

# ISAF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN TRANSITION



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## List of Abbreviations

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| ADT     | Agribusiness Development Team                         |
| ANSF    | Afghan National Security Forces                       |
| AOR     | Area of Responsibility                                |
| CERP    | Commanders Emergency Response Program                 |
| COIN    | Counterinsurgency                                     |
| DAIL    | Directorate of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock |
| DSAT    | District Stability Assessment Tool                    |
| FOB     | Forward Operating Base                                |
| FUOPS   | Future Operations Office                              |
| GIRoA   | Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan     |
| Gov/Dev | Governance and Development                            |
| IED     | Improvised Explosive Device                           |
| IJC     | ISAF Joint Command                                    |
| ISAF    | International Security Assistance Force               |
| NATO    | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                    |
| NGO     | Non-Governmental Organization                         |
| O&M     | Operations and Maintenance                            |
| PRT     | Provincial Reconstruction Team                        |
| RC      | Regional Command                                      |
| TF      | Task Force  |
| UN      | United Nations  |
| USAID   | United States Agency for International Development    |

## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) military mission in Afghanistan—is shaping its strategy and operations around the 2014 withdrawal. This will mark the full transition of security and governance responsibility to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA).

This paper investigates why ISAF’s strategy for governance and development (gov/dev) transition is not incorporated into the implementation of gov/dev projects at the tactical unit level. The question is grounded in the assumption that all military gov/dev projects are part of the nation-wide unity of effort toward supporting the capacity and legitimacy of GIROA, and that strategic principles—in addition to the local operational outcomes—should be part of the assessment process.

This paper’s findings are based on over 60 in-country interviews in Kabul, Bagram, and Jalalabad, with military and civilian members at all levels of the chain of command. We found that ISAF gov/dev transition principles, as articulated in operational plans, are not present in the gov/dev strategy and conversations at sub-brigade levels. Where the principles may be recognized as a good idea, they are not contributing factors to the decision of how and where to implement gov/dev projects.

This disconnect in strategy results from a lack of capacity of ground level units to implement

these principles, a mismatch in the tempo of military operations and gov/dev operations, inherent tensions in ground level operators’ responsibilities, and a lack of expertise and knowledge to balance these tensions. As a result, tactical units tend to use gov/dev projects for specific local outcomes, without considering the longer-term impact on transition. Gov/dev spending can thus in some cases reverse, rather than contribute to, ISAF progress toward empowering GIROA and a 2014 transition.

We recommend that ISAF Joint Command (IJC) centralize the evaluative principles for gov/dev. The process will remain decentralized, but the common ground of priorities needs more top-down handling. We provide two tools that IJC can implement down the chain of command to create common standards and common vocabulary around the assessment of how short-term, operationally focused gov/dev projects align with the ISAF gov/dev transition strategy. This will return all levels of military personnel to the unity of effort for gov/dev transition, and ensure that all projects and spending are done with consideration for the implications for the capacity, sustainability, and legitimacy of GIROA.

While this project investigates a small piece of the overall transition effort, we believe the improved alignment of tactical unit gov/dev spending with transition goals will provide the Afghan government and people the best prospects for future peace and prosperity.

## 2. INTRODUCTION

### 2.1 The Client

ISAF Joint Command (IJC) is the operational planning office within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) mission to Afghanistan. (Appendix A: ISAF Background Information) ISAF headquarters generates an overarching military strategy, working in collaboration with the Government of Afghanistan (GIROA), embassies from NATO member countries, the United Nations (UN), and other members of the international community. (Appendix B: Chain of Command)

IJC's mission is to translate this strategy into operational plans that coordinate the war-fighting activities of the Regional Commands (RCs)—which oversee ISAF operations in each of six geographical areas of Afghanistan. (Appendix C: Map of Afghanistan with RCs, PRTs)

### 2.2 The Question

The Future Operations (FUOPS) office within IJC asked us to look at how ISAF should be prioritizing and implementing governance and development (gov/dev) projects in preparation for the 2014 pullout. Anticipating a reduction in personnel and funding, IJC understands that gov/dev efforts must be re-focused to contribute not only to counterinsurgency (COIN) effects, but also to transition progress. However, while the conventional military strategy—particularly security hand-over to Afghan forces—is structured around the 2014 deadline, IJC recognizes that not all military gov/dev operations are grounded in a parallel gov/dev transition strategy. The key question, then, is how to change the “business as usual” approach to gov/dev that is not synchronized with the transition focus of ISAF efforts.

## 3. THE PROBLEM

### 3.1 Problem Statement

ISAF's strategy for governance and development has undergone a shift in priorities in anticipation of the 2014 transition. Previously, ISAF's reconstruction efforts centered on direct provision of key services and infrastructure—a hands-on response to the needs of both the local communities and GIROA.<sup>1</sup> The hard deadline of December 2014 for a completed security and civil administrative transition, combined with the reduction of personnel and funding that will come with the Summer 2012 troop drawdown, has contributed to a shift in strategy. ISAF now prioritizes building the capacity of GIROA as the foundation for all gov/dev activity. As articulated in the IJC operational plan,<sup>2</sup> the transition-oriented strategy focuses on three key principles:

- 1) Reducing military delivery of services that are parallel to GIROA efforts;
- 2) Putting GIROA in the lead for not only security, but also governance and development objectives;
- 3) Limiting the creation of additional operations and maintenance (O&M) financial obligations<sup>3</sup> that will fall on GIROA.

<sup>1</sup> IJC Operation Naweed 1391: Enclosure – Building Institutional Capacity (Governance) to Support Transition to Appendix 1 – Sub-National Governance to Annex W – Stability, p.2.

<sup>2</sup> The “ISAF Transition-Oriented Gov/Dev Principles” are consolidated from the background discussions of Op-Naweed Annex W. These are not an explicit statement in the plan, which focuses on the priority investment areas for gov/dev. However, they are referenced as the foundation for successful governance and development transition projects.

<sup>3</sup> Operations and maintenance (O&M) costs refer to the future financial and non-financial resources necessary to sustain governance and development investments. This can range from infrastructure repairs to salaries for essential staff (e.g. teachers,

**However, there is an indication that these strategic principles are not influencing the gov/dev projects implemented by tactical units, nor the approval process at brigade and battalion levels in RC-East.** If not brought under the strategic guidelines of ISAF gov/dev strategy, these projects have the potential to undermine the gov/dev transition by building contradictory expectations among communities and GIRoA officials, continuing the reliance on ISAF instead of GIRoA, and leaving GIRoA unprepared to take over after transition.

### 3.2 Significance

1) Although tactical unit projects are typically small in dollar value,<sup>4</sup> (Appendix E: Breakdown of CERP Project Size) they represent a large number of the total projects implemented by the military. These small projects may still have profound impact on transition strategy, since they set expectations for the broad populace and ground-level GIRoA officials. Sub-national governance is the key to extending the reach of GIRoA outside of population centers.

2) While there has been a lot of attention paid to deficiencies in the inter-agency coordination, there has been less focus on gov/dev alignment within the ISAF chain of command.

3) ISAF's strategy for Afghanistan relies on the central premise that security transition is dependent on the capacity of GIRoA and its perceived legitimacy. Thus, gov/dev support that is executed without transition in mind

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staff in a medical clinic) to ongoing expenses (e.g. fuel for generators).

<sup>4</sup> Tactical unit CERP projects represent a small percentage of the total level of governance and development spending in Afghanistan, and a small percentage of the total military spending on gov/dev (much of which goes to joint civilian/military teams, such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Agribusiness Development Teams, which often take on larger infrastructure projects).

could potentially compromise post-2014 security if it undermines progress in these areas.

By 2015, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will have primary responsibility for Afghanistan's security, and NATO forces will likely be significantly reduced to a training, mentoring, and counter-terrorism role. At that point, GIRoA will govern the country with minimal international assistance. For GIRoA to keep the trust of its citizens through governing effectively, it is crucial that it incrementally take on responsibilities during the transition phase. Supporting GIRoA leadership will safeguard many of the security, political, economic, and social gains made since 2001.

This mission—and the resulting operational principles that ISAF sees as critical to underpin all governance and development efforts—must be pursued as a unified effort at all levels of its chain of command. Ensuring the penetration of these principles to front-line decision-making is imperative to best position Afghanistan for a successful transition and a more promising future.

### 3.3 Research Focus

We address a narrow slice of the broader question of governance and development transition strategy. We recognize that there are many critical issues that are beyond the scope of this paper:

1) This paper does not look at the *effectiveness* of governance and development spending. We are not focusing on what governance and development projects have the best outcomes or recommending what types of projects should be done to achieve the greatest technical impact in specific regions. This is an area that deserves closer examination, but progress is critically hampered by the lack of data available. Commanders on the ground are looking for ways to understand the effects and results of their activity, and the U.S. Congress is eager to understand the impact of the hundreds of millions of dollars spent in Afghanistan.



Military personnel can learn lessons from other sectors to understand current best practices of monitoring and evaluation and figure out how to adapt them, especially recognizing the limitations within the COIN context.

2) This paper looks exclusively at governance and development projects that are implemented by tactical units, funded through the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and approved within the military chain of command (Appendix D: The Commanders Emergency Response Program: A Brief History). We do not focus on the work of joint civilian/military platforms [including Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and Agribusiness Development Teams (ADT)], although our recommendations may be transferable to these teams.

We chose to look at the gov/dev efforts over which our client and the military chain of command have full authority. We do not look at the inter-agency process, inter-agency funding, or the military's cooperation with other government agencies and NGOs. We recognize that CERP spending is just drop in the bucket compared to efforts by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and NGOs, but it is the only funding over which the military has complete command and control.

3) This paper does not evaluate the success of CERP as a tool or as a component of COIN strategy. The U.S. military's pursuit of COIN effects through CERP funding needs to be re-evaluated in light of the ten years of lessons learned in Afghanistan. The following policy analysis proposes a contextual solution, filling in implementation gaps in ISAF's transition strategy. These are specific to Afghanistan in the lead-up to 2014, but are not intended to be systemic answers to the shortcomings of CERP.

4) This paper investigates gov/dev policy planning and execution within RC-East, which is a U.S. chain of command. While some of the analysis and recommendations may apply to

IJC interaction with non-U.S. commands, our research focuses on the U.S.-led governance and development line of effort.

## 4. METHODOLOGY

### 4.1 Narrowing the question

#### *Priorities:*

The question of how governance and development should be prioritized to support the transition involves institutions and actors that span the international community and U.S. political system: Congress has investigated the use of CERP; the UN seeks to coordinate all development focusing on nation-building in the country.

In the face of this enormous question, our priority is to define one part of problem that we have the capacity to address. Two questions are instrumental in that narrowing of our focus:

1) What authority does our client have, such that they can implement the solutions and recommendations that we produce?

2) What piece of the military-implemented development mechanism can practically be changed, within institutional norms—especially the principle of “commander's intent” rather than top-down instruction—and limited time and money?

For example, we wanted to avoid working on a problem that could only be solved by centralizing all initiation of CERP projects—a solution that would require going against the decentralized nature of U.S. military culture and the original intent of CERP, which was designed to be bottom up—or that required the full cooperation of USAID or other actors over whom IJC has limited influence and no authority.

Finally, we fully recognized the limited resources of a team of three graduate school researchers. The articulation of the problem



would have to be focused in order to generate concrete recommendations, rather than open-ended conclusions such as “improve the interagency coordination process” and “collect information on metrics that indicate effectiveness of interventions.”

We are committed to offering implementable solutions that, while not solving the entire question, at least offer some means of improving one part of the overall effort.

*Qualitative v. Quantitative evaluations:*

Both military and civilian agencies lack quality data that reports on the effectiveness of military gov/dev spending toward achieving outcomes of stability, community support of the ISAF mission, and community support of GIRoA. This limiting factor shapes our definition of the problem and our approach. Many individuals within the client office emphasized the need for metrics that would define effectiveness, or suggested that we evaluate the “return on investment” for different types of gov/dev projects. While recognizing the centrality of these issues, we also realized that such a project was beyond our capacity given our lack of security clearance, the limited data available, and the timing of the project.

We thus determined to use qualitative methods for the project. This shaped our focus from design to execution—from how gov/dev efforts should be prioritized and implemented (based on quantitative evaluation of impact) to the gap between intention and execution.

*Acceptance of IJC Priorities:*

The criterion of “implementability” leads us away from assessing what priorities IJC should set. The operational plan covering the next 18 months was finalized and authorized during our time in Kabul, and the governance and development strategy within this plan was the product of months of work and consultations by a team of civilian advisors and military planners (Appendix F: IJC Operational Plan 1391 (Op-Naweed)). Although we could add value by evaluating the IJC gov/dev priorities and

bringing an outside perspective to recommendations of strategy and focus, we realize that such suggestions would not be practically useful to the client. It is a timing issue: we would be coming in at the end of a long planning cycle and offering a report that would essentially ask them to return to the beginning of the process.

As a result, we decided to take the IJC governance/development strategy as a given. We do not intend that this report be an implicit endorsement of IJC’s priorities as the correct strategy. Rather, we choose to position our work within the practical reality that these priorities will be focus of IJC for the next 18 months.

*Opportunity:*

The recent completion of an IJC operational plan presents an obvious question and a new opportunity: how will the gov/dev portion of this plan be implemented? There will be a turning point in communication from the operational headquarters to the RCs when IJC presents new operational orders to be considered and implemented at all levels of the military. This presents us with a reason to suggest changes in implementation strategy, and an opportunity for IJC to justify what could be received as “meddling” as they looked to change the process of governance/development planning, approval, and implementation.

Given our priority of presenting solutions that are workable, linking our recommendations to the process of implementing the new operational plan is a natural solution.

## 4.2 Process

*Interviews:*

We conducted over 60 interviews with personnel ranging from ISAF headquarters in Kabul to Task Force Raider in Jalalabad City.

Starting at IJC headquarters in Kabul, we talked to military personnel and civilian advisors to understand the planning process for setting

gov/dev strategy, and the tools and timing for passing the strategies down to the regional commands. We then traveled to forward operating base (FOB) Fenty in Jalalabad, where staff at the Task Force Bronco (TF Bronco) brigade headquarters discussed approval and reporting for CERP projects. Interviews at FOB Finely-Shields, also in Jalalabad, covered the work of the PRT and ADT, as well as how CERP projects are used and managed by battalion command. Finally, we talked with the division staff at RC-East headquarters at Bagram Air Field. Teleconference interviews with RC-South commanders complemented the information collected at the RC-East level. A complete log of the interviews is in (Appendix I: List of Interviews)

#### *Application of results:*

We chose to look at RC-East to identify the process and potential for improving the implementation of IJC's gov/dev priorities. In particular, we narrowed our focus to actors around the city of Jalalabad, near the border of Pakistan.

The primary reason for this focus was that the client suggested we look at a key population center outside of the Kabul region. The ISAF transition strategy prioritizes population centers, and given its proximity to Pakistan and the essential economic activity that passes through the nearby Torkham Gate customs area, Jalalabad was a logical choice. RC-East in particular is a strategic priority, as its territory contains the majority of Key Terrain Districts<sup>5</sup> in the country.

<sup>5</sup> Key Terrain Districts are defined as areas *the control of (and support from) which provides a marked advantage to either the Government of Afghanistan or the insurgents.* United States Department of Defense. "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces." Washington: April 2012 Report to Congress. Footnote 12, p. 34. Accessed 7 March 2012, [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report\\_Final\\_SeDef\\_04\\_26\\_10.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SeDef_04_26_10.pdf)

We do not suggest that Jalalabad and RC-East are representative of the processes and operations of all ISAF efforts across the country. Rather, our approach to a broader application of our findings is as follows:

- 1) Identify the problems with IJC gov/dev strategy translation and implementation down the chain of command within RC-East;
- 2) Test the relevance of these findings through interviews with RC-South;
- 3) Propose specific solutions for RC-East, and identify how the process and tools can be passed to other RC headquarters for adaptation to the particular environment.

## 5. KEY FINDINGS

### 5.1 ISAF transition-oriented principles for governance and development are not influencing decisions at all levels of the chain of command.

The U.S. Armed Forces<sup>6</sup> hierarchical chain of command, which depends on effective decentralization of decision-making that is grounded on centralized orders, has been tried and tested in the environment of conventional war. However, the core principle of "commander's intent"<sup>7</sup> has met with difficulty in the context of the range of responsibilities that commanders oversee in a COIN environment, where the skills and training of the leadership do not necessarily align with many of the tasks they are assigned.

<sup>6</sup> We refer to the U.S. here because we primarily examined the US Chain of Command.

<sup>7</sup> "The 'intent' can be defined as the description of a desired military end state (or 'landscape') that a commander wants to see after the given mission is accomplished. In terms of space, the intent pertains to the scope of the commander's estimate (in U.S. terms, the commander's area of responsibility plus an undefined area of interest)."

Vejo, Milan. "Operational Commander's Intent." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 57.2 (2010): 138-144. p. 138.

In Afghanistan, and particularly in RC-East, the difficulty of aligning ground-level gov/dev operations with centralized strategy appears to be rooted in two issues: 1) the concept of suggestion (rather than order) around IJC's gov/dev strategy, and 2) the lack of interpretive expertise at the tactical level.

1) ISAF Joint Command is responsible for creating the operational guidance that interprets ISAF overall strategy. IJC was established in November 2009 to plan and coordinate the operations of all Coalition forces in Afghanistan, inserted between ISAF HQ (a four-star command) and regional commands (two-star commands). Before 2009, RCs operated independently of each other, with so little strategic coordination that it's said that there were six wars being waged.

While IJC's role is to resolve this strategic disconnect, which is of particular importance during transition, the office is in the awkward position of having responsibility without authority. With no direct command over personnel or funds, IJC relies on coordination and cooperation from the RCs to see its gov/dev strategy interpreted and implemented. Some individuals at IJC referred to their jobs as "desk officers," rather than strategic planners. Others within IJC expressed that much of their work seemed to be done for the benefit of ISAF headquarters, rather than for implementation by the RCs and down the chain of command. In RC-East, there was parallel sentiment that IJC's planning was largely redundant (as RC-East had a parallel process), and was too removed from the ground level to be meaningful.

2) The decentralization of decision-making authority, within the context of commander's intent, has been problematic in the realm of gov/dev responsibilities. We saw that, in RC-East, the command structure has been largely ineffective in aligning tactical-level decisions regarding governance and development projects with operational plans and strategic guidance. While tactical commanders are adept at

converting operational guidance into activities in security-oriented lines of effort, they are less able to choose governance and development activities that best support both local goals and campaign-wide strategy. In other words, it was more difficult for them to ensure that their tactical level actions were in line with ISAF gov/dev strategy than with the security strategy.

In fact, interviews at the brigade, battalion, and company levels in RC-East revealed that several commanding officers were not aware of any explicit overarching governance and development objectives issued by IJC.<sup>8</sup> The transition-oriented principles (minimizing off-budget parallel services, putting GIRoA in the lead, and not adding to O&M obligations) are central concepts in the gov/dev discourse at IJC and RC-East headquarters, but are absent at the tactical levels.<sup>9</sup>

Hence, the tactical units had not developed their own project selection criteria to target CERP projects. Many CERP projects at the tactical level neither recognize the potential for CERP projects to undermine GIRoA capacity in transition, nor recognize the limited capacity of tactical units to implement sustainable development projects.

## **5.2 Even if IJC operational and gov/dev plans could better penetrate lower levels of the command structure, significant constraints on CERP users prevents them from making effective contributions to transition-oriented objectives.**

In terms of contribution to transition goals, most tactical-level units are constrained by

<sup>8</sup> Fitzpatrick, Haig, Werner. Personal Interview: personnel at TF Bronco, TF Raider. 8-10 January 2012. (We will refer to group interviews in order to protect individuals that may have shared controversial opinions.)

<sup>9</sup> Fitzpatrick, Haig, Werner. Personal Interviews: IJC, RC-East. 1-7, 11 January 2012. Personnel at TF Bronco and Raider responded to our questions about these issues, but did not bring up the points unprompted.

more than just their lack of governance and development expertise and the insufficient nature of communication and guidance from above. Commanders also face an incentive structure and timeline that is not conducive to the implementation of effective gov/dev projects.

*1) The tempo of military operations is inconsistent with the tempo of implementing sustainable gov/dev projects.*

While many military operations can yield quick results, gov/dev activities require an investment of time in the implementation, and often results are not immediately seen. For the military, there is not always operational flexibility for patience, as the operations that CERP projects are intended to support can change rapidly as threats evolve. Due to this accelerated timeline, tactical implementers tend to focus on the articulated needs of the community (whether or not they stand up to scrutiny—the priority is often immediate action in order to win favor, rather than a process of community engagement to better understand the needs of the community and to build buy-in, participation, and ownership in the process and the outcome). The biggest operational disconnect is that in operations, the commander controls elements of timing and resources; with development

projects, relationship building is the foundation for good implementation, and the timing of earning trust and participation is outside the control of the commander.

*2) Tactical unit operators are concerned with “getting to” transition, not how GIRoA can maintain transition.*

The transition of individual regions to GIRoA control is conditions-based, meaning that the district must meet a predefined level of security, stability, governance, and development in order for security control to be transferred to the ANSF. Commanders primarily report on progress within districts toward these metrics, as captured by the District Stability Assessment Tool (DSAT), which is sent up to their headquarters on a regular basis.<sup>10</sup>

Thus the pressure and incentives for unit commanders is to engage in activities that will improve the ratings on the DSAT and mark progress in their area of responsibility (AOR) for transition.

TF Bronco, for example, had a backlog of CERP proposals that were waiting for funding. However, when we asked about

#### **Operational Tempo v. Strategic Development:**

An Afghan community expresses a need for a generator. According to one military commander in Jalalabad, it could take the local government more than six months to be able to ask for less than \$5,000 for a generator and receive it from the central government, if it is received at all. A CERP project to deliver the same generator could be executed in terms of weeks, rather than months.

When commanders are performing military operations, they depend on these types of projects to build community support and generate force protection. It is easy to see why they prefer using CERP to going through the GIRoA or working with the community to determine organic sources of funding (e.g. a cooperative purchase of the generator). Despite the short-term peace dividend that the CERP procured generator created, its net impact may be the undermining of GIRoA's capacity, legitimacy and local stability during transition. Tactical units may even recognize this fact, but it is not clearly part of the evaluation.

<sup>10</sup> Interviews: TF Bronco.

transition strategy, it was clear that there was a lack of focus on the bigger picture.<sup>11</sup> When funding becomes available, projects are approved based on what “is in line with operations”; there is a conspicuous absence of overarching transition strategy in the approval process.

meet the transition criteria. However, we did not hear indications that units considered the GIROA impacts of these projects—in our example, how building an independent healthcare facility could undermine the local government by making the people look to ISAF for service provision rather than their own government. Furthermore, this healthcare facility can place financial burdens on

### **CERP’s Unintended Consequences on Transition**

In order to serve the needs of rural farmers (and sometimes to reduce the planting of poppies), commanders have used CERP funds to buy and distribute seeds to the local population. This can yield a number of negative consequences:

1. GIROA’s Directorate of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (DAIL) has a mandate to serve farmers. The DAIL has a number of programs and dedicated staff that have expertise and local knowledge. A CERP seed program, if not done through DAIL, can potentially contradict the policies of GIROA and undermine the legitimacy of the DAIL.
2. Free seed distribution can raise the expectation for a similar program in future years. If this is not within the plan of GIROA, the program could be setting up GIROA to fall short of expectations that CERP has created.
3. If a CERP program requires follow-up from DAIL staff, the military has placed a programmatic and budgetary burden on the ministry for which they have not budgeted. The DAIL may have prioritized other villages for attention that year, but the CERP program requires them to expend resources in a region that was not part of their priority planning.
4. Free seed distribution can distort the economy:
  - If inputs of a particular crop are free, farmers that might have otherwise planted another crop may choose the free seeds, leading to an oversupply and decrease of market price at harvest time;
  - Vendors and elements of the supply chain may be forced out of the market since they cannot compete with free seeds; this may distort the market in future years.

To complicate the situation, at times the priorities of the DSAT rating can be interpreted as conflicting with the ISAF gov/dev transition priorities. For example, the metric of health provision in the DSAT measures a population’s access to healthcare. Tactical level operators must ensure that their AORs have adequate access to healthcare as part of their district DSAT targets. If the region in which they are operating has poor access to healthcare, they might use CERP funds to build a small healthcare facility to respond to local needs and

GIROA—require funding for employment of medical personnel supplies—that the government might not be able to sustain in the future. But the fact that adequate healthcare provision is listed as a metric to fulfill on the DSAT indicates that it is of greater importance just to get the health center built than to worry about the longer term implications.

<sup>11</sup> Interviews: TF Bronco.



3) *Tactical commanders struggle to balance the trade-offs between satisfying immediate mission requirements and long-term outcomes.*

A complicating variable is that military commanders have a responsibility to their own troops to do everything possible to bring them home safely. This does not mean avoiding all possible risk; however it places an additional set of priorities on development projects. One way that military commanders have exercised this responsibility is by using CERP funding to pave roads in rural Afghanistan. It is much harder for an insurgent to plant an improvised explosive device (IED) under a paved, rather than an unpaved. But at the same time, this paved road now places an O&M burden on GIRoA for maintenance once the unit leaves. A transition-oriented plan would value placing as few burdens on GIRoA as possible, while the tactical commander values the safety of his own troops. This tension also makes it difficult to weigh the costs and benefits when deciding what type of gov/dev project to do.

Without sufficient knowledge and experience, it is more difficult for decision makers to weigh the costs and benefits of each alternative, and to choose a course of action that will be best for their short term mission requirements while also not undermining the long term objectives.

### **5.3 Some CERP investments are undermining ISAF transition strategy.**

Compared to other U.S. Government funding sources, CERP is one of the more flexible funding sources for gov/dev projects that are employed in Afghanistan. Perhaps due to the quick access that tactical unit commanders have to \$5,000 increments (“bulk funds”) and the independent oversight that battalions and brigades have over larger funding amounts, not all projects have been assessed for strategic implications. As was the initial intent, CERP is used by commanders to respond directly to needs emphasized by communities in their AOR. But this responsiveness has led to projects that fill service gaps for which GIRoA is responsible, as well as other unintended

consequences that may undermine progress toward a full transition of governance and development responsibility.

We categorize four typical failures of CERP projects, as they undermine transition strategy: (Exhibit 2: Transition Principles and Standards (TPS) Assessment Tool)

#### *1) Supplants the responsibility of GIRoA:*

When CERP projects provide services to communities that should be delivered by GIRoA, they risk undermining the government’s legitimacy and capacity. Even if GIRoA is aware of the project, off-budget provision of services may reduce the incentives of local officials to provide these services. This can further entrench to GIRoA’s dependence on external funding and expertise. If a commander sees a community need, rather than responding with direct service provision, the better solution is to connect local citizens to the proper GIRoA officials. This will not necessarily fill the service void immediately, but it avoids providing a temporary fix to an enduring problem.

#### *2) Creates unrealistic community expectations:*

CERP projects can raise local expectations for GIRoA above and beyond what conditions could reasonably be expected to persist in absence of external support. An expectation that will go unmet—for example, if provision of electricity ends because there is no more CERP funding for diesel that fuels the generators—can create a future threat to stability. Assuming that the legitimacy of GIRoA is partially grounded in its ability to provide services, then the higher the expectations of the community, the easier it will be for GIRoA to fall short of its mandate.

#### *3) Saddles GIRoA with O&M burden:*

An O&M “tail” represents the length of time that a project will need financial support in order to be sustained. This financial obligation includes man-hours and other material costs associated with operating and maintaining the

project as a productive asset. Projects that lack sufficient budgeting and allocation for continued O&M cannot be sustained by GIRoA.

*4) Distorts the local economy:*

NATO-led reconstruction and development activities have injected hundreds of billions of dollars into small, underdeveloped local economies throughout Afghanistan. One result has been significant inflation and the distortion of market incentives to produce and trade certain goods and services. CERP activities that continue to inflate local prices and crowd out private sector investment and indigenous business activity may hinder sustainable, Afghan-led economic growth in the medium-term future.

## 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

**Equip all levels of the ISAF Chain of Command with tools to implement, evaluate, and approve gov/dev projects in accordance with the ISAF transition principles.**

This recommendation may appear self-evident, but it is based on two key conclusions:

*1) Given the short time that remains before the 2014 pullout, IJC should issue an increased level of centralized guidance to the RCs regarding gov/dev strategy. We do not recommend an attempt to change the bottom-up nature of CERP in terms of project identification and initiation. However, in order to coordinate all gov/dev spending around the primary goal of setting up GIRoA for post-transition success, ground-level commanders need more oversight in how they select and implement CERP projects.*

This guidance may be met with resistance, given the decentralized chain of command that is core to the military's culture. To limit pushback, IJC should be clear that it is issuing instruction not on the projects that should be done, but the on principles of implementation that should not be violated.

*2) Recognizing that CERP involves, by definition and culture, a bottom-up process, we address the transition problems associated with implementation rather than with the projects themselves. The Project Matrix implies that some project types should not be undertaken, but assuming that some will still happen, we also recommend how to pursue this work to the minimal detriment of GIRoA's reputation and capacity.*

We recommend that IJC, independent of seasonal orders, send instruction on the Op-Naweed gov/dev strategy to RC-East, where the instruction is further broken down and sent to the brigade level. The main goal of this additional instruction is to guide tactical level commanders on the assessment of how their activities fit in with the overall transition strategy. We recommend that IJC begin by using two tools that we have put together: the CERP Project Matrix, and the Transition Principles and Standards (TPS) assessment tool.

### Tool #1: CERP Project Matrix

**Problem:** *Historical trends of CERP project selection and implementation are likely to harm GIRoA transition process.*

**Solution:** *Enable CERP project implementers and approvers to assess the project in light of capacity, and the implementation process in light of building GIRoA's reputation.*

**Focus:** *Narrowing the CERP project choice and guiding implementation strategy.*

With the following the troop drawdown in Summer 2012, unit commanders will be responsible for more territory, but with fewer resources.<sup>12</sup> The gap between the military's operational tempo and the pace of effective development programming will be exacerbated

<sup>12</sup> Fitzpatrick, Haig, Werner. Personal Interview: Captain Robinson, RC-East. 11 January 2012. Cpt. Robinson said that the replacement of TF Bronco will have twice the territory. Civilian embeds that are leaving in Spring 2012 will not be replaced, and ADT Nangarhar will not be replaced when it leaves in Spring 2012.



by the diminished ability of units to focus on relationships in any one area. Fewer resources and a wider AOR will compound constraints on implementing development projects that depend on developing community and GIRoA relationships. It will also be increasingly difficult to oversee CERP contractors—civilian implementers hired by the military to develop projects or build infrastructure—to ensure on-budget, on-schedule, and high quality completion of the contract.

The CERP Project Matrix (Exhibit 1: CERP Project Matrix) lists the most common CERP project types that we encountered during interviews, classifying them as “quick-impact” or “sustainable development” depending on the time and oversight required to fully implement them. We then describe the likely impact on transition principles according to the historical trends of implementation—again, identified through interviews. The Matrix will help users identify projects that tend to require less oversight and follow-up during implementation (the “fire-and-forget” approach), as well as concepts of how to implement so as to avoid harming ISAF transition goals.

Military personnel should weigh the likely repercussions of their CERP spending on GIRoA through a “do no harm” lens. Though the projects are likely not to contribute directly to the IJC goals, they must at the very least not inhibit the progress other actors will make toward the priority of putting a capable GIRoA in the lead.

It is important to note that there is a need for sustainable development projects. These have been, and should continue to be, implemented by civilian/military platforms, which are not hindered by some of the limitations of tactical units that are discussed in the findings. There is limited capacity for these platforms to expand into all geographical areas, and this will be exacerbated during the drawdown when fewer military assets are available to provide security to civilian implementers. Nevertheless, the

military should resist the temptation to “fill in the gap” with sustainable development. As per the RC-East strategy, CERP should be narrowly focused on quick-impact, operational-tempo projects.<sup>13</sup>

## **Tool #2: Transition Principles and Standards (TPS) Assessment Tool**

**Problem:** *ISAF transition principles are not part of the “unintended consequence” evaluation of CERP projects.*

**Solution:** *Create situational awareness of the range of unintended consequences that gov/dev projects could have on GIRoA that would undermine ISAF transition principles, and create common vocabulary for analysis of and accountability to these principles.*

**Focus:** *Specific evaluation of CERP effects on ISAF transition principles.*

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<sup>13</sup> RC-East leadership is refocusing CERP spending on short-term impact projects that seek to increase troop security and community buy-in to the mission. This is a shift away from historical trends of CERP being employed for large infrastructure and service provisions projects. RC-East is effectively focusing CERP spending on small projects by limiting the amount of funding available to brigades. This has resulted in a focus on projects that can be funded through bulk funds (<\$5,000 per project).

However, because RC-East has not communicated this strategic shift, there is little cohesion at the brigade and battalion levels around the goals of the CERP projects. Bulk funds are spent towards rhetorical goals of economic development as well as pre- or post-operational reputational effects. Commanders also prepare larger-scale projects with the expectation that funding may be available in the future.

RC-East leadership will rotate out, and the gains made in focusing CERP funding on short-term impact will be lost if successors make more funds available. RC-East should ensure that all levels of operation are aligned around the CERP of the strategy of small projects that contribute directly to operational priorities, focused on their effects on transition.

The TPS (Exhibit 2: Transition Principles and Standards (TPS) Assessment Tool) details the possible effects of a CERP project on transition. It goes through a list of questions that tactical level decision makers should always be asking themselves when looking at spending CERP money. These questions revolve around four broad areas:

- 1) Does this project provide services that are parallel to the efforts of GIRoA?
- 2) Does this project create unrealistic community expectations that GIRoA can't fulfill?
- 3) Does this create unplanned O&M costs for GIRoA?
- 4) Does this project distort the local economy?

All four of these questions point to the unintended consequences of CERP spending. These types of questions can bridge the gap between tactical level decision makers and a transition strategy. We have stated before that the tactical level has a hard time following a transition strategy because of their capacity/knowledge, shortened timeline, and incentives to focus on immediate gains over long-term effects. These questions attempt to help outline the possible consequences of CERP spending and to lay out arguments against counter-productive spending. Ultimately, ground level operators and CERP approval boards will have the final decision-making authority, but the TPS will help them sort out both the positive and negative aspects of CERP spending so that they are equipped to make the best decision.

This process will create a common vocabulary to discuss the CERP implications for transition goals, something that is lacking at the battalion and brigade levels. The guidance will also articulate the responsibility of each unit to timelines that are beyond their deployment, and overarching goals that extend beyond the

maintenance of their battle space. Both the implementers and approvers of CERP funds should evaluate the likely impact of the project on these transition priorities, rather than solely thinking of their immediate, operational goals.

These considerations should, as a default, supersede priorities of operational expediency. Any deviation from these principles—e.g. a commander deems a parallel service as strategically essential to an area—should require a high burden of proof of operational necessity. Commanders must not pursue short-term gains that weaken both military and civilian efforts to strengthen GIRoA and increase its capacity to maintain stability after the 2014 pullout.

Follow-up is critical to the success of these tools. Brigade-level commanders should use the TPS to ask these same questions during retroactive justification of bulk CERP projects or approval process of larger projects. Without oversight from higher levels, these tools will become just another burdensome checklist rather than a means of orienting ground-level military gov/dev operations around the unity-of-effort goals for a successful governance transition.

## 7. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

### 7.1 Transferability

As discussed in the methodology section of this report, all interview observations are from IJC and RC-East. Based on interviews with RC-South, we observed preliminary indications that similar problems are endemic in other regions. We recommend that IJC implement these tools with RC-East, as a test case, and then transfer them to RCs with guidance for how to implement them successfully. If other RCs are not employing RC-East's gov/dev strategy for focusing CERP activities on quick-impact projects in transition, the CERP Project Matrix and the TPS may have less relevance.

## 7.2 Assessment of IJC Priorities

This study centers on the translation and implementation of IJC's governance and development priorities down the chain of command, without evaluating whether those priorities are correct. It is worth mentioning two weaknesses that we see in the goals outlined in Operational Plan Naweed.

1) The Op-Naweed goals are not comprehensive in their guidance to tactical actors. The operational plan is intended to create guidance for the regional commands, and ultimately to influence the activities of joint civilian/military units whose mission is solely focused on sustainable gov/dev transition. However, there are many other tactical-level units for which these goals do not match the capabilities, time frames, and operational incentives. Our conclusions above reflect this disconnect between what IJC prioritizes toward transition and what most military personnel are capable of accomplishing, given their operational responsibilities and professional capacities. The recommendations above seek to provide means to fill in this gap.

2) By issuing gov/dev guidance that focuses on strengthening local governments and economies, IJC acknowledges the role of the military in nation building. Inherent in this work, however, is a question that, eleven years into Operation Enduring Freedom, requires significant consideration. These priorities should be understood as preparation for the 2014 pullout. However, they should not contribute to military doctrine regarding the role of the military, and of CERP, in state-building efforts.

We raise these points not to be provocative, but to ground our findings in a response to the current reality on the ground.

## 7.3 Implementation

The above recommendations should be implemented first in RC-East, and we leave it to

the discretion of IJC to determine applicability to other regions.

As previously mentioned, there is an opportunity in Spring 2012 for IJC to implement these tools and, more broadly speaking, this new strategic approach to the evaluation of CERP projects. Personnel at RC-East and at the brigade, ADT, and PRT levels are all rotating out between March and May 2012. At the same time, IJC is introducing Op-Naweed, the new 18-month operational plan. These personnel rotations create a window of opportunity during which IJC can strengthen the guidance it passes down, without meeting the potential pushback from units that are accustomed to the previous dynamic of CERP oversight.

## 7.4 Audience

There is also potential for external implementation of the analytical tool. It is likely that within USAID, GIRA, and other large institutions there is a tension between immediate short-term goals, prioritized by implementers, and longer-term strategic goals generated at a central level. While the content of the tool will change for a non-military audience, the purpose—to translate strategic priorities to ground-level implementers and walk decision-makers through the trade-offs of immediate impact versus transition impact—may have much wider relevance.

## 7.5 Further Research

This study touches on the surface of a deep, complex issue. The recommendations in this paper are an attempt to respond to the symptoms of CERP/transition and IJC/RC-East misalignment in the Afghan transition context. However, the findings also raise fundamental questions about the use of development by the military, particularly through the tool of CERP, and how it may be applied in future contexts. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this project to investigate whether development projects can yield security gains, what types of projects (by an objective measurement) earn the largest

return on investment, and whether the military—regardless of its exploratory, front-line ability to access the most vulnerable areas—*should* develop any expertise in sustainable development.

These are all topics that, in Afghanistan and beyond, we leave to the curiosity, skill, and commitment of future teams of HKS researchers.

## EXHIBITS AND APPENDICES

### Exhibits

Exhibit 1: CERP Project Matrix

Exhibit 2: Transition Principles and Standards (TPS) Assessment Tool

### Appendices

Appendix A: ISAF Background Information

Appendix B: Chain of Command

Appendix C: Map of Afghanistan with RCs, PRTs

Appendix D: The Commanders Emergency Response Program: A Brief History

Appendix E: Breakdown of CERP Project Size

Appendix F: IJC Operational Plan 1391 (Op-Naweed)

Appendix G: Diagram of Planning/Funding Process

Appendix H: Breakdown of CERP Spending

Appendix I: List of Interviews

**Exhibit 1: The CERP Project Matrix**

This Matrix categorizes typical CERP projects according to their timeline (Quick Impact v. Development). The assessment of impact on transition is based on historic trends of implementation, as gauged through our interviews.

| <b>Working Definitions:</b>          | <b>Explanation:</b>  | <b>Rating:</b>  |
|--------------------------------------|--|---|
| <b>Project Types Examples:</b>       | A list of common CERP project types that were frequently mentioned during interviews. This is not intended to be a definitive list.  |   |
| <b>IJC gov/dev transition goals:</b> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Eliminate service delivery that is parallel to GIRoA efforts</li> <li>2. Put GIRoA in the lead for all activities</li> <li>3. Minimize creation of future O&amp;M Burdens on GIRoA</li> </ol>  | <p><b>(+)</b> contributes to core IJC gov/dev transition goals</p> <p><b>(-)</b> reverses progress toward IJC goals</p>         |
| <b>"Quick-impact":</b>               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Timeline of implementation matches military operational tempo</li> <li>- "Fire and forget"--no expectation of repeat interactions</li> <li>- Sustainability/lasting impact a secondary outcome</li> </ul>   | <b>yes/no</b> , according to whether typical implementation of this type of project best fits the parameters of this definition |
| <b>Development:</b>                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Implementation process evolves over time</li> <li>- Successful implementation requires community participation and contribution</li> <li>- Impact intended to be enduring</li> <li>- Implementation a longer-term process requiring repeat interactions (with GIRoA, community, contractors, etc.), follow-up, continued input of time and resources</li> <li>- Often contracted out</li> </ul> | <b>yes/no</b> , according to whether typical implementation of this type of project best fits the parameters of this definition |

## Exhibit 1: The CERP Project Matrix (Continued)

| Project Examples                      | Effect on IJC Transition Goals | Impact on Transition  | Quick-impact? | Quick-Impact Timeframe/Scope   | Development Project? | Development Timeframe/Scope   |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|---------------|--|----------------------|---|
| Battle Damage Repair                  | +                              | - Can prevent the alienation of the population from GIROA, ANSF, and ISAF forces  | yes           | - Can be directly executed by military personnel<br>- Once-and-done event  | no                   | -Funds intended only for use after damage occurs, not to provide population with new/improved facilities  |
| Microgrants                           | -                              | - Can create expectation of external grants that GIROA can't sustain<br>- May disrupt existing capital markets by making it much harder for banks and microfinance organizations to compete in finance sector<br>- Project selection requires understanding of impact on local economy, may enhance perception of corruption, entrench local elites, or alienate some people that don't receive microgrants | yes           | - Can be executed quickly by military actors<br>- Non-transparent process can disrupt local relationships (creating arbitrary winners)<br>- Potentially effective if through transparent selection system<br>- Transparent system requires investigation, repeated interaction, follow-up (and thus less of a "quick win") | no                   | - Best practice in microeconomic development shows that grants do not increase productivity<br>- Without follow-up or repeat interactions, no guarantee that grant is invested in business (even if an in-kind grant of goods or equipment)<br>- Sustainable economic development requires repeat access to capital, not one-time grants. Grants can create expectations of "free" money and pollute the operating environment for other financial service providers. So not just neutral, but potentially negative impact. |
| School Construction and Refurbishment | -                              | - Could potentially contribute to GIROA capacity If and only if school is prioritized within MoE's NPP<br>- Otherwise, is example of off-budget spending, increases O&M burden, and increases GIROA's obligated budget for teachers and supplies  | no            | - Contracting process, and building time shifts it beyond the "quick win" timeline<br>- Majority of projects not intended to build stability, in the sense that their primary goal is not directly in line with their military operations  | yes                  | - To meet transition priorities, must coordinate with GIROA to ensure school and village are planned for by MoE, that GIROA can resource materials and teacher<br>- Timeframe for completion is extended--prior to construction, must coordinate with community on siting and land ownership and local contribution, with GIROA on MoE participation, and properly vet contractor bids<br>- Successful utilization of school depends in large part  |



## Exhibit 1: The CERP Project Matrix (Continued)

|   |   |  |            |  |            |  |
|---|---|--|------------|--|------------|--|
|   |   |  |            |  |            | on community contributions (and thus ownership);<br>timeline set as much by community responsiveness as by funders<br>- Long term, with expectation for long-term results on development (>10 years) |
| Micro- and Small Infrastructure Construction (e.g. fences, repairs) | - | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- If GIROA budget hires local workers to accomplish, could contribute to transition goals.</li> <li>- Increases expectation of communities for GIROA's service/infrastructure provision</li> <li>- Decreases community initiative and motivation to find local solutions (which are often more affordable)</li> </ul> | <b>no</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Could be "stability" if CERP used to pay locals directly to do repairs and thus the timeline is shortened</li> <li>- Potential consequences: expectation of external funding for repairs (and expectation on GIROA)</li> <li>- Requires military personnel to oversee and monitor of progress and quality of labor/materials</li> </ul>   | <b>yes</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- See above</li> <li>- Expectation in village and by neighboring villages that repairs and improvements all to be provided externally</li> </ul>              |
| Provision of School Supplies  | - | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Parallel service provision; need to be budgeted items w/in MoE</li> <li>- Furthering the dependence on ISAF rather than on their own local govt. for needs</li> </ul>   | <b>yes</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Yes, if one-time contribution of supplies</li> <li>- One-time provisions of service, even if core needs, increases expectations on GIROA without increasing their ability to provide this service in the future.</li> <li>- Dis-incentive for village to hold GIROA accountable, and dis-incentive for responsible ministry to work through the budget process to find funding</li> </ul> | <b>no</b>  | -Not a long-term, long impact type project with multiple interactions with GIROA or a lengthy contracting/building process   |
| Well Construction   | - | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Creates expectation on GIROA that potentially they cannot meet, or that should be provided by the private sector/local community</li> <li>- O&amp;M problem</li> <li>- Future problem if water table not evaluated</li> </ul>   | <b>no</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Requires repeated interaction with the population, continued assessments of quality/effectiveness</li> </ul>  | <b>yes</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Contracting process shifts it beyond the "quick win" timeline</li> <li>- Requires oversight and ongoing monitoring of progress and quality</li> </ul>       |

## Exhibit 1: The CERP Project Matrix (Continued)

|                          |   |   |            |  |            |  |
|--------------------------|---|---|------------|--|------------|--|
| Seed Distribution        | - | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- If done independently, undermines work of DAIL in supporting agriculture; if done through DAIL, creates future expectations of free seeds from GIRoA</li> <li>- Interrupts market for seeds, negatively impacts traders and supply chains for inputs</li> </ul>  | <b>yes</b> | - In its most popular form, this is a one-time hand-out to the population, not a seasonal process. | <b>no</b>  | - If creates dependence on outside actors and undermines the responsibility of GIRoA and/or efficient market operation, may be counterproductive to economic development   |
| Road/Bridge Construction | - | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Could be considered "key infrastructure," but must have VERY high burden of proof</li> <li>- O&amp;M is the biggest issue for infrastructure projects; too many are in disrepair</li> <li>- If done, must be w/in GIRoA infrastructure plan</li> </ul>   | <b>no</b>  | - High requirement of oversight required of contracting process and construction progress          | <b>yes</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- High burden of proof on contractor to establish competence to finish the job and to build it to quality standards</li> <li>- Demands oversight of contractor to stay on quality and on budget critical</li> <li>- Awareness of political factors influencing placement of road</li> </ul> |
| Road/Bridge Maintenance  | - | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- If GIRoA budget hires local workers to accomplish, could contribute towards transition goals.</li> <li>- Increases expectation of communities for GIRoA's service/infrastructure provision</li> <li>- decreases community/district/provincial initiative and motivation to find local solutions (often more affordable)</li> </ul> | <b>no</b>  | - Maintenance not a once-and-done process, but requires ongoing cooperation with population.       | <b>yes</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Contracting process shifts it beyond the "quick win" timeline</li> <li>- Requires oversight and ongoing monitoring of progress and quality</li> <li>- Materials and/or technical expertise not always locally available</li> </ul>  |

## Exhibit 1: The CERP Project Matrix (Continued)

|   |   |   |     |  |     |   |
|---|---|---|-----|--|-----|---|
| Electrical Grid Expansion and Enhancement | - | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Could be considered "critical infrastructure" if and only if sustainable energy source (i.e. NOT diesel generators)</li> <li>- Critical to have GIRoA plan for sufficient kWh, as outages and unmet expectation for electricity can increase dissatisfaction with GIRoA post-transition</li> <li>- Renewables (solar, wind) considered parallel service provision, as infrastructure is usually granted</li> <li>- Experience of renewables not good--most turbines and solar displays disassembled and sold, fall into disrepair</li> </ul> | no  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Infrastructure projects usually take too long to have an impact in order for them to generate stability</li> <li>- While they may create employment, contracting practices may also be destabilizing depending on contractor selection, contracting mechanism, and community perceptions</li> </ul> | yes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- If "critical infrastructure," should be managed by inter-agency civ/mil platform at higher command, to ensure compatibility of implementation with GIRoA plans at the provincial level</li> <li>- Expertise and guaranteed ongoing oversight critical</li> </ul> |
| Vocational/ Technical Training            | - | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The military provision of Vo-tech is not necessarily helpful towards transition because it stifles the opportunity for 3rd parties to get involved in Vo-Tec training</li> </ul>   | no  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Timeline for implementation is too long, not a once-and-done project</li> </ul>   | yes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Challenge: guaranteeing funding for these programs (which should ideally be multi-year) in order to have effective follow-up in a context of annual budgets</li> </ul>   |
| Government Capacity-building              | + | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Especially when focused on navigating the provincial and national budget process, aligns with areas of identified weakness within GIRoA</li> </ul>   | no  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Capacity building is a long-term process and gains are seen only after sufficient time is given to train GIRoA officials, and to let them learn through practice.</li> </ul>  | yes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Intended to have longer-term results that increase functioning of governance, and thereby facilitating business activity and economic development</li> </ul>   |
| Civic Cleanup Activity                    | - | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Parallel service, creates market distortion by paying for services that are traditionally managed locally w/o external funding</li> <li>- Salaries distort local economy, intensifying the impact of transition</li> </ul>   | yes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Short-term employment opportunity, may generate stability</li> <li>- May employ MAMs, but disrupts community economic dynamics</li> </ul>   | no  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Not intended to have enduring, long-term impact, but rather, short term improvement in the population's perceptions of GIRoA</li> </ul>  |

**Key Questions to ask when looking at this table:**

Do I have the time? Do I have the resources--not just \$ and time, but local knowledge and trustworthy information? Am I planning for the # of visits and amount of oversight that successful completion will require?

## Exhibit 2: TPS Assessment Tool

The purpose of this tool is to help CERP implementers and approvers think through potential consequences of projects on transition progress. While some questions may be difficult to answer definitively, this tool is designed to build awareness of the broader implications of a community project. The four key criteria below represent principles necessary for transition and should guide CERP decisions on kinds of projects to implement, how to implement them, or whether to implement them at all. Then, we detail a specific list of questions CERP users should be asking.

### 1. Parallel Service Delivery

*Description:* CERP projects sometimes provide services to communities that should be delivered by GIROA. Such projects, while meeting a local need, risk undermining the government's legitimacy and capacity. Even if GIROA is aware of the project, off-budget provision of services may dis-incentivize local officials to provide these services.

*Importance for Transition:* Subnational units of GIROA often lack the financial resources, human capital, and information to execute service delivery. However, short-term provision of services creates expectations for GIROA that they may not be able to meet. It also creates dependency of GIROA on external funding and expertise. If a commander sees a community need, rather than responding with direct provision, the better solution is to connect local citizens to the proper GIROA officials. This will not necessarily fill the service void immediately, but it prevents providing a temporary fix to an enduring problem.

*Example:* A CERP project pays local farmers to attend a training seminar where international experts advise on improving crop yield. The project does not coordinate with the local Directorate of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (DAIL), which hires local Agriculture Extension Agents to provide services to rural farmers. Not only is the local government undermined, but the payment for attendance creates an expectation that GIROA will pay farmers for their time. In short, the good intentions of the project in addressing one community's need reverses regional gains that have been made in building the reputation and responsibility of the GIROA ministry.

### 2. Unrealistic Community Expectations

*Description:* CERP activities can raise community expectations for conditions that are above and beyond what could reasonably be expected to persist in absence of external supports.

*Importance for Transition:* Raising the expectations of communities beyond what can be provided by GIROA may delegitimize GIROA and create transitional instability. Popular discontent may result from GIROA's inability to serve the same functions without the same capacity or resources as CERP providers.

*Example:* A CERP project pays local laborers to clear an irrigation canal. GIROA does not budget the resources to continue to pay workers to perform a task, which has traditionally been a shared and voluntary task for all village farmers.

**Exhibit 2: TPS Assessment Tool (Continued)****3. Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Capacity of GIROA**

*Description:* An O&M “tail” represents the length of time and the amount of financial support that a project will need in order to be sustained. This financial obligation includes man-hours and other material costs associated with operating and maintaining the project as a productive asset.

*Importance for Transition:* Projects that lack sufficient budgeting and allocation for continued O&M cannot be sustained by GIROA. Aside from being a wasted investment that cannot benefit the community into the future, these projects may also undermine popular support for GIROA legitimacy.

*Example:* A micro-hydro dam is constructed on a small river in rural Afghanistan to provide a community with electrical power. However, one year after installation, and handover to the district sub-governor, the local government and community members are not able to replace a broken part in the turbine and the dam goes into disrepair. Without this replacement part, the dam does not provide electricity and represents a failure for GIROA.

**4. Distortion of Local Markets**

*Description:* NATO-led reconstruction and development activities have injected hundreds of billions of dollars into small, underdeveloped local economies throughout Afghanistan, resulting in significant inflation and the distortion of free market incentives to produce and trade certain goods and services.

*Importance for Transition:* Recognizing that CERP spending will be phased out during transition, CERP activities that continue to inflate local prices, crowd out private sector investment and indigenous business activity may hinder sustainable, Afghan-led economic growth in the medium-term. Further, as


*Example:* A micro-grant provided to community entrepreneurs renders microfinance institutions that had covered the area uncompetitive, and establishes an advantage for lead firms. This can hinder new enterprise creation, investment and employment.

A CERP project provides seeds to local farmers without coordinating with the Directorate of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock, which had already budgeted and planned for this seed delivery. Delivering these seeds created community perceptions that NATO would address community needs, and deny GIROA authorities the opportunity to fulfill this important responsibility.


**Exhibit 2: TPS Assessment Tool (Continued)**

|   | <u>YES</u> | <u>NO</u> | <u>Reasoning:</u>   |
|---|------------|-----------|---|
| <b>Parallel/Off-Budget Service Delivery</b>                   |            |           |   |
| 1   |            |           | Have you talked to the responsible GIRoA department?  |
| 2   |            |           | Has the department budgeted (reasonably, verifiably) for this activity?   |
| 3   |            |           | Is GIRoA providing this service in comparable areas?  |
| 4   |            |           | Is providing this service to this locale in the ministry's plan?  |
| 5   |            |           | Do you know who will fund/provide this service once your unit leaves?   |
| 6   |            |           | Does the community know who in GIRoA is responsible for these services?<br><b>e.g. Agriculture Extension Agents from the DAIL provide training/advice</b> |
| <b>Unrealistic Community Expectations</b>                     |            |           |   |
| 1   |            |           | Does the project create new expectations of GIRoA?  |
| 2   |            |           | Will GIRoA be able to meet these expectations?  |
| 3   |            |           | Could the cessation of these services decrease confidence in GIRoA?   |
| 4   |            |           | Does this raise expectations in neighboring communities?<br><b>e.g. Paying annual salary of a teacher that can't be afforded by GIRoA</b>                 |
| <b>Operations and Maintenance (O&amp;M) Capacity of GIRoA</b> |            |           |   |
| 1   |            |           | How often will maintenance/repairs be required?   |
| 2   |            |           | What's the estimated cost of labor and materials per year?  |
| 3   |            |           | Who is responsible for maintenance and repairs?   |
| 4   |            |           | Are there other locally-built structures that use this design and materials?  |
| 5   |            |           | Is there local expertise for maintenance and repairs?   |
| 6   |            |           | Who owns/is responsible for the structure?  |
| 7   |            |           | Does the budget provide for O&M?<br><b>e.g. Building a fence around a school; paving a short segment of road; repairing a bridge</b>                      |
| <b>Distortion of Local Markets</b>                            |            |           |   |
| 1   |            |           | Are you paying for work that was previously voluntary or locally paid?  |
| 2   |            |           | Is the use of grants verified?  |
| 3   |            |           | Are criteria for selecting grant recipients transparent and consistent?   |
| 4   |            |           | Are there opportunities for kickbacks in the grant selection?   |
| 5   |            |           | What are local sources of working capital?  |
| 6   |            |           | Are prices paid to vendors locally appropriate?   |
| 7   |            |           | Does the project create unsustainable demand?   |
| 8   |            |           | Does the project distort supply? Affect local prices?   |
| 9   |            |           | Does the project impact other providers in this market sector?<br><b>e.g. Distribution of micro-grants; free/subsidized seed distribution</b>             |

## Appendix A: ISAF Background Information



## International Security Assistance Force



### International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures

**Mission:** NATO-ISAF aims to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a haven for terrorists, to help provide security, and to contribute to a better future for the Afghan people. NATO-ISAF, as part of the overall International Community effort and as mandated by the United Nations Security Council, is working to create the conditions whereby the Government of Afghanistan is able to exercise its authority throughout the country.

To carry out its mission, ISAF conducts population-centric counterinsurgency operations in partnership with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and provides support to the Government and International Community in Security Sector Reform, including mentoring, training and operational support to the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. NATO-ISAF key priorities in Afghanistan are:

- Protect the Afghan people
- Build the capacity of the Afghan Security Forces so they can take lead responsibility for security in their own country;
- Counter the insurgency and
- Enable the delivery of stronger governance and development.

**Commander: [General John R. Allen \(US\)](#)**  
**NATO Senior Civilian Representative: [Ambassador Simon Gass \(UK\)](#)**

50 Troop Contributing Nations  
 ISAF Total Strength: 130,236  
 28 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p><b>ISAF Commands in KABUL</b><br/>                 ISAF Headquarters<br/>                 Commander: <a href="#">General John R. ALLEN (US)</a></p> <p><b>ISAF Joint Command (IJC)</b><br/>                 Commander: <a href="#">Lieutenant General Curtis Michael SCAPAROTTI (US)</a></p> <p><b>NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A)</b><br/>                 Commander: <a href="#">Lieutenant General Daniel P. BOLGER (US)</a></p> <p><b>Regional Command Capital:</b><br/>                 Headquarter RC(C) in Kabul (TU)<br/>                 Commander: <a href="#">Brigadier General Levent GOZKAYA (TUR)</a></p> <p><b>Regional Command South:</b><br/>                 Headquarter RC(S) in Kandahar (US)<br/>                 Commander: <a href="#">Major General James L. HUGGINS (US)</a></p> | <p><b>Regional Command South West:</b><br/>                 Headquarter RC(SW) in Lashkar Gah (US)<br/>                 Commander: <a href="#">Major General John A. TOOLAN, Jr. (US)</a></p> <p><b>Regional Command West:</b><br/>                 Headquarter RC(W) in Herat (IT)<br/>                 Commander: <a href="#">Brigadier General Luciano PORTOLANO (IT)</a></p> <p><b>Regional Command North:</b><br/>                 Headquarter RC(N) in Mazar-e Sharif (GE)<br/>                 Commander: <a href="#">Major General Markus KNEIP (GE)</a></p> <p><b>Regional Command East:</b><br/>                 Headquarter RC(E) in Bagram (US)<br/>                 Commander: <a href="#">Major General Daniel B. ALLYN (US)</a></p> |
|--|--|


**Note on numbers:** Figures are calculated by Allied Command Operations based on the military personnel required for the mission. Figures do not include troops deployed on a bilateral basis, personnel above minimum requirements, or those serving in a national support or command capacity. Numbers of troops should be taken as indicative as they change daily.

9 January 2012

Source: <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/2012-01-23%20ISAF%20Placemat-final.pdf>



## Appendix B: Chain of Command



**Strategic Level:** Strategy is derived from the NATO policy and is reflective of the national policies of contributing nations; it encompasses major goals and expected outcomes of the overall campaign. In Afghanistan, ISAF HQ interprets the various nations' overall strategies into specific goals and outcomes for Afghanistan, which they have labeled as the 8 Essential Tasks.

**Operational Level:** Operational planning is the combination of a series of tactics to achieve one of the smaller strategic goals. It assigns responsibilities to units and provides guidance to the lower level units to accomplish their individual tasks. Operations "link the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives."<sup>1</sup> In Afghanistan, the operational planning is done mostly by the IJC and RC-level commands. At each of these commands, operational planners are asking themselves if the operations they are setting up and the tactics they use are in direct support of the strategic goals.

**Tactical Level:** Tactics are the day-to-day planning aspects of military activities, and involve the employment of specific units to accomplish specified tasks. "Tactical success is measured by the contribution of an action to the achievement of operationally significant results. Battles and engagements that do not contribute to the campaign objectives, directly or indirectly, are avoided."<sup>1</sup> Tactical level planners must be certain that their tactics are in direct support of the operational and strategic goals.

<sup>1</sup>[http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report\\_Final\\_SecDef\\_04\\_26\\_10.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf)



#### **Appendix D: The Commanders Emergency Response Program: A Brief History**

The Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) is a congressionally-appropriated fund that enables local U.S. military commanders to respond with nonlethal tools to the urgent, small-scale humanitarian needs of indigenous populations. Originally created in 2003 to redirect funding from seized assets of the Hussein regime to the Iraqi people, the U.S. Congress has now appropriated over \$3.7B in CERP funding for Iraq and \$2.64B in Afghanistan. These allocations include complex, multi-year investments in infrastructure, water and sanitation, education, and other sectors without a focus on “small-scale” or “urgent humanitarian needs.” Today, the project portfolios of development actors like USAID and CERP are very similar in terms of size, scope, and complexity.

There are several reasons behind this marked expansion of CERP activity. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency strategies rely on the central premise that socio-economic development, political stability, and security are mutually reinforcing. Based on the perception that traditional foreign assistance mechanisms were sluggish and inadequate in conflict areas, the U.S. Armed Forces increasingly employed CERP funding to enact projects aimed at longer-term, sustainable development objectives.

By design, CERP provides ground-level commanders with a high degree of autonomy in project selection and implementation. While CERP projects must undergo approval processes, the underlying premise for the program is that local commanders understand local conditions best, and are therefore best-suited to flexibly originate and execute such activities. CERP is used to fund the activities of civil-military platforms, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Agricultural Development Teams, and combat units lacking any stabilization or development expertise alike.

Supporters of the evolution of CERP program argue that its activities have been an indispensable non-lethal tool for military commanders. This has filled a critical void in foreign assistance programming, in stabilizing communities by winning hearts and minds, in facilitating the achievement of security objectives, and in protecting U.S. forces. Critics of CERP have pointed to the military’s lack of capacity to implement sustainable development activities, a lack of monitoring and evaluation of outcomes, wasted or inefficiently used taxpayer resources, and its potentially negative, unintended consequences for local communities. Additionally, since CERP is classified as Title X funds, it can only be implemented by U.S. military personnel. It is not available to indigenous institutions, like local governments or NGOs, which are seeking the stronger legitimacy and capacity that budgetary support and leadership in gov/dev activity implementation can create.

While the US military has learned much from CERP’s history, only time will tell whether these lessons are incorporated into military doctrine and practice in future conflicts. And to this end, the future of CERP and other military-led stability/development activities will depend on the U.S. military’s future role in such efforts.

## Appendix E: Breakdown of CERP Project Size

| FY12 CERP Projects & Obligation Totals |   |               |               |                        |             |
|--|---|---------------|---------------|------------------------|-------------|
| Threshold                              | Approval Level  | # of Projects | % of Projects | Total \$ Amt Obligated | % Obligated |
| Under \$50K                            | O-5 BN CDR  | 2511          | 98.09%        | \$6.0M                 | 42.85%      |
| \$50K - \$200K                         | (<\$100K) O-5 BN CDR<br>(>\$100K) O-6 TF/BDE<br>CDR, TF Kabul | 37            | 1.45%         | \$4.0M                 | 28.79%      |
| \$200K - \$500K                        | O-6 TF/BDE CDR, TF<br>Kabul                                   | 12            | 0.47%         | \$3.9M                 | 28.36%      |
| \$500K - \$1M                          | RC-N/S/E/W/W CDR,<br>DCDR-S USFOR-A                           | 0             | 0%            | \$0M                   | 0%          |
| Over \$1M                              | USCENTCOM<br>Commander  | 0             | 0%            | \$0M                   | 0%          |
| <b>Total:</b>                          |   | <b>2560</b>   | <b>100%</b>   | <b>\$13.9M</b>         | <b>100%</b> |

Average cost per project: \$5.4K per project

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This table demonstrates that 98% of CERP projects for FY12 so far are under the \$50,000 dollar levels, which are approved by the O-5 (Lt. Colonel) at the battalion level. For this reason, it is important to consider the rationale behind how projects are being selected and approved. While the total amount spent on these small projects may seem negligible compared to the budgets of USAID other gov/dev actors, the fact that there are so many projects, at the local level, means that their effect is being spread out to many people throughout the whole country.

Our interviews revealed that there is a lack of strategy or accountability on how this money is spent – it is extremely discretionary. In fact, one interviewee likened this money to a “video game,” where captains and lieutenants tried to maximize the amount of money spent, with little strategy or oversight. A common excuse for the lack of strategy and focus for very small CERP projects revolved around the fact that it didn’t matter how the money was spent, because it was so small. However, comparing the average cost per project at \$5400 to the average income of \$1000,<sup>14</sup> even these small amounts have a significant relative importance to local economies.

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>

## Appendix F: IJC Operational Plan 1391 (Op-Naweed)

The Future Planning Unit (FUPLANS) of IJC is tasked with creating annual operational plans for each line of effort in the NATO campaign. This paper's focus is on the line of operation pertaining to governance and development. To create a plan for governance and development, the IJC relies on strategic guidance from the ISAF HQ's Campaign Plan together with GIRoA-identified Afghan National Priority Programs (within the Afghan National Development Strategy). This year's operational plan, Op-Naweed, focuses on building institutional capacity within GIRoA to create resiliency, legitimacy, and sustainability through transition and beyond. This is a marked departure from the operations plans of previous years, which had emphasized the role of the international community as a direct service provider. Going forward, ISAF efforts are to be designed to improve GIRoA capability, effectiveness, accountability and representation.

### ISAF's Transition-Oriented Gov/Dev Principles:

1. Minimize parallel service delivery
2. Put GIRoA in the lead for all activities
3. Minimize creation of future O&M Burdens on GIRoA

To accomplish this goal, IJC has outlined the following objectives, effects, and tasks for itself, IJC, and for each regional command, theatre-wide. It contains six such objectives, three under Governance and three within Socio-Economic Development, respectively.

#### *Governance*

1. Support budget process and connect sub-national priorities to national level
2. Support and monitor effective and transparent civil service and merit-based appointments
3. Coordinate and enable Rule of Law support from NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan and Rule of Law Field Support Mission


#### *Socio-Economic Development*

1. Support the capacity building of development related sub-national and national entities
2. Support agricultural value chains
3. Support critical infrastructure projects which support COIN objectives, require security and which are sustainable long term

The principle mechanism for the attainment of these objectives is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). While the gov/dev roles for other non-PRT military actors are not explicitly mentioned in Op-Naweed, it is clear that the provision of security is inextricably linked to progress in governance and development. The other lines of effort describe the processes by which ISAF militaries are to gradually transfer security responsibility to ANSF.



## Appendix G: Diagram of Planning/Funding Process




The diagram above explains how plans are developed and passed down the chain of command, as well as all of the different ISAF and GIRoA actors that are involved in the governance and development effort in Afghanistan. Starting at the top right with ISAF, strategy is issued to IJC. IJC developed its Operational Plan 1391 – Naweed (Op-Naweed), which is passed to the Regional Commands. The Regional Commands then pass this guidance down to their different Task Forces, which are geographically organized.

At the district level, through a variety of different interactions with the District Governor (DG), District Development Assembly (DDA), Community Development Council (CDC), Executive Director (ED), District Community Council (DCC), and the District Council (DC), plans for their districts are assembled. All of these plans use the District Delivery Program (DDP), Afghan Social Outreach Program (ASOP), National Area Based Development Program (NABDP), and National Solidarity Program (NSP) to come up with priorities for their region's development. These plans are then sent to a committee made of the Provincial Governor (PG) and his relevant staff to be reviewed, approved, and then funded through the Performance Based Governors Fund (PBGF), Afghan Sub-National Governance Program (ASGP), Afghan Civil Service Support (ACSS), and Afghan Funding Project (AFP).

This complicated and bureaucratic process for funding presents one reason why it is so tempting for CERP users to bypass the existing government structures and mechanisms in place.

## Appendix H: Breakdown of CERP Spending



As shown in the above breakdown of Commander's Emergency Relief Program (CERP) spending, more than 50% of the total expenditure in FY 2011 was used for transportation, water and sanitation, and agriculture/irrigation. Generally speaking, these types of projects are more long-term, development-oriented than battle damage repair, condolence payments, or civic support vehicles, which are typically quick-impact and stability-oriented projects.

Based on this paper's analysis, as we move towards transition, the military should be focusing less on these long-term development type projects and more on short-term stability building activities. Beyond their inconsistency with military capabilities and timeframes, these projects tend to create significant parallel services, add Operations and Maintenance (O&M) burdens, and usurp GIRoA's authority and influence.



## Appendix I: List of Interviews

### PAE Interviews in the US

| Person Interviewed      | Organization/Title                  | Date   | Time |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------|------|
| Colonel Rich "Tex" Coe  | IJC FUOPS Synchronization Chief     | 21-Sep | 1300 |
|                         |                                     | 28-Sep | 1300 |
|                         |                                     | 14-Oct | 1300 |
|                         |                                     | 31-Oct | 1300 |
| Col(Ret) Neal Rappaport | IJC FUOPS Econ Advisor              | 3-Oct  | 1300 |
|                         |                                     | 17-Oct | 745  |
|                         |                                     | 17-Oct | 1600 |
| Maj. Clint Hanna        | S-9, 4th ID, Jalalabad-2009         | 3-Dec  | 1500 |
| Aaron Miller            | Cpt, FOB Fenty 2009                 | 30-Nov | 1600 |
| Rockie Wilson           | USAF Civil Engineer, Zabul PRT 2006 | 5-Nov  | 1000 |

### In-Country Interviews

| Person Interviewed       | Organization/Title                            | Date  | Time |
|--------------------------|---|-------|------|
| Neal Rappaport           | IJC FUOPS Econ Advisor                        | 1-Jan | 1000 |
| BGen William Hix         | IJC FUOPS Commander                           | 1-Jan | 1400 |
| Col. Andrew Plant        | IJC Deputy Operations                         | 2-Jan | 1030 |
| Col. William Butcher     | IJC FUPLANS G&D Section Chief                 | 2-Jan | 1400 |
| Lt. Col. Liposcak        | IJC FUOPS RC(E)                               | 2-Jan | 1900 |
| Capt. Wysocki            | IJC FUOPS RC(E)                               | 2-Jan | 2030 |
| Maj. Chris Ricci         | IJC FUOPS RC(S)                               | 2-Jan | 2030 |
| Lt. Col. John Vest       | IJC FUOPS RC(S)                               | 2-Jan | 2030 |
| Lt. Col. Shon Williams   | IJC FUOPS Synchronization Chief               | 3-Jan | 1000 |
| Col. Tom Powers          | IJC Campaign Transition and Governance (CTAG) | 3-Jan | 1500 |
| Lt. Col. Chris MacGregor | IJC Campaign Transition and Governance (CTAG) | 3-Jan | 1500 |
| Maj. Rebecca Patterson   | ISAF Commander's Initiative Group (CIG)       | 4-Jan | 1000 |
| Elizabeth Royall         | IJC FUOPS Ministry of Education Embed         | 4-Jan | 1800 |
| Lt. Col. Glen Tolle      | IJC FUOPS DDP Rep.                            | 4-Jan | 1930 |
| Maj. Maurice Cullen      | USFOR-A - CERP + ARP Program Lead             | 5-Jan | 1000 |
| 1LT Kenneth Yale         | USFOR-A - CERP + ARP Program Member           | 5-Jan | 1000 |
| Maj. Mark Berman         | USFOR-A J9                                    | 5-Jan | 1000 |
| Anders Corr              | IDC Human Terrain Team                        | 5-Jan | 1230 |
| John Owen                | IJC CTAG Analyst, FUPLANS G&D planner         | 5-Jan | 1400 |
| Lt. Col. John Fisher     | IJC FUOPS Stability Ops Team Lead             | 5-Jan | 1900 |
| Col. Mark Ciero          | USFOR-A Deputy IG                             | 6-Jan | 1200 |
| Maj. Mike Jackson        | IJC FUOPS Operational Planner Team            | 7-Jan | 1100 |

**Appendix I: List of Interviews (Continued)**

|                          |  |        |      |
|--------------------------|--|--------|------|
| Col. Richard Coe         | IJC FUOPS Synchronization Chief                    | 7-Jan  | 1400 |
| Maj. Nilda Toro          | TF Bronco - S9 Team Lead                           | 8-Jan  | 1400 |
| Rex Applegate            | TF Bronco - Torkham Gate Lead                      | 8-Jan  | 1900 |
| Kevin Kock               | TF Bronco - USDA Rep                               | 9-Jan  | 900  |
| Maj. David Carlson       | TF Bronco - DSAT Rep                               | 9-Jan  | 1100 |
| Seth Kirchhoff           | TF Bronco - CIDNE Rep                              | 9-Jan  | 1300 |
| Lt. Col. Mark Woodard    | RC(E) Regional Contracting Chief                   | 9-Jan  | 1400 |
| Capt. Brandy Hinton      | TF Bronco - CERP Administrator                     | 9-Jan  | 1400 |
| Clint Phillips           | TF Bronco - CERP Contracting Rep.                  | 9-Jan  | 1500 |
| Lt. Col. James Hayes     | TF Bronco Executive Officer                        | 9-Jan  | 1600 |
| 1Lt. Jeffre Nagan        | PRT Nangarhar Public Affairs Officer               | 10-Jan | 800  |
| Mr. Richard Riley        | Nangarhar Senior Civilian Representative           | 10-Jan | 900  |
| Lt. Col. John Walsh      | PRT Nangarhar Deputy Commander                     | 10-Jan | 900  |
| Panina Livermore         | Nangarhar DST Rep                                  | 10-Jan | 930  |
| Chris Reinstetler        | Nangarhar DST Rep                                  | 10-Jan | 930  |
| Haley Gallagher          | Nangarhar DST Rep                                  | 10-Jan | 930  |
| Lt. Col. Thomas LaChance | PRT Nangarhar S9                                   | 10-Jan | 1030 |
| Capt. Rachel Hamlyn      | PRT Nangarhar Civil Engineer                       | 10-Jan | 1030 |
| Maj. Sam Forrester       | ADT Nangarhar Executive Officer                    | 10-Jan | 1100 |
| Maj. Rutledge McClain    | ADT Nangarhar Agriculture Officer in Charge        | 10-Jan | 1100 |
| Capt. Ryan Leach         | TF Raider S9 Rep                                   | 10-Jan | 1300 |
| Capt. Ryan Norton        | TF Raider S9 Rep                                   | 10-Jan | 1300 |
| Capt. Lee Habib Roberts  | Aide-De-Camp for Gen. McQuillan                    | 11-Jan | 1600 |
| BGen Karl McQuillan      | RC(E) CJTF-1 Commander                             | 11-Jan | 1600 |
| Capt. Andy Robinson      | RC(E) - CJ9 G&D Planner                            | 11-Jan | 1700 |
| Capt. Frederick Fry      | RC(E) - CJ8 Budget Analyst                         | 11-Jan | 1730 |
| Tejinder Minhas          | CJTF-1 Economic Growth Analyst                     | 11-Jan | 2000 |
| Byron Syler              | CJTF-1 Economic Growth Analyst, USAID Rep          | 11-Jan | 2000 |
| Col. Rich Unda           | USFOR-A S9 - Reducing Economic Impact              | 12-Jan | 1300 |
| Lt. Kenneth Yale         | USFOR-A - CERP + ARP Program Member                | 12-Jan | 1300 |
| Maj. Maurice Cullen      | USFOR-A - CERP + ARP Program Lead                  | 12-Jan | 1300 |
| Maj. Mark Berman         | USFOR-A J9   | 12-Jan | 1300 |
| Paul Negley              | Commander's Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT)    | 12-Jan | 1300 |
| Dan Melleby              | Political Advisor to NATO SCR                      | 16-Jan | 1330 |
| Nicola Lee               | Senior Governance and Stabilization Advisor to SCR | 16-Jan | 1330 |
| James Fisher             | Political Advisor to NATO SCR                      | 16-Jan | 1330 |
| Mr. David Crichton       | FUPLANS G&D Team                                   | 16-Jan | 1630 |