENT	Yes	No
LURE CHILD PREV. 794 VIOL	Yes	Yes

e) Legal Financial Obligations

Assumptions for eligibility based on outstanding LFOs:

Outstanding LFOs	Assumption of eligibility
o \$	100% expected to be eligible by election day
Up to 100 \$	50% expected to be eligible by election day
Up to 250 \$	20% expected to be eligible by election day
Up to 500 \$	10% expected to be eligible by election day
Up to 1000 \$	5% expected to be eligible by election day
More than 1000 \$	1% expected to be eligible by election day

Assumptions for LFOs in OBIS data base (sample population) according to county and race:

Source: Dan A. Smith expert testimony⁴⁷

County	Race	o (%)	Up to 100 (%)	Up to 250 (%)	Up to 500 (%)	Up to 1000 (%)	More than 1000 (%)	Total share of eligible voters
Alachua	White & others	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.13	0.22	0.57	0.09
Alachua	Black	0.13	0.03	0.03	0.16	0.26	0.40	0.18
Baker	White & others	0.18	0.02	0.04	0.16	0.19	0.42	0.23
Baker	Black	0.11	0.02	0.02	0.13	0.28	0.44	0.15
Bay	White & others	0.16	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.18	0.51	0.21
Bay	Black	0.11	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.20	0.55	0.15
Bradford	White & others	0.29	0.04	0.03	0.13	0.22	0.29	0.35
Bradford	Black	0.25	0.03	0.03	0.15	0.23	0.31	0.30
Brevard	White & others	0.27	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.14	0.46	0.31
Brevard	Black	0.16	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.16	0.56	0.20

⁴⁷

<https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/SupplementalExpertReportofDanielA.SmithPh.D.UniversityofFloridaSeptember172019.pdf> .

Broward	White & others	0.16	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.18	0.51	0.21
Broward	Black	0.11	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.20	0.55	0.15
Calhoun	White & others	0.09	-	0.02	0.02	0.14	0.72	0.11
Calhoun	Black	0.11	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.22	0.58	0.14
Charlotte	White & others	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.19	0.25	0.30	0.18
Charlotte	Black	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.22	0.27	0.24	0.17
Citrus	White & others	0.17	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.71	0.20
Citrus	Black	0.12	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.68	0.15
Clay	White & others	0.16	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.18	0.51	0.21
Clay	Black	0.11	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.20	0.55	0.15
Collier	White & others	0.15	0.04	0.03	0.11	0.17	0.51	0.20
Collier	Black	0.09	0.03	0.02	0.12	0.19	0.55	0.14
Columbia	White & others	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.19	0.62	0.12
Columbia	Black	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.21	0.63	0.10
Desoto	White & others	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.15	0.71	0.11
Desoto	Black	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.10	0.75	0.11
Dixie	White & others	0.11	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.18	0.57	0.16
Dixie	Black	0.03	0.05	-	0.09	0.09	0.74	0.08
Duval	White & others	0.11	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.44	0.36	0.16
Duval	Black	0.07	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.46	0.38	0.11
Escambia	White & others	0.16	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.18	0.51	0.21

Escambia	Black	0.11	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.20	0.55	0.15
Flagler	White & others	0.10	0.08	0.02	0.07	0.40	0.33	0.17
Flagler	Black	0.09	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.40	0.31	0.17
Franklin	White & others	0.13	0.01	0.02	0.11	0.17	0.56	0.17
Franklin	Black	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.09	0.29	0.52	0.10
Gadsden	White & others	0.18	0.19	0.17	0.23	0.15	0.08	0.33
Gadsden	Black	0.09	0.15	0.15	0.25	0.21	0.16	0.23
Gilchrist	White & others	0.12	0.04	0.02	0.14	0.16	0.51	0.17
Gilchrist	Black	0.06	-	0.01	0.19	0.28	0.46	0.10
Glades	White & others	0.19	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.19	0.25	0.30
Glades	Black	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.22	0.26	0.19	0.22
Gulf	White & others	0.17	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.13	0.64	0.19
Gulf	Black	0.12	-	0.05	0.05	0.15	0.63	0.15
Hamilton	White & others	0.02	0.09	0.05	0.15	0.16	0.54	0.10
Hamilton	Black	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.11	0.16	0.64	0.07
Hardee	White & others	0.13	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.15	0.66	0.16
Hardee	Black	0.02	0.04	-	0.06	0.24	0.64	0.07
Hendry	White & others	0.09	0.05	0.03	0.17	0.26	0.39	0.16
Hendry	Black	0.08	0.04	0.03	0.17	0.26	0.42	0.14
Hernando	White & others	0.16	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.18	0.51	0.21
Hernando	Black	0.11	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.20	0.55	0.15

Highlands	White & others	0.12	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.77	0.14
Highlands	Black	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.84	0.08
Hillsborough	White & others	0.16	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.18	0.51	0.21
Hillsborough	Black	0.11	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.20	0.55	0.15
Holmes	White & others	0.09	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.80	0.11
Holmes	Black	0.04	-	0.01	0.03	0.10	0.82	0.06
Indian river	White & others	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.13	0.21	0.56	0.10
Indian river	Black	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.15	0.20	0.57	0.07
Jackson	White & others	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.23	0.61	0.11
Jackson	Black	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.25	0.64	0.08
Jefferson	White & others	0.36	0.05	0.04	0.18	0.26	0.10	0.43
Jefferson	Black	0.17	0.08	0.05	0.29	0.25	0.16	0.26
Lafayette	White & others	0.13	0.07	0.04	0.13	0.13	0.50	0.20
Lafayette	Black	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.31	0.38	0.18
Lake	White & others	0.30	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.66	0.32
Lake	Black	0.25	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.71	0.27
Lee	White & others	0.12	0.12	0.07	0.11	0.18	0.40	0.22
Lee	Black	0.07	0.10	0.07	0.10	0.20	0.46	0.15
Leon	White & others	0.24	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.65	0.26
Leon	Black	0.17	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.73	0.19
Levy	White & others	0.14	0.03	0.07	0.30	0.27	0.18	0.22

Levy	Black	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.45	0.25	0.20	0.13
Liberty	White & others	0.19	0.05	0.03	0.08	0.25	0.40	0.25
Liberty	Black	0.20	0.03	0.05	0.12	0.34	0.26	0.26
Madison	White & others	0.07	0.04	0.03	0.09	0.16	0.61	0.12
Madison	Black	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.10	0.13	0.61	0.13
Manatee	White & others	0.10	0.03	0.02	0.09	0.22	0.52	0.15
Manatee	Black	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.10	0.24	0.57	0.10
Marion	White & others	0.20	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.15	0.54	0.24
Marion	Black	0.11	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.14	0.65	0.15
Martin	White & others	0.18	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.18	0.52	0.22
Martin	Black	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.23	0.60	0.11
Miami-dade	White & others	0.16	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.18	0.51	0.21
Miami-dade	Black	0.11	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.20	0.55	0.15
Monroe	White & others	0.06	0.17	0.05	0.12	0.27	0.32	0.19
Monroe	Black	0.03	0.14	0.06	0.12	0.28	0.37	0.14
Nassau	White & others	0.14	0.02	0.02	0.17	0.27	0.38	0.19
Nassau	Black	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.24	0.29	0.35	0.14
Okaloosa	White & others	0.14	0.27	0.07	0.06	0.26	0.20	0.31
Okaloosa	Black	0.07	0.22	0.09	0.11	0.25	0.25	0.23
Okeechobee	White & others	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.12	0.75	0.09
Okeechobee	Black	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.21	0.69	0.07

Orange	White & others	0.19	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.24	0.48	0.22
Orange	Black	0.10	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.24	0.59	0.13
Osceola	White & others	0.16	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.18	0.51	0.21
Osceola	Black	0.11	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.20	0.55	0.15
Palm beach	White & others	0.16	0.02	0.01	0.10	0.29	0.42	0.20
Palm beach	Black	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.09	0.26	0.55	0.11
Pasco	White & others	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.06	0.18	0.68	0.06
Pasco	Black	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.24	0.65	0.05
Pinellas	White & others	0.16	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.18	0.51	0.21
Pinellas	Black	0.11	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.20	0.55	0.15
Polk	White & others	0.12	0.08	0.02	0.04	0.10	0.64	0.18
Polk	Black	0.09	0.09	0.02	0.04	0.10	0.67	0.15
Putnam	White & others	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.13	0.28	0.46	0.13
Putnam	Black	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.15	0.24	0.50	0.10
Santa rosa	White & others	0.25	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.49	0.28
Santa rosa	Black	0.13	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.30	0.50	0.16
Sarasota	White & others	0.13	0.05	0.04	0.18	0.22	0.39	0.19
Sarasota	Black	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.17	0.25	0.48	0.11
Seminole	White & others	0.21	0.19	0.12	0.26	0.16	0.07	0.36
Seminole	Black	0.12	0.19	0.14	0.30	0.18	0.08	0.28
St. johns	White & others	0.40	0.02	0.02	0.10	0.12	0.34	0.43

St. Johns	Black	0.34	0.02	0.03	0.12	0.13	0.36	0.37
St. Lucie	White & others	0.42	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.10	0.45	0.44
St. Lucie	Black	0.16	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.73	0.18
Sumter	White & others	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.10	0.77	0.10
Sumter	Black	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.09	0.80	0.10
Suwannee	White & others	0.04	0.08	0.03	0.05	0.14	0.67	0.10
Suwannee	Black	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.11	0.75	0.06
Taylor	White & others	0.11	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.77	0.13
Taylor	Black	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.09	0.78	0.10
Union	White & others	0.31	0.06	0.04	0.09	0.17	0.33	0.37
Union	Black	0.23	0.07	0.04	0.10	0.16	0.41	0.29
Volusia	White & others	0.08	0.04	0.01	0.07	0.34	0.45	0.13
Volusia	Black	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.36	0.48	0.10
Wakulla	White & others	0.37	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.11	0.46	0.39
Wakulla	Black	0.25	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.11	0.57	0.27
Walton	White & others	0.18	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.12	0.62	0.21
Walton	Black	0.14	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.12	0.68	0.17
Washington	White & others	0.09	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.80	0.12
Washington	Black	0.07	-	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.81	0.09

For non-sample population:

County	0 (%)	Up to 100 (%)	Up to 250 (%)	Up to 500 (%)	Up to 1000 (%)	More than 1000 (%)	Share paid LFOs
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Total	22%	5%	4%	10%	21%	38%	27.93%
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f) Life expectancies

Source: Social Security Administration Actuarial Life Table⁴⁸

Below table details the expected years of life at a given age differentiated by male and female. While life expectancy is lower for people that have been incarcerated, this approximation sufficed for our purposes.

Age	Male	Female
0	76.04	80.99
1	75.52	80.43
2	74.55	79.46
3	73.58	78.48
4	72.59	77.49
5	71.6	76.5
6	70.62	75.51
7	69.63	74.52
8	68.64	73.53
9	67.64	72.54
10	66.65	71.54
11	65.66	70.55
12	64.66	69.56
13	63.67	68.56
14	62.68	67.57
15	61.7	66.58
16	60.73	65.6
17	59.76	64.62
18	58.81	63.63
19	57.86	62.66
20	56.91	61.68
21	55.98	60.71
22	55.05	59.73
23	54.13	58.76
24	53.22	57.8
25	52.3	56.83
26	51.38	55.86
27	50.47	54.9
28	49.55	53.93
29	48.63	52.97
30	47.72	52.01
31	46.8	51.05
32	45.89	50.09
33	44.97	49.14
34	44.06	48.19
35	43.15	47.23

⁴⁸ <https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html>

36	42.23	46.28
37	41.32	45.34
38	40.41	44.39
39	39.5	43.45
40	38.59	42.5
41	37.69	41.56
42	36.78	40.62
43	35.88	39.69
44	34.98	38.76
45	34.08	37.83
46	33.19	36.9
47	32.3	35.98
48	31.43	35.07
49	30.55	34.16
50	29.69	33.26
51	28.84	32.36
52	27.99	31.48
53	27.16	30.59
54	26.34	29.72
55	25.52	28.85
56	24.72	27.99
57	23.93	27.13
58	23.15	26.28
59	22.37	25.44
60	21.61	24.6
61	20.85	23.76
62	20.11	22.94
63	19.37	22.12
64	18.65	21.3
65	17.92	20.49
66	17.2	19.69
67	16.49	18.89
68	15.78	18.11
69	15.09	17.33
70	14.4	16.57
71	13.73	15.82
72	13.07	15.09
73	12.43	14.37
74	11.8	13.66
75	11.18	12.97
76	10.58	12.29
77	10	11.62
78	9.43	10.98
79	8.88	10.35
80	8.34	9.74

81	7.82	9.15
82	7.32	8.58
83	6.84	8.04
84	6.38	7.51
85	5.94	7.01
86	5.52	6.53
87	5.12	6.07
88	4.75	5.64
89	4.4	5.23
90	4.08	4.85
91	3.78	4.5
92	3.5	4.18
93	3.25	3.88
94	3.03	3.61
95	2.83	3.37
96	2.66	3.16
97	2.51	2.96
98	2.37	2.79
99	2.25	2.63
100	2.13	2.48
101	2.02	2.33
102	1.91	2.19
103	1.81	2.06
104	1.71	1.93
105	1.61	1.81

g) Voter turnout

Below lists literature that we have consulted to estimate voter turnout among the newly enfranchised population. We used this as a basis to delineate the three turnout scenarios.

Year	Authors	Study
2009	Michael V. Haselswerdt	Con Job: An Estimate of Ex-Felon Voter Turnout Using Document-Based Data
2002	Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza	Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States
2010	Randi Hjalmarsson and Mark Lope	The Voting Behaviour of Young Disenfranchised Felons: Would They Vote if They Could?
2014	Meredith and Morse	The Politics of the Restoration of Ex-Felon Voting Rights: The Case of Iowa
2011	Traci Burch	Turnout and Party Registration among Criminal Offenders in the 2008 General Election
2014	Meredith and Morse	Do Voting Rights Notification Laws Increase Ex-Felon Turnout?
2018	Meredith and Morse	Vox: Why letting ex-felons vote probably won't swing Florida
2020	Florida Rights Restoration Coalition	Orlando Mayor RCT

APPENDIX C – DETAILED PREDICTIONS

a) All enfranchised potential voters

Potential impact prediction on county level through Amendment 4				
Including all potential voters				
County	Enfranchised in sample	Share of sample	Enfranchised in population	Enfranchised & spillover in population
Alachua	867	1%	5275	14348
Baker	157	0%	955	2598
Bay	1495	3%	9095	24738
Bradford	247	0%	1503	4088
Brevard	2560	4%	15575	42364
Broward	4650	8%	28290	76949
Calhoun	61	0%	371	1009
Charlotte	379	1%	2306	6272
Citrus	441	1%	2683	7298
Clay	485	1%	2951	8027
Collier	498	1%	3030	8242
Columbia	303	1%	1843	5013
Desoto	125	0%	760	2067
Dixie	71	0%	432	1175
Duval	2687	5%	16348	44467
Escambia	1724	3%	10489	28530
Flagler	168	0%	1022	2780
Franklin	61	0%	371	1009
Gadsden	517	1%	3145	8554
Gilchrist	53	0%	322	876
Glades	47	0%	286	778
Gulf	85	0%	517	1406
Hamilton	33	0%	201	547
Hardee	90	0%	548	1491
Hendry	132	0%	803	2184
Hernando	562	1%	3419	9300
Highlands	234	0%	1424	3873
Hillsborough	4726	8%	28753	78208
Holmes	63	0%	383	1042
Indian river	198	0%	1205	3278
Jackson	150	0%	913	2483
Jefferson	129	0%	785	2135
Lafayette	25	0%	152	413

Lake	1335	2%	8122	22092
Lee	1401	2%	8524	23185
Leon	1580	3%	9613	26147
Levy	191	0%	1162	3161
Liberty	59	0%	359	976
Madison	71	0%	432	1175
Manatee	642	1%	3906	10624
Marion	1634	3%	9941	27040
Martin	386	1%	2348	6387
Miami-dade	5108	9%	31077	84529
Monroe	280	0%	1703	4632
Nassau	205	0%	1247	3392
Okaloosa	1023	2%	6224	16929
Okeechobee	102	0%	621	1689
Orange	3423	6%	20825	56644
Osceola	817	1%	4971	13521
Palm beach	2192	4%	13336	36274
Pasco	435	1%	2647	7200
Pinellas	3557	6%	21641	58864
Polk	2846	5%	17315	47097
Putnam	268	0%	1630	4434
Santa rosa	607	1%	3693	10045
Sarasota	697	1%	4240	11533
Seminole	1369	2%	8329	22655
St. johns	936	2%	5695	15490
St. lucie	1874	3%	11401	31011
Sumter	123	0%	748	2035
Suwannee	113	0%	687	1869
Taylor	104	0%	633	1722
Union	105	0%	639	1738
Volusia	1250	2%	7605	20686
Wakulla	532	1%	3237	8805
Walton	223	0%	1357	3691
Washington	90	0%	548	1491
Source: See assumptions and own analysis.				

b) Scenario 1: Medium

Impact prediction on county level through Amendment 4						
Medium: Voter turnout at 16% and 12% for enfranchised black and non-black voters						
	Party pattern 1			Party pattern 2		
County	Democra ts	Republica ns	Other s	Democra ts	Republica ns	Other s
Alachua	1670	348	133	1191	462	514
Baker	150	117	49	182	65	82
Bay	1572	1093	530	1754	677	745
Bradford	299	166	82	299	117	133
Brevard	2780	1836	895	3044	1175	1292
Broward	7018	2598	1175	5940	2301	2532
Calhoun	65	33	16	65	33	33
Charlotte	348	299	150	430	166	182
Citrus	364	364	182	498	199	215
Clay	462	364	182	563	215	231
Collier	446	381	182	563	215	248
Columbia	364	199	101	364	150	150
Desoto	166	82	33	150	65	65
Dixie	65	65	33	82	33	33
Duval	4104	1491	661	3441	1341	1472
Escambia	2415	1025	479	2168	843	928
Flagler	215	101	49	199	82	82
Franklin	65	49	16	65	33	33
Gadsden	1009	215	82	729	280	316
Gilchrist	49	49	16	65	16	33
Glades	49	33	16	49	16	16
Gulf	101	49	33	101	33	49
Hamilton	49	16	16	49	16	16
Hardee	65	65	33	101	33	33
Hendry	166	101	49	166	65	65
Hernando	498	446	215	645	248	264
Highlands	248	182	82	280	117	117
Hillsborough	6422	2913	1357	5892	2285	2516
Holmes	33	49	33	65	16	33
Indian river	231	133	65	231	101	101
Jackson	182	101	49	166	65	65
Jefferson	199	65	33	166	65	65
Lafayette	33	16	0	33	16	16
Lake	1605	911	430	1621	628	696
Lee	1556	1009	479	1670	645	713

Leon	2630	794	348	2067	811	876
Levy	182	150	65	215	82	101
Liberty	49	33	16	65	16	33
Madison	133	33	16	101	33	49
Manatee	745	446	215	778	299	332
Marion	1803	1159	563	1937	762	827
Martin	381	299	150	462	182	199
Miami-dade	7249	3044	1390	6438	2500	2747
Monroe	280	215	101	332	133	133
Nassau	215	150	65	231	101	101
Okaloosa	1110	745	348	1208	462	514
Okeechobee	82	82	33	117	49	49
Orange	4453	2184	1025	4219	1637	1803
Osceola	827	612	299	960	364	413
Palm beach	2796	1406	661	2682	1042	1142
Pasco	364	348	182	498	199	215
Pinellas	4352	2366	1126	4319	1670	1836
Polk	3460	1904	895	3460	1341	1472
Putnam	332	182	82	332	133	133
Santa rosa	479	498	248	677	264	280
Sarasota	677	530	248	811	316	348
Seminole	1771	860	413	1670	645	713
St. johns	1074	661	316	1126	430	479
St. lucie	2067	1341	645	2233	860	960
Sumter	150	82	33	150	49	65
Suwannee	117	82	33	133	49	49
Taylor	133	65	33	133	49	49
Union	117	65	33	133	49	49
Volusia	1455	860	413	1491	579	645
Wakulla	514	413	199	612	248	264
Walton	199	182	82	248	101	117
Washington	82	65	33	101	33	49
Source: See assumptions and own analysis.						

c) Scenario 2: Low

Impact prediction on county level through Amendment 4						
Low: Voter turnout at 5% for enfranchised voters						
	Party pattern 1			Party pattern 2		
County	Democrat s	Republica ns	Other s	Democrat s	Republica ns	Other s
Alachua	530	133	49	397	150	166
Baker	65	49	16	65	33	33
Bay	563	446	215	677	264	280
Bradford	101	65	33	117	49	49
Brevard	1009	745	364	1175	446	498
Broward	2350	1025	479	2119	827	911
Calhoun	33	16	0	33	16	16
Charlotte	133	117	65	166	65	65
Citrus	150	150	65	199	82	82
Clay	166	150	82	215	82	101
Collier	182	166	82	231	82	101
Columbia	133	82	33	133	49	65
Desoto	49	33	16	49	16	16
Dixie	16	16	16	33	16	16
Duval	1374	596	264	1224	479	530
Escambia	811	397	182	778	299	332
Flagler	65	33	16	65	33	33
Franklin	33	16	0	33	16	16
Gadsden	316	65	33	231	82	101
Gilchrist	16	16	0	16	0	0
Glades	16	16	0	16	0	0
Gulf	33	16	16	33	16	16
Hamilton	16	16	0	16	0	0
Hardee	16	33	16	33	16	16
Hendry	49	33	16	65	16	33
Hernando	199	182	82	248	101	117
Highlands	101	65	33	117	49	49
Hillsboroug h	2217	1159	547	2168	843	928
Holmes	16	16	16	33	16	16
Indian river	82	49	33	101	33	33
Jackson	65	33	16	65	33	33
Jefferson	65	33	16	65	16	33
Lafayette	0	0	0	16	0	0
Lake	563	364	182	596	231	264
Lee	563	397	199	645	248	264

Leon	860	299	133	729	280	316
Levy	65	49	33	82	33	33
Liberty	33	16	0	33	16	16
Madison	33	16	0	33	16	16
Manatee	264	182	82	299	117	133
Marion	645	479	231	745	280	316
Martin	150	117	65	182	65	82
Miami-dade	2467	1208	563	2334	911	993
Monroe	117	101	49	133	49	65
Nassau	65	65	33	101	33	33
Okaloosa	397	299	150	462	182	199
Okeechobee	33	33	16	49	16	16
Orange	1523	876	413	1556	596	661
Osceola	299	248	117	364	150	150
Palm beach	976	563	264	1009	397	430
Pasco	150	150	65	199	82	82
Pinellas	1523	960	462	1621	628	696
Polk	1208	762	364	1292	498	547
Putnam	117	65	33	117	49	49
Santa rosa	182	215	101	280	101	117
Sarasota	264	215	101	316	117	133
Seminole	612	348	166	612	248	264
St. johns	381	264	133	413	166	182
St. lucie	745	530	264	843	332	364
Sumter	49	33	16	49	16	16
Suwannee	33	33	16	49	16	16
Taylor	49	33	16	49	16	16
Union	49	33	16	49	16	16
Volusia	514	348	166	579	215	248
Wakulla	199	166	82	248	101	101
Walton	82	82	33	117	49	49
Washington	33	16	16	33	16	16
Source: See assumptions and own analysis.						

d) Scenario 3: High

Impact prediction on county level through Amendment 4						
High: Voter turnout at 35% for enfranchised voters						
	Party pattern 1			Party pattern 2		
County	Democrats	Republicans	Others	Democrats	Republicans	Others
Alachua	3756	895	364	2764	1074	1175
Baker	413	332	166	498	199	215
Bay	4004	3128	1523	4765	1852	2035
Bradford	745	462	215	794	316	332
Brevard	7034	5247	2549	8174	3161	3492
Broward	16483	7148	3294	14843	5758	6338
Calhoun	182	117	49	199	65	82
Charlotte	911	843	413	1208	462	514
Citrus	976	1042	514	1406	547	596
Clay	1191	1074	530	1540	596	661
Collier	1208	1110	547	1588	612	677
Columbia	895	579	280	960	381	413
Desoto	397	231	101	397	150	166
Dixie	166	166	82	231	82	101
Duval	9615	4088	1888	8590	3327	3658
Escambia	5742	2864	1341	5494	2135	2350
Flagler	514	299	150	530	199	231
Franklin	166	133	65	199	82	82
Gadsden	2249	514	215	1637	628	696
Gilchrist	117	117	65	166	65	65
Glades	133	82	49	150	49	65
Gulf	248	166	82	280	101	117
Hamilton	117	49	16	101	33	49
Hardee	199	215	101	280	117	117
Hendry	381	248	117	413	166	182
Hernando	1325	1273	628	1787	696	762
Highlands	628	479	231	745	280	316
Hillsborough	15422	8125	3822	15093	5843	6438
Holmes	133	150	82	199	82	82
Indian river	579	381	182	628	248	264
Jackson	462	264	133	479	182	199
Jefferson	498	182	82	413	166	182
Lafayette	82	49	16	82	33	33
Lake	3939	2549	1224	4254	1654	1820
Lee	3922	2829	1374	4469	1738	1904

Leon	6057	2135	960	5048	1953	2152
Levy	498	413	199	612	231	264
Liberty	150	117	49	182	65	82
Madison	299	82	33	231	82	101
Manatee	1836	1240	596	2035	794	860
Marion	4534	3327	1605	5212	2018	2233
Martin	976	843	413	1224	479	530
Miami-dade	17226	8424	3939	16301	6321	6966
Monroe	713	612	299	895	348	381
Nassau	530	446	215	661	248	280
Okaloosa	2812	2103	1009	3261	1257	1390
Okeechobee	248	231	117	332	133	133
Orange	10758	6139	2929	10921	4235	4668
Osceola	2135	1754	860	2614	1009	1110
Palm beach	6819	3988	1904	6999	2715	2978
Pasco	993	1009	498	1390	530	596
Pinellas	10690	6702	3210	11353	4401	4850
Polk	8522	5377	2581	9085	3525	3873
Putnam	811	498	231	860	332	364
Santa rosa	1341	1455	729	1937	745	827
Sarasota	1771	1523	745	2217	860	944
Seminole	4319	2448	1159	4368	1689	1869
St. johns	2647	1852	895	2978	1159	1273
St. lucie	5195	3805	1836	5973	2317	2549
Sumter	381	215	101	397	150	166
Suwannee	299	248	117	364	150	150
Taylor	316	199	101	332	133	133
Union	316	215	101	348	133	150
Volusia	3623	2448	1175	3988	1556	1705
Wakulla	1341	1175	579	1705	661	729
Walton	547	514	248	729	280	316
Washington	231	182	82	280	117	117
Source: See assumptions and own analysis.						

APPENDIX D – CODE FOR REPRODUCTION

You can find replication code and underlying data at: <https://github.com/Alex1005-stack/PAE>