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HAS THE DOOR CLOSED ON ARAB DEMOCRACY?

Tarek Masoud

*Tarek Masoud is associate professor of public policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is the author, with Jason Brownlee and Andrew Reynolds, of *The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform* (2015) and of *Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt* (2014).*

Twenty-five years ago, in this journal's first foray into the politics of the Arab world, the gifted scholar Daniel Brumberg sounded a hopeful note about the region's democratic prospects. "The democratic revolution that has swept through Latin America and Eastern Europe has begun to shake the edifice of authoritarianism in the Arab world," he told us.¹ Brumberg was no Panglossian, of course. He noted that "the allure of authoritarianism remains strong in some quarters of the Arab world," and that the norms of compromise and toleration so essential to democracy were in short supply in the region. But he nonetheless allowed himself (and us) to dream. "Emboldened by the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe," he declared, "Arab intellectuals are now calling for *perestroika* and democratic reform."

The behavior of Arab autocrats in those days offered a measure of justification for Brumberg's optimism. Egypt's Hosni Mubarak had not yet ossified into the avatar of "durable authoritarianism" that he would eventually become. In 1984 and 1987, he had even held relatively free and fair parliamentary elections that resulted in meaningful representation for the country's Islamist and non-Islamist opposition. In 1989, King Hussein of Jordan announced the reopening of the country's legislature, which had been shuttered since the late 1960s, and held an election in which non-violent Islamists came out on top. And in Algeria, as Brumberg noted, free municipal and provincial elections in June 1990 promised a dramatic reconfiguration of that country's authoritarian politics.

As we all know, these hopeful doors soon closed—in some places quietly, in others with a slam, but in all of them definitively. Egypt's

1990 parliamentary election was, by many accounts, a stage-managed farce, designed to all but eliminate the opposition. In Jordan's 1993 elections, the regime responded to the Islamist triumph of 1989 by adopting a rococo set of electoral rules that shrank the partisans of Allah down to manageable size. And in Algeria, a December 1991 parliamentary election that seemed poised to deliver an Islamist majority was cut short by the army, which tried to convince Algerians and the world that it was necessary to destroy democracy in order to save it. Years later, Brumberg would look back on the "trademark mixture of guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective repression" that characterized the Middle East in the 1990s and declare it not a moment of genuine *perestroika* that had simply failed to fulfill its promise, but rather the inauguration of "a *type* of political system whose institutions, rules, and logic defy any linear model of democratization."²

It would be twenty years before the Arab world would once again inspire hopes of the sort that Brumberg allowed himself to express back in the *Journal's* earliest days. In the opening weeks of 2011, young men and women took to public squares throughout Arab capitals. Their inchoate demands for dignity soon hardened into calls for regime change, and in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya those calls were answered (although in the latter case, with an assist from various Western air forces). Autocrats who had come to seem so durable that they were almost considered features of the natural environment were shuffled off stage with a rapidity that made the whole thing hard to believe. Writing in these pages, this author, infected with the spirit of the age, was moved to declare that what the young people of Tunis, Cairo, and Sana'a had wrought was proof positive that "autocracies are inherently unstable," and that "small events (such as the self-immolation of a fruit seller in a dusty Tunisian town) can upend the seemingly settled order of things and cause a seemingly apathetic population to bring down a seemingly unshakeable regime."³

But as with the earlier season of optimism, this one too has proven stunningly unwarranted. As I and my coauthors have pointed out in these pages, the "Arab Spring" may be fixed in the popular imagination as a wave of mass protests that rocked the entire Middle East, but in the end it was largely confined to six countries—Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.⁴ Of those six, only Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen actually saw dictators leave office amid the clamoring of the crowds. And of this already depressingly small subset of Arab nations, only Tunisia has achieved any semblance of the democracy for which people took to the streets in the first place. Outside of that tiny North African republic, Arab democracy seems further away today than it has at any point in the last 25 years.


Let us focus, for a moment, just on those Arab countries that managed to unseat their strongmen: Yemen, whose dictator Ali Abdullah

Saleh resigned in November 2011, has yet to draft a new constitution or elect a new parliament. The country boasts a legislature that was elected more than ten years ago, during the height of Saleh's rule, and a president, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who is the former dictator's deputy and ascended to the top office in an "election" in which, in classic Middle Eastern fashion, he was the only candidate. This is not to say that the old regime has sailed on undisturbed. But the disturbances that it has faced have been challenges less to the remnants of autocracy than to the coherence of the Yemeni state itself. Insurgencies in the north and south, as well as a simmering al-Qaeda threat, tear at Yemen's gossamer-thin political fabric. In September 2014, northern insurgents swept into the capital city, Sana'a, capturing it in a matter of hours. As of this writing, negotiations between the government and the rebels have produced a power-sharing agreement that would see the latter withdraw from the city upon the installation of a new national-unity government.⁵ Whatever happens, the odds of converting Yemen's fractious polity and weak state into a representative, accountable, and capable government seem impossibly long.

A similarly harrowing tale may be told of Libya, which, despite having held two free and fair legislative elections, has proven unable to erect a functioning state amid the ruins of Qaddafi's regime. As this article goes to press, the country is wracked by what appears to be a civil war among tribal, Islamist, and anti-Islamist militias. The Islamist-dominated parliament that was voted out of office in July 2014 has refused to step down, and safety concerns forced the new parliament to set up shop in the eastern city of Tobruk in August.⁶ That same month, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates entered the civil war on the side of an anti-Islamist former general named Khalifa al-Haftar, conducting airstrikes against Islamist militias then battling for control of Tripoli.⁷ As with Yemen, the range of possible futures for beleaguered Libya seems not to include anything resembling a functioning democracy.

Then there is Egypt. Although the Spring did not start in that most populous of Arab countries, it is there that it captured the world's attention. And yet, scarcely two years after crowds gathered in Tahrir Square to compel Hosni Mubarak's resignation, they gathered there once again, this time to demand the resignation of the country's first democratically elected president—Mohamed Morsi, a member of the religiously conservative Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood and its fellow Islamists had run the table of Egyptian elections in the two years after Mubarak's ouster, but large numbers of Egyptians had grown weary of the group's combination of heavy-handedness and underperformance. When the hapless Morsi responded to the demands of the crowds with little more than a haranguing speech, Egypt's military—long accustomed to playing an outsized political role—took it upon itself to usher him off the scene.

FIGURE 1—TRENDS IN FREEDOM HOUSE SCORES IN 16 ARAB COUNTRIES, 2010–13



I leave it to others to decide whether the military was motivated by a genuine concern for the wishes of the people or by a desire to seize the reins of power. What is clear is that events in Egypt since Morsi's 3 July 2013 ouster have been almost unprecedentedly violent for that famously easygoing country. In August of that year, nearly a thousand supporters of the Brotherhood were killed when the military and the police decided to clear them from a public square that they were occupying in northeastern Cairo. Islamist radicals responded by torching churches and bombing police stations. On 24 October 2014, an attack by Islamist terrorists in the Sinai Peninsula killed and wounded approximately sixty Egyptian soldiers.⁸ President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi—a former field marshal who was elected in May 2014 with 97 percent of the vote—has declared a war on terrorism. It remains to be seen whether Egypt will be the first nation in history to render a war on terrorism compatible with a transition to democracy.

Figure 1, which shows Freedom House scores for sixteen Arab countries from 2010 to 2013, shows just how completely the region's democratic hopes have been thwarted. Freedom House categorizes countries as Free, Not Free, and Partly Free based on expert assessments of their levels of civil and political rights. Only two Arab countries, Tunisia and Libya, have scores today that are better than they were in 2010, and both are classified as Partly Free. There is every reason to expect a dramatic downward revision of Libya's rating once the latest developments in that troubled country are taken into account. And there are also reasons to fret about Tunisia's prospects. Tunisia held parliamentary elections in October 2014 that saw an Islamist-led coalition (elected three years prior) cede primacy to a non-Islamist party led by a former ruling-party apparatchik. Though this peaceful turnover of power has been received by almost everyone as a sign of the health of Tunisia's fledgling democracy, it is worth noting that the new leading party ran on a platform of restoring the "prestige of the state" (*haybat al-dawla*)—the byword of Arab authoritarians everywhere.⁹ Although it may be exceedingly pessimistic, it is surely not unreasonable to wonder if an authoritarian restoration is in the cards even in the Arab world's sole "success" story.

In the Arab world as a whole, seven of the sixteen countries earned the same Freedom House scores in 2013 as in 2010, and all of them are rated Not Free. One of these is Egypt, which following a slight bump into Partly Free territory in 2012 (a questionable bit of optimism, given how illiberally Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood ruled), returned to Not Free status after the 2013 military coup. Another is Iraq, which was rated Not Free before the Arab Spring began, and which saw its rating get even worse in 2012, as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki purged his political opponents, before returning to its (abysmal) 2010 level. With the so-called Islamic State's capture of Mosul and other territories in the northwest of the country in mid-2014 and the increasing likelihood of a

Kurdish secession, however, it is fair to ask whether there even remains a thing called Iraq whose democratic performance can be measured.


The Freedom House scores of a further seven countries have actually worsened since the onset of the Arab Spring. The most notable of these is Syria, where what started as protests for democracy in 2011 devolved into an ongoing civil war that has claimed nearly 200,000 lives, according to mid-2014 estimates by the UN Office for Human Rights. As with Iraq, the spread of the Islamic State into Syrian territory leads one to wonder whether the entity known as Syria is not just unfree, but unreal. Lebanon, where the party-cum-militia Hezbollah looms large, is another state whose territorial integrity is increasingly threatened by the spillover of Syria's bloodletting. Others in this group of countries with declining Freedom House scores include Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—oil-rich nations of the Arabian Gulf whose overriding obsession has been to stem the tide of what they see as the chaos and instability that originated in their Arab neighbors to the West.

Explaining Failure

Given this disappointing litany, one must conclude that the answer to the question posed in this special anniversary issue of the *Journal*—"Is Democracy in Decline?"—is, at least in the case of the Arab world, a resounding, even deafening, yes. The glib rejoinder would be to declare that transitions to democracy take time, and that the so-called Arab Spring was merely the opening scene in a long process that will eventually lead the peoples of the region to democratic government. But there are two reasons why this view is unsatisfying at best. First, transitions to democracy do not always take time. The revolutions of 1989, still ongoing when the *Journal of Democracy* first appeared, remade Eastern Europe with stunning rapidity. For 1989, not one of the seven Warsaw Pact countries was rated Free by Freedom House. For 1991, four of them were (five if one includes the former East Germany), and none was rated Not Free.¹⁰ In other words, it took the post-communist world two years to achieve what seems to be decades away for the Arab world. The second reason that we should be wary of pronouncements of the inevitability of long transitions is that they assume that democracy is an endpoint toward which all nations are inevitably inching. There is no reason, aside from a natural tendency toward optimism, to believe this to be true. The Arab world today gives us more cause to think it is inching toward the Hobbesian state of nature than toward decent government.

Why did things go so wrong? The near totality of the Arab Spring's failure will no doubt be interpreted by many observers as reason to dust off old arguments about why the Arabs are destined to be mired

**FIGURE 2—CONTEMPORARY LITERACY RATES
IN SELECTED ARAB COUNTRIES**



Note: Data are plotted against historical British Isles literacy rates (Arab literacy data are from UNESCO; British Isles data were compiled by Gregory Clark, UC Davis).

in political backwardness. One such argument is that they are simply too underdeveloped to sustain democracy. With the exception of the oil-rich states, all members of the Arab League are middle-income and low-income countries with relatively low rates of educational attainment. A dramatic indicator of just how far behind the Arab countries are can be seen when we compare their contemporary literacy rates to historical literacy rates in the British Isles as compiled by the economist Gregory Clark of the University of California at Davis (see Figure 2). Yemen, with a literacy rate around 65 percent, compares to Britain in the 1850s—a full seventy years before the introduction of universal adult suffrage in 1928. Tunisia, with a literacy rate of about 80 percent, is today where Britain was more than 130 years ago. It is difficult to come away from such comparisons with sanguinity about Arab prospects.

Of course, poor, illiterate countries do sometimes make it to democracy. Witness India, which has a literacy rate comparable to Egypt's and less than half its per capita GDP. Perhaps, then, the problem lies elsewhere? A quarter-century ago—coincidentally, in the same issue of this *Journal* that featured that early essay by Brumberg—Seymour Martin Lipset argued for the return of “political culture” to pride of place in the analysis of political systems. To that great student of democratization, Exhibit A of culture's influence on political regimes was the fate of the Muslim world—a place united in his view both by


faith and a notable dearth of representative government. Lipset hinted that the reason for the Muslim world's political backwardness lay not in the details of its political institutions (which vary), but in its culture (which does not).¹¹ More recently, one writer has surveyed the wreckage of the Arab Spring and declared that we should simply come to terms with the fact that Muslims' innate thirst for *shari'a* causes them to vote into power parties that promise to erect illiberal regimes (which could be considered democratic only in the strictest of procedural senses).¹²

Others point to the absence of toleration as the cultural characteristic most responsible for Arabs' inability to generate and sustain democratic self-government. In Egypt, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the army that unseated it brooked no argument and viewed losers in the electoral game not as minorities to be protected but as enemies to be silenced. We saw the same winner-take-all political mentality in Iraq under Maliki, in Syria under Bashar al-Assad, and even in Turkey, where President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has cracked down on protests in a manner reminiscent of Mubarak or Russia's Vladimir Putin, and who now seeks to amend his country's constitution to invest more powers in his office.¹³ Though some might explain these instances of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic heavy-handedness with reference to the weakness of local political institutions, the region's dominant faith and its culture—both of which have been indicted for valorizing authoritarianism and patriarchy—are sure to continue to be implicated (at least in some intellectual quarters).

Over the years, this *Journal* has played host to valiant attempts to sweep the decks of such arguments. One of the most notable was offered in 2003 by Alfred Stepan and Graeme Robertson, who totted up all the years of representative government enjoyed by Muslim-majority countries and declared the religion of Muhammad innocent of the calumny that it was inimical to democracy. Long-lived democratic regimes in Indonesia, Senegal, and Turkey, and shorter (or less completely) democratic spells in other Muslim countries such as Albania, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Pakistan were taken by the authors as proof that Islam and democracy were utterly compatible. The problem, they argued, lay not in Islam, but in Arab culture. Of the Muslim world's democracies, not one was Arab. Though the authors refrained from making an explicitly cultural argument, they nonetheless suggested that "Arab political culture . . . helps to sustain" what they called the region's "political exceptionalism."¹⁴

In a later essay written on the eve of the Arab Spring, Larry Diamond pushed back against even this halfhearted indictment of Arab culture. He noted that other cultures—in Africa and Asia—were similarly thought to be unsuited to democracy, but that democracy nevertheless had "taken hold" among them.¹⁵ And he noted that survey data in the Arab world showed that decisive majorities of Arabs believed

FIGURE 3—DIFFERENCES IN EGYPTIANS' AND INDONESIA'S BELIEF ABOUT THE MILITARY'S PROPER ROLE IN A DEMOCRACY



How essential to democracy? The army takes over when the government is incompetent.

Source: World Values Survey Fifth Wave, 2005–2008.

democracy to be the best form of government, giving the lie to conceptions of Arabs as uniquely prone to authoritarianism. Of course, neither of these two arguments is terribly conclusive: Just because one supposedly undemocratic culture defied expectations does not mean that another one will, or that there is no such thing as an undemocratic culture in the first place. And just because people tell a survey enumerator that they want democracy does not mean they really do, or that they know what it means, or that what it means to them is the same as what it means to us. After all, the regime presided over by Kim Jong-un is called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but it is not democratic in ways that are recognizable to us.

An illustration of the potential gulf between Arab and non-Arab understandings of democracy is provided by the World Values Survey. This multiyear effort to document the norms and beliefs of peoples around the world includes a battery of questions in which citizens are asked to rate various institutions and practices in terms of their centrality to democracy. Specifically, respondents are asked to rate things like “the right to vote” or “protections of civil liberties” on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 means that the thing is essential to democracy, and 1 means that it is not. One of the things whose centrality to democracy respondents are asked to rate is the notion that “the army should take over when the civilian government is incompetent.” It is difficult to think of something more at odds with democracy, and yet 70 percent of the three-thousand Egyptians surveyed in 2008 thought that a military

safety net was essential to democracy (with around 30 percent assigning the notion a score of 10).¹⁶ Lest one be tempted to ascribe this yearning for the strongman to some feature of Islam, Figure 3 compares the breakdown of Egyptians' responses to the question with those of Indonesians (most of whom are Muslims) surveyed two years earlier. In contrast to their Egyptian counterparts, most Indonesians seemed to understand that military intervention was at odds with democracy, or at least not essential to it.

It is possible—perhaps even likely—that the differences between Indonesians' and Egyptians' understanding of the proper role of the military in a democracy is a function of those countries' different circumstances. After all, when the question was put to Indonesians, that country had been a democracy—with civilian supremacy over the military—for the better part of ten years. Egyptians, in contrast, still dwelled under Mubarak's dictatorship. Yet it is also possible that the differences in how Indonesians and Egyptians answered the question are reflective of differences between Arabs and non-Arabs in their culturally ingrained orientations toward the holders of coercive power.

The upshot is that the debate about Islam, Arab culture, and democracy is one that the Arab Spring has only intensified. And it is one in which the Tunisian example will take on increasing importance. If Tunisia manages to hang onto its hard-won democracy, it will constitute a living rejoinder to the argument that Muslims or Arabs lack the capacity or the desire for democratic government. Although, it must be said that, at only ten-million people, and with a long legacy of aggressively Westernizing dictatorship behind it, the extent to which Tunisian democracy (if it lasts) can redeem either Islam or Arab culture is likely to be limited.

The Future of Arab Democracy

One thing that the Arab Spring and its aftermath have made clear is that we should not expect democracy to come as a result of an *intifada* that sweeps dictators from power and enables the masses to erect liberal institutions. As the last three years have demonstrated all too well, in no Arab country are autocrats or their militaries so weak as to be rendered ciphers amid fleeting moments of revolutionary enthusiasm. They crack down (as in Syria or Bahrain) or bide their time (as in Egypt), but they never disappear. If democracy is to alight in that part of the world, it will likely be through a process that is more evolutionary than revolutionary, one in which authoritarian elites dictate the pace of reform. As Terry Lynn Karl found in her study of democratization in Latin America, revolutions either produce counterrevolutions or inaugurate one-party states every bit as objectionable as the ones that they replace. Democracy is usually imposed from above.¹⁷

One implication of this argument is that the Arab world's most promising prospects for reform are likely to be those regimes that were strong enough to weather the Arab Spring, but not so strong that they saw no reason to change in response to it. Places such as Morocco, Jordan, and Algeria are usually coded as instances of stasis when it comes to the effects of the Arab Spring on their regimes, but this assessment neglects subtler changes in regime policy that may prefigure gradual openings. In all three countries, constitutional reforms have been enacted or put on the table that would dial back the supremacy of kings or presidents, protect citizens from the arbitrary exercise of police power, and give more voice to oppositions.¹⁸ Morocco has arguably gone furthest in this regard. Although it is far from a constitutional monarchy—the king remains commander-in-chief of the armed forces, for example, and human-rights violations continue—it is the only Arab country (aside from Tunisia and, before the coup, Egypt) in which an Islamist political party (the Party of Justice and Development) has been allowed to take control of the government after a free and fair election (in 2011).¹⁹

The smart money in the Middle East always bets *against* seemingly democratic reforms panning out. In the past, the pseudodemocratic institutions that adorned Arab polities were seen as implements of what Diamond called “authoritarian statecraft,” used in combination with periodic repression in order to keep opposition forces busy but at bay.²⁰ And that may indeed be what the reforms in Morocco and its counterparts turn out to be. But it is worth noting that so far the Moroccan government is the only one elected after the Arab Spring that was not compelled to relinquish office at bayonet point or amid mass protests.²¹ Compared to the rubble of the Arab Spring, Morocco increasingly looks like a democratic success (albeit a modest one at best).

Continuing with the theme of unlikely bright spots, it may also turn out that the Arab Spring's “empty quarter”—the monarchies of the Persian Gulf—will surprise us with their capacity for reform. At present, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates have been notable mainly for the ways in which they have deployed their oil wealth not just to squelch opposition at home, but also to bolster autocrats and thwart self-styled democrats in places such as Egypt and Libya. As Bernard Lewis once pointed out in these pages, however, monarchy as a regime type may be uniquely favorable to democratic development. According to Lewis, it is mainly in Europe's former monarchies that “democracy has developed steadily and without interruption over a long period, and where there is every prospect that it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.”²² Might the same be true of the monarchies of the Gulf? Although King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has enacted few political reforms, he has given women the right to vote and run in municipal elections, appointed thirty women to the country's

150-member (unelected) legislative body, and moved to trim the powers of the country's conservative political establishment.²³ In Oman, one of the Gulf's more progressive countries (with constitutional provisions against gender-based and religious discrimination), the regime responded to Arab Spring protests by inaugurating elections for local councils in 2012, resulting in four of the 192 seats being won by women.²⁴ Yet a recent essay by Alfred Stepan, the late Juan Linz, and Juli F. Minoves tempers any optimism that we might have about these regimes: Their oil wealth and the sprawling nature of the ruling families suggest that the forces arrayed against meaningful political reform will be difficult to surmount.²⁵ Instead, these authors tell us that it is in the poor monarchies of Jordan and Morocco, with their much smaller and more constrained ruling families, that moves toward what they call "democratic parliamentary monarchy" are likely to occur.

The modest nature of what counts as democratic promise in the Arab world today only underscores how much of a disappointment the Arab Spring has proven to be. It may turn out that the fiftieth-anniversary issue of the *Journal of Democracy* will include a celebration of the spread of democracy throughout the Arab world, but at this troubled moment in the history of that troubled region, it seems safer to wager that the contributors to that volume will be just as vexed by the problem of Arab authoritarianism as we are.

NOTES

The author thanks Jason Brownlee and Andrew Reynolds for helpful insights on the issues covered by this essay.

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3. Tarek Masoud, "The Road to (and from) Liberation Square," *Journal of Democracy* 22 (July 2011): 24–25.

4. See Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, "Tracking the Arab Spring: Why the Modest Harvest?" *Journal of Democracy* 24 (October 2013): 29–44.

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6. Yasmine Ryan, "Libya's Parliament Moves to Small Port City as Dangers in Tripoli Increase," *Washington Post*, 5 October 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/tripoli-is-so-dangerous-that-even-libyas-parliament-has-moved-out/2014/10/03/9952b54e-4053-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html.

7. David D. Kirkpatrick and Eric Schmitt, "Arab Nations Strike in Libya, Surprising U.S.," *New York Times*, 25 August 2014.

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9. Monica Marks, "The Tunisian Election Result Isn't Simply a Victory for Secularism over Islamism," *Guardian*, 29 October 2014, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/29/tunisian-election-result-secularism-islamism-nidaa-tounes-ennahda.

10. The countries are Russia/USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. For more, see Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, *The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

11. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Centrality of Political Culture," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Fall 1990): 80–83.

12. Shadi Hamid, "The Roots of the Islamic State's Appeal," *Atlantic.com*, 31 October 2014, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/the-roots-of-the-islamic-states-appeal/382175.

13. "Turkey's Protests: Erdogan Cracks Down," *Economist*, 22 June 2013, www.economist.com/news/europe/21579873-vicious-police-tactics-have-reclaimed-taksim-square-and-other-places-protest-high.

14. Alfred C. Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, "An 'Arab' More than a 'Muslim' Democracy Gap," *Journal of Democracy* 14 (July 2003): 30–44.

15. Larry Diamond, "Why Are There No Arab Democracies?" *Journal of Democracy* 21 (January 2010): 93–112.

16. Another question put to Egyptians (about which I have written elsewhere) is one that asks them to rate the proposition that "religious authorities should interpret the laws." Here, too, vast majorities of Egyptians surveyed thought that the practice was essential to democracy. It would therefore not be much of an exaggeration to say that Egyptians' responses to these two World Values Survey questions anticipated almost perfectly the circuitous path of that country's post-Mubarak transition—from electing a theocratic legislative majority to calling for a return to military tutelage, all within a span of 24 months; see Tarek Masoud, "Liberty, Democracy, and Discord in Egypt," *Washington Quarterly* 34 (Fall 2011): 117–29.

17. Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23 (October 1990): 1–21.

18. For information on Jordan's proposed reforms, including the establishment of a constitutional court, see Marwan Muasher, "Jordan's Proposed Constitutional Amendments—A First Step in the Right Direction," 17 August 2011, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/08/17/jordan-s-proposed-constitutional-amendments-first-step-in-right-direction>. For a description of recent constitutional amendments in Algeria, see Patrick Markey and Lamine Chikhi, "Algeria Unveils Bouteflika Constitutional Reform Package," *Reuters*, 16 May 2014, www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/16/us-algeria-reforms-idUSBRE-A4F0PU20140516.

19. See "Morocco Approves King Mohammed's Constitutional Reforms," 2 July 2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13976480.

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21. See Quinn Meacham, "The Evolution of Islamism Since the Arab Uprisings," 24 October 2014, Monkey Cage blog, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/24/the-evolution-of-islamism-since-the-arab-uprisings.

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24. Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2014: Oman," www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/oman-0#.VFmgNUvxVR0; "Omanis Vote in Municipal Elections," *AlJazeera.com*, 23 December 2012, www.aljazeera.com/news/middle-east/2012/12/201212231657710943.html; and "Four Women Win Elections, Make History," *Times of Oman*, 23 December 2012, www.opemam.org/node/412.

25. Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Juli F. Minoves, "Democratic Parliamentary Monarchies," *Journal of Democracy* 25 (April 2014): 35–51.